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PREFACE 
 
Proclus is not a good writer. And I often doubt that he is a good philosopher. 
Thanks, however, to patience that to some extent was an obligation, because the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) was kind enough to pay 
me for studying his work, and thanks also to many forms of inspiration that had 
nothing to do with money, I found that the gritty and unwelcoming surface of 
Proclus’ writings is actually one of several faces of an enormous solid that is 
visible only from the inside.  
 
Marije Martijn 
Leiden, February 2008 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
I.1 The aim of this dissertation 
 
T I.1 
“True philosophy of nature must depend on theology, just as nature depends on 
the gods and is divided up according to all their orders, in order that accounts 
too may be imitators of the things they signify.”1 
 
In this brief statement from Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus we find the essential 
elements of Proclus’ philosophy of nature: (i) the dependence of nature on the gods 
and the division of nature into different strata; (ii) the dependence of philosophy of 
nature on theology and (implicitly) the division of philosophy of nature into different 
types; and finally, (iii) the mimetic relation of the account of philosophy of nature to its 
subject matter.  
The main aim of this dissertation is to present an analysis of Proclus’ φυσιολογία,2 
philosophy of nature, from the point of view of the above elements. In a nutshell: the 
conception of nature as depending on the intelligible and as having a particular 
presence on different ontological levels determines the structure of the study of nature 
as consisting of a chain of different kinds of philosophy of nature. The imitation of this 
chain in the didactic account, which is what Plato’s Timaeus is according to Proclus, 
assists the Neoplatonic student in his ascent to the intelligible – but no further than to 
the Demiurge.  
For Neoplatonic students the Timaeus was the penultimate text of the curriculum, 
preparing them for the final stage of their education, the study of the intelligible per se 
as set out in the Parmenides.3 As such, the Timaeus was the intermediary dialogue par 
excellence, starting from the physical world, and revealing its connection with the 
                                               
1 In Tim. I 204.8-12. Note that in this context, ‘theology’ also means ‘metaphysics’. Proclus usually 
applies the term in this sense, although on occasion he uses it to distinguish the philosophy of the 
Oracles from dialectical metaphysics, as at In Tim. I 391.1ff. Proclus does not use the expression τὰ 
μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. 
2 I use φυσιολογία here, as elsewhere, as a blanket term. Besides φυσιολογία, Proclus also uses the terms 
ἡ τῆς φύσεως θεωρία (I 83.29; 132.17, both concerning the role of the Atlantis myth for the theory of 
nature), περὶ φύσεως πραγματεία (I 6.23), περὶ φύσεως λόγος (I 338.24), περὶ φύσεως λόγοι (I 351.20), 
and φυσικοὶ λόγοι (I 19.23; 337.25; cf. 237.21; II 23.12; III 153.31) to denominate the account of 
philosophy of nature. Note that the latter expression is also used for the creative principles of nature. 
See chapter II. 
3 In Tim. I 13.4-6; Theol.Plat. I 8, 32.15-18; cf. In Tim. I 13.11-19 for Iamblichus’ opinion, see also Anon. 
Prol. 26, 12-16. See also Wallis (1995: 19); Siorvanes (1996: 114-121). 
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intelligible. Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus, of which only the first five books, up to 
Tim. 44e, are extant, is the only Neoplatonic text we possess in which we find an 
elaborate and sophisticated explanation of why this is possible and how it is 
accomplished. 
In the past, Proclus’ philosophy of nature as we find it in his Commentary on the Timaeus 
has been described as “the final stage of frustration reached by the scientific thought of 
ancient Greece at the end of a long creative era of nearly a thousand years”.4 More 
recently, a radically different position has been defended, according to which Proclus’ 
philosophy of nature is actually theology and a study of the divine transcendent causes 
of the universe.5 Despite the fact that the latter position is in a sense the opposite of 
the former, both have a foundation in one and the same presupposition of 
otherworldliness, and a rejection of an intrinsic value of the world of sense perception, 
either forthwith or through a reduction of physics to metaphysics. 
That presupposition, I maintain, is largely incorrect. Any value the natural world has 
for a Neoplatonist is ultimately due to its transcendent causes, but that implies neither 
that the natural world should be distrusted as an object of study, nor that physics is 
valuable only if it is reduced to metaphysics.  
Instead, one of my main conclusions regarding the metaphysics and epistemology 
underlying Proclus’ philosophy of nature is that the subject, the nature and the 
methods of philosophy of nature presuppose a fundamental and crucial continuity 
between the world of generation and the intelligible realm. 
 
After two methodological remarks, I will explain in what manner this dissertation 
responds and contributes to the current debate on Proclus’ philosophy, discuss a 
number of preliminary issues to set the stage for the following chapters, and present an 
overview of the structure of this dissertation. 
In the following, I will speak of φυσιολογία and of ‘philosophy of nature’, rather than 
of science of nature, or physics, for two reasons. First of all, I wish to avoid the 
suggestion that there is one modern science, or a common cluster of sciences with 
which Proclus’ φυσιολογία compares, as it contains elements both of what we call the 
natural sciences (physics, astronomy, biology) and of psychology, metaphysics, 
theology, philosophy of science and epistemology. Secondly, I am more interested in 
Proclus’ commentary for its philosophical considerations pertaining to the study of the 
natural world – especially in the fields of metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of 
language – than for the details either of its contribution, if any, to the science of his age 
                                               
4 Sambursky (1965: 11, cf. 6-7). 
5 Lernould (2001), cf. Steel (2003).  
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or of its comparison to that of our age.6 I shall attempt to reconstruct the philosophical 
foundations of Proclus’ philosophy of nature. Setting Proclus’ theory against that of his 
sources is not my main aim, but I will on occasion compare Proclus’ theory to that of 
his predecessors and contemporaries. The main approach in this dissertation, however, 
will be that of conceptual analysis and what Kenny calls “internal exegesis”.7 
 
I.2 Status Quaestionis 
 
As the above comparison of a past and a recent view of Proclus’ philosophy of nature 
illustrate, in recent years, the scholarly attitude amongst historians of philosophy 
towards the philosophical traditions of late antiquity has changed. From a depreciative 
attitude, according to which post-Hellenistic philosophy constitutes the final phase of 
decay after the summit of rationality of the great philosophical systems of classical 
Greece, developed an attitude that is more appreciative of the riches and philosophical 
sophistication of the theories of late antiquity, as well as of the extent to which they 
determined the reception of classical philosophy. The most obvious result of this 
changing attitude has been an explosive expansion of the number of translations, 
handbooks, sourcebooks, monographs and papers on the topic. As concerns Proclus, 
for example, one need only compare the two existing bibliographies of primary and 
secondary scholarly literature on Proclus, the first of which, offering around 350 pages 
of references, covers 40 years of scholarship (1949-1992),8 whereas the more recent 
one edited by Carlos Steel and others provides over 270 pages covering as little as 15 
years (1990-2004).9  
As to Proclus’ philosophy of nature and his Commentary on the Timaeus, more and more 
publications appear on different topics from the commentary,10 a tendency which will 
only increase with the publication of the new English translation of the commentary by 
Tarrant, Runia, Baltzly and Share.11 
More specifically, a wide range of themes in Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus and his 
philosophy of nature have been addressed, such as the generation12 and the structure13 
                                               
6 See Siorvanes (1996) for an evaluation of Proclus’ contributions to the science of his time and his 
influence on its later developments. 
7 Kenny (1996). 
8 Scotti Muth (1993). 
9 Steel, et al. (2005). 
10 See Steel, et al. (2005: esp. 79-82, 157-179) for references. 
11 Baltzly (2007), Tarrant (2007), other volumes forthcoming. 
12 Baltes (1976). 
13 Siorvanes (1996) offers a discussion of numerous physical issues. Cf. Baltzly (2002) on elements and 
causality. 
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of the cosmos, the different demiurges,14 astronomy,15 psychology,16 and, most 
relevant for this dissertation, the role of mathematics in philosophy of nature,17 the 
relation between philosophy of nature and theology/dialectic,18 methodological 
issues,19 and the status of the physical account.20 Most recently the increasing interest 
in the more ‘down to earth’ aspects of Proclus’ philosophy shows from a forthcoming 
volume edited by Chiaradonna and Trabattoni, which is dedicated entirely to Proclus’ 
views on the lowest aspects of reality, such as matter.21 
Surprisingly, Proclus’ notion of nature (φύσις) itself has so far hardly received any 
attention of modern authors, despite the fact that, as I will show, grasping that notion 
is crucial for a proper understanding of Proclus’ philosophy of nature.22 Those authors 
who do discuss it, present a notion of φύσις that obeys to Proclus’ metaphysical 
principles but does not cohere with the material Proclus himself offers on the subject 
of nature.23  
Since the present dissertation to quite some extent covers the same field as the work of 
one scholar in particular, Alain Lernould, a sketch of the difference between his views 
and mine is in order. 
 
I.2.1 Proclus’ philosophy of nature according to Alain Lernould 
 
The main difference between Lernould’s reading of Proclus’ philosophy of nature and 
my own lies in our presuppositions regarding Proclus’ philosophical system. Whereas 
Lernould emphasizes the existence of a chasm between the perceptible and the 
intelligible, my main conclusion from Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus regarding 
the underlying metaphysics and epistemology, as said above, is that they are 
                                               
14 Steel (1987), Opsomer (2000b), (2000a), (2003). 
15 Lloyd (1978). 
16 MacIsaac (2001) 
17 O'Meara (1989), Lernould (2000).  
18 Lernould (2001), Steel (2003). 
19 Gersh (2003), Siorvanes (2003), Martijn (2006b), (forthcoming 2008). 
20 Lernould (2005), Martijn (2006a). 
21 Chiaradonna and Trabattoni (forthcoming). 
22 Lernould (2001) leaves the notion of nature out of his study of Proclian φυσιολογία altogether, apart 
from a reference in passing, p. 32. I can think of two reasons for the neglect, a practical one and an 
‘ideological’ one. Lernould discusses the second book of the commentary, and Proclus’ treatise on 
nature is located in the first book; and his focus is on the theological aspect of φυσιολογία, whereas 
φύσις is a lower level of reality (see chapter II). Gersh (2003: 152-3), who in his reaction to Lernould 
focuses especially on the “prefatory material”, summarizes Proclus’ treatise on nature (in the 
introduction of In Tim.) to highlight its divinity. Cf. Cleary (2006). 
23 Rosán (1949) and, more extensively, Siorvanes (1996). 
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characterized by the assumption of a fundamental and crucial continuity between the 
world of generation and the intelligible realm.  
Physique et Théologie (2001), the reworked dissertation of Alain Lernould, has as its main 
aim to show, through a detailed analysis of the second book of Proclus’ commentary 
on the Timaeus, how Proclus ‘dialectizes’ the Timaeus. Lernould establishes the details of 
this dialectization through a thorough analysis of the second book of the commentary 
on the Timaeus (I 205-end, Diehl).  
Lernould’s book has two parts. In the first part (1-112) the author shows how Proclus 
imposes several structures on the Timaeus that are all different from Plato’s own 
division into the “works of intellect” and the “works of necessity”. What these 
imposed structures have in common is that they reduce the Timaeus to its first part (up 
to 44d), i.e. the part that is covered by the commentary insofar as it is extant.24 In the 
second part of Lernould’s book, entitled “La Dialectisation du Timée” (115-354) 
Lernould argues that Proclus in the second book of the commentary interprets the 
Timaeus as a triple dialectic ascent to the transcendent causes of the universe (the 
Demiurge, the Paradigm, the Good).25 The three ascents are to be found in the so-
called hypotheses (Tim. 27c4-6 and 27d6-28b5; In Tim. 217.7-219.31 and 227.6-274.32), 
the demonstrations (Tim. 28b5-29d5; In Tim. I 275.1-355.15), and the demiurgy (Tim. 
39d6-31b4; In Tim. I 355.18-458.11) respectively. Lernould’s book ends with three 
appendices, containing the text of Tim. 27c1-31b4, a discussion of the relation between 
the body of the world and the elements, and a brief discussion of Alcinous’ summary 
of the Timaeus in the Didaskalikos.  
The main aim of Lernould’s book is to show how Proclus ‘dialectizes’ Plato’s 
philosophy of nature and turns it into theology, thereby sacrificing the professed 
Pythagorean character of the dialogue to its Platonic character.26 Lernould is the first to 
present an elaborate study of the relation between φυσιολογία and θεολογία in Proclus’ 
philosophical system, and a thorough analysis of the second book of the commentary, 
containing many valuable discussions, e.g. regarding the notion of ‘becoming’.27  
The main objection to Lernould’s monograph is that he gets carried away by the thesis 
that philosophy of nature should be theology, to the extent that he looses sight of the 
                                               
24 This does not mean that Lernould thinks the commentary ended there, although he does suggest a 
relation between the restructuring and the fact that we no longer possess the remainder of the 
commentary (2001: 108). 
25 Lernould (2001: 15). 
26 For this purpose in the first pages of his book (11-13) Lernould takes Proclus’ characterization of 
Timaeus’ method in the prooemium as “geometrical” (which Lernould associates with the Pythagorean 
character) and explains it as meaning no more than “demonstrative” (associated with the Platonic 
character). See on this topic chapter III. 
27 Lernould (2001: ch. 8, 153ff.). 
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φυσιολογία itself and reduces it to theology altogether. This interpretation is 
incompatible with a number of aspects of Proclus’ discussion of φυσιολογία, and has 
problematic consequences, most notably that it constitutes an equation of the Timaeus 
and the Parmenides as both dealing with the divine per se, although these two dialogues 
are considered to belong to two different stages in the philosophical development of 
the Neoplatonic student.28 The Timaeus is a work of theological philosophy of nature, 
but not pure theology.29  
Similar problems are present in Lernould’s other work. In a paper on Proclus’ views on 
the relation between mathematics and philosophy of nature (regarding Tim. 31c-d), 
Lernould concludes that the mathematization of physics, combined with a 
theologization of mathematics, in turn leads to a theologization of physics, at the cost 
of the role of mathematics.30 The clearest signal that Lernould’s interpretation runs 
into problems is found in his most recent paper, on the status of the physical account 
(the “likely story”), where Lernould has to conclude that Proclus’ reading of the likely 
story is incompatible with his overall views of philosophy of nature.31  
 
The objections to Lernould’s interpretation of Proclus’ philosophy of nature can all be 
explained as caused by the same assumptions regarding some basic features of Proclus’ 
philosophical system. Lernould emphasizes the opposition between the physical and 
the transcendent, the sensible and the intelligible, physics and theology. I will show, 
however, that Proclus in his overall reading of the Timaeus is concerned especially with 
the continuity both of reality and of cognition. All his writings are deeply imbued with 
the principle “all in all, but appropriately to each thing”.32 According to Proclus, all 
sciences are theology in some manner, since they all discuss the divine in its presence 
in some realm or other, just as all Aristotelian sciences study some aspect of being. 
Only pure theology, however, studies the divine per se, just as for Aristotle only 
metaphysics studies being per se. The other sciences study some aspect of the divine, 
with the appropriate methods and subject to the appropriate limitations. 
In what sense, then, can we say that philosophy of nature is theology? 
                                               
28 Lernould himself later adjusted his position in his paper on the likely story (2005: 152) and in private 
conversation.  
29 Cf. Siorvanes (2003: 174). 
30 Lernould (2000: esp. 140-1). Here the author seems to conflate mathematics as the discursive science 
of discrete and continuous quantity with the originally mathematical principles that constitute the heart 
of Neoplatonic metaphysics. On this topic see chapter IV. 
31 On this topic see chapter V. 
32 El.Th. 103. On the source of this principle, which Wallis (1995: 136) somewhat unfortunately calls 
the ‘principle of correspondence’, and its role in Proclus’ metaphysics, psychology and exegetical 
method see Siorvanes (1996: 51-55). For the related principle of the Golden Chain see Beierwaltes 
(1979: 150-1, and n. 120). 
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I.3 Philosophy of nature as theology 
 
T I.2 
“It seems to me to be glaringly clear to all who are not utterly blind to words 
(λόγοι) that the aim (πρόθεσις) of the Platonic Timaeus is firmly fixed upon the 
whole of physical inquiry (φυσιολογία), and involves the study of the All, 
treating it systematically (πραγματευομένου) from beginning to end.”33  
 
This very first line of Proclus’ fourteen page introduction to his commentary is a 
straightforward and emphatic statement of the aim (the σκοπός or πρόθεσις) of the 
Timaeus as “the whole of physical inquiry (φυσιολογία)”.34 According to late 
Neoplatonic exegetical principles, a text has one and only one σκοπός, and every last 
detail of the text should be interpreted as pertaining to that σκοπός.35 In order to 
enhance the precision of exegesis of all these details, the σκοπός has to be defined as 
narrowly as possible.36 This entails that it does not suffice to mention a general subject, 
in this case φυσιολογία. Instead, one should narrow down the σκοπός as far as possible, 
i.e. to Platonic φυσιολογία.37 That is precisely what Proclus does in the first pages of the 
commentary, while at the same time giving a justification for studying the natural world 
through reading the Timaeus rather than Aristotle’s Physics.38 Proclus describes three 
                                               
33 In Tim. I 1.4-8 transl. Tarrant, slightly modified. The same force speaks from Theol. Plat. I 32.16-18 
τὴν περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμην σύμπασαν ὁ Τίμαιος περιέχειν ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται τῶν καὶ σμικρὰ 
συνορᾶν δυναμένων. 
34 See also Lernould’s discussion of the σκοπός in his chapter 1 (2001: 32ff.). Note, however, that his 
overall thesis makes him reduce the σκοπός to the primary causes (esp. 32). 
35 Even the introductory passages, i.e. the recapitulation of the Republic and the Atlantis story (Tim. 
17b8-25d6), are explained as providing meaningful information, presented in images, regarding 
φυσιολογία. See In Tim. I 4.7-26. For the exegetical principle of εἷς σκοπός, the formulation of which is 
ascribed to Iamblichus, cf. In Remp. I 6.1-4. See also Praechter (1905), Coulter (1976: 77ff.), Martijn 
(2006a). 
36 As Siorvanes (2003: 166-7) points out, the theme of the Timaeus, the “nature of the universe”, seems 
to be straightforward, but the vagueness of the terms “nature” and “universe” leaves a lot of room for 
interpretation. 
37 Cf. Anon. Prol. 22.21-30 ...περὶ ποίας φυσιολογίας τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται...δεῖ οὖν βεβαιότερον κινουμένους 
λέγειν ὅτι περὶ τῆς κατὰ Πλάτων φυσιολογίας ἐστὶν ὁ σκοπὸς καὶ τίς ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ Πλάτων φυσιολογία, καὶ 
μὴ ἁπλῶς περὶ φυσιολογίας. 
38 Cf. I 1.17-24: καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὗτος διάλογος καθ’ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν τὴν φυσιολογίαν ἔχει σκοπόν, τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ 
ἐν εἰκόσι καὶ ἐν παραδείγμασιν ὁρῶν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις καί ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι: συμπεπλήρωται γὰρ ἅπασι τοῖς 
καλλίστοις τῆς φυσιολογίας ὅροις. τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ τῶν συνθέτων ἕνεκα παραλαμβάνων, τὰ δὲ μέρη τῶν ὅλων, 
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approaches to φυσιολογία, one which concentrates on matter and material causes, one 
which adds to that the study of the (immanent) form, and rather considers this to be 
the cause, and a third, which regards matter and form as mere subsidiary causes 
(συναίτιαι), and focuses on other, real causes of everything natural, i.e. the transcendent 
efficient, paradigmatic and final causes.39 Only Platonic φυσιολογία as presented in the 
Timaeus, following Pythagorean practice,40 studies both the secondary and the real 
causes – and rightly so, Proclus states, since ultimately everything, including the 
secondary causes themselves, depends on the real causes.41 Plato treats all the causes of 
the universe in that he “gives the universe matter and a form that derives from the 
hypercosmic gods, makes it depend from the universal demiurgy (i.e. the efficient 
cause), likens it to the intelligible living being (i.e. the paradigmatic cause), and shows it 
to be a god by the presence of the good (i.e. the final cause), and in this manner he 
renders the whole universe an intelligent ensouled god.”42 This approach has far-
reaching consequences, primarily that philosophy of nature becomes “a kind of 
theology”.  
T I.3 
“the dialogue is divine (σεμνός), and makes its conceptions from above, from 
the first principles, and combines the categorical with the demonstrative, and 
equips us to reflect on physical things (τὰ φυσικά) not only physically, but also 
theologically.”43 
 
This Pythagorean character of the dialogue does not result, however, in the reduction 
of philosophy of nature to theology pure and simple.  
Proclus divides all of philosophy into two fields, the study of the encosmic and that of 
the intelligible, analogous to the “two κόσμοι”, the perceptible and the intelligible.44 As 
said above, for Proclus, as for the majority of Neoplatonists, this division is typically 
represented in two dialogues, which form the last phase in the school curriculum as 
established by Iamblichus: the representative dialogue for the study of the encosmic is 
the Timaeus, whereas the Parmenides is considered the summit of the study of the 
                                                                                                                                              
τὰς δὲ εἰκὸνας τῶν παραδειγμάτων, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδιερεύνητον παραλείπων τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἀρχηγικῶν αἰτίων. 
On Plato vs. Aristotle see Steel (2003). 
39 In Tim. I 2.1-9. 
40 Proclus followed the tradition that in writing the Timaeus Plato imitated a Pythagorean named 
Timaeus who also wrote a cosmology, In Tim. I 1.8-16. On this Timaeus Locri see Baltes (1972). 
41 In Tim. I 2.29-3.13. 
42 In Tim. I 3.33-4.5. Cf. In Parm. 641.5ff. 
43 In Tim. I 8.2-5, esp. 4-5: τὰ φυσικὰ οὐ φυσικῶς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεολογικῶς νοεῖν ἡμᾶς παρασκευάζει. 
Cf. the end of book I (In Tim. I 204.8-12), quoted above as T I.1, and 217.25-7. 
44 In Tim. I 12.30-13.4, referring to Tim. 30c. 
INTRODUCTION 
- 9 - 
intelligible. This should not be understood to mean that the science of the encosmic 
and that of the divine are considered entirely separate sciences. Instead, they are 
different approaches to the same subject, namely reality including all of its levels, which 
theology (in the Parmenides) studies from the intelligible archetype, and philosophy of 
nature (in the Timaeus) from the ontological image (εἰκών) that is the natural world.45  
Philosophy of nature in Proclus’ view consists of a chain of different disciplines with 
different subject matters and respective methods, and crowned by theological 
philosophy of nature. It is theology in the sense that it provides insight in the divine 
aspects of the physical world, especially (διαφερόντως) its transcendent efficient cause, 
the Demiurge, but also its paradigmatic and final causes; on a lower level philosophy of 
nature provides insight also in the material and formal causes of the universe.46  
 
 
I.4 Προψηλαφήματα - the prooemium of the Timaeus 
 
For the definition of φυσιολογία and Proclus’ concept of nature the introduction to the 
Commentary on the Timaeus is the most informative source. For the elaboration of his 
notion of the philosophy of nature and its methods, on the other hand, the main 
source of information is his expansive exegesis of the prooemium (Tim. 27c1-29d3, In 
Tim. I 204-355), Timaeus’ methodological preamble to his cosmological exposition. 
Although we find clues throughout Proclus’ commentary, both in numerous 
methodological remarks and in the practice of the commentary, the density of 
methodological information is at its highest in Proclus’ comments on the prooemium, 
and hence this section can be considered the heart of Proclus’ theory of φυσιολογία, its 
methods and limitations.  
A brief introduction of the prooemium will allow me to bring forward two clues which 
set the frame within which Proclus entire exegesis of Timaeus’ cosmological account is 
to be understood: (i) Proclus reads the Timaeus as a hymn to the Demiurge, and (ii) the 
main function he gives to the prooemium is that of ensuring a scientific status for 
philosophy of nature.  
 
                                               
45 In Tim. I 8.13 (see above); 13.7ff, 87.6ff, III.173.2ff. Cf. Dodds (1932: 187). Dodds notes the 
‘Aristotelian’ use of theologikê in the title of the Elements of Theology. The same goes for physikê in the 
other manual, the Elements of Physics. In Neoplatonism the distinction that is thereby made between 
theology and physics (cf. Arist. Met. 1026a18, which includes mathematics), as Dodds notes, is not as 
rigid as these titles suggest. On ontological images see chapter V. 
46 In Tim. I 217.18-28, 2.30-3.2. Cf. Simpl. In Cat. 6.27-30 esp. ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων ... καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ 
ἐπισκέπτεται καθὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν μετέχουσιν. 
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I.4.1 The prooemium and the Timaeus as a hymn 
 
One of the characteristics of Plato’s Timaeus that sets it apart from most other Platonic 
dialogues is that it is not in fact a dialogue, except initially. After the opening, the 
‘recapitulation’ of (part of) the discussion of the Republic, and the Atlantis-story, 
Timaeus takes the stage (at 27c1), not to leave it even at the end of the dialogue. The 
only interruption in Timaeus’ long account is a short remark of Socrates’, just after 
Timaeus’ famous request to his audience to be content with a likely story: 
T I.4 
Bravo, Timaeus! By all means! We must accept it as you say we should. This 
overture (τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιον) of yours was marvellous. Go on now and let us 
have the work itself (τὸν δὲ δὴ νόμον). (Tim. 29d4-6, transl. Zeyl) 
 
This remark is important for two reasons. First of all, through this one remark, the 
foregoing section of Timaeus’ account (Tim. 27c1-29d3) is set apart from the sequel as 
its prooemium. It is thereby identified as a unity, and given extra weight and a special 
function with respect to what follows. Secondly, by his choice of words Socrates 
summons an image of the account Timaeus is in the course of giving as a poem or a 
musical piece (a nomos). A prooemium is, generally speaking, any preamble, be it to a 
piece of music, a poem, or a speech.47 But by the addition of nomos, which among many 
other things means ‘melody’, or ‘strain’, Timaeus’ account is compared with a musical 
performance. As the Athenian stranger in the Laws points out: 
T I.5 
“…the spoken word, and in general all compositions that involve using the 
voice, employ ‘preludes’ (a sort of limbering up (ἀνακινήσεις), so to speak), and 
[…] these introductions are artistically designed to aid the coming performance. 
For instance, the νόμοι of songs to the harp, and all other kinds of musical 
composition, are preceded by preludes of wonderful elaboration.”48 
                                               
47 Cf. Phaedr. 266d7-8. The term prooemium is not uncommon in Plato (e.g. at Rep. 531d7-8 and 532d7 
the term is applied to all of education before dialectic, which is called the νόμος), and occurs especially 
frequently in the Laws. See for the parallel between the prooemium of a speech and of a poem or 
musical performance also Arist Rhet. III 14, 1414b19-26. 
48 Laws 722d3-e1 (transl. Saunders modified), cf. 734e3-4. The metaphor becomes an actual pun in the 
context of the Laws, of course, since the preambles are in fact followed by νόμοι, in the sense of laws. 
The main purpose of the prooemia expounded in the Laws is to convince the possible wrongdoer 
otherwise; just as in a speech, the preamble is persuasive in nature. Cf. 722e7ff; 773d5ff; etc. At 
925e6ff, however, the stranger speaks of a more general  prooemium, which would have an apologetic 
character, like the prooemium in the Timaeus. See below. 
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This same image of a musical performance is present in the very first lines of the 
Critias, the sequel of the Timaeus. It is here that we find the end of Timaeus’ account, in 
the form of a prayer for forgiveness for any false notes.49 With this added element of 
the prayer, Timaeus ends his νόμος the way he commenced his prooemium at Tim. 
27d1-e4.50 Whereas at the outset of his account he prayed to the gods in general, he 
here addresses “the god who in fact existed long before but has just now been created 
in my words”,51 that is, the Demiurge.  
In his explanation of Socrates’ remark that delimits the prooemium, Proclus picks up 
the image of the musical performance, but interestingly chooses a particular 
instrument: the lyre. This choice is not a casual one: Proclus deliberately compares 
Timaeus to a lyreplayer, who composes hymns to the gods.  
T I.6 
“The word νόμος [at Tim. 29d6] is taken from the νόμοι of the lyre-players: they 
are a particular kind of songs, made in honour, some of Athena, some of Ares, 
some are inspired, and others aim at regulating behaviour. They usually had a 
prelude precede these νόμοι, which they called for this reason “pre-stroking of 
the strings” (προψηλαφήματα).” (I 355.4-9)52  
 
As has been shown by Van den Berg, Proclus considers Critias’ Atlantis story to be a 
hymn to Athena.53 More important for our purposes is that Timaeus’ account is here 
ranked among the hymns. And elsewhere, in the Platonic Theology, Proclus tells us that 
the divinity celebrated by Plato in the Timaeus is the Demiurge. Through Timaeus’ 
entire exposition he presents “a kind of hymn” to Zeus the Demiurge: 
 
                                               
49 Crit. 106a3-b7, esp. b1 παρὰ μέλος, b2-3 τὸν πλημμελοῦντα ἐμμελῆ ποιεῖν, cf. 108b4-5, θεάτρου, 
ποιητής. 
50 There is another image, namely that of the account as a journey. This image is evoked by the word 
προοίμιον (οἶμος in the word προ-οίμιον), and recurs at the beginning of the Critias as well. The first 
line of the Critias, which is in content also the last one of the Timaeus, is spoken by Timaeus. He 
expresses his relief at taking a rest, as it were, after a long journey (ἐκ μακρᾶς ὁδοῦ) (Crit. 106a1-2), and 
orders Critias to take on the continuing journey (106a2 διαπορείας). This image is less relevant to our 
purposes as it is not picked up by Proclus. 
51 Crit. 106a3-4. 
52 Note that the term Proclus uses to refer to the custom of playing a prelude, προψηλαφήματα, as if it 
were a common name term (ἐκάλουν) is in fact a hapax, which emphasizes the novelty of his 
interpretation. προψηλαφάω – ‘massage beforehand’, Paul. Aeg. 4.1 (pass); ψηλάφημα – ‘touch’ Ph.1.597, 
‘caress’ X. Smp. 8.23 
53 Van den Berg (2001: 22ff.). 
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The providence of the Demiurge manifests itself from above down to the 
creation of this [visible world], and this text has been presented by Plato as a 
kind of hymn (οἷον ὕμνος τις) to the Demiurge and the Father of this universe, 
proclaiming his powers and creations and gifts to the cosmos. (Theol.Plat V 20, 
75.10-14)54 
 
A similar position was taken two centuries earlier by Menander Rhetor, who classifies 
the Timaeus as a ὕμνος φυσικός/φυσιολογικός,55 i.e. a hymn in which we identify an 
aspect of the natural world with a divinity and study its nature.56 Menander, however, 
refers to the Timaeus as a hymn to the universe (τοῦ Παντός, 337.23), rather than to the 
Demiurge.57 The importance of Proclus’ choice is that as a hymn to the Demiurge, the 
dialogue is also considered an ἐπιστροφή to him,58 and this, we will see in later chapters, 
has its reflection in Proclus’ analysis of the structure and function of the Timaeus.  
 
I.4.2 The prooemium and philosophy of nature as a science59 
 
The prooemium has a second important function, namely that of securing a scientific 
status of philosophy of nature.  
                                               
54 The Timaeus is not the only dialogue which Proclus calls a hymn. See Saffrey/Westerink (1968: vol. V 
187, n. 3) for references to other examples. Strictly speaking, the phrase ‘this text’ (οὗτος) refers only to 
the description of the demiurgic creations, not those of the lesser gods, and therefore not to Timaeus’ 
entire exposition. Still, Proclus here also refers to the entire range of creation, ἄνωθεν...ἄχρι τῆς τούτων 
ποιήσεως, and thus we can conclude that he does include all of Timaeus’ account into the hymn to the 
Demiurge. 
55 Menander Rhet. 336.25-337.32, esp. 337.5 and 22ff. (Spengel). 
56 On the so-called φυσικοὶ ὕμνοι see Russell and Wilson (1981: 13-15 with 235-7) and van den Berg 
(2001: 15ff.). I propose to translate φυσικοὶ as “of nature” rather than “scientific” (as Russell/Wilson), 
to emphasize that we are dealing with hymns that reveal the nature (essence, cf. 333.12) of a divinity 
through a (scientific, true) discussion of their presence in nature (the natural world, cf. 337.5). On the 
commentary as prayer see Brisson (2000). Cf. the 3rd/4th c. Pythagorean hymn to Nature, see Powell 
(1925: 197-8), and Simplicius, who dedicates his own commentary on Aristotle’s De caelo as a hymn to 
the Demiurge (In Cael. 731.25-29). 
57 In fact, Menander states that Plato himself in the Critias calls the Timaeus a ὕμνος τοῦ Παντός. As has 
been remarked by modern commentators Russell and Wilson (1981: 236), van den Berg (2001: 16), 
nowhere in the Critias can such a remark be found. Russell/Wilson propose that Menander was 
thinking of Tim. 27c and 92b, or Critias 106a, all invocations. I propose that in addition Menander may 
have had in mind Tim. 21a, where Critias (rather than the Critias) calls his own account a kind of hymn 
(οἶόνπερ ὑμνοῦντας).  
58 And not, e.g. to the One. On hymns as ἐπιστροφή see Van den Berg (2001: 19ff., 35ff.). 
59 I am grateful to David Runia for letting me mine his unpublished paper ‘Proclus’ interpretation of 
the proœmium of Plato’s Timaeus (27d-29d)’, which was presented at “Plato’s Ancient Readers”, a 
conference held in Newcastle (AUS), June 2002.  
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As has been shown by Runia, the Timaeus places itself in the tradition of the presocratic 
περὶ φύσεως literature by incorporating in the prooemium the following elements: (1) 
invocation of the gods, (2) introduction of the author, (3) indication of the audience, 
(4) statement of the subject, (5) truth claim, and (6) outline of the method to be 
followed.60 The only element that does not fit the tradition is what Proclus will call 
“the hypotheses and what needs to be demonstrated from them beforehand”,61 i.e. 
Timaeus’ developing of the starting points of his account (Tim. 27d5-29d3). We will see 
that Proclus considers this same eccentric element to be the core of the prooemium, 
through which Plato secures a scientific status for his philosophy of nature.  
Proclus presents two summaries of the prooemium on one page. The first contains five 
items, in the order of the Platonic text: (1) “the kind (εἶδος) of research subject”, (2) 
“the hypotheses” and (3) “what needs to be demonstrated from them beforehand”, (4) 
“the kind (εἶδος) of text”, and (5) “the disposition of the audience”.62 In the second 
summary all that is mentioned as the content of the prooemium are the hypotheses 
and the demonstrations.63 The εἶδος of the subject matter is no longer separated from 
the hypotheses, and as a consequence the nature of the text (which is determined by 
the subject matter) is no longer separated from the demonstrations. The disposition of 
the audience is left out altogether.  
We can conclude, then, that in his exegesis of the prooemium Proclus concentrates on 
(2) and (3): “the hypotheses and what needs to be demonstrated from them first”, that 
is, on the only non-traditional element of the prooemium. Proclus’ main reason for 
this, as will be shown, is that through the hypotheses and demonstrations Platonic 
philosophy of nature is given the status of a science.  
 
I.5 The structure of this dissertation 
 
T I.7 (=T I.1) 
                                               
60 Runia (1997: 104-6). 
61 In Tim. I 355.2-3. 
62 I 354.27-355.4. A comparison with Runia’s analysis of Plato’s text shows several similarities, and one 
puzzling difference: the prayer, one of the traditional constituents of the prooemium, occurs in neither 
summary, despite the fact that Proclus comments on it extensively. That does not mean he thinks that 
the prayer is not really needed (as does Menander, who states that a hymn of nature does not require a 
prayer, 337.25-6), but rather that it does not belong to the prooemia (cf. In Tim. I 206.26-27). Another 
difference is that in Proclus’ summaries there is no mention of the author/speaker. As to the 
similarities, we recognize the introduction of the subject matter in (1), the truth claim in (4), and the 
mention of the audience in (5).   
63 I 355.23-28. Proclus later adds the characterization of the text.  
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“True philosophy of nature must depend on theology (III), just as nature depends 
on the gods (II) and is divided up according to all their orders (II/IV), in order 
that accounts too may be imitators of the things they signify (V).”64 
 
The elements of this statement, which as mentioned at the outset of the introduction, 
sum up the basic ingredients of Proclian philosophy of nature, have their counterparts 
in the different chapters of this dissertation (II-V). 
Chapter II of this dissertation discusses the ontological realm that is the subject matter 
of philosophy of nature: φύσις. The chapter presents an analysis of Proclus’ notion of 
nature (φύσις) as described in the introduction to the commentary on the Timaeus, as 
well as elsewhere in his work. The main issues discussed in this chapter are the 
ontological status of nature, its relation to soul, and its activities. I will argue that in 
Proclus’ metaphysical system universal Nature is an intermediary hypostasis, which, 
together with Soul, connects the physical world with its intelligible causes. It is also the 
proximate cause of physical objects. This universal nature, however, only partly 
transcends its effects, and is part of a chain of natures, from the highest intelligible 
“source of nature” to its lowest manifestation in individual natures.  
In chapters III and IV, the elements of this metaphysical chain of nature will be shown 
to have their correspondents in an epistemological chain of different kinds of 
philosophy of nature. Each of the five books of Proclus’ commentary contains a 
different kind of philosophy of nature, with its own subject matter, and the proper 
methods and limitations imposed by that subject matter.65  
In chapter III, the highest kind of φυσιολογία is discussed. This theological and 
dialectical philosophy of nature, the main part of which Proclus finds in the 
prooemium, consists in an analytic proceeding from the nature of the sensible world to 
its primary cause, the Demiurge, and in him also to the intelligible Living Being and the 
Good. Proclus presents an analysis of this highest kind of philosophy of nature in 
which he emphasizes certain parallels between Plato’s procedure and that of a 
geometer. I argue that the aim of this comparison is not just to give philosophy of 
nature a scientific status, but also to determine the precise kind of science: the starting 
points of the ascent to the Demiurge remain hypothetical and are partly a posteriori. The 
combination of partly empirical starting points and a scientific status rests on an 
                                               
64 In Tim. I 204.8-12. 
65 The part of the first book in which Proclus interprets the summary of the Republic and the Atlantis 
story as presentations of the universe in images and symbols respectively (Tim. 17b5-20c3 with In Tim. 
I 26.21-73.21, and 20c4-26e1 with I 73.25-196.29 respectively), will be left out of consideration. These 
passages are preparatory, according to Proclus, and as opposed to the other preparatory passage of the 
Timaeus, the prooemium, hardly elicit remarks on his part concerning the nature and methods of 
φυσιολογία.  
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ingenious notion of δόξα as the cognitive faculty with which we study the natural 
world.  
Chapter IV contains an analysis of the notion of philosophy of nature as it occurs in 
the later books of the commentary. I will show that we there find lower kinds of 
philosophy of nature, matching the respective subjects of the books in question: 
mathematical φυσιολογία for the body and the soul of the world, empirical philosophy 
of nature for the heavenly bodies, and something like biology, a science of the living 
being. As part of this chapter I discuss the explanatory role of mathematics in 
philosophy of nature. I argue that in Proclus’ view the structure of the natural world is 
in a sense mathematical, but that at the same time for understanding that world 
mathematical explanations are helpful but not sufficient. I also argue that the manner 
in which mathematics helps us reach a proper explanation of the natural world is 
determined by the aspect of the world that is being explained, namely the body or the 
soul of the world respectively.  
In the last chapter, chapter V, I discuss Proclus’ interpretation of the textual and 
didactic aspects of the Timaeus, as he finds them in Plato’s famous remark that the 
account of nature is a mere “likely story”. Rather than discuss the limitations of an 
account of the natural world, Proclus’ main aim in his inventive interpretation is to 
demonstrate how such an account facilitates the ascent to knowledge of the intelligible 
causes of the universe. A crucial element in the account’s fulfilling of this function is 
the ontological nature of its subject, the natural world. Because the natural world is an 
ontological image (εἰκών) of its own transcendent causes, an exposition about that world is 
an iconic account in the sense that it is a direct presentation of ontological images.  
I moreover show that for Proclus all discourse, including that about the natural world, 
can have a didactic function due to its two ‘directions’, namely one of natural 
resemblance to its subject matter, comparable to emanation, and one of a further 
assimilation to its subject matter by the author/speaker, comparable to reversion.  
In the conclusion I bring together the findings of chapters II to V. 
 
II PLATONIC ΦΥΣΙΣ ACCORDING TO PROCLUS 
 
II.1 Introduction  
 
The subject of this chapter is Proclus’ concept of φύσις. Our primary focus will be on 
the content and role of this concept as the subject matter of the Timaeus, but since such 
a crucial and complex notion as φύσις deserves more than just an isolated contextually 
bound study, we will also delve into more general issues regarding Proclus’ concept of 
nature.1  
The last part of Proclus’ introduction to his commentary on the Timaeus is a treatise on 
φύσις (In Tim. I 9.31-12.25).2 At first sight this treatise does not fit among the elements 
that traditionally constitute the introduction to a commentary, the schema isagogicum. Its 
presence can be explained, however, as a further delimitation of the σκοπός of the 
Timaeus, which is in first instance determined as “all of φυσιολογία”.3 As we have seen 
in chapter I, Proclus immediately delimits this σκοπός by digressing on the different 
kinds of φυσιολογία, and selecting the study that focuses on the true causes of 
everything natural as the real Platonic philosophy of nature. This leaves us in the dark 
with respect to the actual subject of the Timaeus: what does it mean to study the real 
causes of the natural? At I 2.7-8 Proclus states that true Platonic φυσιολογία is that 
which points to the true causes of what “becomes by nature” (τῶν φύσει γινομένων).4 
This implies that the character of the entire dialogue, and of its σκοπός, is determined 
by what is meant by φύσις,5 although of course the actual subject of the Timaeus has a 
wider extension than φύσις alone. Since φύσις is a highly polysemous word,6 the 
discussion of the σκοπός is not complete until we have reached an agreement on what 
its meaning – or range of meanings – is in the context of Plato’s Timaeus. Or, as 
Proclus remarks, since different people have understood φύσις in different ways, we 
should find out what exactly φύσις means for Plato, and what he thinks its essence 
(οὐσία) is, before moving on to the main text.7  
                                               
1 In the following, I will write Nature (capitalized) to indicate universal, divine φύσις, which is a 
hypostasis (on φύσις as hypostasis see below).  
2 For useful notes on this passage see Tarrant (2007: 103ff.). 
3 See T I.2. 
4 Cf. I 1.23-34. 
5 Cf. Hadot (1987: 115). 
6 See e.g. RE s.v. Natur. 
7 In Tim. I 9.31-10.2. Note that the meaning of φύσις in the treatise in the In Tim. – and consequently in 
this chapter – is limited to nature as it figures in the ἱστορία περὶ φύσεως, accounts of origin and 
generation of and in the universe. Cf. Etienne (1996: 397), Naddaf (2005). 
CHAPTER II 
- 18 -
It is for this reason that Proclus devotes a section towards the end of his introduction 
to a systematic treatise on Plato’s notion of φύσις, and how it differs from – and of 
course improves on – that of just about any non-platonic philosopher.8  
Of course, another reason for presenting an answer to the question “what is nature?”, 
apart from determining the σκοπός of the dialogue at hand as precisely as possible, is 
the wish to create a parallel with Aristotle’s paradigm, who starts his physical works 
from answering the question what nature is, and includes a doxographical discussion.9  
The fact that the treatise takes up over three pages of the fourteen page introduction 
cannot but be indicative of its significance. Nonetheless, no systematic explanation of 
its contents has been given in modern scholarship. In the following, this treatise on 
Platonic nature, which is the most concise description of Proclus’ own ideas regarding 
φύσις, will be the starting point for a broader discussion of Proclus’ notion of φύσις.  
Because in the introduction to the In Tim. Proclus is emphatically giving an account of 
a Platonic notion of nature, this being part of narrowing down the σκοπός of the Timaeus 
to Platonic φυσιολογία, he puts Plato’s notion in a polemic contrast to that of others. As 
a result, the description of the notion of nature is purposefully stripped of any 
Aristotelian or Stoic aspects. Elsewhere, however (mainly in the discussion of Timaeus 
41e, and in book III of the In Parmenidem), different features of nature are discussed 
more extensively, resulting in a more subtle picture.  
 
II.1.1 Plato’s φύσις  
 
One of the difficulties Proclus must have encountered in describing a Platonic notion 
of nature concerns his source material: Plato himself hardly ever characterizes nature as 
such, let alone discusses it. Of course, in accordance with good Neoplatonic practice, 
the theory on φύσις offered is really that of Proclus, rather than Plato, but as we will see 
our commentator does find the source of his theory in Plato. There are few Platonic 
passages that today are considered informative with respect to Plato’s notion of nature, 
namely  Phaedo 96a6ff, Phaedrus 270aff, Sophist 265c-e, and Laws X 891c1-892c7.10 At 
                                               
8 In Tim. I 9.31-12.25. Hadot (1987: 115) compares Proclus’ little treatise to Origen’s treatise on love in 
his introduction to in Cant. She suggests that the purpose of such systematic treatises on the σκοπός 
was to ensure that the reader is forewarned of the difficulty of the subject matter (ib. and 113). In the 
In Tim., however, there is no sign of such a warning.  
9 Arist. Phys. I 2 192b8ff., cf. Festugière (1966-8: vol. I, 35 n. 4). Cf. Arist. Metaph. Δ 4 for an 
enumeration of different meanings of φύσις. 
10 E.g. Etienne (1996: 397, n. 3), Claghorn (1954: 123-130), Solmsen (1960: 92f.), Naddaf (2005). The 
other passages mentioned by Etienne (Lysis 214b, Prot. 315c, Tim. 57d, Lett. VII 344d) are mere 
mentions of natural inquiry. Some dialogues abound in mentions of φύσις, but most of them involve 
PLATONIC ΦΥΣΙΣ ACCORDING TO PROCLUS 
- 19 - 
Phaedo 96a6ff. Socrates refers to the study of nature (περί φύσεως ἱστορία) as concerning 
the causes of generation, perishing, and being (existential or predicative).11 Crudely 
speaking, nature here refers to the class of objects that are subject to generation and 
perishing. Phaedrus 270aff. clearly makes a connection between the φύσις that figures in 
περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία and φύσις as the essence of something (to understand the nature of 
something, one has to understand the nature of the universe). Again, Sophist 265c-e and 
Laws X 891c-892c are both criticisms of the common opinion that everything growing 
owes its existence to mindless nature and chance, rather than to a divine cause (in the 
Laws, that cause is soul). So here we find another meaning of φύσις, that of an irrational 
automatic agent. The Timaeus, paradoxically, is not considered by modern scholars to 
contain valuable information regarding Plato’s concept of φύσις,12 although according 
to Proclus it does. For him Tim. 41e, where the Demiurge is said to show the souls the 
nature of the universe (ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις), is a crucial addition to the source material. 
Today this passage does not sparkle any scholarly discussions with respect to the 
concept of nature, but we will see that it is central to Proclus’ analysis of the 
ontological level of nature. Another passage Proclus relies on is the myth of the 
Statesman, and especially 272dff, where the universe is abandoned by the helmsman and 
turned over to its natural motions (εἱμαρμένη τε καὶ σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία). 
Like Proclus, modern authors tend to overlook or ignore the fact that there is hardly 
such a thing as Plato’s doctrine of φύσις and describe “Plato’s concept of nature” in a 
manner that is tailored entirely to their own purposes, e.g. interpreting Plato’s 
utterances through the Aristotelian material. By way of illustration, let us briefly look at 
Claghorn, who writes in an Aristotelian context, and at the more recent discussion of 
Naddaf. Claghorn claims that Plato in the Timaeus “had taken the name φύσις to apply 
to Reason, rather than to the world of things”, and that he “identified the ὄντως ὄντα 
with the φύσει ὄντα.” His main source is Tim. 46e, in which Plato speaks of ἡ ἔμφρῶν 
φύσις – where φύσις is clearly to be read as “essence” or “being”. What Claghorn could 
have said, is that Plato ascribes to Reason, rather than to nature, the creation of order 
and motion in the world. But this in no way implies an identification of nature and 
Reason.13 In general Claghorn confuses Reason, Mind and Soul: “’Mind’ in the Timaeus 
                                                                                                                                              
nature in the sense of the essence of something. On the notion of φύσις in antiquity see Holwerda 
(1955).  
11 Cf. Plato Phil. 59a. For an assessment of Plato’s place in the περὶ φύσεως tradition see Naddaf (1997), 
Runia (1997). 
12 E.g. Claghorn (1954: 121ff.). As he has shown, the word φύσις is hardly used in the Timaeus, and 
when it is, it has the sense of substance (74d, 75d, 84c), basis of characteristics (18d, 20a, 30b, 48b, 
60b, 62b, 90d), or proper order of behaviour (29b, 45b). 
13 Claghorn (1954: 124, 130). For criticism of Claghorn see Solmsen (1960: 97, n. 22), who brings 
forward some suggestion concerning Plato’s notion of φύσις in which inadvertently – or at least 
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then, is the φύσις of the world, for it basically is rationality, and this is what directs its 
movements…To Plato, therefore, Nature is the world of Reason. It is described as 
Soul to emphasize its ability to initiate motion, since only soul can do that, and mind 
dwells in soul.” 
More recently, Naddaf has argued that φύσις is the ‘development of the contemporary 
world (...) from beginning to end’,14 and that we find it in this sense in Plato’s Laws X.15 
The disadvantage of Naddaf’s interpretation of Platonic φύσις is that it is made 
subservient to his attempt to demonstrate through it that early Greek περὶ φύσεως 
literature contained a ‘politogony’.16 Thus it cannot, in fact, be considered an 
interpretation of φύσις as such. For example, he selects from Laws X the passage in 
which φύσις is opposed to τέχνη (889a4-e2), while at the same time taking the latter, as 
limited to the development of human culture, as part of φύσις in the sense defined. 
Naddaf does not, however, include the sequel of Laws X (891cff.), where the argument 
culminates in the analysis of the relation between φύσις and ψυχή, and as a consequence 
he leaves the main point of the Laws discussion out of consideration, which is the 
question whether the gods exist and whether the natural world is ensouled.  
It may not be possible to come up with a meaningful account of Plato’s concept of 
nature, and it certainly is not needed here. By way of starting point, let me merely state 
the very general claim that Plato at times associates φύσις (if it does not mean ‘essence’) 
with generation and decay, and with irrationality. In other words, he seems to have a 
somewhat negative stance towards nature. This is most obvious at Phaedo 96a6-10, 
probably the best known Platonic passage on philosophy of nature, where being 
natural is clearly given a negative qualification as being material, perceptible, temporal, 
becoming, perishing, and the natural is emphatically set apart from what is real.17 There 
are passages, however, such as in the Sophist, where nature has a slightly more 
distinguished status than it has in the Phaedo. Nature does not produce everything 
natural, the Athenian stranger says, “by some spontaneous cause that generates it 
without any thought”, but “by a cause that works by reason and divine knowledge 
derived from a god” (Sophist 265c, transl. White). Nature is here not replaced by a 
                                                                                                                                              
without warning – the word is used in three different senses within one paragraph: first as “essence”, 
then as “the realm of movement”, and finally as “something relating to the realm of movement” (1960: 
92f). 
14 Naddaf (2005: 20, 28-9) 
15 Naddaf (2005: 32-4). Unfortunately volume II of Naddaf’s work, which will deal with an analysis of 
φύσις in Plato, and especially with regard to Laws book X (2005: 1), is not published yet.  
16 Naddaf (2005: 2). For a critical discussion of the earlier publication of the work in French (1992) see 
Mansfeld (1997).  
17 The Laws passage mentioned above cannot really be used as a source of positive Platonic doctrine 
on nature, since the argumentation of the Athenian stranger remains hypothetical (see II.3.2). 
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divine cause, but supplemented with it. Proclus, we will see, takes the more optimistic 
angle in his views of nature. 
 
II.2 The essence of nature 
 
In ancient philosophy, very generally speaking, the range of concepts referred to by the 
word φύσις runs from nature as a class of things characterized by matter, change, and 
spatiotemporality, through nature as a principle active in that class of things,18 to 
nature as the essence of a thing, not tampered with by man, as opposed to e.g.  τέχνη 
or νόμος.19 In Proclus we find the same spectrum. For our present purposes the latter, 
nature as the essence of a thing, is least relevant.20 
  
Proclus commences his treatise on nature at In Tim. I 9.31-12.25 with three questions:  
T II.1 
“τίς ἡ φύσις καὶ πόθεν πρόεισι καὶ μέχρι τίνος διατείνει τὰς ἑαυτῆς ποιήσεις;”  
 
What is nature, where does it come from, and how far does it extend its activities?21 In 
other words: (1) what are nature’s essence, (2) ontological origin and (3) causal power? 
(1) The question of the essence of nature divides into two subquestions: (i) Is nature a 
kind of, or a part of, lower soul (treated in II.3.1), and (ii) if not, then is it identical to 
“everything natural”? (II.3.2) It will become clear that nature for Proclus is neither soul 
nor the aggregate of everything natural, but primarily a hypostasis of its own in 
between the two, where hypostasis is to be understood in the narrower technical sense 
of “fundamental ontological level” – something that is, rather than has, a hypostasis, 
one could say. 22  
(2) The second question, regarding the origin of nature, results in a discussion of the 
different levels of reality on which we find nature, of the interdependence of those 
                                               
18 As e.g. in Phaedo 96a6-10. 
19 For general literature on the early and classical Greek concept of φύσις: Lloyd (1991), Naddaf (2005) 
(mainly presocratics, and somewhat controversial, cf. Mansfeld (1997)), Schmalzriedt (1970: 113ff) for 
a description of the development from “Individualphysis” to “Allphysis” in the second half of the 5th 
century BC, and Vlastos (1975: 18-22). 
20 But see II.5.2. 
21 In Tim. I.10.4-5. 
22 Cf. Steel (1994: 79-80), and Witt (1933), Dörrie (1955) on the history of the notion. Cf. Gersh (1973: 
30-32), who apart from the causal dependence also emphasizes the complex (often triadic) structure of 
many hypostases. 
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different “natures” and of the question which of them is primarily considered nature 
(which is not the same as the question which of them is ontologically primary) (II.4).  
(3) And finally, the third question concerns the activity of nature as source of motion 
and unity of all bodies (II.5). These are all questions that were at the heart of the late 
ancient debate on nature. 23 
 
 
II.3 Nature, soul, and the natural  
 
According to Proclus Plato surpasses other philosophers in giving an account of the 
essence of nature. Proclus’ support of this claim, an explanation of the mistakes made 
by other philosophers, amounts to a nice – albeit incomplete – history of the concept 
of nature through antiquity.24 Let us briefly review it before looking closer at two 
aspects thereof: the relation between nature and soul (II.3.1), and between nature and 
the natural (II.3.2).  
Proclus starts out with Antiphon, who identified nature with matter. This unexpected 
presence of Antiphon reveals that Proclus’ main source for the doxographical material 
is Aristotle.25 
The second target is Aristotle himself, and his equation of nature with form.26 In this 
polemic context Proclus does not refer to Aristotle’s definition of nature as the source 
of motion, probably because Proclus in fact maintains that definition (see below II.5).27  
Thirdly, Proclus mentions some anonymous predecessors of Plato who underestimated 
nature by identifying it with “the whole” (τό ὅλον), as those who are scolded by the 
Athenian stranger in book X of the Laws for calling the products of nature “natures” 
(τὰ φύσει φύσεις προσηγόρευον).28 In light of the fact that τὸ ὅλον is subsequently called 
τὸ σώμα,29 we have to assume that it refers to any whole consisting of both matter and 
form, rather than to the sum of everything physical.30 Proclus here seems to be 
                                               
23 See Sorabji (2004: esp. 33-60) for a selection of discussions on these and related issues from the 
ancient commentators on (mainly) Aristotle. 
24 For reff. to similar doxographies see Festugière (1966-8: 35, n. 4).  
25 In Tim. I 10.5-6. Proclus’ source is Arist. Phys. 193a9-17, but as Festugière shows Antiphon is also 
part of the Aetian tradition. Tarrant (2007: 103, n. 51) refers to Dox. 1.22.6, 2.20.15, 2.28.4, 2.29.3, 
3.16.4. Cf. Alex.Aphr. In Met. 357.7ff., Simpl. In Phys. 273.36, Philop. In Phys. 207.19ff. 
26 In Tim. 10.6-7. For nature as form see Arist. Phys. 193a30ff.; cf. Met. Λ 1070a11-12. 
27 Cf. Schneider (1996: 439). For nature as source of motion see Arist. Phys. 200b12-13, Cael. 268b16. 
28 In Tim. 10.7-9, see below, II.3.2. 
29 In Tim. 10.14. 
30 Cf. Festugière (1966-8: vol I, 36 n. 4.).  
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repeating Aristotle’s criticism that that which is constituted from matter and form is 
not a nature, but natural, like for example a man.31 
Yet another mistaken conception of nature, which is like the previous one criticized in 
the Laws, is that nature is identical with physical powers such as weight or density.32 
The philosophers who adhere to such notions are identified as Peripatetic 
philosophers33 and “even older ones” (probably atomists).34 
Proclus ends the list with two theories that he does not ascribe to anyone, namely the 
theory that nature is the craft of (a) god (τέχνη θεοῦ),35 and finally the theory that 
equates nature and soul.36 With respect to the latter theory we can safely assume that 
Proclus has in mind Plotinus, who maintained that nature is the lowest, non-
descended, part of the World Soul.37 The former, that nature is a divine craft, has been 
identified as Stoic, according to the reasoning that if Stoic nature is a god, as well as a 
πῦρ τεχνικόν, then nature is also a divine τέχνη.38 I will argue, however, that instead 
Proclus here has in mind a Platonic passage (Soph. 265e, see below II.5.1).  
In general Proclus’ judgment is harsh: Plato would not deem matter, form, the body, or 
physical powers worthy of being called φύσις primarily. And as to the option he 
mentions last, Plato shrinks (ὀκνεῖ) from calling nature soul just like that (αὐτόθεν). 
Instead, in Proclus’ view Plato gives us the most exact description, saying that the 
essence of nature is in between soul and physical powers. It is significant that Proclus 
does not reject the theory of nature as a craft of (a) god. We will return to this later.39 
As Festugière points out, the doxographical character of the above listing of definitions 
of nature could indicate that it was copied from a handbook, but the real paradigm of 
the list is Aristotle’s Physics.40 More importantly, the list is not given merely for reasons 
of scholasticism, but to demarcate the area of the Platonic notion of nature by 
                                               
31 Arist. Phys. 193b4-6.  
32 Plato Leg. X 892b3f.  
33 Perhaps Proclus is here confusing the Peripatetic theory that physical changes start from the four 
δυνάμεις cold, warm, dry and moist (Arist. Meteor. 340b14ff, Alex. In Meteor. 181.13ff.) with lists of 
‘secondary’ physical properties, such as at Arist. PA 646a18ff and Alex. In Meteor. 13.30ff. Cf. Simpl. in 
Cael. 380.29-35. 
34 In Tim. 10.9-12. 
35 In Tim. I 10.12. This is a separate theory, and not a further explanation of the previous, pace Romano 
(1991: 242). On nature as τέχνη θεοῦ see below II.5.1. 
36 In Tim. I 10.12-13. He adds “or some other similar thing” (ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον), but this seems to be an 
addition for the sake of completion rather than a real alternative for soul. 
37 See below, II.3.1. 
38 This is the argument of Festugière, who refers to Zeno (ap. Diog. Laert. VII 156 τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι 
πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῷ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν = SVF I 171). Cf. Tarrant also refers to SVF II 774, 1133-4. [CR]  
39 See below II.5.1. 
40 Festugière (1966-8: vol. I 35 n. 4) 
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eliminating notions that are too high or too low. The order of presentation is revealing 
of a Proclian (or at least Neoplatonic) interpretation: rather than present the different 
definitions in chronological order, Proclus gives them in an increasing order of 
ontological status ascribed to nature (ranging from the lowest, matter, to the highest, 
soul). 
The most interesting aspects of Proclus’ little history of the concept of φύσις for our 
purposes are the fact that the theory of nature as a craft of (a) god is not rejected, and 
that the Plotinian theory of nature as soul, although it is not rejected forthright, is at 
least considered in need of modification.  
 
 
II.3.1 Nature is not soul 
 
The relation between nature and soul was a matter of debate among ancient 
philosophers, primarily with regard to questions about whether lower animate and 
inanimate beings possessed soul, or only nature. Another issue in the Platonic tradition 
was how both nature and soul could be the ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.41 A more implicit issue in 
the discussion of soul and nature concerns the ontological relation between nature and 
soul themselves. For our purposes the most interesting position on the latter issue is 
that of Plotinus, as this is the position Proclus challenges. In short, Plotinus 
maintained, as is well known, that nature is the lowest part of soul, and more precisely 
of the World Soul.42  
Proclus’ position on the ontological relation of nature to soul has been assessed in 
different ways. Romano (1991: 242) points to the difference between nature and soul 
(he capitalizes only soul: “natura e Anima”), but incorrectly ascribes to Proclus the 
Plotinian view that nature is nothing other than the activity of Soul in matter.43 
Siorvanes (1996: 137) is rather unclear (e.g. “...Platonists came to regard nature as a 
                                               
41 Mohr (1980: esp. 47), reprinted in Mohr (1985: 158ff.), cf. Sorabji (2004: 44). For φύσις as source of 
motion see II.5.2. 
42 Enn. IV 3 [27] 10; IV 4 [28] 13, esp. 3-4: ἴνδαλμα γὰρ φρονήσεως ἡ φύσις καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον. Cf. III 8 
[30] 4.14-16. Armstrong (1967: 254), O'Meara (1993: 77), Wilberding (2006: 180-5 [CR]), Brisson 
(forthcoming).  
43 Cf. Dörrie and Baltes (1998: 328f. and n. 18, cf. 343), who refer to Syr. In Met. 39.21 and Simpl. In 
Phys. 298.18f. as indicating that nature is the lowest level of soul. In both these passages, however, 
nature is mentioned next to soul, and there is no indication in either passage that nature should be 
understood to be ontologically included in or part of soul. As to the former, Proclus’ teacher Syrianus, 
it is difficult to assess his view on the relation between nature and world soul (see below). It is clear, 
however, that Syrianus distinguishes an ontological level of nature from that of soul. In Met. 12.6, cf. 
81.33, 113.3, 119.6, 147.12. Cf. Praechter (1932: 1753). 
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kind of lower soul”), but seems to assume that Proclus’ position was the same as 
Plotinus’. Leisegang, however, identifies Proclian φύσις, correctly, we will see, as a 
separate entity in between the corporeal and the psychic.44 That Proclus distances 
himself from Plotinus has hitherto not been noticed.  
Proclus summarizes the ontological position Plato assigns to nature as follows:  
T II.2 
“[Plato] locates the essence of nature in between the two, I mean soul and 
corporeal powers, inferior to the former due to being divided over bodies and 
by not reverting upon itself,45 but rising above everything that comes after it46 
by possessing their λόγοι and producing everything and giving it life.”47 
 
The second half of this description concerns the relation between nature and the 
natural and will be treated in the next section. For now let us focus on the relation 
between nature and soul. Nature’s place on the ontological ladder just beneath soul is 
explained from two points of view, namely their respective relations to body and their 
capacity of reversion (ἐπιστροφή). In his treatise on nature, Proclus is more interested 
in the relation to body (for nature’s lack of reversion see below):48 
T II.3 
“Intellective (νοερὰ) soul is not the same thing as nature. For nature belongs to 
bodies, immersing itself in them and being unseparable from them, but soul is 
separate and roots in itself and belongs at the same time both to itself and to 
another, having the “of another” through being participated, and the “of itself” 
through not sinking into the participant…for these things are continuous: itself, 
its own, its own and another’s, another’s, other.49 The latter is, of course, 
                                               
44 Leisegang (1941).  
45 Accepting Festugière’s reading αὑτήν for Diehl’s αὐτήν.  
46 Tarrant (2007: 104, n. 58) remarks that μετ’ αὐτήν probably means ‘after soul’. As a consequence 
nature is at this point not yet determined to be something that comes after soul, unless, I would say, we 
read the genitive (τῶν μετ' αὐτήν) not just as the object of ὑπερέχουσαν (‘exceeding the things that come 
after soul’) but also as descriptive of φύσις (‘exceeding of the things that come after soul’). 
47 In Tim. I 10.16-21 ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἀμφοῖν τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς θέμενος͵ ψυχῆς λέγω καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν 
δυνάμεων͵ ὑφειμένην μὲν ἐκείνης τῷ μερίζεσθαι περὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τῷ μὴ ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς αὐτήν͵ 
ὑπερέχουσαν δὲ τῶν μετ΄ αὐτὴν τῷ λόγους ἔχειν τῶν πάντων καὶ γεννᾶν πάντα καὶ ζῳοποιεῖν 
48 In his essay on the Myth of Er, instead, Proclus focuses on divinity and motion: nature is inferior to 
soul because it is not a god, but is superior to body because it does not move (In Remp. II 357.11-15). 
49 Cf. In Tim. I 373.7ff., where the same enumeration from “itself” to “other” is given to argue for the 
principle of plenitude. Tarrant (2007: 105, n. 62) suggests that the five members of the series may be 
related to the five causes, and shows that this works for the paradigmatic cause (itself) and the efficient 
cause, the Demiurge (its own). His tentative connexion of soul, nature and the sensible world with 
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everything perceptible, which is full of all kinds of separation and division; and 
of the former the one (another’s) is nature, which is inseparable from bodies, 
and the other (its own and another’s) is soul, which is in itself and illuminates 
something else with a secondary life.”50  
 
The word ‘intellective’ (νοερὰ) in the first line of this passage leaves open the 
possibility that φύσις is a non-intellective kind of soul, but in view of Proclus’ emphatic 
distinction between soul and nature in this passage a reading of the adjective as a 
pleonasm here as at I 12.19 is more likely to present Proclus’ theory accurately. We 
have as yet no conclusive evidence, however, that this is the right interpretation. 
The main difference between soul and nature, according to this passage, lies in their 
different relations to body. Nature is not only intrinsically and essentially related to 
bodies (τῶν σωμάτων, ἀχώριστος ἀπ' αὐτῶν), but is also physically immersed in them 
(δύνουσα κατ' αὐτῶν). As such, it is “the of another” (τὸ ἄλλου): it is not self-sufficient. 
Intellectual soul, on the other hand, is separate from bodies, and roots in itself 
(χωριστή ἐστι, ἐν αὑτῇ ἵδρυται51). As opposed to nature, soul has an existence that is 
somehow tied up with bodies – which is expressed by its being “of another” (τῷ μὲν 
μετέχεσθαι τὸ ἄλλου ἔχουσα) – yet does not sink into them, and is therefore “of itself” 
(τῷ δὲ μὴ νεύειν εἰς τὸ μετασχὸν τὸ ἑαυτῆς). Soul is an αὐθυπόστατον, i.e. it is capable of 
maintaining its own existence.52  
Later on in the first book (In Tim. I 257.6-11) we find a subtle indication of the same 
difference between soul and nature, pertaining to their respective degrees of divisibility. 
When discussing the question whether Timaeus’ definitions of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’ 
encompass all of reality, Proclus points out that by assuming the summits, the 
intermediates are included. The intermediates, following the principle of plenitude, are 
‘being-and-becoming’ and ‘becoming-and-being’.53 Soul is said to be intermediate 
between being and becoming in that it is being and at the same time becoming, just like 
Time, whereas the “summit of things that have become” (ἡ ἀκρότης τῶν γενητῶν), to 
which (universal) Nature belongs, is becoming and at the same time being.54 These somewhat 
obscure formulations “being-and-becoming” and “becoming-and-being” are more 
                                                                                                                                              
final, formal and material cause is not convincing. Soul is not the final cause of the universe, the Good 
is. And nature is a sixth cause, namely the instrumental cause (see below).  
50 In Tim. I 10.24-11.9. This passages gives us important information regarding the question whether 
there exists an imparticipable nature, for which see section II.4.1. Cf. In Tim. 12.19-21. 
51 Accepting Festugière’s αὑτήν instead of Diehl’s αὐτήν.  
52 See also below. 
53 In Tim. I 257.5-8 τὸ ὂν καὶ γινόμενον, τὸ γινόμενον καὶ ὄν. 
54 Proclus’ formulation suggests that not only Nature belongs to this category (τοιαύτη δέ ἐστι καὶ ἡ τοῦ 
παντὸς φύσις, I 257.8-9), but he names no other occupants. Perhaps one should think of the lower 
universal natures (see below II.4.2).  
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than a mere dialectical spinning out of possibilities. They are intended as what we 
might call dynamic conjunctions55, in which the former member takes precedence over 
the second, and the terms cannot be inverted without semantic consequences - as 
opposed to an ordinary conjunction, in which such an inversion would not have 
consequences. The predicate that comes first expresses the predominant property, 
while the second predicate is that of the minor property. In a normal conjunction the 
two properties, in whichever order, would add up to the same. In these dynamic 
conjunctions, however, soul, having the ontologically more valuable property of 
“being” before the less valuable property of “becoming”, has a sum total of properties 
that is more valuable (more real in the sense of “being”, and less divided) than that of 
nature, which has the lower property of “becoming” first and “being” second. Note 
that in this context the participles “being” and “becoming” (at I 257.5-8) pertain not so 
much to existence in time, as to degree of divisibility and dependence.56 The word 
“becoming” in this context is an expression especially of nature’s divisibility over 
bodies, and “being” of its incorporeality.57  
The formulation using the two dynamic conjunctions also tells us that both Soul and 
Nature are what we might call transitional hypostases, i.e. hypostases that bridge or 
close the gap between the indivisible (Being) and the divisible (Becoming), by 
essentially belonging to both.58 This is confirmed by Proclus’ discussion elsewhere of 
the two intermediates (μεσότητες) between true indivisibility and true divisibility.59 
These two intermediates are soul and ‘the divisible essence’ (ἡ μεριστὴ οὐσία), and their 
description is similar to that of soul and nature in the passage discussed above. The 
reasoning is the following: the divisible essence is a second transitional hypostasis 
(μεσοτής), just below soul. Just as there are two intermediates between true Being and 
true Becoming, so too are there two intermediates between the corresponding true 
indivisibility and true divisibility (i.e. divisibility into infinity): soul is divided (over some 
things, but not everything, cf. II 142.2ff.), and yet remains one through having a 
separable existence. The divisible essence on the other hand is divided into many (but 
not into infinity, as is body) and has its existence in another (is ἄλλου), not in itself. The 
                                               
55 This is a notion from dynamic semantics. Dynamic semantics is used mainly to explain and formalize 
anaphora. See Asher (1998).  
56 I thank Jan Opsomer for pointing out the importance of divisibility in the notion of nature. On the 
different senses of “becoming” see Lernould (2001: 222f.) and chapter III, n. 87. There are other 
differences between soul and nature that accompany their respective combinations of Being and 
Becoming, such as degrees of rationality and causal power, but Proclus is not interested in these 
differences at this point.  
57 In Tim. I 257.9-11 καὶ γὰρ αὕτη πάντως ὡς μὲν μεριστὴ περὶ τοῖς σώμασι γενητή ἐστιν͵ ὡς δὲ παντελῶς 
ἀσώματος ἀγένητος, cf. Theol. Plat. I 15 76.20-21. 
58 Cf. Schneider (1996: 439). 
59 In Tim. II 152.9-20. 
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terminology here is so similar to that of the passage quoted above that we can assume 
that by ‘the divisible essence’ Proclus intends nature. 60 
In general, the impression that Nature for Proclus constitutes a hypostasis separate 
from Soul is reinforced by the many enumerations of the main (ontological) strata of 
reality (or corresponding aspects of e.g. the universe or human beings). These 
enumerations differ from one context to the next, and therefore as such can be used 
only to reconstruct a picture of all the different levels Proclus assumes. That is, they 
should not be taken separately as exhaustive representations of reality. This said, the 
following can cautiously be stated. Nature figures next to soul in quite a number of 
those enumerations, which supports the thesis that Proclus takes nature to be a 
separate level of reality.61 On many other occasions, however, nature is not 
mentioned.62 This would weaken our thesis, if it implied that nature, in these cases, is 
subsumed under soul. However, rather than to take the absence of nature as an 
indication that nature is there subsumed under soul, I propose that in these cases 
nature and body are implicitly folded into one, since the former constitutes the latter 
(see below). This is moreover suggested by the fact that, when “body” is mentioned in 
the enumerations, it is often in the plural (e.g. In Tim. I 132.28ff), or in some other way 
that indicates that Proclus is speaking of informed body (e.g. Theol.Plat. I 14, σωματικὴ 
σύστασις). As we will see (II.5) Nature is the proximate cause of the information of 
body. 
One of those enumerations clearly describes the relation between nature and soul as 
that between any two adjacent hypostases: the universal of every level is a likeness of 
its immediately superior level, and the first members of any order participate in the 
superior level;63 for nature that means that universal Nature is similar to universal 
Soul,64 and that higher particular natures somehow participate in Soul, whereas the 
lower ones do not, but are mere natures.65 
                                               
60 Cf. Opsomer (2006: 159).  
61 For some examples of ‘lists’ including a reference to nature, other than the ones from El.Th. quoted 
above (limited to the In Tim and the Theol.Plat., and leaving out the introduction of the In Tim.), see: In 
Tim. I 261.26f., 263.5f., 269.17f., 314.14f., 386.13ff., 454.23, II 24.7ff, 300.21f., III 6.4ff., 28.18f., 
115.23ff., 193.30, 198.11ff., 270.16-271.27; Theol.Plat. I 103.27f, II 62.13ff, III 8.2f, 12.8ff, IV 47.7f., 
74.20ff. 
62 ‘Lists’ without nature, and more precisely consisting of mind, soul, and body, are numerous in the In 
Tim., mainly because of Tim. 30b4-5: νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι. e.g. In Tim. I, 269.17f, 
291.26ff (re. Tim. 30b); cf. Theol.Plat. I 14.7ff., III 24.25ff, 25.11ff, 28.3ff, IV 60.1ff., V 98.14ff, 111.18ff 
etc.  
63 El. Th. prop. 108-112 
64 In Tim. III 115.23-27. 
65 El.Th. prop. 111.  
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The above is evidence in favour of assuming that universal Nature is a real hypostasis 
in Proclian metaphysics. We have to keep in mind, however, that there are also 
indications that it is only barely so. Nature is primarily Becoming, and only secondarily 
Being, it is irrational, divisible, and most importantly, it does not revert upon itself.66 
That nature does not revert upon itself means that it has no self-contemplation and 
hence is not self-sufficient or self-constituted (αὐθυποστατόν). It also tells us that 
nature is not self-moving, as everything self-moving is capable of reverting upon 
itself.67 Self-sufficiency, self-constitution and self-motion are all properties of 
hypostases. 
Proclus’ motivation for nonetheless separating nature from soul is more than just 
obedience to, for example, the principle of continuity or of plenitude, which result in 
the seemingly endless proliferation of ontological levels. Rather, following his teacher 
Syrianus,68 he hereby tries to dissolve the incongruity he felt in the fact that there are 
things which are considered entirely soulless (i.e. they do not even have a vegetative 
soul), yet have some properties normally associated with being ensouled:  
T II.4 
“Nature...through which even the things that are most devoid of soul 
(ἀψυχότατα) participate in a kind of soul (ψυχῆς τινός).”69  
 
Saying that something participates in a kind of soul (ψυχῆς τινος) either means that it 
partakes in something that belongs to the genus of souls, and more precisely to a 
certain species thereof, or that it partakes in something that does not belong to the 
genus of souls, but to another genus that has some properties primarily belonging to 
souls, and hence is similar to a soul. Proclus could have chosen the former alternative, 
by adding a yet lower species to Soul, similar in part to the peripatetic vegetative soul. 
As Opsomer’s discussion of irrational souls reveals, Proclus does not explicitly do 
this.70 The indications that Proclus may have supposed a vegetative part, or vegetative 
capacities of the soul, are all indirect and based to a large extent on the assumption that 
                                               
66 See In Tim. I 10.16-21, quoted above as T II.2. 
67 El.Th. prop. 17. On reverting upon oneself see also El.Th. prop. 15-16, and Dodds’ comments 
(1932: 202ff.), cf. prop. 29-39. Steel (2006: with bibl. in n. 16). 
68 Syrianus In Metaph. 186.3-5, see also below II.5. For more references on nature in Syrianus see 
Cardullo (2000: 38-41). 
69 In Tim. I 11.21-25. Considering the use of the very rare superlative of ἄψυχος there is an undeniable 
presence in the background of Tim. 74e, where Timaeus describes different kinds of bones, the ones 
full of soul, which are covered with little flesh, and the soulless ones (Tim. 74e2-3, ἃ δ΄ ἀψυχότατα 
ἐντός), which are instead very meaty.  
70 Opsomer (2006). 
CHAPTER II 
- 30 -
Proclus’ doctrine can be gathered from that of later Neoplatonists (Ammonius and 
Philoponus).71  
It is exactly on this issue of irrational souls and their relation to nature, that Proclus’ 
philosophy becomes rather inarticulate. For example, when answering the question 
whether there is an Idea of Soul, Proclus informs us that the irrational souls are said to 
proceed from one monad and one Idea, which is called “the highest, spring-like 
Nature, which exists before the many natures” (ἀπὸ τῆς φυσέως τῆς ἀκροτάτης καὶ 
πηγαίας προϋπαρχούσης τῶν πολλῶν φύσεων, 820.5-7).72 This seems to contradict the 
ontological separation of nature from soul, and might lead one to believe that nature is 
a kind of soul after all.73 There is another option, however, which is that irrational 
souls are in fact natures. This option is to be preferred, because, as Opsomer (2006: 
137ff.) has shown, according to Proclus the irrational souls are not really souls, but 
rather images of souls.74 So, without going into the details of Proclus’ notion of 
irrationality, we can say that also with respect to irrational souls there is no need to 
assume that nature is a kind of Soul. 
 
Another rather complex issue is that of the relation between the world soul and 
Nature. In general, Proclus is hopelessly vague on this topic. Sometimes he ascribes to 
the world soul properties that elsewhere belong to universal Nature (e.g. the animating 
of things that have no life of their own),75 but there are three clinching arguments, I 
submit, against an identification. First of all, nature is entirely inseparable from the 
corporeal, but the world soul is considered to be separable and partly separate from the 
corporeal.76 After all, soul, as opposed to nature, does not really reside in body. As a 
consequence, nature is not a kind of soul.77 Secondly, when wondering what Fate is in 
his essay on the Myth of Er, Proclus clearly rejects the option that it is the world soul, 
only to embrace the option that is the nature of the universe, which is a clear indication 
                                               
71 For the evidence see Opsomer (2006: 144ff.).  
72 In Parm. 819.30-820.20. Note that nature is the source only of their appetitive powers (ὄρεξις). The 
irrational souls owe their cognitive powers to the Demiurge (In Parm. 820.2ff.). Moreover, they also 
descend from the paradigms in the rational souls, and depend on those rational souls (820.15ff.). Cf. In 
Remp. ΙΙ 12.13ff. for relation φύσις, fate, and vegetative part/kind the soul, and why τὰ φυτά...ἀπὸ 
φύσεως ὠνόμασται. 
73 Cf. Opsomer (2006: 158). 
74 El.Th. prop. 65 ἴνδαλματα ψυχῶν, Theol. Plat. III 23.23 εἴδωλα ψυχῶν. 
75 In Tim. I 407, cf. II 105-6. Cf. Praechter (1932: 1753). 
76 E.g. In Tim. I 406.31-407.1. 
77 Cf. In Tim. III 249.27ff, where Proclus limits the productivity of the mixing bowl of Tim. 41d to 
psychic life, and excepts physical and noeric life. That is, physical life and psychic life do not have the 
same source.  
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that he thinks of them as separate strata of reality, with distinct properties.78 And 
finally, the Demiurge is said to insert a life into the universe in order to make the 
universe receptive to soul.79 This life, which must therefore be ontologically distinct 
from soul, is in fact nature (see II.5). The conclusion is warranted, therefore, that 
nature is not identical to the world soul, and also not part of the world soul.80  
 
In conclusion we can say that for Proclus, as opposed to Plotinus, Nature is not a part 
of Soul, but rather is a separate level of reality, the lowest transitional hypostasis 
between the intelligible and the perceptible.  
For Plotinus, Nature had to be a kind of Soul because there are no more than three 
hypostases,81 while at the same time Nature, as a cause of Becoming, cannot be in 
Becoming but has to be ontologically prior to it.82 Proclus has a different solution for 
Nature’s causality. Before discussing that, however, we return to Proclus’ doxography 
on nature to see why, just as those ancient philosophers who claim that nature is a part 
of soul were off the mark, so too the ones who equated nature with physical powers, 
are wrong. 
 
II.3.2 Nature is not the natural 
 
As we have seen above, Proclus puts nature above “corporeal powers”, where we 
should understand “corporeal powers” to refer not only to the physical powers 
mentioned in the theory that nature is identical to weight, density, etc.,83 but in general 
to all theories that identify nature with something too low (i.e. matter, form, both, or 
physical powers).84 
                                               
78 In Remp. II 357.7ff. Note that Linguiti (forthcoming) has shown that for Proclus Fate and Nature are 
not identical. That does not diminish the use of the above paraphrased passage as argument for the 
separation of nature from soul. 
79 In Tim. I 401.22ff. 
80 Also in Syrianus the relation between nature and world soul is unclear. See on this subject Praechter 
(1932: 1753) and In Tim. III 248.25ff, where Syrianus’ view on the mixing bowl is described in a way 
that seems to imply that nature is a kind of encosmic soul. 
81 Enn. V.1, esp. 8. 
82 Enn. III.8 [30] 3.4-5, cf. Wagner (2002: 303). 
83 In Tim. I 10.9-10. 
84 It is clear from I 10.13ff. that this is what Proclus has in mind. He rejects the described theories in 
two clusters, soul on the one hand, and matter, form, their combination, and physical powers on the 
other, and consequently states that Plato places nature “between the two” (ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ἀμφοῖν), namely 
below soul, and above corporeal powers. The latter picks up the entire second cluster.  
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Just as Plotinus did, Proclus denies that nature is somehow identical with its 
products.85 Proclus initially bases his rejection of the equation of nature with its 
products, a theory held by “some predecessors of Plato”, on Laws X.86 Proclus 
mentions how those philosophers “called the natural ‘natures’” (τὰ φύσει φύσεις 
προσηγόρευον). This echoes Plato’s “...the natural, and nature, that which they 
incorrectly call just that...” (τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις, ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν αὐτὸ 
τοῦτο, Laws X 892b6).87 In the latter passage, the Athenian stranger is in the process of 
explaining to Clinias that philosophers of nature tend to have the “mindless opinion” 
(ἀνόητος δόξα, 891c7) that the natural (e.g. the elements) is identical to nature, where 
nature is “the coming into being of the first things”.88 They are wrong, the stranger 
says, because in fact soul is prior to those natural things, and hence soul should be 
called “natural” a fortiori. As in other Platonic passages, it is difficult to decide which 
value Plato gives to “nature” and “natural” here, as he is playing on the whole semantic 
spectrum between “what grows” and “what is primary”.89 His main point, however, 
can be construed as follows. The conclusion Plato wants to reach is that soul is ‘more 
natural’, i.e. superior to what the Presocratics call nature. This conclusion is reached 
from the starting point “whatever is the origin of the ‘coming into being of the first 
things’ is nature”, and the subsequent demonstration that soul is the origin of 
everything, and hence is ‘more natural’ than the elements. In this way, the philosophers 
who hold their ‘mindless opinions’ and ignore the superiority of soul to nature are 
refuted.  
Proclus in the In Tim. and elsewhere makes very selective use of the above argument 
and leaves out the mention of soul altogether. For example, in the essay on the Myth of 
Er he refers to the Laws passage, and states that the fact that nature is obviously 
(δηλαδή) not identical to the natural is reason to suppose that nature is something 
                                               
85 For Plotinus see Enn. IV.4.13, esp. 7-11, with Brisson’s discussion of the passage (forthcoming). 
Brisson points out that the notion of identity of nature with its products is Aristotelian and Stoic. It is 
true that at times Aristotle equates nature with its products (see below), but on occasion he also 
explicitly distinguishes between nature and the natural, Phys. II 1 192b35-193a1; perhaps also 199b14ff. 
Note that Proclus, who connects the identification of nature and its products with the passage from 
Laws X, is aiming his criticism primarily at pre-Platonic philosophers.  
86 In Tim. I 10.7-9, see above. 
87 The relevant passage starts at 891bff., where the equation of physical substances to nature is first 
mentioned. The argument runs up to 899c. 
88 τὰ πρῶτα here refers to the four elements, cf. 891c.  
89 This meaning of ‘natural’ can be understood only against the background of the wider context: the 
debate on the relation between φύσις and νόμος, and the question whether the faculties and products of 
soul belong to the former or the latter. See esp. 888e-889e and 891a-c. 
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beside (ἄλλη τις) bodies, i.e. the natural. Proclus assigns to nature, rather than to soul, 
the superiority of ‘the origin of everything’ to everything natural, i.e. its products.90  
 
In support of Plato’s position (as Proclus sees it) that nature is distinct from its 
products, our commentator adduces three arguments.  
(1) First of all: 
T II.5 
“...in accordance with our common notions (κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας) ‘nature’ is 
one thing, and ‘according to nature’ and ‘by nature’ another.” (In Tim. I 10.22-
23) 
 
Although Proclus does not explain this claim – after all, the whole point of introducing 
a common notion is that it is self-evident –, the emphatic juxtaposition of “nature” 
(φύσις), “according to nature” (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν) and “by nature” (τὸ φύσει) suggests that 
he is referring to the purely logical sense in which anything is prior to that which is 
derived from it (as the prepositional phrase and the “dative of agent phrase” are 
derived from the noun).91 
(2) The second argument adduced is one from a well-known analogy, namely that 
between nature and τέχνη: “After all,” Proclus states, “the product of art is not the 
same as art (In Tim. I 10.23-24 καὶ γὰρ τὸ τεχνητὸν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν τέχνην),” which 
allows him to infer that therefore the natural (understood as the product of nature) is 
not the same as nature. The parallel between nature and art, which assumes that art 
imitates nature and that therefore observations concerning art allow us to draw 
inferences about nature, is of course a common one in antiquity.92 This particular 
argument, however, stating that the artificial is not the same as art, and that the natural 
is not the same as nature, is first formulated by Alexander of Aphrodisias, in an 
explanation of Plato’s motivations for supposing the existence of Forms (“natures”) 
besides everything natural.93 Proclus’ application of it may contain an implicit criticism 
                                               
90 In Remp. II 357.21-26. Note that in the In Remp. Proclus uses the singular φύσιν, which we also find in 
the Platonic text. The “something else” is here identified by Proclus as Fate (Εἱμαρμένη). On the 
relation between nature and fate see Linguiti (forthcoming).  
91 Which is also expressed by the δηλαδή in In Remp. II 357.23, see previous note.  
92 E.g. Arist. Phys. II 1 193a31ff, II 8 199a13ff. The parallel between art and nature, on which see 
Fiedler (1978) (not consulted) is already present in Democritus (DK 68B154), and of course plays a 
crucial role in the Timaeus itself, in the sense that the Demiurge is portrayed as a craftsman who chisels, 
moulds and constructs the universe. On this theme see Brisson (1974: esp. ch. 1). For the relation 
between nature and the Demiurge according to Proclus see below, II.5. On the parallel between 
Timaeus and the Demiurge see chapter V. 
93 Alex. In Met. 55.17ff. 
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of Aristotle. In Phys. II 1 we find a passage that is verbally very similar, but in content 
almost the opposite: “just as we call what is artificial and a work of art ‘art’, so too do 
we call what is according to nature and natural ‘nature’”.94  
 
(3) The final argument brought in for nature’s separation from and in fact priority to its 
products is that nature contains the creative principles of “what comes after it” 
(Proclus is not bothered by the fact that with regard to the thesis he is arguing for this 
argument is merely begging the question):  
T II.6 
“...because it rises above (ὑπερέχουσαν) everything that comes after it by 
possessing their λόγοι and producing everything and giving it life.”95  
 
Behind this argument lies a principle of causation that is central to Proclian 
metaphysics. 
One of the tenets of Neoplatonic metaphysics is the rule that every productive cause is 
superior to what it produces.96 The hidden assumption in the context of the argument 
quoted above is, of course, that nature is indeed a productive cause. The fact that 
nature contains the creative principles of everything coming after it,97 and in that sense 
produces them, implies that nature must be superior to, and therefore distinct from, 
those products.98 Nature’s incorporeality, which is also brought up in the treatise in In 
Tim.,99 can be explained from this same principle. Since nature is the cause of 
everything corporeal, and a cause is altogether different from its effect (πανταχοῦ 
ἐξήλλακται), nature is incorporeal.100 Thus, when considered as the aggregate of all that 
                                               
94 Phys. 193a31f. ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν 
[λέγεται] καὶ τὸ φυσικόν. A small but revealing difference between the two passages is the fact that 
Aristotle has the verbal adjective τεχνικόν, whereas Proclus uses a (post-classical) passive participle 
(τεχνητόν). The passive form has a connotation that the verbal adjective lacks, namely that of an efficient 
cause of what is artificial that is distinct from the artificial (i.e. τέχνη). The parallel then suggests that there 
is also an efficient cause of the natural, and distinct from it: φύσις. The same connotation cannot be 
summoned by the corresponding adjective derived from φύσις, φυσικός (and φυτόν is semantically too 
limited). 
95 In Tim. I 10.19-21, quoted above as part of T II.2. Note that ‘it’ may refer to soul, see n. 46. 
96 El.Th. prop. 7, Πᾶν τὸ παρακτικὸν ἄλλου κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῆς τοῦ παραγομένου φύσεως and 75, Πᾶν τὸ 
κυρίως αἴτιον λεγόμενον ἐξῄρηται τοῦ ἀποτελέσματος. 
97 Whether ‘it’ refers to soul or nature makes no difference for the metaphysical distinction between 
nature and its products. See n. 46. 
98 Cf. In Tim. III 198.9-16 οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως [λόγοι προϊόντες] φυσικὰ [ποιοῦσι]. On the working of 
nature see II.5.  
99 In Tim. I 11.11, see further below. 
100 Theol.Plat. II 62.11-15. Cf. In Tim. I 257.10-11 παντελῶς ἀσώματος.   
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which is caused by nature, “the natural” cannot be identical to nature. Instead, there 
has to be a separate, incorporeal, causally efficient nature. Siorvanes and Rosán take 
this to imply that there has to be a transcendent monad of Nature,101 which brings us 
to the question on which ontological level nature should primarily be placed. 
 
II.4 The ontological level of Nature  
 
In summary, the preceding paragraphs yield the following picture. On the one hand, 
nature is set apart from soul, because of its immersion into bodies, its divisibility, and 
its lack of self-sufficiency. On the other hand, that which is called nature primarily, 
especially in the introduction to the in Tim., is an incorporeal productive cause, and 
hence, Proclian metaphysics would suggest, a transcendent monad (Nature).  
These two sides do not sit easily together. Immanence and divisibility as such are 
incompatible with transcendence and productive causality.102 The tension becomes 
even more acute if one considers nature in terms of participation, i.e. assuming that 
everything natural somehow participates in Nature, which presupposes the existence of 
an imparticipable Form of Nature. We have seen above (II.3.1) that Nature is the “of 
another”, whereas soul is “of another and of itself”, and mind is “of itself”. These 
expressions were explained among others with reference to participation: Soul is “of 
another” because of being participated, and “of itself” due to not descending into the 
participant (τῷ μὴ νεύειν, 10.28). From this we can conclude by analogy that nature, 
being “of another”, is participated, and does descend into its participant (cf. δύνουσα, 
10.25) – if it did not, it would also be “of itself”. If nature is participated, however, 
according to Proclian metaphysics there should be an unparticipated Nature,103 i.e. a 
Nature that is not connected with body. 104 
One can see this tension very nicely illustrated in Lowry’s table of (im-)participables, 
which I reproduce at the end of this chapter.105 Lowry’s table II presents an overview 
of all of Proclian reality in terms of what is participated and imparticipable, connected 
to the levels of divinity found in the Platonic Theology. It is revealing that the table has 
                                               
101 Cf. El.Th. prop. 109, In Tim. III 115.23-27, Theol.Plat. V 18, 64.3-20 for indications in that direction. 
For Siorvanes and Rosán see the next section. 
102 This tension is present in Platonic metaphysics as a whole, but is most acutely felt in the case of 
nature, since, as opposed to other levels of reality that are related to the corporeal, such as soul, nature 
is explicitly denied any existence separate from the corporeal.  
103 El.Th. prop. 23. 
104 This has been pointed out by Siorvanes (1996: 138), albeit in confusing terms, as he takes ‘monadic’ 
to be an equivalent of ‘imparticipable’. Proclus does not use the word ‘monadic’ only or even 
predominantly in this sense.  
105 Lowry (1980: 103).  
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two question marks, where by analogical reasoning one would expect (1) divine 
unparticipated Nature with the hypercosmic and encosmic gods and (2) divine 
participated Nature with the encosmic gods. 106 
As I will argue, Proclus himself is well aware of the impossibility of an imparticipable 
Nature, and the first question mark will remain. The second question mark, however, 
will be shown to be the place of the Nature of the universe.  
 
II.4.1 Hypercosmic-and-encosmic – Siorvanes’ solution 
 
Rosán (1949) and Siorvanes (1996) have assumed the existence of imparticipable 
Nature, and have assigned to this imparticipable Nature a particular level of divinity, 
namely that of the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods.107 This identification is nowhere 
made by Proclus, yet Rosán assumes it to be correct without any argumentation. 
Siorvanes does present an extensive argumentation. In the following, we will look into 
his main argument, which will be shown to be untenable. The question whether there 
is an imparticipable Nature will not be answered here, but in the next section. 
 
Siorvanes (1996: 137-8) assumes the following. Immanent nature cannot be 
imparticipable. Yet for every participable there has to be an imparticipable monad. 
Therefore, there has to be an imparticipable monad of Nature that “is exempt from 
any link with body”. His support for this thesis concerning the existence of an 
imparticipable monad of Nature rests mainly on the assumption that the level of 
divinity of Nature is that of the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods, also called – among 
others –  the unfettered gods (ἀπόλυτοι),108 due to their indivisibility, and the 
immaculate gods, due to the fact that they do not descend (μὴ ῥέπον). This level of 
divinity is the one just below that of Soul.109  
This interpretation has several problems. First of all, apart from the fact that Proclus 
never explicitly assigns Nature to this order of gods (as Siorvanes also admits), the 
terms Proclus uses to describe them are themselves associated with Soul, not with 
Nature. This is enough reason to conclude that these hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods 
cannot be on the same ontological level as the nature discussed in the introduction of 
the In Tim., since that nature is expressly characterized as divisible and descending (see 
                                               
106 On the thesis that Nature does not belong to the level of the hypercosmic and encosmic gods, see 
II.4.1. On Nature’s divinity see also II.5.1.  
107 Cf. Beutler in RE sv Proklos. 
108 Theol.Plat. VI 15 74.21ff 
109 For the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods see Theol.Plat. VI 15-24. 
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II.3). But this is not what is at stake. Rather, we want to know whether there is also a 
nature on a higher ontological level.  
Secondly, the activities of this hypercosmic-and-encosmic Nature would have to be, as 
Siorvanes calls it, “touch and go”.110 This qualification is applicable to the 
hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods. It is also applicable, however, to the world soul, 
which is therefore ranged with the unfettered gods.111 Combine this with the fact that 
nature is on a lower ontological stratum than soul (including the world soul, see II.3.1), 
and we have to conclude that nature can not be found on the level of the hypercosmic-
and-encosmic god, unless it belongs to a lower level within the order. We will return to 
this below. 
Finally, Siorvanes (1996: 138) also argues that, since Proclus mentions that the 
Demiurge uses Nature and Necessity in creating, which comes down to identifying 
them, and since Necessity is ranged with the unfettered gods, Nature should be ranged 
with the unfettered gods. We will not here go into the highly complicated relation 
between Nature and Necessity (treated by Proclus among others in Prov. 11-13; see 
below). Suffice it to say that this argument is a non sequitur as long as the identity of the 
two is not proved: that Nature and Necessity are both used by the Demiurge is no 
reason in itself to put them in the same order of divinity. And as Linguiti has recently 
shown in an as yet unpublished paper, Nature and Fate (sometimes called Necessity) 
are closely related, but not identical.112 
An argument in favour of locating Nature with the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods is 
the fact that Proclus ascribes to some gods of the dodecad of hypercosmic-and-
encosmic gods functions which he also ascribes to universal Nature. Hephaestus, the 
third god in the demiurgic triad, inspires the corporeal with natures, Ares, the third god 
in the guardian triad, gives corporeal natures strength, power and solidity, and Artemis, 
the third god in the vivific triad, activates the physical principles (παντὰς κινοῦσα τοὺς 
                                               
110 Siorvanes does not give a reference, but I am quite certain that the quotation he presents in support 
of this qualification of touching and not touching (ἁφὴ καὶ μὴ ἁφή) does not stem directly from 
Proclus, but rather from Rosán (1949: 171) (“touching (ἁφή) and not touching (μὴ ἀφή)”. Rosán, in 
turn, refers to a passage in the Platonic Theology (VI 24 109.19-114.22, re. Parm. 149d5-6, ἅπτεταί τε καὶ 
οὐχ ἅπτεται), i.e. also from the discussion of the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods. The same image of 
touching-and-not occurs in Arist. GA II 1 734b15-16, where ‘that which made the semen’, i.e. the male 
parent, is said to set up movement in an embryo ‘not by touching any one part at the moment, but by 
having touched one previously’ (transl. Platt.). I thank professor A.P. Bos for attracting my attention to 
this passage. 
111 In Tim. II 297.2-4, cf. In Parm. 1221.32ff., where “the one divine Soul” is said to be intermediate 
between the encosmic and the hypercosmic. 
112 Linguiti (forthcoming). 
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φυσικοὺς λόγους εἰς ἐνέργειαν, 98.9-10).113 Perhaps the solution to the question whether 
or not Nature belongs to the order of hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods can be found in 
the fact that the gods that perform the “natural” activities are always the third and 
lowest in the triad. If we allow for a hierarchy within the unfettered order, such that 
not every god in the dodecad is both hypercosmic and encosmic, but in which the 
lowest gods of the triads are always encosmic, Nature could be found at the bottom, so 
to speak, of the order of the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods. This will have to remain 
a tentative solution, however. We will see that nature is indeed encosmic yet 
transcending its products. We will not, however, further study Proclus’ views on the 
relation between nature and the hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods. 
In short, Nature is certainly not to be identified with the whole realm of unfettered or 
absolute order of gods described in book VI of the Platonic Theology, and if it can be 
identified with a part of the order, then not with the hypercosmic part. There are no 
reasons to exclude Nature’s belonging to the order of the encosmic gods. For now, 
however, arguments in favour of this will have to remain primarily negative. If Nature 
indeed fits in the order of unfettered gods, it belongs to its lower, i.e. encosmic aspect. 
If it does not, it has to belong to a lower order, and there is only one order below that 
of the unfettered gods, namely that of the encosmic gods themselves, which splits into 
the heavenly and sublunary gods.114 Since the lowest end of the chain of divinity is the 
encosmic gods, it is clear from this description that gods need not be non-immanent in 
order to be transcendent. Likewise, the question whether there is an imparticipable 
Nature cannot be rephrased as “is nature immanent or transcendent?”115  
Little is known about the order of encosmic gods. As Opsomer argues, it consists of a 
monad followed by a triad. What we do know, and which provides us with a potential 
argument for locating Nature in this order, is that the monad of the order, Dionysus, 
can be identified with the world soul, as “an essentially hypercosmic god in an 
encosmic environment”.116 Nature being ranged ontologically lower than the world 
soul (see II.3.1), it would have to belong to the encosmic gods, unless the order of the 
hypercosmic-and-encosmic gods partly overlaps with the order of the encosmic gods 
in such a way that the monad of the encosmic gods is ontologically prior to the lowest 
                                               
113 Theol. Plat. VI 22. Note also that there are no activities in the fourth, anagogic, triad that are in any 
way related to the activities of φύσις. This can be explained from the fact that the fourth triad concerns 
epistrophê, which is something nature does not have. See also Opsomer (2000: 121). On the working of 
nature see II.5. 
114 Cf. In Tim. III 162.15, on what Proclus calls the ‘golden chain’ of levels of gods. The sublunary gods 
manage genesis in an ingenerated manner, and nature in a supernatural manner. On the divinity of 
Nature, see also II.4.2.  
115 This was pointed out to me by J. Opsomer, during the ESF Workshop ‘Physics and philosophy of 
nature in Greek Neoplatonism’, Castelvecchio Pascoli, June 2006. 
116 Opsomer (2000: 121-2) 
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gods of the hypercosmic-and-encosmic order. This issue will have to be left 
unresolved. We can, however, come to a conclusion on the ontological status of 
Nature without having pinpointed its divinity. 
 
II.4.2 Chain of Nature – Proclus’ solution 
 
In this section I will argue that for Proclus the existence of an imparticipable monad of 
Nature is beyond dispute, and that he dissolves the paradox of the imparticipable 
monad simply by not calling it nature. This may not sound like a solution at all, and in 
a sense it is not. I maintain that in the case of Nature Proclus has to bend the rules of 
his own metaphysics in order to allow for a lowest transitional hypostasis (after Soul) 
between the intelligible realm and the realm of the sensible. 
As said above, and as is fitting to his metaphysics, Proclus does not distinguish one 
Nature, but a whole gamut of natures. So far we have spoken mainly about the nature 
that is the subject of the treatise in the introduction to the In Tim.. As is to be expected, 
Proclus there has in mind the hypostasis of Nature, which, I will argue, is in fact 
universal Nature.117 This universal Nature is present also elsewhere in Proclus’ work, 
and is sometimes called “one Nature” (μία φύσις) .118  
In order to get a clear picture of the place of the different kinds of nature within the 
intricate configuration of Proclus’ metaphysics, and to understand why an ontologically 
paradoxical imparticipable Nature is not needed, let us first look into the whole “chain 
of nature”, before determining in more detail the characteristics of universal Nature.  
 
A comprehensive overview of the chain of nature is to be found in the commentary on 
the Parmenides, in Proclus’ fourth argument for the existence of the Forms.119 In this 
argument, we find the following levels of nature in ascending order of productive 
power, generality, etc.:  
(1) individual (maternal) natures, i.e. particular natures that are passed on through the 
mother.120 Among these particular natures as on every level of Proclus’ ontology, we 
read in El.Th., a progression can be distinguished, in this case from natures that are 
                                               
117 Cf. In Tim. I 12.3, ἡ ὅλη φύσις. 
118 ἡ μία φύσις: El.Th. prop. 21.23, 24-5; In Tim. II 24.7, 72.26, 86.26, III 137.31. ἡ ὅλη φύσις: El.Th. 
prop.21.32; prop. 109.27; In Crat. 88.36-39 ; In Tim. I 51.27, II 27.8-9, 53.27, III 115.26, 273.6. We 
should be aware of the risk of over-interpreting these latter passages, since the expression ἡ ὅλη φύσις 
– as opposed to ἡ μία φύσις – may simply refer to the aggregate of everything natural.  
119 In Parm. 791.28-795.8. As D'Hoine (2006: 49) has pointed out, the entire argument is structured as a 
fictitious dialogue with a peripatetic philosopher.  
120 See D'Hoine (2006: 52-3). 
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somehow presided over by souls, to natures that are just that (φύσεις μόνον, El.Th. 
prop. 111). 
(2) first level universal nature = the nature of the earth, containing the principles of all 
individual natures. Presumably, there are individual natures and universal natures also 
in each of the other three spheres of elements, but they remain implicit. 
(3) second level universal nature = the nature of the moon, containing the species of 
the natures of all four spheres of the elements. 121 After this follows “an ascent through 
(all?) the spheres” (διὰ τῶν σφαιρῶν ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἄνοδον), which suggests that after 
the earth and the moon follow the spheres of the other planets, again presumably each 
with its own nature, containing the principles of all the lower natures. 
(4) the ascent ultimately leads to the third level universal nature = the nature of the 
universe (ἡ φύσις τοῦ παντός).122  
This last nature is also the Nature of the In Tim., as is clear from its description (In 
Parm 793.22-794.5): this most universal Nature contains the rational principles of 
everything, but it descends into bodies (δύνασα κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων, In Parm 794.3-4), 
and is thus “of others, not of herself” (ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ἑαυτῆς, In Parm 794.17-18). 
We can thus conclude that ἡ φύσις τοῦ παντός, ἡ μία φύσις, and ἡ ὅλη φύσις are all terms 
for universal Nature which is also the nature of the universe.  
The existence of this immanent, irrational yet λόγοι-possessing Nature, is required for 
two reasons:123 on the one hand, the proximate cause of the information of the 
corporeal has to be an irrational cause, in order to prevent it from withdrawing from 
the objects it informs, which would leave the corporeal world bereft of a rational 
structure. On the other hand, this same cause has to be rational in the sense of 
possessing λόγοι, in order to ensure the maintenance of proper (i.e. rational) 
boundaries and motions, which is something the corporeal, being ἑτεροκίνητος, cannot 
do itself. So against the Peripatetics, Proclus maintains that nature can be irrational 
without thereby loosing its rational efficient power.124 This is an important issue for 
him, which he introduces also in the very first pages of the In Tim: the Peripatetics, he 
complains, may well define nature as the source of motion, but they consequently 
deprive it of the efficient power it should have according to this definition, by denying 
                                               
121 Cf. Theol. Plat. III 2 8.12-24, where Proclus explains how the natures of (the) earth, fire and the 
moon owe their being and activity to universal nature. On the connexion between moon and nature, 
which Proclus ascribes to Iamblichus, see In Tim. I 34.13, III 65.17-20, III 69.15, III 162.17, cf. III 
355.16. 
122 This is the “world nature” Siorvanes (1996: 145) says ought to exist as intermediary between the 
world soul and the world body. 
123 In Parm. 794.11-17, see also below, II.5. On φύσις as containing creative reason-principles see also 
Syrianus In Met. 39.21 and Simpl. In Phys. 298.18ff. 
124 Cf. Dörrie and Baltes (1998: 232). 
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nature the possession of the λόγοι of its products.125 The very criticism Aristotle 
addresses to Plato, namely that he does not distinguish an efficient cause of natural 
things, is here turned against the Peripatetic philosophers.126 
Although immanent irrational Nature is necessary for the information of the material 
world, it is not sufficient. A true cause (ἡ κυριωτάτη αἰτία), Proclus continues, has to be 
transcendent to its effects,127 and thus cannot reside in them as does the Nature of the 
universe. Moreover, Nature is irrational, and therefore the λόγοι, rational principles, in 
the world of sense perception cannot have their ultimate source in Nature.128 It would 
be truly irrational and incorrect, Proclus tells us, to turn over the universe to irrational 
ratios (ἀλόγοις γάρ, οἶμαι, λόγοις ἐπιτρέψαι τὸ πᾶν μὴ τῷ ὂντι ἄλογον ᾖ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθόν, 
794.26-27).129 Considering the οἶμαι, I think what we have here is a moment of 
Proclian pride at his own play with words. If so, its purpose is clear, as it underlines the 
point made, which is that there must be a higher, transcendent and rational cause that 
contains the Forms as source of the λόγοι of Nature.130 This cause is the Demiurge: 
T II.7 
“It is then necessary to put the reason-pinrciples in some other being that will 
know what is within him and whose action will be knowing as well as creative. 
It would be absurd that we should know the All and the causes of what comes 
to be, and the maker himself be ignorant both of himself and of the things he 
makes. A knowledge, then, greater than our own will reside in the cause of the 
cosmos, inasmuch as it not only knows but gives reality to all things, where we 
only know them. And if the demiurgic cause of the All knows all things but 
looks to the outside, again he will be ignorant of himself and be inferior to a 
particular soul. But if it is to himself that he looks, all the Ideas are in him, 
intellectual and knowing, not outside in phenomena only.”131 
 
                                               
125 In Tim. I 2.20ff; 268.13-22; 389.8-9; In Parm. 905.18-27. The irrationality of nature is illustrated with 
the myth of the Statesman, in which nature is incapable of guiding the universe the moment the 
Demiurge abandons it. See below, II.5.2.  
126 Arist. Met. Α 6 988a8ff., cf. 992b4f. and M 5 1079b12ff. 
127 El.Th. prop. 75. Here transcendence is taken in the strong sense of non-immanence. 
128 A true cause has to be rational (and divine): In Parm. 795.35-6.  
129 Thus Schneider’s (1996: 439, n. 4) claim that the fact that nature has λόγοι “ne signifie pas que ces 
raisons sont rationelles” is unjustified.  
130 In Parm. 794.23-795.8. This is the actual motivation for Proclus’ discussion of the notion of nature 
in the In Parm.: coupled with the Neoplatonic principles of causation (see n. 96) it allows him to build a 
case for the existence of transcendent Forms.  
131 In Parm. 794.27-795.8. 
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One might object at this point that in his argumentation for the ontological separation 
between Nature and its products (see above II.3.2), Proclus took recourse to the 
transcendence of causes, and that hence he is now contradicting himself when he 
claims that we need a cause of Nature just because Nature itself is not transcendent. 
Fortunately, Proclus’ statements, if properly understood, turn out to be congruent, due 
to the different contexts of the two cases (natural vs. Nature and Nature vs. cause of 
Nature). In the first case, of the natural vs. Nature, the context of the argument is that 
of production. All Proclus is maintaining there, is that any producer is ontologically 
prior to (ὑπερέχουσαν) its products (as stated in prop. 7 of the El.Th.) and in that sense 
transcends it. In the second case, of Nature vs. the cause of Nature, Proclus is instead 
speaking of a more limited domain, namely that of the true cause (ἡ κυριωτάτη αἰτία), 
discussed in El.Th. prop. 75 (τὸ κυρίως αἴτιον λεγόμενον), as opposed to subsidiary 
causes (αἱ συναιτίαι). It is in this context that the technical term for transcendence 
(ἐξῃρήται) comes in. Nature, as we will see, is not a real cause but a subsidiary cause (see 
II.5.2) and as such only partly transcends its effects. Transcendence in Proclus’ system 
is a property that comes in kinds and degrees, as is clear from his remark “the more a 
cause transcends its effects, the more pure and perfect its activity”.132 Nature 
transcends the corporeal to the extent that it is incorporeal, contains some rationality, 
has more causal power, and more unity. 
 
(i) Universal Nature  
The above argument from the In Parm. reveals that and why universal Nature is 
immanent, namely in order to ensure an internal cause of movement and order of what 
is not capable of moving and ordering itself. This immanence of Nature is beautifully 
illustrated by Proclus with an image, inspired on Aristotle:  
T II.8 
“For Nature, when she descends into bodies, acts in them as you might imagine an 
artificer descending into his pieces of wood and hollowing them out from inside, 
straightening, drilling, and shaping them. Something like this is the case with 
Nature, which infuses itself into bodies, inhabits their mass, and, together with 
them, breathes the reason principles and motion from inside.”133 
                                               
132 In Parm. 794.20-22. 
133 In Parm. 794.3-11: ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις δύνασα κατὰ τῶν σωμάτων οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ποιεῖ οἶον εἰ τὸν 
τεχνίτην νοήσειας δύναντα κατὰ τῶν ξύλων, καὶ ἔνδοθεν αὐτὰ κοιλαίνοντα, εὐθύνοντα, τετραίνοντα, 
σχηματίζοντα. Τοιοῦtον γάρ τι πέπονθεν ἡ φύσις, συνδιαβαπτιζομένη τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ ἐνοικοῦσα τοῖς 
ὄγκοις αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔνδοθεν συμπνέουσα τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν κίνησιν. Translation Morrow and 
Dillon (1987), modified. The workings of nature described in this passage as reminiscent Hephaestus, 
PLATONIC ΦΥΣΙΣ ACCORDING TO PROCLUS 
- 43 - 
 
This image is clearly concerned primarily with portraying the immanence of Nature, 
but is imprecise in that it suggests a rationality Nature does not have. Tracing the 
image of the carpenter back to its Aristotelian source helps explain Proclus’ intentions. 
The Stagirite also uses the image of the craftsman working from inside his product, 
although his point is rather different. Aristotle imagines that the art of shipbuilding 
would work just like nature, were it inside the wood.134 Aristotle’s aim here is to 
illustrate that teleology has a place in the works of nature even though nature does not 
deliberate. Likewise, Proclus’ carpenter should be read, not so much as a deliberating 
agent, but rather as an immanent active principle that displays (a derived) rationality.  
Let us return to the argument for the existence of Forms through the irrational 
rationality of Nature. Apart from showing why universal Nature is necessarily 
immanent, it also suggests that there is no imparticipable Nature as such, merely an 
imparticipable cause of universal yet participated Nature. If this is indeed the case, then 
discussions of the monads would have to reflect this difference between Nature and 
other hypostases. And in fact they do. In the corollary to proposition 21 of the Elements 
of Theology (the proposition that states that every order of reality is proceeded by a 
monad and from there evolves into plurality) we encounter universal Nature again 
when Proclus identifies “the nature of the whole” as the monad on which all other 
natures depend (αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐκ μιᾶς εἰσι τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως, 24-25).135 A few lines 
later, this “nature of the whole” is called “whole nature” (μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν αἱ πολλαὶ 
φύσεις, 32-3). This phrase, which we now know we should understand to mean 
“universal Nature”, occurs in the summary of the corollary, and is significant for its 
divergence from the other formulations used:  
T II.9 
“Thus there are henads consequent upon the primal (πρῶτον) One, intelligences 
consequent on the primal (πρῶτον) Intelligence, souls consequent on the primal 
                                                                                                                                              
the artificer (In Tim. I 142.23) who is said to breathe nature into (ἐμπνεῖ) bodies and create all the seats 
of the encosmic gods (Theol.Plat. VI 22, 97.15-16 Saffrey-Westerink). 
134 Phys. II 8, 199b28-9. The same Aristotelian image seems to be behind In Parm 841.8-14, where 
Proclus criticizes the simile of wax impressions for the Forms by pointing out that Forms, and nature, 
have an internal activity, as opposed to the external activity of craft (I owe this reference to prof. C. 
Steel). 
135 Proclus in first instance introduces ἡ φύσις τοῦ σώματος, which might lead one to believe that he is 
speaking about the essence of body, rather than about nature which is immanent in body. Considering 
the fact that body does not recur in any way in the remainder of prop. 21 and corollary, I take it 
Proclus adds τοῦ σώματος as an explanatory genitive, to limit the discussion to Nature as immanent 
principle. Cf. In Parm. 703.18-19 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσεων ἡ μία καὶ ὅλη φύσις πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὑφέστηκε. 
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(πρώτην) Soul, and a plurality of natures consequent on universal (ὅλην) 
Nature.” (El.Th. 21.30-33, transl. Dodds) 
 
The One, Intelligence and Soul all receive the adjective “primal” (πρῶτον/πρῶτην), but 
Nature is credited only with “universal” (ὅλην), because there is no primal Nature. Here, as 
in the In Parm. and In Tim., the realm of Nature does not ascend higher than the 
“nature of the whole”, i.e. universal Nature (ἡ τοῦ ὅλου/παντὸς φύσις). 136  
 
It has become clear by now that for Proclus ἡ φύσις (ἁπλῶς, as it were) is identical to 
the nature of the universe, which in turn is the most universal Nature, which is 
participated and immanent.137 We also know that there must be a physically 
transcendent cause of Nature. The following section will deal with that demiurgic cause 
of Nature. This will lead us to a yet higher source of Nature, namely the life-giving 
Goddess Rhea/Hecate. 
  
(ii) Demiurgic Nature 
Proclus finds evidence for a Platonic theory of a cause of universal Nature that exists 
in the Demiurge in Timaeus 41e. Unfortunately, his exegesis of this passage is not very 
consistent.  
T II.10 
“He mounted each soul in a carriage, as it were, showed them the nature of the 
universe, and described to them the laws of fate.” (Tim. 41e1-3, transl. Zeyl, 
slightly modified)  
 
In first instance, when refuting the thesis (ascribed to Theodorus of Asine) that the 
nature of the universe which the Demiurge shows to the souls, and the vehicle the 
                                               
136 At the same time, “the nature of everything” (ἡ φύσις τοῦ παντός) keeps the meaning it seems to 
have in the Timaeus, namely of “character of the universe”. Cf. Tim. 27a4 (Proclus does not comment 
on the phrase there), 41e2 (see below (ii)), 47a7. Cf. In Tim. I 217.23-4 (re. Tim. 27c4) and In Tim. I 
338.23-4, where we find ἡ ὅλη φύσις (re. Tim. 29b3). Likewise In Tim. I 13.13, 339.32, Prov. 11 36.18 
“una mundi natura”. 
137 Rosán argues for the physical transcendence of Nature with respect to the material world by 
referring to In Parm. 1045, where we find λέγω δὲ φύσιν τὴν μίαν ζωὴν τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς ὑπερέχουσαν, 
καὶ μετασχοῦσαν μετὰ νοῦν καὶ ψυχὴν, διὰ νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς, γενέσεως (32-35). Considering the immediately 
foregoing sentence, however, (...τὴν φύσιν...ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡδρασμένην τοῖς κινουμένοις καὶ ἠρεμοῦσι) I think 
we should accept Taylor’s conjecture ὑπάρχουσαν for ὑπερέχουσαν, in which case the text does not 
support Rosán’s argument anymore. The other passage he refers to (In Tim. II 11) is completely 
irrelevant in this context. 
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souls are mounted onto are identical, our commentator assumes that the nature of the 
cosmos here referred to is ontologically posterior to the souls:  
T II.11 
“As [the souls] contemplate nature (τὴν φύσιν) they see the entire cosmic order 
(πᾶσαν τὴν κοσμικὴν τάξιν), while they themselves are ordered (τεταγμένας) 
above the nature of the cosmos (ὑπὲρ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ κόσμου), despite having 
obtained the encosmic sphere that is suitable to them. For first they were 
constituted, then they were distributed over the divine hegemonies, and then in 
the third place they entered their vehicles, contemplated nature (τὴν φύσιν), and 
heard the laws of fate.”138 
 
The nature of the cosmos is clearly put on an ontological level below that of the souls, 
assuming, that is, that the φύσιν that is the object of their contemplation is identical to 
the φύσιν τοῦ κόσμου that they supersede. There seems to be no reason in the above 
passage to assume otherwise – quite the contrary, identity is suggested by the parallel 
between φύσιν... πᾶσαν τὴν κοσμικὴν τάξιν and τὴν φύσιν τοῦ κόσμου. A little further, 
however, in the discussion of the same lemma,139 our commentator realizes that for the 
Demiurge to show the nature of the universe to the souls, the nature in question 
cannot be ontologically posterior to him: 
T II.12 
“So how does the Demiurge show them the nature of the universe (τὴν τοῦ 
παντὸς φύσιν)? Did he maybe turn them towards the cosmos and equip them to 
contemplate the λόγοι in nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει)?”140 
 
This option is rejected for two reasons. First of all, it would result in diverting the souls 
from λόγοι that are separable from the perceptible to those that are inseparable, 
thereby demoting the souls and excluding their reversion.141 So instead the Demiurge 
leads the souls up to the intelligible, makes them revert to himself (ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς 
ἑαυτὸν),142 separates them from matter (sic), and fills them with divine powers and 
demiurgic ideas.143 Secondly, the Demiurge himself cannot turn to something 
posterior: whoever shows something to someone else also looks at the object shown; 
                                               
138 In Tim. III 266.9-16. 
139 In Tim. III 270.16ff. 
140 In Tim. III 270.17-18. 
141 In Tim. III 270.19-21. 
142 Cf. the Demiurge’s address to the lower gods, and especially the words θεοί θεῶν at Tim. 41a, as a 
means of making them revert to him, see In Tim. III 199.13ff. See also V.4.2. 
143 In Tim. III 270.21-23. 
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the Demiurge shows the souls nature; therefore the Demiurge looks at the nature 
shown to the souls; the Demiurge looks only at himself or at that which is prior to 
himself, since looking to something “outside”, and to the world of phenomena, would 
make the Demiurge inferior even to individual souls;144 therefore the Demiurge has 
within himself the unitary principles (ἑνιαῖαι ἀρχαί) of everything, and he has pre-
established within himself the powers (δυνάμεις) of the generation of everything, 
including Nature.145 Note that this is not the conclusion one expects, as this would 
rather be “therefore the nature of the universe shown to the souls is prior to or in the 
Demiurge”. Instead, an extra argument is somewhat surreptitiously introduced, namely 
that the Demiurge possesses the principles of everything and hence, it is implied, also 
of Nature. This allows Proclus to avoid the logically necessary conclusion that the 
nature of the universe itself is pre-established in the Demiurge, by replacing it with the 
ἀρχαί and δυνάμεις of the creation of Nature. So the “nature” of the universe shown to 
the souls is not really (a) nature, but rather the paradigm, the source, and the cause, of 
(the) Nature (of everything), that exists within the Demiurge.146 It is nature only κατ’ 
αἰτίαν, and in a supernatural manner (ὑπερφυῶς).147 
 
(iii) The source of Nature 
According to the Chaldaean Oracles, there is an ultimate source of nature even above 
the Demiurge. In the context of the Parmenides, Proclus casually brushes aside this 
cause of nature as it is identified by the theologians, as he there prefers what he calls 
the philosophical (or Platonic) explanation of the cause of nature, i.e. that it is in the 
Demiurge.148 In the In Tim., however, our commentator favours the theological 
explanation, and for this reason, after introducing the paradigm of universal Nature in 
the Demiurge, he brings in an even higher cause of nature:  
T II.13 
“We should also speak after another manner, not just by philosophically placing 
an idea only in the Demiurge, but we should also, as the theologians teach, 
                                               
144 In Parm. 795.2-5. 
145 In Tim. III 270.25-31. For this argument see also Theol.Plat. V 32, esp. 118.3-9; cf. In Parm. 821.9-33, 
where the argument functions in the proof for the existence of a Form of Nature. 
146 In Tim. III 270.24-5. Note that the fact that φύσις is shown (ἔδειξεν) whereas the laws are told (εἶπεν) 
is given metaphysical significance by Proclus, in that nature is something separate from the souls, 
whereas the laws are somehow embedded in them (καὶ γὰρ τὴν μὲν φύσιν “ἔδειξεν” αὐταῖς, ὡς ἐτέραν 
αὐτῶν οὖσαν, τοὺς δὲ νόμους “εἶπεν”, ὡς ἐγγράφων ἐν αὐταῖς, In Tim. III 275.18-19). This is another 
indication of the essential difference between nature and soul (or in this case, souls). 
147 In Tim. III 270.32. 
148 In Parm. 821.5ff. 
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contemplate nature primarily as it intellectually pre-exists in the lifegiving 
goddess. … So nature is primarily ‘on the back of the lifegiving goddess’, as the 
Oracle says: ‘Immense Nature is suspended on the back of the goddess.’ And 
from there it also proceeds to the demiurgic mind…” 149 
 
The more theological approach to nature reveals that the nature in the Demiurge is 
only a secondary source, and that the primary source of nature is “the life-giving 
goddess” as referred to in the Chaldaean oracles. This life-giving goddess is 
Rhea/Hecate. Hecate, in the Chaldaean Oracles, is in charge of the material world.150 
Her position in the Proclian pantheon is in between pure Intellect (Kronos) and 
demiurgic Intellect (Zeus). She corresponds with Rhea in the Orphic tradition. As is 
clear from several passages, for Proclus the two goddesses merge into one as the 
divinity that imparts life to the universe.151  
The fact that “Nature is suspended on the back” of this goddess can be explained as 
referring to Nature’s being diverted “backwards” (ὄπισθεν) to an external object, i.e. 
body, and is hence an illustration of Nature’s irrationality and immanence (cf. above ‘τὸ 
ἄλλου’).152 
We can now adjust the account of the nature that is shown to the souls by the 
Demiurge: he shows them the cause of nature that he has within himself, but as this 
nature has proceeded from the life-giving goddess he actually shows them that nature: 
T II.14 
“So the nature that [the Demiurge] shows the souls is that source-like (πηγαία) 
nature, that pre-exists in the entire life-giving goddess...”153 
 
                                               
149 In Tim. III 271.1-12. The same oracle (29 Kroll = fr. 54 (Des Places)) at In Tim. I 11.21; In Remp. II 
150.21; Theol.Plat. V 117-120 (see below). Cf. Damascius In Parm 156.31-157.28, who calls nature the 
third life of the lifegiving goddess. 
150 On Rhea/Hecate and Or.Chald. fr. 54, see Lewy (1956: 84 n. 65), Des Places (1971: 134, n. 5). On 
Hecate, the Timaeus and Proclus, see Brisson (2000: 139-43), (2003: esp. 118-9, 123). On Hecate in 
general, see Johnston (1990). Festugière (1966-8: vol. I, 27) rightly rejects Lewy’s identification of 
Hecate with Nature. See also van den Berg (2003: 193-5). Tarrant (2007: 97, n. 28; cf. 105, n. 66) points 
out the difficulties in pinning down this goddess and naming her, among others due to Proclus’ 
seeming disinterest in the latter. Tarrant also proposes Hera as a possible candidate. 
151 See e.g. Theol.Plat. V 117.8-120.25, where fragment 54 recurs in a context devoted to Rhea, and In 
Tim. III 249.12-20, which echoes it. 
152 In Remp. II 150.19-23. 
153 In Tim. III 271.22-24. 
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Proclus can still maintain that the nature shown is the one that is within the Demiurge, 
as the ultimate source of nature (ἡ πηγαία φύσις) proceeds from the life-giving goddess 
to the demiurgic mind,154 and is hence shown to the souls as it exists in his mind. 
The πηγαία φύσις is not Nature in the primary sense, but the source or cause of nature, 
and the phrase ἡ πηγαία φύσις is the equivalent of ἡ τῆς φύσεως πηγή (see below).155 If 
this is not already obvious from the fact that this ‘nature’ transcends the demiurgic 
source of nature, it also shows from Proclus’ terminology in his explanation of the 
oracle in the Platonic Theology.156 What is “suspended on the back of the life-giving 
goddess” as one of the three monads that depend on her (the other two being Soul and 
Virtue), is the source of nature (ἡ τῆς φύσεως πηγή, 118.1), and the primordial cause of 
nature (ἡ τῆς φύσεως πρωτουργὸν αἰτία, 119.26), not Nature itself.  
At one point, Proclus states that Rhea “in the end also gives birth to Nature”.157 As 
Festugière (1966-8: vol. V, 117 n. 1) points out, this myth is not to be found in Hesiod. 
In Greek mythology, Rhea’s last child is not Nature, but Zeus. A tentative 
interpretation of this puzzling claim that Rhea in the end gives birth to Nature could 
be the following. As Zeus, in his demiurgic function, possesses a blueprint of the 
nature of the universe, of which he is the creator, Rhea, by “in the end” giving birth to 
Zeus, gives birth also to paradigmatic Nature. 
 
For the sake of clarity, let me present the natures we have encountered so far, as well 
as the transcendent causes of nature, in a table: 
 
Table 1 - The Chain of Nature 
“Location” Kind of Nature 
Suspended from the back of the Life-
giving Goddess (Rhea/Hecate) 
Primary source and cause of nature 
In the mind of the Demiurge Demiurgic paradigm, the ἑνιαῖαι ἀρχαί 
and δυνάμεις of everything natural (the 
child of Rhea?) 
(In) the universe Immanent universal Nature, the 
nature of the universe, world nature, 
in which are pre-contained all 
subordinate natures, both heavenly 
                                               
154 In Tim. III 271.12. 
155 Compare the adjective replacing the substantive apposition (Kühner Gerth I 264). 
156 Theol.Plat. V 117-120. 
157 ἐπὶ τέλει καὶ αὐτὴν ἀποτίκτουσα τὴν Φύσιν, In Tim. III 249.12-20. 
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and sublunary  
In the planets? Universal planetary natures, containing 
all subordinate natures? 
In the moon Universal lunar nature, comprising the 
species of all sublunary natures. 
In the spheres of each of the elements? Universal elementary natures, 
containing the natures of whatever lives 
in that element? 
In the earth  Universal nature, containing all 
individual natures (that live in/on the 
earth?) 
In bodies Particular natures 
- presided over by souls 
- just natures 
 
Let us briefly return at this point to our initial question in this section II.4, namely 
whether there is an imparticipable monad of Nature. We know now that there is no 
imparticipable Nature, although there are sources, or causes, of the immanent 
hypostasis Nature. In terms of Lowry’s table (see the appendix to this chapter), one 
question mark will have to remain, namely that of the hypercosmic-and-encosmic, 
imparticipable monad below Soul. That Lowry’s riddle cannot be solved entirely is due 
also to a paradox inherent in the table: crossing the progression of henads there is the 
progression of imparticipables ((one), being, life, intellect, soul), yet this progression 
ends in the ‘henad’ divine body (θεῖον σῶμα), which is neither participated nor 
imparticipable, but material. In between imparticipable soul and divine material body, 
then, one would expect a transitional layer of reality, e.g. something participated.  
The second question mark, of the encosmic participated in between Soul and body, 
can now be replaced with – to use Lowry’s terminology – “θεία φύσις μεθεκτή”, divine 
participated nature, or universal Nature. 
 
II.5 Nature’s working 
 
Now that the ontological position of Nature has been established, let us return to the 
treatise on nature in the introduction to the In Tim. We know that nature is not a kind 
or a part of soul, that it is not identical to the sum of everything natural, and that its 
monad is not imparticipable. Time to move on to a positive assessment. What sort of 
thing is nature and what does it do? This is also the subject of the second half of the 
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treatise on nature in the introduction to the In Tim.158 Two things are crucial in the 
account of what nature is and does. First of all, there is the fact that nature is required 
as an internal source of motion and unity to the ἑτεροκίνητα, those things that do not 
have their own source of motion. Secondly, there is the one description of nature 
Proclus did not immediately reject in his doxography, namely that nature is a τεχνὴ 
θεοῦ.159  
 
II.5.1 Nature and the Demiurge 
 
Let us begin with the latter. Nature, Proclus tells us, is “the last of the causes that 
create (δημιουργούντων αἰτίων) this corporeal and sensible world”, “full of creative 
principles and powers, through which it guides the encosmic”.160 It is itself a god, but 
only in a derivative sense, through being inspired by the gods, and in the sense we call 
a statue divine.161  
To meet those who want nature to be a Demiurge halfway,162 Proclus suggests that 
nature could be called the lowest Demiurge, but in the sense that it is a demiurgic 
τέχνη.  
The notion of nature as a τέχνη θεοῦ, we have seen, has been traced back to the Stoic 
πῦρ τεχνικόν by Festugière.163 I propose, however, that this is one of the instances 
where Proclus manages to glean a positive theory of nature from Plato’s dialogues. The 
source, in this case, are the discussion of Laws X 891c-892c and the following remark 
of the Athenian stranger in the Sophist:  
T II.15 
“I maintain that everything that is called “natural” (τὰ φύσει λεγόμενα) is made 
by a divine craft (θείᾳ τέχνῃ).” (Sophist 265e3) 
 
Although the Athenian stranger is here in fact probably replacing nature as efficient 
agent with divine craft, this passage made its way into overviews of definitions of nature 
                                               
158 In Tim. I 11.9ff. 
159 See above II.3. 
160 In Tim. I 11.9-13; cf. 261.26-27. 
161 In Tim. I 8.5-8; 11.13-15. 
162 Proclus may be thinking of Numenius and Harpocration, whom he reports to have assumed the 
created world (ποίημα, κόσμος) as a third Demiurge (303.27ff). More generally he may have in mind 
the Peripatetic notion of demiurgic nature, see Arist. PA 645a6-23, cf. IA 711a18, PA 647b5. 
163 See above II.3. 
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as the Platonic view.164 I propose that the above passage from the Sophist, together with 
the notion of a craftsman of the natural world from the Timaeus (cf. esp. 33d1) and the 
discussion in Laws X on, among others, the existence of the gods and the primacy of 
τέχνη over φύσις,165 gave rise to various Neoplatonic concepts of divine craft, θεία 
τέχνη, or, as it is at times referred to, τέχνη (τοῦ) θεοῦ.166 Thus the phrase τέχνη θεοῦ in 
Proclus’ doxography may well refer to the development of that Platonic phrase θεία 
τέχνη.167 In that case, Proclus like earlier Platonists reads the Sophist passage as an 
identity statement given for the sake of clarifying the notion of nature: “Nature”, he 
understands, is “a divine craft”. 
So what does that mean, that nature is a divine craft? Not, as it did for the Stoics, that 
nature is a god and a craftsman,168 because for Proclus nature is not itself a god. 
Instead, it can be called a divine craft in the sense that it is a non-reverting emanation 
from the Demiurge, and an instrument of the gods that has an effective power of its 
own.169 Alexander of Aphrodisias also discusses and accepts the notion of nature as a 
divine craft, probably with the same passages from Sophist and Laws in mind,170 but the 
interpretation he has of ‘divine craft’ is of course rather different. He rejects the claim 
that nature is a divine craft, taking this to mean that would be rational and create 
teleologically by using a paradigm, and argues instead for nature’s utter irrationality. He 
does not object to calling nature a divine craft as long as that means that it is a non-
rational power that ultimately stems from the gods, not that it is a craft employed by 
the gods.171 Proclus seems to follow Alexander to a great extent, but does not agree 
with his conclusion: that nature is non-rational does not mean that, because it does not 
contemplate it herself, it cannot apply the paradigm, or a weaker version thereof. This 
                                               
164 E.g. Galen. defin. medicae 371.4-6, where it is opposed to the Stoic πῦρ τεχνικόν. For Alexander’s 
discussion of the Platonic notion of nature as divine craft at In Met. 104.3ff see below.  
165 Cf. Laws 889c5-6 οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν, οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλά, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ 
τύχῃ [πασῶν γενομένων], and, of the refutation, esp. 892b3-8.  
166 E.g. in Philo Quis heres 156.2 ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ τέχνη, about the craft with which the Demiurge created 
(ἐδημιούργει) the universe, cf. Aet. mundi 41.6, or Athenagoras, who refers to what he calls the Platonic 
view that the cosmos is a τέχνη θεοῦ (Suppl. 16.3). On the terminology of craft in the Timaeus see 
Brisson (1974: chapter 1). The fact that the expression (ἡ) τέχνη (τοῦ) θεοῦ is found mainly in Christian 
contexts may be an indication of a rare Christian influence in Proclus’ work. For a discussion of the 
development of the theme of “nature as craftsman” in Greek philosophy, see Solmsen (1963). 
167 Proclus’ formulation is certainly closer to Plato’s than the Stoic πῦρ τεχνικόν. 
168 Festugière (1966-8: vol. I, 36 n. 3) mentions Zeno’s πῦρ τεχνικόν, and the fact that nature is a god. 
That does not make nature the τέχνη of a god. Rather, it makes it a τέχνη and a god. See Aetius I 7 33 
(SVF 2.1027), Diog. Laert. VII 156, Cicero ND 2.57 opifex natura; cf. Galen defin. medicae 371 (SVF 
1133), Clemens Al. Stromat. V 14 p. 708 Pott. (SVF 1134). 
169 I 12.1-25, cf. In Tim. I 143.19-22. 
170 In Met. 104.3-10, re. Met. 991a23. 
171 Cf. Alex. In APr. 3.20. 
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non-rational rationality is possible exactly due to the fact that nature is always 
dependent on and in fact utilized by the Demiurge.172 
It is also in this dependent sense that nature can be called the third Demiurge. Proclus 
is herewith refuting the Stoics and those who supposed that there are three Demiurges 
above Soul, as well as opposing the Peripatetic notion of demiurgic nature.173 When 
Aristotle calls the work of nature demiurgic, he has in mind nature as an autonomous 
efficient cause, but for Proclus there must always be a source of nature’s efficient 
power (see also above, II.4.2). 
The instrumental function of nature is beautifully illustrated in the In Parm., where 
Proclus compares nature with “the signet ring that descends upon objects”, and soul 
with the hand (belonging to intellect) that wields the signet ring:  
T II.16 
“What, then, is the proximate cause of the imposition of this seal? For matter 
corresponds to the wax, and individual man to the impression. And whatever 
shall we have correspond to that ring that descends onto the objects, if not 
nature which pervades matter and thus shapes the perceptible with its own 
λόγοι? And corresponding to the hand that uses the ring, is soul, that guides 
nature (universal soul guiding universal nature, and individual soul individual 
nature), and corresponding to that soul, which makes an impression through 
the hand and the ring, is intellect, which fills the perceptible with forms through 
soul and nature.”174 
 
We here find our commentator taking on board a simile well-known from different 
contexts: the simile of the signet ring is an amalgam of passages from Plato’s Timaeus 
(50b5-51b6) and Theaetetus (191c8-e2), Aristotle’s De Anima (II 12 424a17-24), and a 
Plotinian passage (Enn. IV.4 [28] 13).175 The metaphysical aspect of the comparison, of 
impressions of forms in matter, is to be found in the Timaeus, although there is no 
mention there of a signet ring, but only of impressions (τυπωθέντα, 50c5) made in a 
                                               
172 Cf. In Tim. I 298.23-27, where Proclus discusses the subordination of soul, nature and auxiliary 
causes to the demiurgic intellect. 
173 Cf. above n. 162.  
174 In Parm. 884.11-26. At In Tim. I 298.23-27 (cf. n. 117) the two functions are distinguished by their 
functional relation to intellect, and soul is said to “work with” (συνεργεῖν), nature to “work under” 
(ὑπουργεῖν) intellect. The auxiliary causes are slaves (δουλεύειν).  
175 Cf. also the epistemological use by the Stoics, Diog.Laert. VII 45-6 (=SVF II 53, Chrysippus), 
Sextus Emp adv.math. VII 227 (=56, Cleanthes), Aëtius Plac. IV, 20.2 (=387), Philo Leg. Alleg. II 22 (I 
95,8 Wendl) (=458). See also below n. 179. 
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substance (ἐκμαγεῖον, 50c2).176 The argument in which the signet ring figures is found 
instead in the discussion of issues from epistemology and philosophy of mind in 
Plato’s Theaetetus and Aristotle’s De Anima, more precisely in the context of the origin 
of memories, and the nature of sense impressions.  
That Proclus nonetheless uses the simile of the signet-ring in this ontological context, 
is probably due to a third source, Plotinus, and the use he makes of the very same 
image. Plotinus applies the image in the discussion of what we might call the 
epistemology of nature, when arguing that nature possesses no reflection, but merely 
an efficient power.177 He illustrates this by comparing the rationality seeping from 
intellect to nature with an imprint in a layer of wax: the imprint will show only vaguely 
at the lower side of the wax, and likewise nature has a derived and weak form of 
rationality. Nature’s efficient power lies in its passing on unintentionally (ἀπροαιρέτως) 
that which it receives from higher ontological levels.178  
In Proclus’ version, quoted above as T II.16, the epistemological origin of the simile 
has made way entirely for ontology.179 Moreover, by adjusting the simile to Timaeus 
50c, he makes room for some kind of matter (the wax) as an affected, rather than 
impassive (ἀπαθής) receiver of impressions.180 Proclus’ metaphysics contains a highly 
complicated stratification of ‘matters’, but considering the example in the quoted 
passage of the individual man (ὁ τῇδε ἄνθρωπος, 884.14), the ‘matter’ relevant in the 
analogy is something like the substrate of particular bodies informed by nature.181  
According to Proclus the above image of the signet ring is imprecise in one important 
respect, which brings Proclus to express a general criticism of images like the above as 
mere ‘aids to the less advanced students’ (εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀτελεστέρων βοήθειαν, In Parm. 
841.33). Adequate as it may be to picture the dependency of nature on the Demiurge 
                                               
176 Note that the passage in the Timaeus is riddled with different forms of the noun φύσις (50b6, c2, d4, 
e2, 51b3), but in reference to the third kind, which is the receptive element, and hence, transported to 
Proclus’ analogy, corresponds to the wax, or matter.  
177 Enn. IV.4 [28] 13.5-7. 
178 Simplicius (In Phys. 230.36-231.5), who ascribes to Plato four hypostases, the lowest of which is the 
natural world as a receptacle of imprints of Forms. Cf. Dillon (19962: 346-49). 
179 Morrow/Dillon also refer to Plutarch (De Is. 373A, ἐν κηρῷ σφραγῖδες), Arius Didymus (ap. Euseb. 
PE XI, 23.2-6 fragm. 1 Diels, σφραγῖδος μιᾶς ἐκμαγεῖα γίνεσθαι πολλὰ), and Alcinous (Didask. 12, 
idem). They also use the simile in this ontological sense, but more generally in the context of the 
Forms (as in the Timaeus). The point they are making, that a λόγος or Form remains unaffected by 
participation, is also made by Proclus. See n. 181. Plotinus seems to be the first to relate the simile to 
nature. 
180 Cf. In Parm. 839.37ff.  
181 Cf. the preceding passage, where Proclus speaks of ‘one identical seal impressed upon many pieces of 
wax’ (884.9-10 οἷον σφραγὶς ἡ αὐτὴ πολλοῖς ἐντεθειμένη κηροῖς). On different kinds of matter in Proclus 
see de Haas (1997) and van Riel (forthcoming).  
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and the chain of efficient causality, the image fails to capture the nature of nature: a 
signet ring is never actually inside the object (the wax) that it forms, whereas nature 
descends into that which it informs.182 This adjustment reveals a crucial distinction 
between Proclus’ and Plotinus’ view, since according to Plotinus nature does not 
operate from within the informed objects.183 
The simile of the signet ring also illustrates another point with regard to nature as 
demiurgic τέχνη, namely that it is external to its user, the Demiurge. Proclus distinguishes 
three kinds of demiurgic τέχνη, one that remains in its owner, the Demiurge, one that 
proceeds from and returns to him, i.e. intellectual Soul, and one that merely proceeds 
from him, or in fact “has already proceeded from him”.184 And this last τέχνη is nature. 
In this proceeding τεχνή we recognize the τεχνή in act (ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς τέχνης), which 
Aristotle, in his explanation of the working of the vegetative soul, compares to the 
motions of the tools used by an artificer.185 Likewise, Proclus states that it is due to the 
fact that nature is an external demiurgic τέχνη (external, that is, to the demiurge) that it 
can be called a tool of the gods. Because it is a divine tool, rather than a simple human 
one, it is not life-less and motionless, but instead has a kind of self-motion (ἔχουσα πῶς 
τὸ αὐτοκίνητον) due to being an agent in its own right.186 Instruments of the gods, 
unlike our instruments, have an essence consisting in efficacious λόγοι, are endowed 
with life, and their activities coincide with those of the gods.187  
 
In short, nature is an external, irrational tool of the Demiurge, that has efficacious and 
motive power of its own.188 One could say that it is both an instrumental cause and the 
proximate efficient cause, although it is never a real efficient cause, due to its non-
rationality, its lack of divinity, and its immanence.189 Thus by creating a connexion 
between the real efficient cause of the Demiurge, and nature, Proclus takes Aristotle’s 
criticism of the neglect of efficient causality in Platonic philosophy of nature,190 and 
turns it against him, while maintaining the transcendence of the Demiurge. 
 
                                               
182 In Parm. 841.1ff. See II.4.2 for a simile focusing on the immanence of Nature.  
183 Enn. III.8 [30] 3.4-5, cf. above II.3.1. 
184 In Tim. I 12.13 προϊουσαν, 12.16 ἤδη προελθοῦσαν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ γενομένην, cf. 12.21. 
185 Cf. Arist. GA 740b25-34. 
186 In Tim. I 12.21ff. That nature has self-motion may suggest that it is a soul, an irrational one to be 
precise, but this is not the case. As I proposed above, following Opsomer, irrational souls are not in 
fact souls, but natures. See II.3.1. 
187 In Tim. I 12.24-25. 
188 Cf. Plotinus, for whom nature is the ‘handmaiden’ of soul (Opsomer (2005: 86ff.)). 
189 In Tim. I 263.23-27: the instrumental cause is the proximate mover of the composite consisting of 
matter and form; In Parm. 796.35ff. 
190 Cf. above n. 126. 
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II.5.2 Nature as the source of life, motion, body, and unity 
 
Proclus’ account of the functions of nature, and the question how in that account he 
reacts to problems he encountered in the theories of his predecessors, supply enough 
material for at least an entire chapter. In this context, however, we will merely give an 
overview of the main tasks nature has in the constitution of the world of sense 
perception. A number of these we have already encountered in the previous sections. 
Nature’s function could be summarized as follows. It is (1) the source of motion and 
life of bodies, (2) their proximate cause, and (3) the source of their containment.191  
 
(1) We have seen that nature for Proclus has the Aristotelian function of being the 
internal source of motion and rest.192 In this respect it is important especially for the 
ἑτεροκίνητα, things that do not have their own source of motion (which suggests the 
paradoxical situation that nature, which pervades everything corporeal, never belongs 
to anything essentially). Nature is what gives something similar to soul to “even the 
most soulless of things”.193 Being soulless is associated with not being alive, i.e. with 
not having an internal source of motion.194 This, then, is the prime function of nature: 
to impart a very low, physical kind of life, and thus motion, to that which does not 
have a soul.195 Of course the motion in question is natural, both in the sense of not 
psychical, and in the sense of not accidental.196 For example, by giving the primordial 
chaos its proper motions, nature also decides on the appropriate order of the 
elements.197 
Thus, Proclus can maintain against Plutarch and Atticus that the primordial motion of 
Tim. 30a is natural, rather than the working of an evil soul.198 The main argument of 
Plutarch and Atticus was that where there is motion, there is soul, which becomes false 
                                               
191 In Tim. I 11.13-22, Prov. 11. 
192 Cf. In Parm. 1045.29-31. 
193 See above T II.4. 
194 Laws 889b1-5. In Plato ἄψυχος is used for natural, non-living things (e.g. Soph. 265c2, Laws 931aff., 
967aff.), that have no internal source of motion (Phaedr. 245e6, Laws 896b8). Aristotle: dA 403b26 (the 
soulless lacks movement and sensation); Met. 981b2-4, HA 588b4-6. 
195 In Tim. II 146.5, III 249.12ff. Cf. III 141.15, In Parm. 1045.32-3. Cf. Beutler (1957: 231): Nature as 
manifestation of Life (of the triad Being, Life, Intellect). The connection with Rhea/Hecate, the life-
giving goddess, is clear. 
196 In Tim. II.96.10 (re. Tim. 34a3-8), where it functions as an axiom in an argument for the motion of 
the universe, being a physical body, III 119.11-126.5 (re. Tim. 40a7-b4). Cf. Aristotle, Phys. II 1 192b20; 
VIII 4 255a32. 
197 In Tim. II 38.22-29. The description of how nature does this suggests some kind of rationality on its 
part (esp. κατιδοῦσα). I take it Proclus is merely allowing himself some literary imagery here. 
198 In Tim. I 381.26ff, esp. ὑπὸ φύσεως, 383.7, φύσει, 383.11. 
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if the existence of other sources of motion can be proven. The myth of the Statesman 
(esp. 292e) provides Proclus with the authoritative argument for his view of primordial 
motion. In first instance (not to be understood in a temporal sense, of course) only 
some nature is present to the universe, and it is capable of imposing motion without 
assistance, but not order. For that the Demiurge is required, as is clear from the myth 
in the Statesman, where the universe, abandoned by the Demiurge, lapses into a 
disordered motion ‘due to a kind of fate and a natural desire’ (ὑπὸ δή τινος εἱμαρμένης 
καὶ συμφύτου καθ΄ αὑτὸν ἐπιθυμίας).199 Note that this argument is problematic, as it 
introduces a second kind of nature, the irrational primordial essence, as it were, of the 
universe, which is not the nature we have discussed so far.200  The two should be 
distinguished, since primordial nature is the source of irregular motion and is not 
receptive to soul, whereas Nature is inserted in the universe by the Demiurge precisely 
to make it receptive to soul.201  
  
(2) Nature fashions all bodies (ποιητικόν), even the heavenly bodies.202 They are, as it 
were, nature’s progeny (ὡς ἔκγονα φύσεως).203 This fashioning of bodies is an 
information of the corporeal, with the use of physical λόγοι. Some of those bodies 
nature equips with a receptivity for soul.204 This task is like the theurgic activities of the 
initiator into the mysteries, who attaches symbols to statues to render them receptive 
of certain divinities. Likewise, nature furnishes bodies, like statues of the souls, with 
those specific physical λόγοι that accommodate a specific kind of soul.205 This 
fashioning of bodies is the creation of particular natures, some more and some less 
excellent, matching the qualities of the souls (if any) that will enter them.  This seems 
to imply that nature’s work is prior to that of soul, despite the fact that the former is 
ontologically inferior and therefore posterior to the latter. As Brisson (forthcoming) 
remarks in his discussion of Plotinus’ φύσις, we need not suppose that Nature is prior 
to Soul in this respect since Soul perfects the particular souls ‘before’ Nature perfects 
                                               
199 In Tim. I 389.5-15, cf. In Remp. II 13.2; ib. II 356.6; Theol.Plat. V 119.16; Prov. 11. 
200 The intricate relation between fate and nature will here be left aside. See In Tim. III 271.28-274.14, 
In Remp. II 357.26-27, Theol.Plat. V 32 118.24ff; De Prov. 11-12 (Boese). Cf. Hermias In Phaedr. 200.29, 
who ascribes the equation of Fate and universal Nature to Iamblichus. On fate and nature in Proclus 
see Linguiti (forthcoming). Romano (1991) gives an inventory of passages concerning the relation 
between Fate and Nature in Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus.  
201 Cf. I 401.22ff. and Festugière (1966-8: 273, n. 1). 
202 In Tim. I 261.26-7, I 2.15-29.  
203 In Tim. I 429.6, cf. Prov. 11 36.20, Boese. 
204 A similar theory is formulated by Simplicius, In Cael. 380.25ff and 387.12ff., who in his treatment of 
the question how nature and soul can both be sources of motion of the heavenly bodies, takes nature 
to be a kind of life that makes bodies suitable to being moved by soul.  
205 In Tim. I 51.25-52.1. 
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the particular natures, whereas it is the working of the particular (embodied) souls that 
is indeed posterior to that of universal Nature. 
The sensible universe is characterized by a “war” of contraries, and one of the main 
results of the activities of the Demiurge is the establishing of a regular order between 
those contraries, keeping them at peace with each other.206 And here lies an important 
task for nature as his tool, and as the mother, so to speak, of all things.207 The creation 
and preparation of bodies by nature consists in the establishing of a bond (i.e. a life) 
which has the capacity of uniting and harmonizing things that are each other’s 
contraries.208 Nature does this both on a cosmic scale, as the “war” of contrary 
properties is to be found in the cosmos as a whole (In Tim. I 78.1ff),  “holding together 
the heaven by its (Nature’s) summit” (In Tim. I 11.13-14) and by creating individual 
natures.   
Through the bond established in particular natures universal Nature is in charge of all 
nurture, reproduction and growth.209 That bond is established, again, through the 
insertion of formative reason principles,210 which universal Nature possesses of 
everything natural.211 It is in this respect very similar to the Peripatetic vegetative or 
nutritive aspect of the soul, although Proclian Nature is more extensive in that it is also 
responsible for the unity of natural things that are not ensouled.212 The theory that 
universal Nature possesses natural reason principles of everything is also found in 
Syrianus, who uses it to explain what looks like spontaneous generation.213 What 
Aristotle would call spontaneous generation, is in fact Nature at work.214  
The formative reason principles, which Nature possesses in act, are consequently 
activated in the recipient,215 and may manifest themselves as σπερματικοὶ λόγοι in 
                                               
206 The description of this systoichia is one of the three main themes of the In Tim. Gersh (2003: 152). 
For a relation with Hecate see Brisson (2000: 141). Cf. I. 205.15ff. 
207 In Parm. 793.31-32 (D’Hoine 236.26-27).  
208 In Tim. II 53.27-28; In Parm. 703.18-22; In Tim. II.24.6-11, exegesis of Timaeus 31c4-32a6. Cf. II 
15.12-25 where the three kinds of bond (δεσμός) that guarantee the unity of a (one) thing are illustrated 
by the way they are exemplified in a living being. Nature is the ‘intermediate bond’, i.e. not the first 
cause, not the bound elements (nerves and tendons), but the λόγος φυσικός which issues from the 
cause and uses the corporeal elements in constituting things. On the notion of bond in Proclus’ 
account of the elements, see Lernould (2000: 137). See also chapter IV. 
209 Theol.Plat. I 15 75.22-3:. ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ πρὸ τῶν σωμάτων ταῖς φύσεσι τὸ τρέφειν ἢ γεννᾶν ἢ αὔξειν [sc. 
ἐπίπονον ἐστι] (ταῦτα γὰρ ἔργα τῶν φύσεων). 
210 φυσικοὶ λόγοι, e.g. In Tim. III 197.30-31, Theol.Plat. TP V 66.2-4. 
211 In Tim. I 11.12, quoted above. 
212 Arist. DA II 3; cf. Proclus Prov. 11 36.8, where nature is called “quod plantativum”. 
213 In Met. 186.3-5. Cf. In Met. 12.5ff.  
214 On Aristotle’s account of spontaneous generation see Lennox (2001). 
215 In Parm. 792.20ff. 
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particular natures.216 The Stoic notion of σπερματικοὶ λόγοι is both used and criticized 
by Proclus. The Stoics should not have assumed, according to Proclus, that the 
σπερματικοὶ λόγοι by themselves were a sufficient explanation for the information of 
objects. Real causes are needed, namely the Forms, transmitted by the φυσικοὶ λόγοι. 
Most of the time, Proclus does not commit to any position regarding the relation (be it 
identity or something else) between the φυσικοὶ λόγοι and the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι,217 but 
when he does take position, he puts the latter below the former.218 
 
(3) Describing the task of nature as “creating bodies” suggests that it is functional only 
at some temporal beginning of the cosmos. Since there is no such temporal beginning, 
but only a conceptual and metaphysical one, a more precise rendering of nature’s 
everlasting creation of bodies is that it sustains them (συνεκτική τῆς τούτων 
συστάσεως).219 Within living beings nature, or more precisely ‘their (particular) natures’, 
guarantee the unity and persistence of their bodies and body parts.220 In this respect 
nature resembles the Stoic sustaining or cohesive cause (συνεκτικόν).221  
In providing this unity and permanence to bodies, nature is active both horizontally 
and vertically, so to speak. Nature’s horizontal activity takes place within the world of 
sense perception, and consists in uniting the opposites within that world (e.g. earth 
with fire). Its vertical activity, on the other hand, is what ensures the connection 
between higher and lower levels of reality, “everywhere weaving together the 
particulars with the universals” (In Tim. I 11.18-19): it connects the enmattered with the 
immaterial λόγοι, corporeal motion with primary motion, and encosmic order with 
intellectual arrangement (εὐταξία).222 Thus in being both Becoming and Being (see 
II.3.1) nature functions as a bridge between the intelligible and the sensible. 
 
II.6 Conclusion 
 
                                               
216 For φυσικοὶ λόγοι (as reason principles, not as ‘a treatise on nature’) see  I 27.27; 49.17; 51.28; 148.4, 
6; 301.10; II 15.21; 51.12; 51.19; 139.19; 146.7; 254.12; III 188.7; 188.28; 194.3; 343.9.  
217 In Tim. I 143.17-18, III 188.5-10, In Parm. 731.30-732.6 
218 Most clearly at In Parm. 889.25, but also at In Tim. III 191.7, In Parm. 883.29. Cf. Steel (1984: 24) 
219 De Prov. 11.11-14. 
220 De Prov. 11.4-16.1, In Tim. II 15.17-25, In Parm. 893.11ff. 
221 On the cohesive cause see e.g. Chrysippus apud Clement Stromata III, vol. II p. 929 Pott, 346.2ff.  
Whereas Simplicius alters the Stoic theory of the συνεκτική, to the extent that nature is not the 
containing cause but triggers it, acts προηγουμένως (In Ph. 2, 370.1; 326.15-6), Proclus takes universal 
Nature itself to be συνεκτική. On the Neoplatonic use of the Stoic συνεκτικόν, see Steel (2002). For 
nature’s unifying power in Plotinus see Wagner (2002: 307ff.) 
222 In Tim. III 271.1-12. 
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T II.17 
“...we have now said, what nature is according to Plato, that it is an incorporeal 
essence, inseparable from bodies, in possession of their λόγοι, incapable of 
contemplating itself...”223 
 
Proclus, who has so often been accused of utter lack of originality, has in this chapter 
been shown to have a concept of φύσις that is sophisticated, not for the sake of 
dialectical sophistication, but because it is a careful attempt at solving several problems 
by making the most of Plato’s scarce references to φύσις.  
Proclus never goes so far as to explicitly state that nature is not soul in any sense, 
because the properties he ascribes to it are very close to those of soul. Nevertheless, he 
clearly extricates nature from soul and hypostasizes it in order to explain the existence 
of unity and motion in entities that are not animated by soul.  
Moreover, Proclus’ concept of nature is the ultimate justification of the efficiency of a 
transcendent cause, which is capable of informing the material world through nature as 
its immanent tool. At the same time, the rationality of the processes taking place in this 
world is guaranteed due to the dependence of nature on its demiurgic origin.  
In order to obtain this subtle nature, Proclus has to adjust his metaphysics and allow 
for a hypostasis that does not have an imparticipable monad, but instead has a 
participated monad, universal Nature, or the nature of the universe, which is 
metaphysically transcendent, but physically immanent, and an imparticipable cause, the 
Demiurge, who is also physically transcendent.  
 
 
                                               
223 In Tim. I 12.26-30. 
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Appendix: Lowry’s Table II and the riddle of imparticipable nature 
 
Τὸ ἕν —   ἑνάδες νοηταί —   ἑνάδες νοηταὶ καὶ νοεραί —   ἑνάδες νοεραί —   ἑνάδες ὑπερκόσμιοι —   ἑνάδες ὑπερκόσμιοι καὶ ἐγκόσμιοι —   ἑνάδες ἐγκόσμιοι 
       
τὸ ἀμεθέκτος ὄν —   μεθέκτως ὄν —   μεθέκτως ὄν —   μεθέκτως ὄν —   μεθέκτως ὄν —   μεθέκτως ὄν 
      
 θεία ζωή ἀμεθέκτως —   θεία ζωή μεθεκτή —   θεία ζωή μεθεκτή —   θεία ζωή μεθεκτή —   θεία ζωή μεθεκτή 
     
θεῖος νοῦς ἀμέθεκτος —   θεῖος νοῦς μεθεκτός —   θεῖος νοῦς μεθεκτός —   θεῖος νοῦς μεθεκτός 
    
θεία ψυχή ἀμέθεκτος —   θεία ψυχή μεθεκτή —   θεία ψυχή μεθεκτή 
   
 
? —   ? 
  
 
θεῖον σῶμα 
 
Table 2 This table is taken from Lowry (1980: 103),  
with kind permission of Rodopi. The callouts are my additions. 
x 
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III THE PROOEMIUM:  
THE GEOMETRICAL METHOD OF PHYSIOLOGIA 
 
III.1 Introduction – φυσιολογία, θεολογία, and the geometrical method of the 
Timaeus 
 
In his introduction to the Commentary on the Timaeus, Proclus emphatically states 
that the skopos of the entire dialogue is “all of φυσιολογία.”1 Consequently, its 
subject is φύσις.2 For Proclus’ most emphatic and extensive elaboration of the 
notion of philosophy of nature and its methods, we turn to the commentary on 
the prooemium, i.e. the methodological introduction to Timaeus’ cosmological 
account (Tim. 27c1-29d3, In Tim. I 204-355). We there find a different statement 
as to the subject matter of Timaeus’ exposition, namely that “the enterprise 
(ὑπόθεσις3) covers the entire demiurgy”.4 This shift of focus from nature to the 
Demiurge can be explained from the context, but also gives crucial insight in the 
manner in which the Platonic philosophy of nature is theology. In the 
introduction to the commentary Proclus is clearly painting a picture of Platonic 
physics in Aristotelian colours, in order to reveal the superiority of the former 
over Aristotle’s. By the time we reach the prooemium, such polemics are no 
longer relevant, and the core of the Timaeus can be identified as “the entire 
demiurgy”, or more precisely “the study (θεωρία) of the all insofar as it proceeds 
from the gods...according to its corporeality, insofar as it participates in particular 
and universal soul, insofar as it is intelligent, but especially according to the 
emanation from the Demiurge”.5 This enterprise has its unique starting point in 
the question whether or not the universe has come into being (πότερον γέγονε τὸ 
πᾶν ἢ ἀγενές ἐστι, 219.21-226). Everything else, thus Proclus, will follow from that.  
                                               
1 In Tim. I 1.4-5, see chapter I. 
2 Chapter II is devoted to this concept. 
3 This is a surprising choice of words, as the description of the subject matter is called πρόθεσις in 
the schema isagogicum. Ὑπόθεσις is the term used for the dramatic setting. See chapter I.  
4 In Tim. I 214.19-20. 
5 In Tim. I 217.18-25. 
6 The Timaeus-lemma as we find it in Diehl: “We, who are about to somehow (πῃ) converse about 
the universe (περὶ παντὸς), whether (ἢ) it is generated or (ἢ) is instead ungenerated”. Diehl’s 
reading of Proclus’ Timaeus-quotation differs from Burnet’s reading of Plato. The latter has ἡμᾶς 
δὲ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγους ποιεῖσθαί πῃ μέλλοντας, ᾗ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν. As to the first 
difference: in the mss. of the Timaeus both παντὸς and τοῦ παντὸς are attested, as in the mss. of 
the In Tim. See Diehl and Festugière (1966-8: 40, n. 1) for an overview of the different readings. 
Considering the predomination of περὶ τοῦ παντὸς elsewhere in the commentary (already 10 lines 
further down we find ἔσται οὖν αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἡ θεωρία, In Tim. I 217.18-19), I propose we 
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In his discussion of the starting point and what follows from it, Proclus repeatedly 
draws a parallel between Plato’s procedure and that of a geometer.7 The very first 
occurrence of the comparison is a statement saying that in introducing the starting 
points of philosophy of nature, Plato works “as if from geometrical hypotheses”.8 
Later instances, likewise, refer to Plato’s method as similar to what a geometer 
does, and compare parts of the prooemium to constituents of a geometrical 
method. Plato posits certain undemonstrated starting points,9 namely definitions, 
hypotheses, axioms, and common notions,10 and defines (‘names’) the subject 
matter of the treatise.11 He consequently demonstrates all of philosophy of nature 
from the starting points,12 and the conclusions of those demonstrations have 
geometrical necessity.13 
This choice for the method of geometry is not an obvious one. True, geometry 
plays an important role in this most Pythagorean of Plato’s dialogues, most 
notably in the description of the geometrical proportions of the world soul, and 
the exposition on the geometrical character of the solids, i.e. what Proclus calls the 
mathematical images used in the iconic mode of discourse.14 But in those contexts 
it is the subject matter of geometry, continuous magnitude and its properties, that 
are relevant.15 And consequently it is these geometrical properties and their 
relations to aspects of the physical universe that are central to Proclus’ exegesis of 
                                                                                                                                       
read the article in the lemma as well. To the second difference (concerning the aspiration of the 
η) many exegetical problems are related, and quite a lot turns on it with regard to the ultimate 
interpretation of the entire dialogue, most notably regarding the question whether Plato describes 
a creation in time or not. See Baltes (1978: 1-3), (1996), Lernould (2001: 129ff.) for extensive 
discussions. 
7 Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 7-10) and O'Meara (1989: 182) mention In Tim. I 226.22-227.3; 
228.25-229.11; 236.8-237.9; 258.12-23; 272.10-17; cf. 263.19-264.4; 265.3-10; 283.11-20; 332.6-9; 
344.28-345.7; 348.13ff; 355.24; II 7.19-33.  
8 In Tim. I 226.22-227.3. 
9 In Tim. I 228.25-229.11, cf. 265.3-9 and 344.28-345.7. Proclus suggests, at least, that they are 
undemonstrated and indemonstrable, and that all starting points are equal, but at the same time 
in a number of passages he tries to establish a logical connection of some kind, to the extent that 
all starting points follow from the first two (e.g. I 226.27ff, 236.11, see below, III.5).  
10 In Tim. I 258.12-23. 
11 In Tim. I 272.10-17. 
12 In Tim. I 236.8-237.9; cf. 263.19-264.3, 283.11-20, 348.13ff., 355.24-25.  
13 In Tim. I 332.6-9; cf. I 346.31-347.1. 
14 Theol.Plat. I 4. For the iconic mode, see chapter V and Martijn (2006b). 
15 There are numerous references to geometry in the third book of the In Tim., but these all 
concern the actual geometry present in the Timaeus, such as geometrical proportions, and are 
never introduced by way of a comparison of disciplines. For the role of geometry and 
mathematics in general in the discussion of the regular solids (Tim 31b-34a; see esp. In Tim II 
13.15-56.11) and the world soul (Tim 34a-40d; II 102.7-316.4, esp. 166.15-211.30), see chapter IV. 
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those passages, not the method of geometry. Moreover, the method of geometry 
was famously criticized by Plato. In the light of Socrates’ harsh words of criticism 
of geometers for assuming unfounded starting points (Rep. VI, esp. 510c1-d3) 
Proclus’ association of Plato’s methodology with that of a geometer therefore 
does not come across as a compliment. Yet, as we have seen above, our 
commentator repeatedly draws a parallel between the method of geometry and the 
presentation of the starting points of the cosmological account in the 
prooemium.16  
That choice is even more puzzling if we consider that Proclus had an alternative. 
As our Neoplatonic commentator points out from the outset, he takes the central 
aim of the Timaeus to be explaining the sensible world from its true and divine 
causes, and of these primarily the efficient cause, i.e. the Demiurge.17 According to 
Proclus it is Plato’s methodology that, through a conceptual analysis, allows that 
ascent to the transcendent causes of the universe.18 It has therefore been argued 
that ‘geometrical’ in the context of Proclus’ remarks on scientific method in this 
and other work equals ‘scientific’,19 or ‘rigorously syllogistic’.20 If this is all Proclus 
has in mind, however, there is another science that could have fulfilled the role of 
methodological paradigm, and that would have been more appropriate to the 
context, namely dialectic. Dialectic in the Neoplatonic sense of the word is both 
science par excellence, and as such the source and paradigm of the scientific method 
of the other sciences (including geometry), and the science of the transcendent 
causes.21  
 
The aim of this chapter is to lay bare Proclus’ reasons for choosing geometry 
rather than dialectic in his discussion of Plato’s methodology.22 I will scrutinize 
                                               
16 By comparison with other prooemia of works in the περί φύσεως tradition, these starting points 
of the cosmological account are the only non-traditional element in the prooemium of the 
Timaeus. On Proclus’ strong focus on precisely this non-traditional element of the prooemium, 
see I.5. 
17 In Tim. I 2.1-9, see ch. I. Cf. Syr. In Met. 88.24ff. 
18 Steel (2003), O'Meara (1989), Lernould (2001). For the conceptual analysis see below, III.4. 
19 Lernould (2001: 11-13). 
20 The latter is proposed by O'Meara (1989: 182), and it is in this sense that we find the 
comparison on occasion in the In Parm.. That the method is called geometrical can, in these 
readings, be explained from the simple fact that geometry was the first discipline that actually 
followed what has been called the Classical Model of Science. See de Jong and Betti 
(forthcoming). On the issue of axiomatic deductivity and the method of geometry, see Mueller 
(1974). 
21 Cf. Lernould (2001: 301). 
22 Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 7-9) already pays some attention to the theme of the geometrical 
method in a summary of the passage, and (1963: 565-7) by analyzing one of Proclus’ exegetical 
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how Proclus elaborates the comparison, and show that he chose geometry not just 
to grant philosophy of nature a scientific status, but assign to it the proper scientific 
status. Thus the main theses to be defended in this chapter are that for Proclus 
philosophy of nature has a scientific status, and that this scientific status is one 
that is appropriate to its subject matter, the natural world. The main issues 
brought forward are  
(1) the hypothetical foundation of philosophy of nature and  
(2) the partly empirical foundation of philosophy of nature.  
(1) A conceptual analysis in the prooemium leads to knowledge of the efficient 
cause and the paradigmatic cause of the universe, but not to an unhypothetical 
first principle. Hence it is geometry, rather than dialectic, that is chosen as the 
method of comparison, not just because ‘geometrical’ equals ‘scientific’,23 but 
because, like philosophy of nature, but other than dialectic, geometry remains a 
hypothetical science in the strong sense that it does not reach an unhypothetical 
starting point.24 (2) Epistemologically speaking the world of sense perception, 
which is the subject matter of philosophy of nature, is a combination of the 
perceptible and the intelligible. Consequently, the cognitive level on which 
philosophy of nature works is that which combines sense perception and 
reasoning. Since these two faculties cannot cooperate as such, a crucial role is 
played by the intermediate faculty of cognitive judgment (δόξα).25 To argue for 
this position Proclus presents a highly sophisticated reading of the starting points 
of the prooemium, invoking the geometrical procedure of reversion.  
The order of this chapter is dictated by the structure of the prooemium: we will 
follow Proclus in his analysis of the prooemium into different kinds of starting 
points.26 After a short introduction of the prooemium as a whole (III.2), follows 
the analysis of the definitions (III.3), axioms/hypotheses/common notions (III.4), 
and demonstrations (III.5). Along the way, we will distil the geometrical method 
as it appears in Proclus’ commentary and, where needed, explain how it can be 
reconciled with what he has to say about that same method as it occurs in his 
paradigm of geometry, Euclid’s Elements.  
                                                                                                                                      
techniques, namely the indication of logical connection between lemmas. O’Meara’s lucid 
monograph on Pythagoreanism in Late Antiquity contains a chapter on mathematics and physics 
in Proclus, O'Meara (1989: part II, chapter 9, esp. 179ff.). The most extensive treatment of the 
proœmium as a whole is the one of Lernould (2001). 
23 Lernould (2001: 11-13). 
24 Pace Lernould (2001), see chapter I. 
25 For δόξα as faculty of cognitive judgment see below III.5.1. 
26 The εἶδος of the text (i.e. a likely story), which Proclus is willing to include in the 
demonstrations (ἐν τοῖς δεικνυμένοις ἄν τις θεῖτο, In Tim. I 355.25-26) is left out of consideration 
here. For this topic see chapter V. 
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III.2 The constituents of the geometrical method in the prooemium 
 
Proclus takes the prooemium as laying the foundation of φυσιολογία as a discipline 
in its own right: 
T III.1 
“...Plato seems to lay down beforehand (προκαταβάλλεσθαι) the 
foundations of the entire philosophy of nature: for just as there are 
different starting points of poetry, of medicine, of arithmetic and of 
mechanics, so too are there certain starting points of the entire philosophy 
of nature. (...) From these everything that follows proceeds.” 27 
 
We here see how what was identified as the σκοπός of the dialogue, φυσιολογία, is 
treated as a particular, autonomous discipline28 that will be unfolded in the Timaeus 
in all its aspects, to start with the proper starting points.29 The starting points 
Proclus recognizes will be discussed in further detail below, but to facilitate the 
understanding of the parts I will provide a brief outline of the whole. Out of the 
lemmata of the prooemium Proclus distils five starting points and three 
demonstrations.30  
 
A. Five starting points 
Two definitions (Tim. 27c6-28a4),31 on occasion also called hypotheses, axioms, 
common notions, namely  
1. the definition of Being32;  
                                               
27 Cf. In Tim. 236.13ff. Note that Proclus mentions both disciplines that are ἐπιστῆμαι, and τέχναι. 
28 I will here assume that there is such a thing as autonomous disciplines in Neoplatonic 
philosophy, although I think that considering the essential continuity of Neoplatonic reality that 
notion should encounter serious difficulties. This issue will not be discussed here.  
29 On the skopos of the Timaeus see chapter I. As Lernould (2001: 343) points out, pace 
Festugière, the hypotheses and demonstrations of the prooemium are not the only ones 
introduced in Timaeus’ exposition. For example, Proclus himself at the beginning of book III 
mentions a number of starting points (axioms), none of which belongs to the five starting points 
of the prooemium (In Tim. II 7.18-31).  
30 For the lemmata see the table in appendix II. For the division of the starting points see 
Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 8-9), In Tim. I 236.21-27; 348.13-15 and I.5.  
31 On the use of this terminology see III.4.1. 
32 Strictly speaking, of ‘the always Being’ (τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν). In the commentary on the prooemium our 
commentator uses ‘Being’ and ‘the always Being’ interchangeably, although he takes the text to 
deal with the whole range of eternal Being(s), including Being ἀπλῶς (In Tim. I 229.11ff.). The 
addition of ἀεί is explained as an emphasis of the fact that the distinction between Becoming and 
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2. the definition of Becoming;  
 
And three other starting points (likewise called hypotheses, axioms, and common 
notions), concerning 
3. the efficient cause (consisting of the couple a. everything becoming has a cause; 
b. without cause there is no becoming, Tim. 28a4-6);  
4. the paradigmatic cause (consisting of the couple a. if the paradigm is eternal 
(Being), then the product is beautiful; b. if the paradigm is not eternal (Becoming), 
then the product is not beautiful, Tim. 28a6-b2);33  
5. The determination of the subject matter (Tim. 28b2-4) 
 
B. and three demonstrations 
1. ‘The essence of the universe is Becoming’ (Tim. 28b7-c2) 
2. ‘The universe has an efficient cause’ (Tim. 28c2-5) 
3. ‘The universe has an eternal paradigmatic cause’ (Tim. 28c5-29b1) 
 
As has been shown,34 Proclus does not strictly separate the discussion of the 
starting points from that of the demonstrations. Already in his exegesis of (A), 
which should strictly speaking concern only the general principles, Proclus is 
immediately applying them to the universe – following the example, of course, of 
Plato who at Tim. 28a6, i.e. after the introduction of the efficient cause, without 
warning switches to “the Demiurge”.35 This blending of starting points and 
demonstrations shows in the content of the exegesis, but does not affect the 
formal structure imposed.  
Let us turn to the analysis of the starting points of φυσιολογία as discerned by 
Proclus.  
 
III.3 Three aporiai concerning two definitions  
 
As said above, the enterprise of the demiurgy has its unique starting point in the 
question whether or not the universe has come into being: 
T III.2 
                                                                                                                                      
Being is primarily related to the distinction time-eternity (I 238.5ff, esp. 239.17-20). In book IV, 
however, Proclus does distinguish between unqualified (ἁπλῶς) Being and eternal Being (III 
15.22ff.).   
33 For the emphasis on pairs (two definitions, twice two axioms), see In Tim. I 265.3ff.  
34 Lernould (2001: 166). 
35 As pointed out by Runia (2000: 115). 
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“For this will be looked into before everything else: and in fact in the 
whole of philosophy of nature this provides the greatest achievement, if 
the being generated or ungenerated of the universe is supposed correctly or 
incorrectly (ὀρθῶς ὑποτεθέν ἢ μή). For from this hypothesis we will be able 
to discover of what kind its essence and its powers are, as will be clear to 
us a little further. So for the sake of education the logoi about the universe 
will proceed, taking their start from that beginning, whether the cosmos is 
generated or ungenerated, and compose from this everything else 
according to its consequences.”36  
 
This passage calls to mind the Cratylus, where Socrates compares the namegiver to 
a geometer to emphasize the importance of correct starting points: “The first step 
of geometrical constructions at times contains a small and indiscernible mistake, 
and yet the consequences, a great number as they may be, may still be consistent 
with one another. In every beginning, everyone should make a great effort and a 
thorough investigation to see if it is assumed correctly or not. When that has been 
investigated adequately, the other steps will turn out to follow from it” (Crat. 
436d2-7). Proclus, like Socrates in the Cratylus, is aware of the importance of a 
proper beginning of the process of reasoning and emphasizes it on two more 
occasions in the exegesis of the prooemium. At crucial transitions, from what he 
calls the starting points to the demonstrations, and at the end of the prooemium, 
in the exegesis of Timaeus’ own statement regarding the proper beginning (Tim. 
29a2f., Μέγιστον δὴ παντὸς ἄρξασθαι κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχήν), Proclus points to the 
order of reasoning and the importance of the choice of one’s starting points.37 In 
the latter, he seems to be referring to the Cratylus passage again: “because even the 
smallest oversight in the beginning is multiplied in the process,” as well as to a 
common dictum ascribed to Pythogoras: “the beginning is half of the whole”.38 
                                               
36 In Tim. I 219.23-31. Strictly speaking the ἢ μή is superfluous, but it may have been added to 
prevent a reading whereby the hypothesis in question would be the disjunction as a whole. Cf. 
Parm. 137b for a similar construction (where, however, the question is not strictly dependent on 
ὑποθέμενος). As Baltes points out, in the passage quoted above it is hard to decide where Proclus 
is reporting Porphyry’s (and Iamblichus’) interpretation and where he is adding his own. I follow 
Baltes (1978: 2-3) in assuming that Proclus takes the floor at “So for the sake of education…” 
(ἔσονται ἄρα etc.), but quote the whole passage, as Proclus clearly agrees with Porphyry.  
37 In Tim. I 275-276.7 and 337.8-338.19.  
38 In Tim. I 338.8-9. Proclus’ source is probably Iamb. VP 237.17 Nauck (referred to by Diehl, 
29.162.2 Klein (Teubner)). Variations of the proverb, in which the beginning is more than half of 
the whole, are found in Plato, Rep. V 466c2f. (where it is ascribed to Hesiod), Laws 753e6 and 
Aristotle, NE 1098b7.  
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The didactic exposition that is the Timaeus will present a reconstruction of the 
universe39 starting from its being generated or not, which is further specified as 
the question whether it belongs to the realm of Being or to that of Becoming. 
This question, the first problêma concerning the universe, dictates the consequent 
question what it is to be generated (or not): 
T III.3 
“That it was necessary for Plato to have made the definitions of that which 
always is and that which is becoming before all the other fundamental 
principles can easily be understood if we consider that the very first of the 
problems concerning the universe is ‘whether it has come into being or is 
ungenerated,’ as was stated a little earlier (Tim. 27c5), and that he himself 
will state further on: ‘we should therefore first examine concerning [the 
universe] what it is laid down that we must examine for every subject at the 
outset, whether it has always existed, having no beginning of its becoming, 
or has come into being’ (28b3–6). If this is the very first of the subjects to 
be investigated, it is fitting that it has the first position among the 
fundamental principles, namely what is that which is generated and what is 
that which is eternal. The other principles follow these, just as the other 
problems follow on the problem concerning the coming into being.”40 (In 
Tim. I 235.32-236.13, transl. Runia, modified) 
  
The answer to that fundamental question of φυσιολογία, and the determination of 
the εἶδος or nature41 of its subject matter, the universe, will be reached through a 
prior analysis of the two relevant realms of reality, Being and Becoming.42 The 
present section, III.3, contains a discussion of that analysis, concentrated around 
three aporiai Proclus encounters. The three aporiai summoned by the first two 
starting points of the prooemium serve Proclus as vehicles for methodological 
discussions regarding different issues all related to the proper presentation of 
scientific knowledge. In these discussions, geometry is always the explicit 
paradigm. 
                                               
39 For Proclus’ interpretation of the Timaeus as a didactic exposition (διδασκαλίας ἕνεκα), the 
deduction or construction of the whole logos regarding the universe from this first question, and 
the text as image of creation see chapter V. 
40 Cf. the division of speeches into πρόβλημα and ἀπόδειξις, Arist. Rhet. 1414a30ff. For the 
(logical) relation between the different principles, see III.4-III.5. 
41 αὐτοῦ [τοῦ κόσμου] τὸ εἶδος: 276.19-21; ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φύσις: 226.28. 
42 The analysis of these two genera, and the following subsumption of something under one of 
these genera occurs also at Phd 78bff, the analysis of the composite/sensible and the 
incomposite/intelligible and the assignment of soul to the latter.  
THE PROOEMIUM 
- 71 - 
 
III.3.1 First aporia: the διάκρισις of Being and Becoming 
 
At 27d5, after the prayer and the exhortation of both himself and his audience, 
Timaeus starts his actual account of the universe with the words:  
T III.4 
“Well then, in my opinion first the following division should be made 
(διαιρετέον τάδε):”43 
 
The division to be made, we find out in the following sentence, is 
T III.5 
“...what is that which always is, but does not have generation, and what is 
that which is (always) becoming, but never really is?”44   
 
Both Plotinus and Proclus indicate that this passage presented a challenge for 
interpreters.45 The main cause of exegetical difficulty was the word διαιρετέον in 
the first lemma, since it suggests that the method applied in the Timaeus is Platonic 
διαίρεσις, the method of dividing a genus into its species.46 Since the consequent 
sentence shows which two species constitute the division: in short “Being” and 
“Becoming”, the questions arose what kind of division Timaeus has in mind,47 
and what genus it is that consists of “Being” and “Becoming”?  
 
Proclus, who at first avoids the use of the word διαίρεσις and instead applies the 
more neutral term διάκρισις in order not to bias his discussion,48 extensively 
                                               
43 Tim. 27d5 as quoted in In Tim.: ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατὰ γε ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε. Burnet 
has κατ’ ἐμὴν. He does not mention variants that include γε, and for all we know the addition of 
γε may be Proclus’ own idea. If so, the addition is understandable when we consider that Proclus’ 
first comments on this lemma consist in a discussion of a Pythagorean trait of Timaeus’ 
procedure, namely to present one’s own opinion, as opposed to that of others, which would be 
Socrates’ choice (In Tim. I 223.5ff). On prayer, exhortation and this Pythagorean aspect of the 
account see chapter V.  
44 Tim. 27d6-28a1: τί τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γενόμενον μέν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; 
Proclus does not have a second ἀεὶ, Burnet does. 
45 For Plotinus see below.  
46 Phaedrus (265c-266d), Sophist (216a-232a) and Statesman (258b-268d; 274e-end). 
47 Contemporary commentators Taylor (1928), Cornford (1937), Brisson (1992), Zeyl (2000) see 
no reference to a technical terms here, and unanimously translate “distinction”.  
48 In Tim. I 224.10: ἡ διάκρισις τῶν ὄντων καὶ γιγνομένων; 224.12-13: τῶν δύο τούτων γενῶν ἡ τοῦ 
ὄντος καὶ τῆς γενέσεως ...διάκρισις. There is no real difference (e.g. of classes and their members) 
between the plural in the first case (τῶν ὄντων καὶ γιγνομένων) and the singular in the second (ἡ 
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reports the quandaries surrounding this suggestive formulation,49 by scholastically 
spelling out all five possible kinds of division – a cut (τομή) as of some whole into 
parts; a diaeresis of a genus into species; of one word into a number of meanings 
(σημαινόμενα); of a substance (οὐσία) into accidents; the inverse, an accident into 
substances – and rejecting each one of them.50 That Proclus goes out of his way to 
distinguish and explain five different kinds of division despite the fact that he 
consequently rejects them all, has two reasons. First of all, it allows him to show 
his erudition and awareness of scholastic discussions. Secondly, and more 
importantly, starting the exegesis of the starting points with a division – even if it 
turns out not to be a real division – fits in with Proclus’ desire to see all the 
dialectical methods, division, definition, demonstration, and analysis, applied in 
philosophy of nature, as befits a true Platonic science.51 Of the first three of these 
methods, which in his view are all synthetic, division is the most august, and is to 
be applied first because it provides the principles of definition, which in turn is the 
basis of demonstration.52  
Proclus’ proposed alternative is that, instead of a division, Plato is only making a 
διάκρισις ἀφοριστική, a “delimiting distinction” in which we find out what Being 
and Becoming are. A Platonic diaeresis (of any type) is a division of similar 
entities, qualities etc. in that they are on equal level, be it ontological, semantic or 
otherwise and can be grouped under the same higher level entity, quality etc. 53 
Since Being and Becoming are essentially different, in many respects each other’s 
contraries, but moreover ontologically ordered according to priority and 
posteriority, a division of these two is impossible: there is no genus over an 
ordered series.54 Rather than bringing them together under a higher level, Being 
and Becoming have to be conceptually separated. This is exactly what is 
                                                                                                                                      
τοῦ ὄντος καὶ τῆς γενέσεως): they occur in one and the same sentence, and both refer to the 
distinction between ὄν and γιγνομένον.  
49 In Tim. I 224.17-227.3. 
50 Proclus’ discussion of the different types of division, which opens up all kinds of interesting 
questions concerning the Neoplatonic interpretation of the method of diaeresis, will not be 
discussed here. On the types of division see also Dillon (1993: 73-74). 
51 On philosophy of nature being aided by dialectic, see Plot. Enn. I 3 [20] 6.2-5. 
52 In Parm. 982.11-15, Theol.Plat. I 9.40.10-12. On definition as ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀποδείξεως see In Parm. 
980.33ff, 981.3, 24, In Eucl. 206.13. See also below, III.3.2. Analysis is not included in these 
hierarchies of dialectical methods, because from a directional point of view it is considered the 
opposite to all three other methods: analysis constitutes the upward, anagogic method and is as 
such more valuable than the synthetic methods. Cf. Beierwaltes (1979: 248). 
53 Following Aristotle’s notion of synonymy: items falling under a single genus share not only the 
name of that genus but also the corresponding definition (Cat. 1, 5). 
54 Cf. Plot. Enn. VI 1 [42] 1-2, and the lucid reading of de Haas (2001: 503ff.). On the more 
general issue of Neoplatonic genera see Lloyd, A.C. (1962), (1990: 76ff.). 
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emphasized by explaining “di-vision” as an elucidation of the chasm gaping 
between the two genera through their respective definitions.55 Proclus sees a 
parallel in this context with the Philebus, where Plato distinguishes three genera (τὸ 
πέρας, τὸ ἄπειρον, τὸ μικτόν, 23C-D). They, too, are highest genera, that can not in 
turn be brought together under a higher genus.56 
In order to highlight the nature of the “di-vision”, Proclus subsequently speaks of 
a “delimiting distinction” (διάκρισις ἀφοριστική), “we must carefully distinguish” 
(διευκρινητέον57), followed by a repeated “separate” (χωρίς twice), and phrases 
such as “in order that we don’t confuse” (ἴνα ... μὴ συγχέωμεν), but “distinguish 
from one another” (διακρίνωμεν αὐτὰς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων).58  
As Proclus concludes:  
T III.6 
“...this is not a division of one entity, but the present investigation needs 
the distinction (ἀφορισμός) of these two genera (τῶν διττῶν τούτων γενῶν) 
before everything else, in order for the exposition to proceed as from 
geometrical hypotheses to the examination of the consequents (τῶν 
ἀκολούθων) and discover the nature of the universe and its paternal and 
paradigmatic causes.”59 
 
This solution is very similar to that of Plotinus, who criticizes Severus’ 
interpretation of the diaeresis.60 The Platonist Severus had interpreted the 
diaeresis of the prooemium as a division of the semantic genus τί (inspired by the 
                                               
55 According to Porphyry (apud Simplicius In Phys. 135.9ff, 134F Smith), Plato is making a logical 
distinction of two opposites (ἀντιδιαιρούμενος). ἀντιδιαιρεῖν (used at In Tim. I 384.19ff of matter 
and the Demiurge) is “to distinguish logically” (cf. Iamb. Comm.Math. 4) and (pass.) “to be 
opposed as the members of a natural classification”, Arist. Cat. 14b34, Top. 143a36, cf. Iamb. 
Myst. 9.7.  
56 In Tim. I 226.2-7. 
57 This expression occurs at Plato Parm. 135b3. The only other time the verb is to be found in 
Proclus is in his commentary on that text (In Parm. 976.26-38), where almost identical vocabulary 
is used as here in the In Tim.: “you should carefully examine (διευκρινήσασθαι) the genera (!) of 
beings...the distinct causes (τὰς διωρισμένας αἰτίας)...we have divided (διειλόμεθα)...the words 
“that which is carefully examined” (“διευκρινησάμενον”) indicate the unmixed and pure 
intellectual apprehension (τὴν ἀσύγχυτον καὶ καθαρὰν νοερὰν ἐπιβολήν)...for clear distinction is a 
kind of delimiting [clarity] of the particularity of each thing (ἡ γὰρ εὐκρίνεια σαφήνειά τίς ἐστι τῆς 
ἑκάστων ἰδιότητος ἀφοριστική).” 
58 In Tim. I 225.25-226.2. Note that διάκρισις and διαίρεσις are sometimes equivalents, as at 
Theol.Plat. IV 92.4ff. and In Tim. III 249.21ff. Cf. the use of διάκρισις in Plato Sophist 226d and 
Leg. 908b. 
59 In Tim. I 226.24-29 
60 Plot. Enn. VI.2 [43] 1, esp. 21-28. 
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Stoic category) into Being and Becoming.61 Plotinus explicitly rejects the Severian 
insertion of that genus above Being and Becoming as ridiculous and compares it 
to equating Socrates with his image. He moreover makes clear that Plato 
distinguishes Being and Becoming, and sets them apart (τὸ ἀφορίσαι καὶ χωρὶς 
θεῖναι) in the first place in order to warn those who mistakenly call Being that 
which is actually Becoming.  
For Proclus the distinction is crucial not only as a warning, but furthermore as 
providing Timaeus with the means to “discover the nature and efficient and 
paradigmatic causes of everything” as if from geometrical hypotheses and their 
consequences (cf. T III.6). Distinguishing between the different genera relevant to 
a science is part and parcel of the task of a good scientist. As Proclus remarks in 
the In Eucl., it belongs to the qualities of the good μαθηματικός to be able to 
distinguish between the different genera, and choose the proper demonstration 
accordingly, where the proper demonstration is the one that uses the principles 
fitting to the subject matter, and that has the appropriate epistemological status 
and degree of certainty.62 That μαθηματικός can here be taken in the broad sense 
of scientist, including the philosopher of nature, is clear from the fact that the 
Timaeus is subsequently mentioned as the clear example of a text in which the 
subject matter influences the degree of certainty.63  
The importance of distinguishing between different kinds of subject matter of a 
demonstration is similar to the importance attached to division as the method of 
providing a neat organization of the constituent terms/concepts of a science,64 
and of eliminating what is irrelevant to the task at hand.65 Not distinguishing the 
fundamental concepts properly is a source of mistakes.66 Translated to the context 
of the In Tim., where as we have seen there is no division, the distinction of the 
two genera allows us to eliminate the genus that is least relevant to the task at 
hand, a crucial step in determining the nature of the universe. In this sense, of 
preventing confusion by accurately distinguishing the main concepts relevant 
within a science, the διάκρισις is no less significant than a diaeresis would have 
been. 
Some thirty pages after the discussion of the alleged division, Proclus presents 
another, far less problematizing, but also less interesting discussion of the 
                                               
61 Cf. In Tim. 224.25-29, where Proclus refers to that same interpretation. On the Platonist 
Severus and his use of the Stoic category τι, see Gioè (1993). On the Stoic category see Long and 
Sedley (1987: 27); Seneca Ep.58.13-15; Alex. In Ar.Top. 301.19-25; ibid. 359.12-16. 
62 In Eucl. 32.21ff.  
63 In Eucl. 34.4-7. 
64 Cf. Barnes (2003: 129-130), who refers to Boethius, div 875 D-876 D. 
65 In Eucl. 211.23-212.1. 
66 Barnes (2003: 129-130), esp. the reference to Galen ad Glauc XI 4. 
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διάκρισις.67 He emphasizes again that it is not really a division (τὸ διαιρετέον οὐκ 
ἐδήλου διαιρετικὴν ὁδόν), and this time reinforces this claim by subsuming some 
of the other starting points (see the outline in III.2) under the object of the verbal 
adjective “διαιρετέον” as well. Only now is it made explicit that the verbal 
adjective should not be read as a technical term, since it signifies rather:  
T III.7 
“...that one should distinguish the hypotheses.68 For “that everything 
becoming by necessity becomes through a cause”, and “that it is impossible 
to have becoming without a cause”, and after these “that that which 
becomes with regard to an eternal paradigm is beautiful”69, all these have 
been presented with reference to “must be distinguished” (διοριστέον70), 
and they are axioms, not parts (μόρια71) of a division.”72 
 
This reading of the Timaeus, where the first four starting points are presented as 
objects of διαιρετέον, is possible, and in fact not at all unlikely, since διαιρετέον is 
the only verb that can govern their accusative/infinitive constructions. The 
Platonic text should then be read as “First we need to distinguish Being and 
Becoming, (...), that all Becoming has an efficient cause, that it is impossible to 
have becoming without a cause, etc...”. Note that Proclus is here presenting yet 
another argument against reading a diaeresis in Tim. 27d5. Up to now, the main 
question was whether it is at all possible to present a Platonic diaeresis the μόρια 
of which are Being and Becoming. Now, however, Proclus is thinking of a 
diaeresis as a chain of divisions, in the manner of Plato’s Sophist, and states that 
                                               
67 In Tim. I 258.12ff. 
68 There is a switch from the ontological to the logical level here, since before the distinction 
made was between genera of reality.  
69 Proclus here names both affirmative and negative clause of the lemma concerning the efficient 
cause, yet only the affirmative clause of that concerning the paradigm. Reasons for this may be 
the following. 1. The context: we find this remark in the discussion of the lemma on the efficient 
cause, so the text on the paradigm has not been treated yet; 2. The phrasing of the Timaeus: the 
negative clause about the paradigm is the only one of the four that does not contain an explicit 
accusative/infinitive construction. The latter fits in with the fact that the fifth starting point, i.e. 
the naming of the subject matter, is not included: its verb is a third person imperative, which 
cannot be the object of the verbal adjective.   
70 This seems to be a slip, be it Proclus’ or a scribe’s, as the word διοριστέον is not used in the 
Timaeus at 27d5. It does occur later, at 29b4.  
71 Μόρια are the constituent parts, also of a genus. Cf. Plato Soph. 229b7, Arist. Met. V 15 
1023b19.  
72 In Tim. I 258.18-23.  
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the starting points concerning the efficient and paradigmatic causes of the 
universe (#3 and #4 in the overview) are not μόρια of such a chain. 
 
 
III.3.2 Second aporia: the definitions 
 
The distinction of Being and Becoming is initially introduced as a “division”, and 
commences with the phrase “what is…” (see T III.5). Commentators had thereby 
been led to assume that, following the division, Timaeus is laying out definitions 
(ὁρισμοί). In Platonic philosophy, the method of division is traditionally the 
method related to definition,73 and the formula “what is...” is the standard 
question to which a definition provides the reply.74 The function of divisions, 
however, is to provide the genus that together with the specific differentia will 
constitute a definition, whereas in the Timaeus it is the genera themselves that are 
defined. The mere fact that, as we saw, Being and Becoming cannot be brought 
under any of the five kinds of division already bodes ill for the definitions, because 
of that which cannot be part of a division there cannot be a definition.75   
And indeed, the commentators referred to by Proclus (he does not reveal who 
they are, but Plotinus and Porphyry are likely candidates, see below, n. 81) 
criticised the definitions they supposed were given, since the two questions (“what 
is Being?” and “what is Becoming?”) are answered as follows: “eternal Being is 
what is known through intellect and reasoning,” and “Becoming is what is judged 
through opinion and sense perception” (Tim. 28a).76 These descriptions, Proclus 
tells us, have been criticised for two reasons. First of all, they do not obey the 
rules of definitions (οἱ τῶν ὅρων κανόνες), because they do not supply a genus. 
Secondly, they do not clarify what the nature of the definiendum is, but instead 
                                               
73 In Parm. 982.12-13. Cf. In Eucl. 57.18-26, 69.9ff. where definitions are coupled with division as 
the methods concerning first principles and essential properties. Cf. Buzzetti (1997: esp. 332-6). 
Alcinous says that definition, which aims at knowledge of ‘what each thing is in itself in virtue of 
its essence,’ arises (γεννᾶται) from division (Alc. Didask. V 157.1-10 Whittaker)).  
74 In Tim. I 227.13-18 “First of all, then, the “what” is intended to be definitory: for it is common 
usage in definitions to put “what is” first.” This is followed by a criticism of Severus, the 
Platonist mentioned above who apparently was an adherent of the Stoic theory of categories, 
according to which the repeated word τί introduces only one question, namely ‘what is that which 
includes both the existing and the subsisting?’ On Severus’ reading see Gioè (1993). 
75 In Parm. 980.29ff. Cf. Steel (2004). 
76 The issues here discussed regarding the definitions are to be found at In Tim. I 240.13-243.2. 
For discussions of Proclus’ exegesis of the definitions themselves, and his reaction to Aristotle’s 
criticism thereof (I 243.26-258.12), see Lernould (2001: 153ff.) and Baltes (1978: 3ff.); for 
Proclus’ views on opinion (δόξα), see also below III.5.1(iii). 
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describe it by our modes of cognition. One should, however, study the things 
themselves as such, before moving on to our epistemological relation to them. 77 
 
(i) The answer to the first objection 
Proclus responds to this criticism with rhetorical indignation, stating that he will 
demonstrate “the very opposite”, namely that the anonymous objectors “are 
completely mistaken,” after which he agrees to the gist of their objections, and 
subsequently explains them away. As to the first: Timaeus indeed does not appeal 
to a genus for the definienda, and he is right in not doing so, since there is no 
genus above Being. Proclus does not reveal whether Timaeus could have provided 
a genus for Becoming.78 Although the answer to that question would be 
interesting, Proclus chooses to deal only with the issue that plays an important 
role in ancient metaphysics: Being as the highest genus. His defence of Plato’s 
definition concerning Being comes down to the following:79 1) There is no genus 
above Being, “for what kind of genus is appropriate to Being, which encompasses 
the entire intelligible substance (οὐσία)? If there is no genus above substance, nor 
a definition of substance, since it is most generic (γενικώτατον), what would you 
say in the case of Being, which encompasses all substance, all potentialities, and all 
actualities?” Proclus is here playing on the distinction between τὸ ὄν and ἡ οὑσία, 
and combining the Peripatetic notion of substance as highest genus and the 
Platonic one of Being as highest genus. Since Being encompasses not only 
substance, but also the ontologically different actualities and potentialities, of 
which ‘Being’ cannot be predicated synonymously,80 and since there is not even a 
genus above substance, there is a fortiori no genus above Being;81 2) Proclus goes 
                                               
77 In Tim. I 241.31-242.2; cf. In Tim. III 254.27-31, where Proclus calls a genuine (ὀντῶς) 
definition one that 1. conveys a character that is applicable to all the genera falling under the 
definition, 2. expounds the essence of the definiendum, 3. does not include the definiendum in 
the definiens. 
78 The notion of genus in this context is an Aristotelian one, and for a discussion of a genus 
above Becoming a Platonic genus is required. On Platonic genera, which allow the species of a 
genus to be an ordered series, see Lloyd, A.C. (1990: 76ff.). 
79 In Tim. I 242.5ff. 
80 Cf. Arist.Top. II 2 109b6, where it is said that all genera are predicated synonymously of their 
species. 
81 In Tim. I 242.5-10. Porph. Isag. 4.1.5. On Being as a highest genus, cf. Plato Soph. 254eff. For 
Plotinus οὐσία is not a genus as it is not predicated synonymously (Enn. VI.1 [42] 3), and τὸ ὄν is 
one of the five highest genera (VI.2 [43] 8.44-45), although the other four are its constituent 
actualities. Cf. de Haas (2001: 514-5) and Chiaradonna (2002: 80-81 and ch. 3, 227ff.). Proclus 
seems to follow Porphyry (Isag. 4,1.5.1-2), who in turn follows Arist. Met. VI 1. As in the case of 
the ‘division’, Proclus focuses exclusively on Being, because his discussion is part of a more 
general defence of Plato’s theory of Forms.  
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on to show with a reductio ad impossibile that there is no genus of Being, because if 
there were, it would be either Being or not Being. Being is not the genus of Being, 
because this would reduce the second Being to a particular kind of Being, rather 
than Being simpliciter; 3) On the other hand, the genus of Being cannot not be 
Being (or be non-Being), since the negation would have to be predicated of the 
species,82 i.e. of Being, which would thereby become self-contradictory (assuming 
self-predication).  
This hardly seems adequate or convincing by way of justification of the definition 
of Being, but it is not intended as such a justification. As in the case of the 
division discussed above, Proclus brings in the scholastic discussion of a technical 
term, and rejects the technical meaning of the term as unsuitable in the context. 
He does not see any harm in the definition not being a real definition. What he 
really wants to argue here is that Being is the highest possible genus, that for this 
reason no genus can be given in the definition, and that therefore no proper 
definition can be given. So in a roundabout way, he is defending Plato, not by 
refuting the criticism itself, but by showing that Plato had no other choice.  
That this is what Proclus has in mind shows from the terminology he uses. To 
indicate that he is merely using the term “definition” in a derivative sense, and that 
the two answers to the questions “what is Being” and “what is Becoming?” are 
(merely) similar to definitions, he calls the “what” (τί) in these questions ὁρικόν 
(“akin to definition”), rather than ὁριστικόν (“belonging to definition”), the more 
common expression.83 The rare term ὁρικόν is used by Aristotle to designate 
something that is not a standard definition, but is similar to it in that it does 
express the identity of two things.84 “Τὰ ὁρικά” are described by the Stagirite as 
“everything that falls under the same method as definitions” – they may not reveal 
                                               
82 The genus is predicated of all the species, In Tim. I 242.12-13; cf. In Parm. 950.22-23. The 
phrase echoes Arist. Top. II 2 109b6 (see also n. 80), although the word συνωνύμως is absent (as in 
Syrianus, In Met. 29.35; 46.12 Kroll). 
83 In Tim. I 227.13; cf. 309.9-13, where Plato is said to have “secured” (κατεδήσατο) eternal Being 
through the definitory explanation (ὁρικῆς ἀποδόσεως, ὁρικῶς ἀποδοθέντος). Note that 
Festugière’s translation “la nature de l’Être Éternel” (at 309.9) is incorrect, for the very reason 
that the “definition” of Being does not reveal its nature. In the passage in question Proclus argues 
why the Demiurge cannot be identical to Being. The argument is not (as is suggested by F.’s 
translation) 1. the Demiurge is hard to find (Tim. 28b), 2. we have found the nature of Being 
(from the definition), hence 3. Being and the Demiurge are not identical. Instead, the argument is 
rather 1. the Demiurge is hard to find (Tim. 28c), 2. we already know how Being is to be found 
(from the definition, namely through intellect and reasoning), hence 3. Being and the Demiurge 
are not identical. 
84 Arist. Top. I 5, 101b37ff. 
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the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), but they are interchangeable with what they “define”.85 
In this sense, the two descriptions, or cognitive pilots as we may call them, from 
the prooemium are indeed akin to definition. They provide criteria that will 
identify (only) Being and (only) Becoming respectively, as the metaphysical 
distinction between Being and Becoming is “expressly equated” or “correlated” 86 
with that between the intelligible and the sensible, just as in the simile of the 
divided line in the Republic (509dff).87 That this extensional identity is supposed by 
Proclus, and, in fact, by Plato himself, to exist between definiendum and definiens 
is clear also from the fact that the converse of the definition of Becoming (i.e. 
“everything perceptible is Becoming”) is later used in the first demonstration, 
concerning the nature of the universe.88 And extensional identity is a necessary 
condition for this kind of conversion. That demonstration will also show that, in 
order to serve as criteria, the ‘definitions’ are necessarily related primarily to the 
subjective discrimination by the knower.   
 
(ii) The answer to the second objection 
The second objection brought forward against the definitions was that they do not 
reveal the essence of the definienda. Where the first objection gave Proclus 
occasion to show that Plato did not have any other choice than to present non-
technical definitions, in response to this second objection he takes the opportunity 
to show that, in the circumstances, Plato did the second best thing. Proclus agrees 
that the definitions themselves do not reveal the essence of the definienda, but 
adds that this is justified by the didactic purpose of Timaeus’ exposition, as well as 
the anagogic function of the dialogue as a whole for the reader. The definitions 
                                               
85 Aristotle’s main point in the Topics chapter is that a definition should always be a proposition 
(λόγος), rather than a word (ὄνομα), but this does not undermine our case. This narrower sense 
of ὁρικόν, for those descriptions that are abbreviations of definitions, is found in Hermias (In 
Phd. 120.6ff), who says that soul can be defined by a ὁρικὸν ὄνομα, and shows that such an ὄνομα 
is in fact an abbreviation of a proposition.  
86 Taylor (1928: 61), Zeyl (2000: xxviii). 
87 Thus it is not the case that we do not find a criterion with which to distinguish Being from 
Becoming until I 255, as is maintained by Lernould (2001: 162-4). Lernould takes Proclus’ 
introduction of his own addition to the description of the two genera, namely the (not) having an 
existence in time in all respects (οὐσία, δύναμις, ἐνεργεία), to be a first criterion for distinguishing 
Being from Becoming. Apart from the fact that there is another addition (that of (not) having 
self-subsistence) that is at least as important, a criterion should primarily be related to the 
subjective discrimination by the knower, and only secondarily to objective properties of the 
object as the ultimate grounds of that discrimination. The ‘definitions’, as descriptions of our 
cognitive access to Being and Becoming, are the first occasion where such a yardstick is offered.  
88 Tim. 28b7-c2. In Tim I 283.15-19; 292.19ff; II.4.4. For a discussion of the role of the 
conversion in the foundation of philosophy of nature, see III.5.1.  
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(ἀποδόσεις), he points out, will later be used as axioms and hypotheses of the 
demonstrations, and as such they have to be known and evident to us (γνωρίμους 
[…] καὶ ἐναργεῖς ἡμῖν).89 This formulation harks back to Aristotle’s distinction 
between “what is prior and better known (γνωριμώτερον) to us” and “what is prior 
and better known by nature”, a distinction the Stagirite makes in the context of 
listing the requirements of the starting points of demonstrations.90 By adopting 
this distinction, Proclus makes the rules of defining subordinate to the rules of 
demonstration, in the light of the didactic aim of the text. This aim demands that 
the learning audience be familiar with the subject matter, as we also read in the 
very first lines of the Posterior Analytics: “All teaching and all intellectual learning 
develop from pre-existing knowledge” (71a1-2). And since “Timaeus wants to 
make Being and Becoming familiar through the use of the definitions, in order for 
the demonstrations that are to follow to proceed from hypotheses that are familiar 
and known to the audience”,91 it is only reasonable that Plato presents the peculiar 
nature of Being and Becoming by describing the epistemic access we have of 
them, which will subsequently result in anamnesis, our awakening (ἀνεγείραντες) to 
a clearer grasp of their nature.92 The setting out of the starting points is a 
preparatory phase before the actual unfolding of science. 
In order for this second defence of Plato’s definitions to hold water, Proclus 
expands Aristotle’s notion of “what is prior and better known to us”, to include 
not only “that which is closer to perception”, and “the particulars” (as at APo I 2 
71b33ff), but also the (mental) object of our intellect and reasoning (as objects of 
intellect and reasoning, not per se). This would not be the case in an alternative 
reading of the phrase “prior and better known to us”, namely as cognitive priority 
due to the positing, rather than prior to the positing. The definitions of Being and 
Becoming would then be prior and better known due to the mere fact that 
Timaeus starts his exposition on the universe with them. In such a reading, 
however, the point of the necessity of epistemological priority of the definitions to 
                                               
89 In Tim. I 242.16-19. Cf. I 345.6ff., II 27.1ff.. Diehl and Festugière have the “as we said before” 
refer to 228.25ff., where Proclus speaks of the hypothesis “that Being exists”. It is both 
grammatically and with regard to content unlikely that the plural τούτοις at 242.17 refers to the 
singular ὑπόθεσις (the gender is irrelevant here), which, moreover, is no mention of either 
definition, but an assumption that is already implicit in them (on which see below, III.3.3). More 
suitable are In Tim. I 226.22ff., the first mention of the use of hypotheses and demonstrations, 
but in the context of the ‘division’; I 229.1ff., on philosophy of nature being a hypothetical 
science; or 235.32ff., on the definitions as first starting points. 
90 APo I 2, 71b33ff, cf. Phys. I 1, 184a16ff. See Barnes (1994: 96-7), Mignucci (1975a: 30-31) for 
more reff.  
91 In Tim. I 242.21-24. 
92 In Tim. I 242.26-27. 
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the demonstrations would be an argument in favour of beginning with definitions of 
Being and Becoming, but entirely lose its argumentative force in the defence of 
the particular choice of the definitions: any definition would do. Since it is the 
particular choice of the definitions that Proclus is here concerned with, we have to 
read the “prior and better known” as indicating cognitive priority prior to the 
positing.93  
Starting from what is known simpliciter, or by nature, rather than from knowledge 
that the interlocutors already possess, would be a didactical mistake: 
T III.8 
“If [Plato] had encouraged us to try and apprehend the actual nature as 
such of things, he would have inadvertently filled the entire teaching with 
unclarity.”94  
 
Once the students have been led from what they already knew to those starting 
points that are “the beginning by nature, but the end with respect to us”,95 i.e. the 
causes of the universe, the exposition can, and should, follow the natural order of 
things. Since a didactic text is an exteriorization of the inner scientific discourse of 
the teacher, it should run parallel to it, and since (scientific) knowledge has the 
same structure as its (external) object, a didactic text should also have the same 
structure as its object.96  
                                               
93 The epistemological priority of the definitions prior to positing lies minimally in the audience’s 
already knowing 1) that it has sense perception and opinion, and that they have a proper object, 
as well as 2) that it has an intellect and reasoning, and that they again have a proper object. That 
the proper objects in question are Becoming and Being respectively need only have priority due to 
positing. On the distinction prior and better known to us and per se see also de Haas (2002). 
94 In Tim. I 242.19-21, note the opposition of “hunt” (θηρᾶν) and “teaching” (διδασκαλία). 
Making ones students chase after knowledge, rather then showing them the way, is didactically 
ineffective. Cf. below, III.5.1. For the use of the expression τὴν φύσιν θηρᾶν in relation to the 
distinction appearance vs. real nature see Galen De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis ac 
facultatibus 461.16-462.2 (l. 11, Kühn). The expression is perhaps a variation of Phd 66c2, ἡ τοῦ 
ὄντος θήρα. 
95 In Tim. I 338.22-3, cf. Arist. APo I 2. 
96 In Tim. I 337.29-338.5 in paraphrase: as the universe naturally begins from, i.e. is caused by, the 
gods and the source of beings, so the scientific discourse starts from a natural beginning. 
Scientific knowledge follows the order of things, and the didactic account in turn follows science. 
Proclus is not very clear on where we find the actual start of the didactic account: he mentions 
the starting points (337.29-338.4, cf. 338.27-8), the final cause as the proper beginning of the 
universe (338.27), but therefore also of the didactic account, and the distinction concerning the 
iconic status of the account (οἱ λόγοι 338.28-2). On the parallel between text and creation see 
chapter V.  
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The two ways in which the definitions, and especially that of Becoming, 
contribute to the actual carrying out of the anamnesis aimed at by this didactic 
scheme will be discussed in III.5.1.  
 
In the end, one gets the impression that Proclus wants to have it both ways: he 
admits that the definitions are not really definitions, yet at the same time maintains 
the designation “definitions” for the phrases in question,97 something I will do as 
well. That Proclus still calls the descriptions definitions every now and then may 
have several reasons, such as a wish to distinguish these two first starting points 
from the others as more fundamental to the whole exposition, a custom in the 
exegetical tradition to speak of definitions, or because in this manner at least at 
first sight, as in the case of the division, the correct order of the synthetic 
dialectical methods is safeguarded: first division, then definition, then 
demonstration.98 But the most important reason at this stage is no doubt that 
Proclus thus maintains the parallel with geometry as we find it in Euclid’s Elements, 
which starts off with the formulation of definitions. This parallel is important not 
just for rhetorical reasons: as we will see, in Proclus’ idiosyncratic notion of 
definition in geometry we find an important clue as to the status of philosophy of 
nature as a hypothetical science.  
 
 
III.3.3 Third aporia: the hypothesis of Being  
 
Proclus’ third aporia concerning the starting points of the prooemium may in first 
instance come as a surprise:  
T III.9 
“Now why has Plato not discussed the ‘if’ before the ‘what’?”99 
 
Why would Proclus, besides discussing whether the label ‘definitions’ is applied 
correctly to the definitions, also raise the aporia why Plato does not discuss 
existence (the “if”) before essence (the “what”)? That this question comes up at all 
can be understood only if we assume that the definitions of philosophy of nature 
presuppose the existence of their definienda. The easiest way to dispel the aporia, 
in that case, is to show that philosophy of nature is a hypothetical science. As we 
will see, this is indeed the main argument Proclus has recourse to: in philosophy 
                                               
97 After the discussion here summarized, at In Tim. I 243.13; 254.16; 258.12; 320.27-8; II 4.4-16. 
98 In Parm. 982.11-15, Theol.Plat. I 9.40.10-12. 
99 In Tim. I 227.19-20. 
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of nature, as in geometry, the existence of certain entities is presupposed, and 
therefore the constituent concepts of that science can be defined without proving 
their existence.100 It is in this issue that the parallel between Plato’s method and 
that of a geometer is most significant, and for a proper understanding of the sense 
in which philosophy of nature is a hypothetical science, we will make an excursion 
into geometry (III.3.3 (ii)).  
First, however, we will discuss some of the other arguments Proclus offers to 
resolve the aporia. Anonymous predecessors of our commentator (τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν, 
227.19) formulated this aporia, provoked by the interrogative “τί” that introduces 
the definitions of Being and Becoming, and that was taken to suggest that Plato 
had in the back of his mind the four problêmata (as later distinguished by Aristotle) 
εἴ ἐστι, τί ἐστιν, ὁποίον ἐστι, διὰ τί ἐστιν.101 The practice of treating the “what” 
before the “whether” was considered incorrect, since it contravenes the rules of 
scientific demonstration (ὁ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν νόμος), which say that one should 
first ascertain the existence of the subject matter, before defining it.102 This need 
becomes all the more urgent in the case of entities of which the existence is 
disputed, such as the Platonic Forms, i.e. Being: “for what proof does [Plato] have 
that eternal Being exists?”103  
Proclus’ formulation of the aporia, the great pains he takes to solve it, the 
solutions he comes up with, but especially the exclusive focus on the existence of 
Being in the resolution of the aporia (see below), reveal that he interprets it as 
more than a methodological issue, namely as an attack on the theory of Forms.104 
                                               
100 This point of similarity between geometry and the philosophy of nature of the Timaeus is noted 
also by Finkelberg (1996: 403-4). Note, however, that Finkelberg contradicts himself by 
maintaining that “Timaeus is neither truth nor fraud, it is a hypothetical argument” (1996: 404), 
while at the same time taking this hypothetical character to explain why Plato adopts propositions 
which he thinks are false (1996: n. 30).  
101 Arist. APo II 1 89b24-35.  
102 In Tim I 227.21-22. Note that Elias (In Isag. 37.9-16), who matches each of the four 
(Aristotelian) dialectical questions to a (Platonic) dialectical method, has the question “if it is” 
correspond with the method of division, which would also solve the aporia: the presence of the 
division is thereby an answer to the question ‘if it is’. 
103 I 227.20-21: πόθεν γάρ, ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν; Cf. Arist. APo II 1, 89b31-34, on “if it is simpliciter”, 
concerning centaurs and gods. Elsewhere, Aristotle also brings up the order “if it is, what it is” 
concerning the discussion of entities whose existence is problematic, namely infinity (Phys. 
208a28) and the void (213a13). 
104 If the aporia had been no more than a methodological issue, Proclus could have sufficed with 
an argument ad auctoritatem, by referring to Plato’s Phdr. 237bc, where Socrates says that one 
should in the investigation of any subject first look into what it is (τὸ τί ἐστιν). Cf. In Tim. I 
275.14-20, where Proclus does use this argument to explain that the proper beginning of 
Timaeus’ account is the fundamental question concerning the εἶδος of the cosmos (i.e. whether 
the cosmos is Becoming or Being). 
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The existence of Becoming is not discussed in any explicit way.105 Moreover, 
Proclus explains both why Timaeus does not discuss the existence of Being before 
defining it, which is the actual aporia, and why there is in general no need for him 
to present a proof of the existence of Being, although he does not separate these 
questions explicitly. 
 
(i) The answers to the third aporia, part I 
Proclus’ first answer to the aporia is that Timaeus’ negligence of the rules of 
demonstration is not that grave, since he may have had reason to believe that he 
did not need a proof of the existence of Being.106 The fact that this suggestion is 
subsequently buttressed with a grand total of seven arguments, including a 
forthright rejection of the aporia, reveals that Proclus still felt the aporia had to be 
dispelled. In summary, the arguments rely on  
1) the contents of the Republic;  
2) the existence of the gods;  
3) our common notions;  
4) the methodological parallel between philosophy of nature and geometry;  
5) a rejection of the aporia: Plato does prove the existence of Being;  
6) the existence of the Demiurge;  
7) the existence of the paradigmatic cause of the universe.107  
As will become clear, of these arguments 1, 2 and 3 defend the thesis “we don’t 
need proof of the existence of Being because we already have it”, 5, 6, and 7 the 
thesis “we don’t need proof of the existence of Being because we will get it later”, 
and 4, which is called “the most true” explanation,108 defends the thesis “we 
should not get any proof of the existence of Being in this context”.  
These arguments will here be reviewed in their proper order, with a special focus 
on the fourth and “most true” argument, which concerns the geometrical method. 
The first two arguments can be dealt with briefly. They are 1) Timaeus does not 
need an argument for the existence of the Forms, since a proof has been given by 
Socrates “the day before”, i.e. during the conversations described in the Republic;109 
2) Perhaps (τάχα δέ) also the fact that the prooemium is preceded by a prayer can 
                                               
105 See below, III.3.3(iv).  
106 In Tim. I 227.23-24. 
107 In Tim. I 227.24-229.11. 
108 In Tim. I 228.25-26. 
109 Proclus (In Tim. I 227.24-228.7) mentions several issues discussed in the Republic from which 
the existence of Being can be surmised: the immortality of the soul (Rep. X 611d7-612a4), the 
distinction of the object of reason and the object of opinion (V 476e6-478e6), the divided line 
(VI 509e6-511e5) and the simile of the sun (VI 508e1-509d5). Cf. Diehl ad loc. and see 
Festugière (1966-8: vol. II., 53-4).  
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be considered proof that Being exists: if there are gods, then Being, which is 
related (ἡνωμένον) to them, must also exist.110 In Proclus’ metaphysical system the 
gods properly speaking are prior to Being,111 whereas Being is the first hypostasis 
to participate in divinity.112 Here, however, Proclus is apparently referring to the 
more simple fact that the gods are eternal, i.e. not generated or perishable, and 
that therefore through the gods we have a guarantee of the existence of eternal 
being.113 This is a curious proof, based on the implicit assumption “we pray, 
therefore there are gods”.  
(3) The third and more important argument,114 is what could be called an 
ontological argument. The existence of Being is a metaphysical necessity according 
to Proclus, and therefore knowledge of it is part of our common, a priori intuitions 
(κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, see also III.4.1). Those intuitions tell us that there has to be such a 
thing as the always Being, in the sense of the uncreated and uncaused, since 
otherwise causation of what is Becoming would be impossible. Using an 
argumentative sequence well known from El.Th. prop. 11, plus the assumption 
that there is no Becoming ex nihilo, Proclus argues that denying the existence of 
Being as cause of Becoming leads to infinite regress or circularity.115 Since neither 
is acceptable, Being has to exist. 
(4) It is not until the fourth argument that Proclus introduces what he considers 
the “most true explanation” (τὸ ἀληθέστατον), which we will here discuss at 
greater length.116 The argument runs as follows. Plato’s method is like that of the 
geometer, who “mentioned (ὑπέμνησεν) what the point is, and the line”,117 while 
assuming their existence. Likewise, Plato has Timaeus define Being, assuming as a 
hypothesis that it exists.118 This argument is consequently explained by pointing out 
that like geometry,  
T III.10 
                                               
110 In Tim. I 228.7-11; the prayer referred to is Tim. 27c1-d1.  
111 El. Th. prop. 115 with the comments of Dodds (1963: 261-2).  
112 El. Th. prop. 138. 
113 Thus more in the vein of Plotinus Enn. V.1 [10], esp. 4.11-12. 
114 In Tim. I 228.11: μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸ τούτων.  
115 In Tim. I 228.11-25.  
116 In Tim. I 228.25-28, 228.30-229.3. In the following discussion the repetition of the same 
argument at In Tim. I 236-7 is also taken into account. 
117 In Tim. I 237.30-31. The aorist ὑπέμνησεν tells us that Proclus is here thinking not of 
geometers in general, but of the concrete example of Euclid.  
118 In Tim. I 228.26-7: ὡς μὲν ὑπόθεσιν λαβὼν εἶναι τὸ ἀεὶ ὂν ὡρίσατο.  
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“[philosophy of nature] is also a hypothetical science (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 
ἐπιστήμη), and therefore before the demonstrations hypotheses need to be 
assumed.” 119  
 
Before moving on to a further assessment of this fourth argument, and the 
remaining arguments in resolution of the third aporia, it is worth our while to 
scrutinize the parallel between philosophy of nature and geometry as hypothetical 
sciences. An excursus on the sense in which geometry is a hypothetical science 
will allow us not only to better analyze the scientific status of philosophy of 
nature, but also to dismiss unjust charges of conceptual sloppiness brought against 
Proclus.  
 
(ii) Excursus: Proclus on the hypothetical nature of geometry 
The very first occurrence of the geometrical method in the prooemium, 
mentioned also above, gives us the details of the parallel in a nutshell: 
T III.11  
“The present investigation needs the distinction of these two genera before 
everything else, in order for the exposition to proceed as from geometrical 
hypotheses to the examination of the consequents (τῶν ἀκολούθων) and 
discover the nature of the universe and its paternal and paradigmatic 
causes.”120 
 
This passage, which tells us that the comparison with geometry pertains to the 
division of two genera, the use of hypotheses and the examination of their 
consequents, raises numerous questions. For example, how can examining the 
consequents of definitions or hypotheses lead to the discovery of the nature and 
causes of the universe? And when he speaks of the consequents of the 
hypotheses, does Proclus have in mind logical consequence? The answer to these 
questions will become clear in due time. For now, we will concentrate on another 
question, namely what exactly is referred to by “geometrical hypotheses”.  
As suggested above (III.3.2), by maintaining the term ‘definitions’ throughout, 
while acknowledging the fact that the descriptions of Being and Becoming are no 
technical definitions, Proclus reinforces the methodological parallel between 
                                               
119 In Tim. I 229.1-3. Note that there is a textual problem in this passage: ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 
ἐπιστήμη † καὶ αὕτη. καὶ αὕτη makes no sense, but the general meaning of the sentence is clear 
(“it is a hypothetical science”). Kroll suggested καὶ αὐτὴ and καὶ ταύτῃ (app.), the former of which 
renders the expected meaning. Another option would be τοιαύτη, which would render “that is 
what a hypothetical science is like”. 
120 In Tim. I 226.24-29, quoted as part of T III.6. 
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philosophy of nature and geometry. In T III.11, however, the distinction of the 
two genera Being and Becoming is said to allow a beginning of reasoning from 
geometrical hypotheses rather than definitions. Interestingly, in what for Proclus is 
the paradigm of the geometrical method, Euclid’s Elements, the starting points that 
are distinguished are definitions, axioms and postulates, but not hypotheses. So 
what does Proclus mean by “geometrical hypotheses”? In his commentary on the 
Elements, at times Proclus refers to Euclid’s definitions in the customary manner, 
i.e. as ὅροι. On several occasions, however, he speaks of hypotheses in that 
context as well.121 This fact has led Heath and others to accuse Proclus of 
confusing hypotheses and definitions.122 As a first response to this accusation, it is 
worth noting that it is not at all clear that Euclid himself called his starting points 
definitions.123 Still, the starting points of Euclid’s Elements are commonly 
considered to be definitions. A second answer to the accusation is that Proclus 
here merges the conceptual apparatus of Aristotle with that of Euclid. Szabó 
(1965: 361-2) argues against such a suggestion that the apparent confusion in 
Proclus cannot be reduced to a blending of Aristotelian terminology into that of 
Euclid, given that Aristotle expressly points out that definitions and hypotheses 
are not the same (APo I 2 72a18-21). To this we reply that this does not prevent 
Proclus from confusing them, or rather, on the positive side, from consciously 
merging the different concepts. Moreover, we will see that Proclus’ definition of 
hypothesis, Aristotelian as it may be, but does not include the distinction made in 
APo I 2.  
Proclus’ use of terms for the constituents of a science does indeed first of all 
suggest an attempt to reconcile different sets of terms, mainly that of Aristotle and 
Euclid. Whereas Aristotle distinguishes axioms, theses, hypotheses and definitions 
as the starting points of a science, Euclid’s preliminaries are traditionally divided 
into definitions (ὅροι), postulates (αἰτήματα) and common notions (κοιναὶ 
ἔννοιαι).124 Proclus merges these two groups into one, consisting of 
                                               
121 In Eucl. 75.27; 178.1-8, 354.8, 388.14, 398.25. 
122 Heath (1956: vol. I, 122), von Fritz (1955: 46-7). It seems odd that Hartmann (1909: 47-8) 
accuses Proclus of the exact opposite, namely “daß ein grundsätzlicher Platoniker wie Proklus 
diesen hypothetischen Character der Definition übersehen konnte.” The hypothetical character 
Hartmann has in mind is different from the one here discussed: as the endpoint of a process of 
delimitation started by induction, the definition will always have a hypothetical nature - “Um [die] 
Allgemeinheit [der] Definition zu leisten, mußte dan freilich zuvor eine Grundlegung gemacht 
werden….Freilich darf man dann auch nicht vor der Konsequenz zurückschrecken, die 
Definition selbst zur ὑπόθεσις zu rechnen…”. Cf. Beierwaltes (1979: 263). 
123 Szabó (1969: 243-452, esp. 310-328 and 341-346), who claims that mathematicians call their 
starting points definitions, and Waschkies (1995: 103-4, 109ff.), who argues that they do not. 
124 These three kinds of starting points are found at the beginning of book I, in the given order. 
Definitions are also found in other books (II-VII, X-XI). See also above and previous note.  
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hypotheses/definitions, axioms/common notions, and postulates. Apart from the 
practical point of harmonizing, Proclus has two more interesting reasons for 
calling the definitions hypotheses. First of all, the definitions, as well as the axioms 
and the theorems, are hypotheses in that they function as premises in the 
demonstrations.125 How this pertains to the hypotheses of the Timaeus will be 
discussed in further detail below (III.4.1). More interesting for our present 
purposes is the second reason, which is a Platonization of Euclid. 
The two passages to which modern authors refer in their disapproval of Proclus’ 
use of the term “hypothesis” for Euclid’ definitions, both bear heavy marks of the 
famous criticism of geometry in Plato’s Republic.126 Socrates’ criticism comes down 
to the following. Geometers, when defining terms, introduce entities – that is, they 
hypothetically assume the existence of certain entities, without giving account of 
them. This is where, for Proclus, definition and hypothesis come together. This is 
also why geometry is a hypothetical science:127 geometers start from definitions 
that are posited, but for which no justification is given.128 The hypothetical nature 
of geometry, and, as we will see, of philosophy of nature, is no reason for Proclus 
to reject or criticize these sciences, as the good scientist would be able to present a 
justification for the starting points, but within a superordinate science.129  
As we will see, Proclus’ use of the famous passage from the Republic in his 
Commentary on Euclid’s Elements holds the key to his understanding of 
definitions.  
(1) The first instance of identification of hypothesis and definition is to be found 
in Proclus’ enumeration of the different kinds of starting points of Euclidean 
geometry as “hypotheses, postulates, and axioms” (In Eucl. 75.27ff). Definitions 
are not even mentioned here, and the hypotheses seem to have taken their 
place.130 Proclus’ subsequent description of the characteristics of hypotheses says 
“whenever the listener does not have a self-evident conception concerning an 
                                               
125 Morrow (1992: lxi, 62, n. 62; 131, n. 98; 140, n. 1). 
126 Plato Rep. VI 510c2-d3 and 533b6-c5. In the Meno mathematics is also portrayed as a science 
that uses hypothesis, but as Szabó (1978: 233-4) points out, the role of hypotheses is different 
there, as it refers to any ad hoc assumption. 
127 In Eucl. 11.22, 31.20, 57.19, 75.7. 
128 Cf. Heath (1956: 122). Lloyd, G.E.R. (1991: 339) argues that it cannot be decided if in the 
passage in the Rep. Plato had in mind definitions, existence assumptions, or “assumptions 
concerning the possibility of carrying out certain constructions”, as the different kinds of starting 
points of geometry had not been clearly distinguished in his time. It is clear, however, that 
Proclus took Socrates to refer to the second, i.e. existence assumptions. See also below. On 
Proclus’ defence of mathematicians against ‘the disparagers of mathematics’, i.e. those who read 
the Rep. passage as a rejection of mathematics, see Mueller (1987). 
129 See below and chapter IV.  
130 Cf. 178.7-8.: τὰς [...] ὑποθέσεις καὶ τοὺς καλουμένους ὅρους. The καὶ is epexegetic. 
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assertion, but he still posits it and agrees with the speaker who assumes it, such an 
assertion is a hypothesis”.131 This is almost an exact match with one of Aristotle’s 
descriptions of hypothesis, namely the one where Aristotle compares hypotheses 
and axioms.132 Two properties Aristotle ascribes to hypotheses elsewhere (APo I 2 
72a5-24), to be precise the fact that they are propositions that assume either part 
of a contradictory pair, and their indemonstrability, are not mentioned in that 
particular description. Leaving the second property aside for a moment, we can 
say that the first property is shared by hypothesis and axioms alike and therefore 
irrelevant in the context of their comparison – which is what Proclus is concerned 
with. Aristotle does refer to this property when he compares hypotheses and 
definitions: a thesis that assumes either part of a contradiction, e.g. says that 
something is or is not, is a hypothesis. One that does not do this is a definition 
(APo I 2 72a18-21).133 It is generally assumed that likewise definitions in Euclid 
are not propositions, do not assert anything about anything, and therefore do not 
involve any claims as to the existence of their subjects.134 It is this difference 
between hypotheses and definitions, i.e. that the former are but the latter are not 
assertions, which should prevent Proclus from reducing definitions to hypotheses. 
Nowhere in Proclus’ description of hypotheses, however, do we find mention of 
this particular property. Nor does he ever point to a non-propositional character 
of definitions. These are indications that he did not subscribe to Aristotle’s earlier 
characterization of hypotheses and definitions, which is not surprising considering 
the fact that Proclus is a Platonist. The second property mentioned above, the 
indemonstrability of hypotheses, is incompatible with the Platonic view of 
hypotheses as starting points that should be justified.135 Therefore the only 
Aristotelian definition of hypothesis useful for Proclus is the later one of 
                                               
131 In Eucl. 76.12-15. 
132 APo I 10 76b27-30.  
133 Note that Narbonne (1987: 540, n. 19) explains this Aristotelian passage not as an exclusive 
dichotomy, but as a division of kinds of definition: “L’hypothèse est pour Aristote une définition 
posant l’existence”.  
134 Mueller (1991: 63). Netz (1999: 94-5) states that a mathematician who gives a definition merely 
states what he is doing. He cites Mueller (1991), but Mueller’s point is that early Greek 
mathematical definitions can be either formally usable abbreviations or explanations of what one is 
talking about (1991: 63-4). For an emphatic arguing of the thesis that Euclid’s definitions do not 
say anything about the existence of the things defined, see Heath (1956: 143ff.). Cf. however 
(119), where Heath claims, on the basis of Arist. APo, that in geometry, besides the definitions, 
the existence of some primary items has to be assumed.  
135 As is clear also from the fact that he sees definitions as possible premises, e.g. In Tim. I 
242.21ff. Cf. however In Eucl. 206.12-16 where definitions are taken as terms (middle terms in 
demonstrations, as in Arist. APo II 17 99a21). 
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hypothesis, from APo I 10, which one could call the didactic or dialectical one, as 
it concerns statements that are hypothetical relative to the student.136 
A consequence of the fact that Proclus uses this Platonized version of Aristotle’s 
notion of hypothesis, is that the main objection to equating hypotheses and 
definitions disappears.  
The next question to be answered is of course why Proclus would relinquish the 
non-propositional character of definitions. Proclus’ referring to the definitions as 
hypotheses at In Eucl. 75f. in itself seems inexplicable, but a closer look at the 
context reveals the rationale behind this choice: only briefly before his 
enumeration of the three kinds of starting points of geometry, Proclus had been 
discussing the hypothetical nature of geometry, explaining that a geometer 
assumes certain starting points that themselves are not proved (75.5ff):137  
T III.12 
“We say that this science, geometry, is based on hypothesis (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως), 
and demonstrates the consequents from definite starting points (ἀπὸ ἀρχῶν 
ὡρισμένων).”138  
 
This sentence clearly suggests that the definite starting points of geometry, i.e. the 
definitions, are hypotheses. 
(2) The second instance of supposed confusion regards Euclid’s Deff. X-XII, the 
definitions of the right, the blunt and the sharp angle. In Euclid’s definition of the 
three kinds of angles there is no mention of their existence. Proclus, however, 
comments on these definitions by stating that these are the three kinds of angles, 
about which Socrates complains in the Republic (510c) that they are assumed as 
hypotheses (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως) by the geometers. Proclus’ next remark is crucial: most 
geometers are incapable of presenting a justification of that division, he says, but 
use the hypothesis that there are three kinds of angles.139 Again, he is not confusing 
definition and hypothesis, he is merely pointing out that the definitions of 
                                               
136 Cf. von Fritz (1955: 47, 42), who calls it hypothesis “im uneigentlichen, d.h. im dialektischen 
Sinne”, and Mignucci (1975b: 207-9), who brings forward the suggestion that the later 
description of hypothesis is polemizing against Plato by indicating the difference between real 
presuppositions of demonstration (ἁπλῶς ὑπόθεσις), and the Platonic ones, that are only 
hypothesis for pedagogic purposes (πρὸς ἐκεῖνον μόνον). Cf. Breton (1969: 41, n. 8), “relative 
hypotheses”, and Leszl (1981: 305), “hypotheses ad hominem”. 
137 Note that Aristotle, too, mentions that mathematicians start from hypotheses: EN 1151a16f. 
138 In Eucl. 75.6-8  
139 In Eucl. 131.9-19. This complaint concerns primarily the division of all angles into three kinds 
(“that there are three kinds of angles” rather than “that there are three kinds of angles”), but the 
criterion for success of the division is whether it accurately represents all real angles, and the 
existence of these angles is presupposed. 
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geometry are at the same time implicit hypotheses concerning the existence of the 
definienda. Note that the lack of justification of the starting points is not due to 
the subject matter, but to the geometers in question: Pythagoreans, thus Proclus, 
would have no problem giving account of the three kinds of angle by relating 
them to their causes.140  
Proclus expands his statement about the hypothetical nature of geometry to all 
other sciences except dialectic, and uses philosophy of nature as an example. The 
philosopher of nature, he states, proceeds from the definite starting point that 
motion exists.141 This Aristotelian approach to physics comes as a surprise, since it 
does not cohere with the identification of Being and Becoming as the starting 
points of φυσιολογία in the In Tim. The explanation for the discrepancy is that 
Proclus discerns different kinds of philosophy of nature, concerning different 
ontological levels and using different methods.142 When he speaks of φυσιολογία in 
the In Eucl., Proclus has in mind a lower, Aristotelian kind of philosophy of 
nature, as it is to be found also in Proclus’ Elements of Physics.143 And of this lower 
Aristotelian physics the unique starting point is the hypothesis that motion exists – 
a starting point, incidentally, which Proclus puts down as an Aristotelian attempt 
at imitating Plato. 144  
To return to Proclus’ formulation, as in the case of the first instance of supposed 
confusion discussed above, so too does Proclus here juxtapose “definite starting 
point” (ἀρχῆς ὡρισμένης) with “the hypothesis that motion exists” (ὐποθέμενος 
εἶναι κίνησιν). Motion is a definite, i.e. defined, starting point, and its definition is 
taken to imply a hypothesis of existence.  
Three things are clear from the above. (a) First of all, Proclus’ conception of ‘the 
method of geometry’ is a blend of Euclidean, Aristotelian, and Platonic 
elements.145 (b) Secondly, and far more importantly, for Proclus definitions are 
intricately interwoven with existence claims. Proclus is well aware of the difference 
between hypothesis and definition, but he does take every definition to involve an 
hypothesis, namely concerning the existence of the definiendum. Proclus would 
agree with Aristotle that “τὸ γὰρ τί ἐστι μονὰς καὶ τὸ εἶναι μονάδα οὐ ταὐτόν” (APo 
I 2 72a23-24), but would add that “τὸ εἶναι μονάδα” is part of “τὸ τί ἐστι 
                                               
140 In Eucl. 131.21ff. 
141 In Eucl. 75.19-20. Cf. Arist. Phys. 185a12-3. 
142 See chapter IV.  
143 On the Elements of Physics see the appendix of chapter IV. Note that Nikulin (2003: 199) 
mentions that definitions II 1-6 of the El.Ph. are considered ὑποθέσεις in Valdanius’ translation.  
144 In Tim. I 237.17ff. 
145 For the role of Stoic logic in Proclus’ conception of the geometrical method, see III.5.1 
CHAPTER III 
- 92 - 
μονὰς”.146 In other words, the relation between the two kinds of starting points 
(definitions and hypotheses) is asymmetrical, and a relation of inclusion, not of 
identity. All definitions are hypotheses, but the inverse does not hold: there are 
plenty of hypotheses that are not definitions. (c) And thirdly, since, as we have 
seen, philosophy of nature is a hypothetical science like geometry and is said to 
use definitions in order to start “as it were, from geometrical hypotheses”, we can 
conclude that philosophy of nature also assumes the existence of its subject 
matter. In the following, we return to the In Tim. to find further confirmation for 
this thesis. 
 
(iii) The answers to the third aporia, part II 
Let us return to the fourth argument in Proclus’ response to the third aporia, 
“why has Plato not discussed the ‘if’ before the ‘what’?” Since philosophy of 
nature is a hypothetical science, like geometry, according to Proclus Plato is 
justified in not proving the existence of Being: Plato is merely observing what 
befits philosophy of nature (τὰ καθήκοντα τῇ φυσιολογίᾳ τηρῶν) by proceeding 
from hypothesis, and not proving one of the starting points of his science.147 He 
would be exceeding the boundaries of his science, and not be a philosopher of 
nature anymore, as the geometer would not be a geometer, if he started discussing 
the proper starting points of his science.148 Any science other than dialectic 
receives its proper starting points from a higher science.149  
As is well known, Proclus, like Plato, distinguished two kinds of science that start 
from hypotheses, namely one (dialectic) that starts from hypotheses and moves ‘up’ 
towards an unhypothetical principle that grounds its starting points, and one (e.g. 
geometry) which instead proceeds from the hypothetical starting points to their 
conclusions, but never reaches the unhypothetical. Proclus tends to call only the 
latter hypothetical sciences.150 In the light of the comparison with geometry (in 
general, but esp. at In Tim. I 228.27) we know that philosophy of nature is 
reckoned to the latter. Thus the point Proclus is making with this fourth argument 
is that the starting points of philosophy of nature will not be proved and therefore 
                                               
146 This is of course also the case for Aristotle to the extent that one should inquire whether a 
thing is before asking what it is (see above), in other words, the possibility of a definition 
presupposes existence, but this is not the same as maintaining that a definition is itself an 
existence claim.  
147 In Tim. I 228.30f.  
148 In Tim. I 236.32-237.3. 
149 In Eucl. 9.25ff. 
150 In Remp. 283.2ff, on the hypothetical sciences and the one unhypothetical science, 
dialectic/theology. Cf. In Eucl. 75.6-10. See Lernould (1987) and Lernould (2001: 115ff.) on 
Proclus on dialectic as first science.  
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will not rise above their initial hypothetical status. Since further on Proclus seems 
to maintain the opposite, however, by claiming that one of the starting points, 
namely the existence of Being, will in fact be demonstrated (see below, on 
arguments 5-7), this solution turns out to be too simple.  
Closer scrutiny of the texts in question brings out a possible weaker reading of the 
hypothetical nature of philosophy of nature, that avoids this problem, but runs 
into another:  
T III.13 
“Observing what befits philosophy of nature [Plato] proceeds from this 
hypothesis [i.e. that Being exists] and demonstrates what follows it. For 
philosophy of nature, like geometry, is a hypothetical science, and its 
hypotheses should be assumed before the demonstrations (προειλῆφθαι τῶν 
ἀποδείξεων).”151 
T III.14 
“...the geometer mentioned what the point is, and the line, before the 
demonstrations (πρὸ τῶν ἀποδείξεων)...according to the same principle, the 
philosopher of nature will say what eternal Being is, for the sake of the 
coming demonstrations, but will in no way prove that it is.”152 
 
In both these passages, Proclus emphasizes the moment at which the hypotheses 
are introduced, namely before the demonstrations. The statement concerning the 
existence of Being could be understood in the same way: proving the existence of 
Being does not belong to the starting points of φυσιολογία. This need not imply, 
however, that some kind of proof of the existence of Being cannot ensue at a later 
point from the demonstrations. This reading would correspond to the accusation 
made against Plato, and in answer to which Proclus presents the seven point 
defence: the accusation was that Plato did not “discuss the ‘if’ before the ‘what’”, 
i.e. that he does not start with a proof of the existence of Being. It is in the light of 
this accusation that we could understand Proclus’ argument in a weaker sense. 
However, this weaker sense cripples the comparison with geometry: philosophy of 
nature would instead be a hypothetical science in the style of dialectic. And this, in 
turn, does not cohere with Proclus’ arguments for the thesis that we do not need 
any proof of the existence of Being, as in the statement that “Timaeus would not 
be a philosopher of nature anymore were he to discuss the starting points of his 
                                               
151 In Tim. I 228.30-229.3.  
152 In Tim. I 236.30-237.3. 
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own science”.153 I will therefore maintain the stronger reading of the fourth 
argument, and return to this issue after the discussion of arguments 5-7. 
 
But first there is another matter related to the fourth argument that requires our 
attention. In this argument, Proclus responds to what we might call a Peripatetic 
criticism with a Peripatetic defence. In the second book of the Posterior Analytics 
we find the ‘rule’ on the basis of which Plato is being criticised, namely that we 
should inquire into the definition only after ascertaining existence,154 and that it is 
impossible to know the essence of something without knowing that it is.155 This 
requirement of finding the existence of the subject matter concerns the acquisition 
of some knowledge, if even a mere indication, of that existence. If Proclus had 
adhered to this version of the rule, he could easily have met Plato’s accusers by 
pointing out that they are confusing two practices: there was no need for Plato to 
start from the existence of Being, as such a procedure belongs to the context of 
discovery, whereas the Timaeus is a didactic exposition.156 The Lycian does not use 
that defence, however, because he has a different interpretation of the ‘rule’ of 
having an indication or proof of the existence of one’s subject matter before 
defining it. It has a more extensive function for Proclus than for Aristotle, as the 
former has it apply, not only to inquiry, but also to all arguments.157 This wider 
scope is due to the fact that Proclus incorporates into the rule the demand of the 
first book of the Posterior Analytics, that all learning proceeds from pre-existent 
knowledge: one should in fact know the meaning of a thing (πρᾶγμα), “what it 
signifies” (σημασία, τὸ τί σημαίνει158) even before knowing that it exists, and 
before knowing “what it is” (τὸ τί ἐστι). It seems that Proclus is here referring 
either to something like a nominal definition, or to a “sketch” or “outline 
account” (ὑπογραφή),159 but not in the sense of mere stipulations of the meaning 
                                               
153 In Tim. I 236.32-237, see above. 
154 APo II 1, 89b33-35: γνόντες δὲ ὅτι ἔστι, τί ἐστι ζητοῦμεν. 
155 APo II 8, 93a16-20. Cf. In Alc. 275.1-276.3 (Westerink), where Proclus explains in more detail 
what the rule entails, and compliments Aristotle for the way he formulated it.  
156 Cf. Arist. Met. VI 1025b16-18.  
157 In Alc. 275.2: οἱ λόγοι καί αἱ ζητήσεις. 
158 In Alc. 275.9-276.3. Cf. Arist. APo I 1 71a15, I 10 76a32. 
159 A ὑπογραφή is an account that marks off the definiendum, e.g. when a definition cannot, or 
not yet, be given (i.e. of highest genera and individuals). Such a sketch would give their accidental 
properties (Chase (2003: 114, n. 253)) or the proprium. On the use of ὑπογραφή by Simplicius in 
his interpretation of Aristotle’s Categories, see Narbonne (1987: esp. 534ff.). Simplicius is 
concerned especially with the fact that Being itself is not a genus. For him the ὐπογραφή gives the 
proprium of the essence (ἰδιότης τῆς οὐσίας, In Cat. 29.19-20). Cf. Porph. In Cat. 60.15ff, 64.16. 
The Stoics are the first to use ὑπογραγή in a technical sense (SVF II 75 = Galen defin. medicae 1 
XIX 349K; D.L. 7, 60), but the term probably goes back to Arist. SE 181a2, DA 413a10. 
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of a word. Instead, he has in mind the “explication of a certain determinate 
intuition.”160 This rule is well applicable to the context of the Timaeus, where 
existence is assumed, and something like a ὑπογραφή is given of Being (and 
Becoming) through describing our cognitive access to them.  
 
On the basis of the fourth argument, concerning scientific methodology, we now 
know why Plato should not argue for the existence of Being, namely because he 
observes the limitations of the hypothetical science he is concerned with, 
philosophy of nature.  
The last three arguments to the aporia are at first sight puzzling, because in 
opposition to the fourth argument, which states that Plato should not prove the 
existence of Being, these arguments say that he does prove it.161 Let us consider 
these arguments in order.  
(5) In the fifth Proclus states that “after the κοσμοποιία...in the discussion of 
matter” Plato will prove the existence not only of matter, but also of Being.162 The 
passage referred to is the beginning of the account concerning Necessity, where 
Timaeus revises his starting points, and in the process provides an argument for 
the existence of Being, again one that is based on our cognition.163 The argument 
there presented by Plato can be summarized as follows. If understanding and true 
opinion are distinct, they must have different objects, namely the Forms and the 
objects of sense perception respectively. True opinion and understanding are in 
fact distinct. Therefore, there have to be Forms, i.e. Being, as objects of 
understanding.164 We have no way of finding out what Proclus’ comments on this 
very passage are, because that part of the commentary is not extant, but a similar 
optimistic epistemological argument, from the superiority of the objects of 
                                               
160 In Alc. 275.9-10: ἀνάπτυξις ἐπί τινα νόησιν ὡρισμένην. This seems to be a Platonising 
explanation of APo II 8, 93a21-22 τὸ δ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν...ἔχομεν...ἔχοντές τι αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος (see 
Demoss and Devereux (1988: 135)), no doubt to be understood in the context of Meno’s 
paradox and other Platonic questions concerning the source of knowledge (as Alc. 106eff.). On 
Proclus’ answers to these questions by the distinction of the innate reason principles that are like 
“breathing” and “pulsating” thought, from the active knowledge obtained through science and 
recollection, see Steel (1997). 
161 The arguments saying that Plato does prove the existence of Being are taken by Lernould 
(2001: 344 and n. 13) as one of the signs that we find a “dépassement” of the geometrical method 
in favour of theology in Proclus’ commentary. Cf. chapter I.  
162 In Tim. I 228.28-30, ἀποδείκνυσιν; 229.1-5, ἀποδείξει; 9-11, id. Cf. 237.3-8, κατασκευάσει. 
163 Tim. 47e3ff., with the epistemological argument for the Forms at 51b6-52b5. 
164 A similar argument is found in Rep. V 477dff. For the Tim. passage and the so-called Object of 
Thought Argument, i.e. the Aristotelian ascription of a particular kind of epistemological 
argument for the existence of the Forms see Fine (1993: 136f. and 295 n. 8).  
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understanding to those of perception, occurs in Proclus’ Parmenides Commentary, 
with reference to Parm. 135bc.165  
The proving of a principle of philosophy of nature, and thereby exceeding the 
limitations of that science, is later in the In Tim. explained as fitting the exceptional 
character of both Timaeus and Plato: in a quite divine manner (πάνυ δαιμονιῶς) a 
demonstrative proof is presented for the existence of Being, because neither 
Timaeus nor Plato is an ordinary φυσιολόγος.166 Timaeus has a Pythagorean 
background, and Plato “displays the summit of knowledge” (ἐπιστήμην 
ἀκροτάτην…ἐπιδεικνύμενος). This ἀκροτάτη ἐπιστήμη may refer either to the 
science of dialectic or to Plato’s own intellect. In the former sense, the expression 
occurs only in Proclus.167 Considering the middle voice ἐπιδεικνυμένος, in this 
context the latter reading should be preferred, i.e. that it is Plato’s νοῦς that shows 
in the proving of principles.168 As to Timaeus’ Pythagorean background, we have 
seen above (III.3.3. (ii)) that Proclus ascribes to the Pythagoreans the capacity of 
giving account of the starting points of geometry, i.c. tracing the three kinds of 
triangles that are hypothesized back to their causes. Likewise, in philosophy of 
nature, the Pythagorean Timaeus exceeds the boundaries of philosophy of nature 
by proving the existence of Being. It is this Pythagorean feature of Timaeus’ 
exposition on the universe, which is revealed especially in the tracing back of the 
physical to its real divine causes, that makes it superior to Aristotle’s physics.169  
This leaves only the last two arguments for the existence of Being to be 
considered. Their foundation is the same as that of the third argument, i.e. the 
argument from our common notions.  
(6) From the third hypothesis, which Proclus summarizes as “that there is a 
Demiurge of the cosmos”, we obtain also that there is some eternal being before 
the generated;170 likewise, (7) the fourth hypothesis shows that the Demiurge used 
an eternal being, namely the paradigm, in manufacturing the universe.171 So from 
the applications of the third and fourth hypotheses to the universe we obtain 
                                               
165 In Parm. 978.23-983.18. See Steel (1984: esp. 6-17) on different epistemological arguments for 
the existence of the Forms in Proclus. Cf. Alc. Didask. 164.1-6, with Dörrie and Baltes (1998: 6-
15, 226-232). 
166 In Tim. I 237.3-8. 
167 Cf. In Eucl., where we find the expression twice, once in the sense of dialectic (32.4) and once 
as referring to the faculty of νοῦς (4.9). 
168 On the function Proclus ascribes to νοῦς in the Timaeus see III.5.1 and chapter V . 
169 Cf. In Tim. I 7.26-31, where Proclus presents a list of properties of the Timaeus that are 
associated with the speaker’s being a Pythagorean. One of those properties is “relating everything 
to the intelligible” (τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν πάντα ἐξάπτον), 203.15-204.16. See also Steel (2003).  
170 In Tim. I 229.5-7. 
171 In Tim. I 229.7-9. 
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knowledge of the fact that there is something that has eternal existence (and hence 
is eternal Being), namely the Demiurge and the paradigm. The necessity of an 
efficient and a paradigmatic cause of the universe is itself inferred from the very 
“existence” of Becoming (see III.4.2 and III.4.3).  
Argument (6) is in fact no more than an application of argument (3). Whereas the 
third argument concerned the possibility of the existence of Becoming in general, 
and the ensuing necessity of the existence of eternal Being as (efficient) cause of 
that Becoming, the sixth argument instead revolves around the specific case of the 
universe as something generated, and its efficient cause, the Demiurge. The choice 
of words is very careful: words related to demonstration do not occur. Through 
the necessity of the existence of that Demiurge Proclus obtains (ἔχει) that at least 
one eternal Being exists prior to the generated.172 Likewise, in argument (7) says 
that Plato shows (ἀποφαίνει) that there is an eternal entity, namely the paradigm.173 
Immediately after argument (7) Proclus reinforces the impression that the careful 
choice of words is deliberate by stating emphatically “but the existence of eternal 
Being itself by itself prior to generated things he will demonstrate (ἀποδείξει) in the 
passage mentioned before (i.e. Tim. 51b6-52b5).”174 
  
The fourth argument on the one hand (“as in geometry, so in philosophy of 
nature one should not prove the starting points”), and the general point of 
arguments 5-7 on the other hand (“Plato will later prove one of the starting 
points, namely the existence of Being”), seem mutually exclusive. We know, 
however, that argument (5) concerns a later stage of the dialogue, and even a 
different ‘treatise’, namely the ‘treatise on matter’ as opposed to the κοσμοποιία. 
In that later treatise, the starting points of philosophy of nature are revised and 
hence any limitations holding for the first set of starting points are no longer valid 
there. Arguments (6) and (7), on the other hand, are not considered proof but 
indications of the existence of Being. Thus we can maintain the stronger reading 
of argument (4), according to which the presentation of the hypothetical starting 
points of φυσιολογία cannot contain any proof thereof. We can now give a partial 
answer to the question whether φυσιολογία can still be considered a hypothetical 
science in the sense that geometry is, i.e. moving from hypothetical starting points 
                                               
172 On the argument for the inclusion of the Demiurge among eternal Being, see In Tim. I 
229.11ff, esp. 229.26-230.4. 
173 Cf. Syrianus, who may have in mind the same Tim. passage, when stating that the Pythagorean 
Timaeus proves (κατασκευάζων) both that the Forms exist and that they are causes of the physical 
world (In Met. 105.12-14). The slightly stronger terminology can be explained from the context: 
Syrianus defends the theory of Forms against Aristotle’s criticism at Met. XII 4 1078b12-37 by 
tracing its origins back to the Pythagoras and Parmenides. 
174 In Tim. I 229.9-11.  
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to their conclusions. The comparison of philosophy of nature with geometry, as 
said before, suggests a downward direction of demonstration from starting points, 
but proof of a starting point instead suggests an upward direction, towards an 
unhypothetical principle. In that case, φυσιολογία would become dialectic. It is 
clear by now that Proclus has in a sense two readings of the Timaeus, which will be 
shown to correspond to the distinction between the knowledge of Timaeus and 
the presentation thereof to his audience. Whereas Proclus clearly takes Platonic 
philosophy of nature to surpass especially Aristotelian physics, and emphasizes the 
extent to which it relates the physical world to its transcendental causes, at the 
same time he is very careful to maintain the boundaries of what he considers to be 
an autonomous science. Φυσιολογία is not dialectic, because it is subject to certain 
methodological and epistemological limitations.  
At a later stage, after a more extensive treatment of the other starting points 
involved,  I will show the presupposition that if φυσιολογία displays an upward 
direction, it will reach an unhypothetical principle and become dialectic, to be 
incorrect.175 
 
(iv) Being and Becoming 
Proclus’ customary method of commenting is highly scholastic: no options are left 
unventured. It is therefore meaningful when instead an option is left unprobed. In 
the discussion of the three aporiai concerning the first starting points the amount 
of attention spent on Becoming is negligible. It does not figure in any way in the 
entire third aporia, regarding the proof of the existence of the definiendum. 
Before turning to the remaining starting points, let us briefly look into why 
Proclus gives such a large amount of attention to Being, and why so little to 
Becoming. Both questions have fairly straightforward answers, but they are worth 
mentioning nonetheless.  
Let us start with Being. The issue of the existence of Being is closely related to the 
existence of the Forms, because although the Forms and Being are not 
identical,176 “Being” in the narrowest sense refers to the Forms. The question of 
the existence of the Forms is a debate that runs through all of antiquity, starting 
from the discussions in the Old Academy, 177 and still very much alive in Proclus’ 
day. As is well known, in the Commentary on the Parmenides Proclus himself points 
out that the theory of the Forms is replete with all kinds of very complicated 
aporiai, first and foremost the question whether one should accept the hypothesis 
                                               
175 See III.5. 
176 El.Th. prop. 74, corr. and the discussion at In Tim. I 229.11ff. 
177 Plato Phd. 74a9ff, Parm. 135b5-c3, Tim. 51b6-52a7, Arist. Met. I 9, 990b8-22, De Id. 79.3-85.13. 
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of the Forms at all, brought up by countless philosophers after Plato.178 This 
question is also the first of the four questions to be broached in the extensive 
discussion on the doctrine of the Forms, as discerned by Proclus (following his 
master Syrianus).179 In the In Parm., as in the In Tim., Proclus needs to explain the 
fact that the question whether we should accept the hypothesis of the existence of 
the Forms is not elaborated by Plato himself in the dialogue under consideration. 
In the case of the Parmenides, the summit of theology, where the methodological 
limitations valid for φυσιολογία no longer obtain, Proclus’ explanation is that Plato 
may be challenging us to find the answer for ourselves – a challenge that Proclus 
consequently takes up with fervour, by developing no less than six arguments in 
favour of the theory of Forms.180 
 
Turning to the issue of the existence of Becoming, we observe that neither the 
reasons why it is not necessary to discuss the existence of Becoming nor the fact that 
this is not necessary are made explicit. Only later in the commentary does Proclus 
reveal in a roundabout way that he chose not to make the existence of Becoming 
an issue. At In Tim. I 236.28ff. the question whether proof of the existence of 
Being is needed is brought up once more, and the argument from the autonomy 
of the sciences is repeated.181 On this occasion, Proclus has ample opportunity to 
add the issue of Becoming, but he does not. He creates the illusion, however – 
perhaps unconsciously – that he does: 
T III.15 
“And I think that for that reason [i.e. that he is presenting the starting 
points of his science, just like a geometer] Timaeus says what eternal Being 
is and what Becoming, but does not say of one of them (θάτερον αὐτῶν) that 
it is. For the geometer also recalled what the point and the line are, before 
the demonstrations, but in no way taught (ἐδίδαξε) that both of them 
(τούτων ἑκάτερον) are.” 182  
                                               
178 In Parm. 919.36-40.  
179 On the Neoplatonic debate on the doctrine of Forms, see Steel (1984) and more recently 
D'Hoine (2006: 27ff.). 
180 In Parm 784.27-28 ἴσως ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ζητεῖν ἀφέντος τοῦ Πλάτωνος, with the six arguments at In 
Parm. 785.4-797.3. For a detailed analysis of each of these arguments see D'Hoine (2006: 27ff.).  
181 In part this repetition has already been treated above, in the context of arguments (4) and (5). 
182 In Tim. I 236.28-32. On ἑτερός with article as ‘(a definite) one of two’ (der Bestimmten von 
zweien), see Kühner and Gerth (1955: vol. I, 635). The phrases “does not say…that it is” and “in 
no way taught that both of them are” seem to sit ill with my interpretation of the definitions of 
geometry as involving an implicit hypothesis of existence. We can safely assume, however, that 
“saying that something is” and “teaching about existence” are considered to come to more than 
just a tacit assumption, and rather to involve explicit argumentation, which indeed we do not find 
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The example of two fundamental concepts from geometry (point and line), easily 
tricks one into thinking that Proclus is here presenting an exact parallel between 
that science and philosophy of nature, and that for the latter, too, the existence of 
two fundamental concepts is at play.183 But in fact, there is no such parallel. The 
“that one of them is” should be interpreted as just that, the proof of the existence 
of one of the two fundamental starting points, and not either one, but only Being. 
That this is what Proclus has in mind is clear from the sequel: 
T III.16 = T III.14 
“For how could [a geometer] still be a geometer if he started discussing 
(διαλεγόμενος) the proper starting points [of his science]? Clearly then, by 
the same principle, the philosopher of nature will also say what the always 
Being is, for the sake of the coming demonstrations, but he will never 
demonstrate that it is.”184  
 
Proclus seems to be aware, then, of the fact that he is dodging the issue of the 
existence of Becoming. 
There are fairly obvious (albeit implicit) reasons for not discussing the existence of 
Becoming. First of all, there is the more general point that Proclus writes in a pre-
Cartesian era, and is a realist with regard to the world we perceive in the sense that 
he takes its existence independently of that perception to be evident. Secondly, 
since Proclus takes the definition of Becoming, i.e. the description of an 
epistemological criterion (“that which is grasped by opinion combined with sense 
perception”, cf. the outline in III.2), to be correct, the mere fact that we perceive 
is evidence enough for the existence of Becoming: it is a “given”.185 To put it in 
Aristotle’s terms, the assumption of the existence of the scientific genus (i.e. what 
a science is about) does not have to be made explicit, if that existence is evident:  
T III.17 
“Of course, in some branches of knowledge there is nothing to prevent 
you from not supposing that the genus exists, namely when it is evident 
                                                                                                                                      
in Euclid or the prooemium of the Timaeus. Cf. in the next sentence (see T III.15) διαλεγόμενος 
picking up ἐδίδαξε.  
183 As shows from the fact that Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 67) translates “que d’aucun des deux, il 
ne démontre qu’il existe”, or Runia (forthcoming) “that each of them exists”. 
184 In Tim. I 236.32-237.3. 
185 As, by the way, Being is supposed to be a given due to the mere fact that we think. See above. 
“Given” is here used in the sense criticized by Sellars (1956) in his “myth of the given”.  
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(φανερόν) that it does (for it is not equally clear that number exists and that 
hot and cold exist).”186  
 
An example of a science in which according to Aristotle it is evident that the 
genus exists is philosophy of nature: it is evident (φανερόν) that nature exists.187 
Likewise, Proclus will have assumed that at least the existence of Becoming is 
evident to the senses, and that there is therefore no need to broach the issue.  
A different, ontological, reason for not bringing up the question whether there is 
such a thing as Becoming is that strictly speaking it is impossible to give a proof 
thereof, since existence is contrary to the essence of Becoming. Becoming, 
“always becoming, but never being,”188 is not. If one were to prove that Becoming 
is, it would thereby be shown to be identical to Being. 
Finally, rhetorical considerations may have played a part. Emphasizing the role of 
the “existence” of Becoming at this stage would have overstated the extent to 
which the entire deduction of the causes of the universe ultimately depends on 
that for which our cognition consists in “opinion combined with sense 
perception”. We will come back to this in III.5.1(iii). 
 
III.3.4 Intermediate conclusion on the three aporiai 
 
Generally speaking, the geometrical aspect of Plato’s method as we have 
encountered it so far, lies in the application of certain dialectical methods, namely 
division and definition, but always with modifications due to the context: the 
division is no real division, but a delimiting distinction, and the definitions are no 
definitions, but cognitive pilots, so to speak. The main reason why geometry, 
rather than dialectic, is the methodological paradigm is that geometry, like 
philosophy of nature, is a hypothetical science.  
                                               
186 Arist. APo I 10, 76b16-18. I take it by “supposing” (ὑποτίθεσθαι) Aristotle means “explicitly 
hypothesizing”. Barnes (1999: 139) takes Aristotle to refer to individual demonstrations, and 
hence to enthymemes in which one may leave out one of the three elements of demonstration 
mentioned at APo I 7. This does not make sense for the genus, however, as first of all it is 
unlikely that Aristotle expected every (or at least most) demonstrations to show that its genus 
exists, and secondly in I 10 Aristotle speaks of the elements of sciences, not of demonstrations. Cf. 
Met. VI 1025b16-18: some sciences suppose the existence of their subject matter, some ‘make it 
clear to perception.’ 
187 Arist. Phys. II 1 193a3-9. The context is not so much supposing as proving the existence of 
nature: it would be ridiculous to try and do that - an attempt at providing a proof would be a 
logical mistake, since that would involve supplying something less evident to explain something 
evident. Cf. Arist. Top. 105a3-8.  
188 Plato Tim. 27d6-28a1: τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε. 
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More specifically, the function of the ‘definitions’ of Being and Becoming is to 
describe the criteria of our cognitive access to (the) two ‘genera’, Being and 
Becoming, as the central concepts of philosophy of nature, thereby enabling us, 
before we have obtained actual knowledge of those concepts, to follow the 
reasoning of the prooemium and hence, in Platonic terms, awaken189 our innate 
knowledge of those concepts. At least the definition of Being, and in all likelihood 
also that of Becoming, at the same time involve a hypothesis of existence. This 
combination of defining the subject matter of one’s science, and thereby 
supposing its existence, is one that has been shown to belong to geometry as 
understood in the idiosyncratic Platonized form that we find in Proclus. In the 
context of the exegesis of the Timaeus, the characteristic of definitions of always 
presupposing a hypothesis of existence of their subject holds a fortiori. The 
situation is slightly different from that in the Euclid Commentary, to the extent that 
the definitions of the Timaeus cannot but entail an existence claim. Being and 
Becoming are defined from our modes of cognition, and since one cannot have 
cognitive access to what does not exist,190 such definitions presuppose the 
assumption of existence of their subjects.191 
The definitions, then, are read by Proclus as shorthand for “there is such a thing 
as eternal Being (or Becoming) and it is apprehensible by intellect and reasoning 
(or perception with opinion)”. Apart from this presupposing a hypothesis, the 
definitions themselves also function as hypotheses:  
 
T III.18 
“...he wants to use these definitions as axioms and hypotheses of the 
demonstrations that will be pronounced.”192  
 
As in the case of geometry, so too in philosophy of nature definitions are 
hypotheses in multiple ways: they are necessarily hypotheses in that they are 
always an implicit assumption of existence, but they are moreover potentially 
hypotheses in that they can be used as premises in demonstrations. This meaning 
                                               
189 In Tim I 242.26. 
190 This holds also for the definition of Becoming (if we understand existence in a wide sense) 
because Proclus takes the sources of cognition of Becoming (i.e. αἴσθησις and δόξα) to be 
capable of delivering reliable cognition. Cf. In Tim. II 310.3-10 and below III.5.1. 
191 This need not be the case for definitions in general, as they may be stipulative, pace Nikulin 
(2003: 199). 
192 In Tim. I 242.16-19. The definitions themselves are called hypotheses at 226.22; 242.21-4; the 
starting points in general, including the definitions, are called hypotheses at 283.15-19; 292.19ff; 
320.26-29. 
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of hypothesis will be treated in the next section, which is devoted to the three 
remaining starting points and the sense in which Proclus uses the terms 
“hypothesis”, “axiom” and “common notion” to describe both them and the 
definitions. 
 
 
III.4 The remaining three starting points 
 
After the definitions of Being and Becoming, Proclus recognizes three more 
starting points, concerning: 
3. the efficient cause193 (III.4.2) 
a. everything becoming has a cause;  
b. without cause no becoming;  
4. the paradigmatic cause (III.4.3) 
a. if the paradigm is eternal (Being), then the result will be beautiful;  
b. if the paradigm is non-eternal (Becoming), then the result will not be 
beautiful.  
After these two Plato introduces a fifth starting point, according to Proclus, 
namely  
5. the ‘naming of the universe’ (III.4.5) 
 
Three issues are of importance with regard to these starting points. First of all, the 
apparently confused terminology Proclus uses in identifying certain features of 
what he calls the geometrical method in the prooemium: the starting points, 
including the definitions, are dubbed hypotheses, axioms and common notions.194 
Secondly, the logical relation Proclus sees between starting points 3-5 and the 
definitions. He takes two different positions on this relation, by suggesting both 
that starting points 3-5 are adopted independently of the definitions, and that they 
are logical consequents of those definitions. And third, the role of the fifth 
starting point in the reasoning of the prooemium. After a general proposal 
concerning how to understand Proclus’ terminology (III.4.1), we will treat the 
three remaining starting points in order. 
 
III.4.1 Terminology: hypothesis, axiom, common notion 
 
                                               
193 Following the overview of the starting points, see above III.2. 
194 For a first analysis of Proclus’ proœmium-interpretation from the perspective of the logical 
structure, see Festugière (1963: 565-7) and Lernould (1990). 
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The terminology Proclus uses in his exegesis of the prooemium to summon the 
geometrical method at first sight seems erratic, as he apparently applies the 
technical terms “axiom” and “hypothesis” arbitrarily to all the starting points, 
including the definitions, and on top of that calls the third and fourth starting 
points “common notions.”195 The clearest example of apparent confusion is the 
following passage on the introduction of the paradigmatic cause, in which all five 
starting points are called both hypotheses, axioms, and common notions within 
one and the same paragraph:  
T III.19 
“And just as in the case of the first set of axioms there were two hypotheses, 
‘what is that which always is’ and ‘what is that which is becoming’, and in 
the case of the second set there are two others, ‘all that which is becoming 
has a cause’ and ‘that which does not have a cause is not generated’, so too 
in the case of these axioms there are two common notions, ‘that which comes 
into being with regard to an intelligible is beautiful’ and ‘that which comes 
into being with regard to a generated (model) is not beautiful’.”196  
 
Passages such as these suggest that Proclus’ use of the names of different kinds of 
principles is indiscriminate, and that he applies them to suggest a technical 
context, rather than as proper technical terms. Nonetheless, elsewhere Proclus 
does discuss the difference between them, and indeed mentions people who 
disregard it and call everything “axiom” – with the Stoics as prime example – or 
“hypothesis”. 197 This does not imply that the people in question use both terms at 
random, but instead that they systematically choose one over the other. Proclus, 
however, does not choose, and his mingling of terminology cannot, then, be put 
down as a mere adherence to either one of the “common” practices he 
describes.198 Instead, I propose that the mixture is, if not purposeful, at least 
meaningful (which is not to say that the common practices could not be 
meaningful, but that adherence to them just because they are common is not). 
Moreover, I propose that the mixing does not render the terms equivalent.199 
Accordingly, I will argue that it is possible to recognize certain principles of 
discrimination which Proclus, perhaps unconsciously, applies when employing one 
                                               
195 Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 7-8, cf. 66 n. 1) and Lernould (2001: 115-7). 
196 In Tim I 265.3-9. 
197 In Eucl. 76.24-77.6. Cf. In Eucl. 193.20-194.2. On the Stoic custom to call any assertion axiom 
see Diog. Laertius VII 65. 
198 Pace Festugière (1966-8: vol II, 8). Cf. Hartmann (54), who concludes “in beiden Fällen sind 
dann alle Prinzipien ὑποθέσεις”.  
199 Again, pace Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 7).  
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term rather than another, or, as above, a combination of different terms. These 
principles do not distinguish different kinds of starting points, but different 
aspects of the same starting point. The different aspects that are highlighted in this 
way are (a) the role of the starting point within the argumentative context; (b) the 
universal validity of a statement; (c) its epistemological status. The first aspect is 
underlined by the term ‘hypothesis’, the second by ‘axiom’, and the third by 
‘common notion’.200 
Let us look into the former two first. In the context of geometry, Proclus defines 
axiom as an assertion of inherent attributes that is both indemonstrable and 
immediately understood.201 He describes them as known to the student, and 
credible in themselves, whereas hypotheses are assumptions, propositions of 
which the student does not have a notion that is credible in itself, but which he 
will accept from the teacher nonetheless.202  
We can safely say that Proclus’ use of the terms in the Timaeus commentary 
approximates these meanings, but cannot be identical to them. For one thing, the 
same starting points are called both axiom and hypothesis. If we accepted the 
definitions he gives of those terms in the In Eucl., that would imply, among others, 
that the same propositions have to be both known and unknown, and both self-
evident and not, to the same student at the same time. I will show that it is the 
epistemological aspect of axioms that is not present in the In Tim. in any significant 
manner: one could say that from an epistemological point of view, what is an 
hypothesis to the as yet ignorant audience, is an axiom to Timaeus (but not to the 
student). 203  
 
                                               
200 Lernould’s explanation of the terms (2001: 115-6) is similar to mine, but  Lernould equates the 
terms “axiom” and “common notion” and takes both to refer to the self-evidence of the starting 
points. 
201 τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα συμβεβηκός τι καθ΄ αὑτὸ λέγει γνώριμον αὐτόθεν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, In Eucl. 181.8-9. 
Proclus presents a number of examples, inspired on Aristotle’s description of problemata and 
theses that do not need inquiry: “such as that fire is hot, or some other quite evident truth about 
which we say that they who are in doubt need either perception or punishment” (ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ 
θερμὸν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν περιφανεστάτων͵ ἐφ΄ ὧν τοὶς ἀποροῦντας ἢ αἰσθήσεως ἢ κολάσεως 
δεῖσθαι λέγομεν) – and not, as Morrow/Dillon: “must be prodded to use them,”: the κολάσις 
refers to the measure taken against people doubting obvious moral truths, in Arist. Top. 105a3-7. 
Note, however, that Elias makes a similar mistake (In Cat. 122.22ff. Reimer). 
202 In Eucl. 76.9-15, discussed above (III.3.3(ii)), see also In Eucl. 195.17ff..  
203 Cf. Arist. APo I 2, 72a14-17. Proclus’ definitions differ from that of Aristotle, mainly in that 
Aristotle speaks about what should be known prior to learning, Proclus of what is known.  
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(i) Hypothesis 
Proclus uses the term “hypothesis” more often than “axiom”  to indicate the 
principles assumed in 27d5-28b5,204 and indicates the two parts of the prooemium 
with the terms “hypothesis” and “demonstration” respectively.205 This is no 
coincidence. The difference between axiom and hypothesis is a functional one: the 
term ‘axiom’ is used to indicate a fundamental and general proposition, regardless 
of context. ‘Hypothesis’ on the other hand is a term used to indicate the function 
of a proposition as the foundation of a demonstration.206 An axiom may be used 
as an hypothesis. This explains why the starting points, when they are considered 
as the first half of the prooemium laying the foundation for the second half, i.e. 
the demonstrations, are called “hypotheses”.207 Thus the definitions themselves 
are also called hypotheses on occasion because, apart from including a hypothesis 
of existence, they, too, will function as premisses in the demonstrations to come. 
This function is closely related to the didactic nature of Timaeus’ exposition: the 
hypotheses are not ‘hypothetical’ for the speaker, but only for his student, as was 
stated in Proclus’ definition of hypotheses. 208  
In the case of the third and fourth starting points, Proclus’ reformulation of the 
Platonic text into conditionals (see below) gives an extra semantic shade to the 
term “hypothesis” as the premise of a hypothetical syllogism, and as such the basis 
of a demonstration.209 
 
(ii) Axiom 
The term “axiom” in the prooemium of the In Tim. has a wider application than in 
the In Eucl., where it is reserved specifically for the self-evident geometrical 
starting points that  are nowadays called “axioms” as well. In the In Tim., however, 
it is used for all the starting points of the prooemium, when they are considered in 
themselves and separate from their argumentative context. Thus the use of the 
term approximates the Stoic one as reported by Proclus, with the difference that 
                                               
204 Lernould (2001: 116). 
205 As remarked by Lernould (2001: 123 n.6 ). 
206 Cf. Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 66, n. 2) : “Ensemble de données à partir duquel on essaie de 
démontrer par voie logique une proposition nouvelle.”  
207 In Tim. I 229.2-3, 236.14, 242.16-18, 242.21-24, 274.21-24, 275.3-15, 283.15-19, 292.19ff, 
296.15ff , 320.26-321.2, 328.16-329.17, 338.2-4, 338.27-8, 348.13-15, 355.24ff.  
208 See above on the second definition of hypothesis based on Arist. APo I 10 76b27-30. 
209 As shows from his list of conditionals (see III.4.3), our author considers those starting points 
to be universal conditional statements, a combination, as it were, of a Stoic conditional and a 
Peripatetic universal premise, that allows an inference concerning particulars, eliminating the 
quantification. Cf. Mueller (1974: 41): the most common form of inference in the Elements is 
stating a general rule, a common notion, and applying it to a particular case (of course in 
geometry the conclusions concerning particular cases are then generalized).  
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Proclus includes negative propositions, while on the other hand limiting the use of 
the term to universal statements.210 All starting points except the last (the naming 
of the subject matter) consist of two axioms, one affirmative and one negative, 
which is the obverse of the affirmative. The negative axiom is always felt to be a 
complement to the former, which is clear from the fact that on the rare occasion 
that Proclus uses the singular “axiom”, he refers to the affirmative proposition.211 
The last starting point, which introduces the name of the universe (Tim. 28b2-4, 
see below) is an exception. It is neither a universal nor a conditional statement, 
but an imperative clause expressing a proposal, and does not have a negative 
counterpart. It is nonetheless reckoned among the axioms.212 
 
(iii) Common notion 
The term “common notions”, finally, is reserved for the third and fourth starting 
points, i.e. those starting points that are assumed next to the definitions, and is 
used to accentuate their epistemological status.213 “Our common notions” are 
moreover mentioned as the store-room in which we find justification for Plato’s 
implicit presupposition “that there is such a thing as eternal Being”. 214 In general, 
common notions (κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι or προλήψεις) in Proclus’ epistemological 
vocabulary are innate,215 they are uncorrupted,216 self-evident,217 and receive 
neither demonstration nor explanation,218 although they do require awakening.219 
Moreover, they are primarily mental contents, and only secondarily assertions,220 
although by derivation the term is used for the assertion expressing that content, 
                                               
210 Thus also in the In Remp., e.g. I 27.13, 33.19, 36.13, II 9.26, 11.12.  
211 E.g. In Tim. 262.2, 29. 
212 In Tim. I 272.10. 
213 For the Stoic origin of this concept, see SVF II 83 (Aetius Placita IV 11), II 473 (Alexander 
Aphr. de mixt. 216.14 Bruns.). The Stoics distinguish between natural and taught conceptions, the 
former of which, the preconceptions, are the ones adopted in Neoplatonism as common notions, 
with, of course, the adjustment that their being untaught does not mean that they just arise from 
sense perception, but that they are innate. An important paper on the Stoic common notions is 
Todd (1973), although his argument loses some of its force because at times Todd confuses 
ontology and epistemology. 
214 In Tim. I 228.12, see above III.3.3.  
215 ἀδίδακτοι, In Eucl. 76.16; De prov. 7, 32.1-2 (or indubitantes). 
216 ἀδιάστροφοι, In Tim. I 168.26 etc., cf. Segonds (1985: 86, n. 4 (on p. 180)).  
217 In Eucl. 255.16, καὶ is taken epexegetically. 
218 In Parm. 1092.20-4, In Eucl. 266.11ff., cf. In Alc. 104.8-9, but cf. In Parm. 1092.34, where 
Proclus does present an explanation for a common notion. 
219 In Parm. 1092.23. 
220 As is clear from e.g. In Eucl. 76.16 and In Tim. I 228.12, ἀπόκειται. 
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which can be used as major premise in a syllogism,221 and must in general precede 
any demonstration, as in geometry.222 As such, they are close relatives of axioms, 
in that they are what lies at the foundation of an axiom. In the In Eucl., Proclus 
seems to follow the Aristotelian/geometrical custom which holds axiom and 
common notion to be identical,223 but elsewhere, including the In Tim., axiom is a 
less restricted term, and refers to propositions rather than mental contents. Note 
that in the In Tim. the term “common notion” is never used without the 
accompaniment of at least one other term, be it “definition”, “hypothesis”, 
“axiom”, or a combination of these, because “common notion” is an 
epistemological term, rather than one describing the elements of a science. 
The being common of the notions has two senses, namely a primary cognitive one 
(ὁμολογία, they are common in the sense that they are shared by all or most 
people, since all partake in a common reason, λόγος)224, and a scientific one 
(κοινωνία, the common notions are common in the sense that they are shared by 
several sciences, cf. τὰ κοινὰ225). 
By describing the propositions introducing the efficient and paradigmatic causes 
not only as hypotheses and axioms, but also as common notions,226 Proclus 
                                               
221 In Alc. 175.19ff, In Parm. 1091.24ff. In the In Alc., κοινὴ ἔννοια seems to be closer to the 
Aristotelian common notions, as opinions shared by many if not all, rather than to a Platonic 
innate idea. Note the strange singular, almost like a mass term. 
222 In Parm. 1092.27ff.  
223 In Eucl. 194.8. 
224 Cf. In Alc. 104.18ff. As O'Meara (2000: 290) points out, this sense of commonness is a 
presupposition of the anagogic function of the Proclan science of metaphysics. I think this 
statement can be expanded to hold for all sciences, insofar as they are taught.  
225 On the role of common notions in science according to Proclus and Neoplatonists in general, 
see Saffrey and Westerink (1968-1997: 110, n. 4 (on p. 159ff)), who give an extensive description 
with many useful references. They distinguish several common notions proper to particular 
sciences, to wit theology, mathematics, physics, ethics, and logic. By incorrectly treating logic as 
an independent science, this list obscures an important aspect of the last group of common 
notions, namely that they are common not only in the psychological sense, but also in the sense 
that they are valid and used in several (or all) sciences – these logical principles are more properly 
common in that they are not limited to a particular content. Cf. Theol.Plat. I 10 45.20-22: Τὰ μὲν 
γὰρ πρῶτα τῶν συμπερασμάτων δι᾽ ἐλαχίστων ὡς οἷόν τε καὶ ἁπλουστάτων καὶ γνωριμωτάτων καὶ 
οἷον κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν εὐθὺς κατάδηλα γίνεται. On the double meaning of κοινός in the Aristotelian 
and Stoic theories of common notions/opinions see Todd (1973: 54, 61). Cf. von Fritz (1955: 
43ff and n. 60). 
226 In Tim. I 258.14, “other common notions stating the efficient cause are added (προστίθησι)”. 
The fact that Proclus here speaks of “other common notions”, which might imply that he also 
considers the definitions to be common notions, does not detract from our point, as he never 
actually calls the definitions common notions. Moreover, ἀλλα can be read as introducing 
something different (e.g. Plato Gorg. 473d1, τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων, cf. Kuhner-Gerth I 
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refines their functional description (universal propositions that serve as the 
starting point for the coming demonstrations), with an epistemological 
justification: these two starting points are assumed without demonstration, 
because they are self-evident, just as the axioms (in the narrow sense) in geometry. 
The “commonness” of these two common notions is the psychological rather 
than the scientific one. With this in mind, let us turn to the actual passages in 
which the three remaining starting points are introduced, in order to see how 
Proclus interprets them, especially from the point of view of the structure of his 
reasoning and the logical relation he supposes to exist between starting points 3-5 
and the definitions. 
 
III.4.2 The efficient cause  
 
T III.20 
“Everything becoming by necessity becomes through a cause; for it is 
impossible for anything to come into being without a cause”.227 
 
The introduction of this starting point, presenting the efficient cause, is sketchily 
embedded in the geometrical method.228 Proclus presents it as consisting of two 
common notions that Plato adds (παραλαμβάνει, προστίθησι) “in a truly 
geometrical fashion” in order to facilitate the consequent demonstrations of the 
efficient cause of Becoming.229 The formulation so far suggests that this starting 
point is primitive in the sense that it does not have any logical relation (e.g. of 
consequence) to the previously introduced starting points, and are merely invoked 
                                                                                                                                      
274 A. 1, b). Thus the term “common notion” is not applied to all starting points, pace Lernould 
(2001: 122, n. 3). Cf. I 265.7, on the paradigmatic cause.  
227 Tim. 28b, In Tim. I 258.9-264.3. In his earlier summary of the principles on I 236 Proclus 
changes the second half from an impossibility regarding Becoming (namely that Becoming is not 
possible without cause) to an inverse statement, saying that that which exists without (efficient) 
cause is not Becoming (I 236.23-24); likewise in a later summary (265.6-7). At 258.15ff instead he 
formulates it as “the becoming absolutely becomes through a cause, and what does not become 
through a cause cannot possibly have generation.” Since the latter reformulation is given right 
after the lemma and is closer to Plato’s original, any significance to the differences between 
Proclus’ two formulations should be sought primarily in the former, rather than the latter (pace 
Lernould (2001: 174-5)).  
228 For the structure of Proclus’ own analysis of the passage, see Lernould (2001: 173-4). 
229 In Tim. 258.12-16; 237.12-13. 
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in aid of the proof, as is customary also in geometry.230 We will return to this issue 
at the end of this section.  
Proclus reformulates the lemma as a syllogism which he takes to be behind the 
Platonic text.231 He thus explains the presence of the second half of the lemma (“it 
is impossible for anything to have becoming without a cause”) as the major 
premise (the meson) of a categorical syllogism in the first figure, that has the first 
half of the lemma (“everything becoming necessarily becomes through a cause”) 
as its conclusion. The whole “categorical syllogism in the first figure” that Proclus 
proposes is:  
T III.21 
“It is impossible that the becoming becomes without cause; 
Everything of which it is impossible to become without cause, by necessity 
becomes through a cause;232  
Therefore everything becoming by necessity becomes through a cause.”233  
 
The modal phrases can be disregarded, as Proclus himself considers the syllogism 
to be categorical. Modality in categorical syllogistic is an alethic qualification, i.e. a 
property of premises, but since the modal phrases added here by Proclus are de re, 
they are part of the predicate. We can therefore reformulate the syllogism as 
follows:  
 
All Becoming is áincapable of becoming without causeñ;234 
All áthat is incapable of becoming without causeñ is ánecessarily becoming 
through a causeñ; 
Therefore all Becoming is ánecessarily becoming through a causeñ. 
 
The syllogism is explained as a didactic measure, informing us through the more 
clear (ἐναργέστερον) about the less known and clear (ἧττον γνώριμον καὶ σαφές). 
The two statements (i.e. the major premise and the conclusion) look the same, 
                                               
230 Cf. In Eucl. 196.18-19 ὁ γεωμέτρης πολλαχοῦ καὶ τοῦτο [i.e. “that the whole is more than the 
part”] παραλαμβάνει πρὸς τὰς ἀποδείξεις.  
231 In Tim. I 258.23-259.4. 
232 This minor premise relies on the equivalence of the impossibility of p and the necessity of  
non-p.  
233 This categorical syllogism is said to be preferable to a hypothetical one (I 259.2-4). Lernould’s 
suggestion (2001: 175 and n. 8) that Proclus is “destoicizing” Plato in response to Middle-
Platonists such as Plutarch of Chaironea is rendered implausible by the later formulation of a 
series of conditionals (see below, III.4.3). 
234 I use the brackets ‘á’ and ‘ñ’ to set apart the phrases that function as terms in the syllogism. 
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Proclus says, because it is clear (δῆλον) “that it is necessary that the impossible is 
not, and that it is impossible that the necessary is not”, that is, the minor premise 
is evident.235 Despite the interdefinability of necessity and possibility, however, the 
statement of (im)possibility is better known than the statement of necessity.236 
Proclus presents a nice series of illustrations of this point, that gives the 
impression of being copied from a handbook.237 A physician will convince his 
patient to eat, not by telling him that it is necessary to eat, but by pointing out that 
it is impossible not to eat – and live.238 Secondly,239 it is clear that it is necessary to 
die from something (διά τινα αἰτίαν), from the impossibility not to die.240 Thirdly, 
it is necessary to pay the tyrant what you are due to him because it is impossible 
not to.241 The first example is most illuminating: Just as it is impossible not to eat 
and still live, so too is it impossible not to have an efficient cause and still have genesis 
(not having an efficient cause is in itself very well possible in Proclus’ 
metaphysics).242  
As is clear also from these illustrations, Proclus explains the functionality of 
concluding something’s necessity from the impossibility of its negation by 
pointing out that the negation is a kind of imaginary separation (χωρίς etc.) of, in 
our case, genesis from its efficient cause.243 The method recalls an element of 
Parmenidean dialectic, namely the investigating of non-existence (or the not-
                                               
235 In Tim. I 259.5-6, τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι δῆλον, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι 
ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι. Cf. Arist. Int. 22b5-7 εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο οὐχὶ εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ 
εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι, τοῦτο ἀνάγκη εἶναι. Proclus inverts the second clause, to match his 
Platonic example in which the first clause concerns necessity, and the second possibility. 
236 As a consequence, the common notion expressing impossibility is more of a common notion, 
so to speak, than the one expressing necessity, as the former is self-evident, whereas the evidence 
of the latter depends on that of the former (see below). 
237 In Tim. I 259.8-14.  
238 Cf. Arist. Met. V 5 1015a20ff.  
239 καὶ πάλιν should not be translated “and the inverse” (thus Festugière), as the inversion already 
takes place before the example of the physician. 
240 The example seems to be Stoic rather than Platonic. Cf. Epict. Diss. I 27.7 ῞Οταν θάνατος 
φαίνηται κακόν, πρόχειρον ἔχειν ὅτι τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνειν καθήκει καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὁ θάνατος. 
241 As Festugière points out, the tyrant here replaces the classical people (Ar. Lys. 581), so that the 
example pertains to a debt to the state. See Plato Rep. I 331e3ff for Simonides’ statement that 
justice is giving what is due (τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἀποδιδόναι).   
242 Frans de Haas suggested to me that the case of the tyrant might be parallel to that of the 
doctor: it is impossible not to pay the tyrant one’s dues and still live. For the example of death, of 
course, such a parallel can not be drawn (“it is impossible not to die (from something) and still 
live” does not make sense). Considering the context and the addition of διά τινα αἰτίαν we should 
read this example as illustrating efficient causality: “it is impossible to die and not to die through 
some cause”. 
243 In Tim. I 259.16-27.  
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being-the-case) of something in order to discover its causal role and hence its 
essence in full detail.244 The logical analogue of the ontological separation makes 
visible to the mind’s eye what aspects of genesis are the responsibility of the 
efficient cause: its preservation (τὸ σῴζεσθαι), its maintenance (τὸ συνέχεσθαι) and 
hence its not sliding into non-being - Proclus here makes clever use of the 
polysemy of ἀδυνατόν to sketch a “powerless” and hence “impossible” Becoming 
without cause (cf. the added ἀσθενές). As it turns out, genesis owes its very 
existence (if one can call it that) to the efficient cause. In a sense, this is also a 
justification of the two common notions themselves, as we now know that the 
concept of Becoming necessarily involves a concept of external causation.245  
 
Thus although these common notions were merely “invoked” (παραλαμβάνει, see 
above), Proclus shows how their formulation at the same time comes down to a 
justification. This brings us back to the logical relation between the definitions and 
this third starting point. In the exegesis of the definitions Proclus had carefully 
established a connection between the definitions and the other axioms. He stated 
that the latter follow (ἕπεται) the former, as the “other problems” (i.e. the 
questions which the axioms intend to answer) follow (συνακολουθεῖ) the first 
problem: the question whether the universe has become or not.246 Words like 
ἕπεσθαι and συνακολουθεῖν by no means necessarily imply that the axiom of the 
efficient cause is a logical consequence of the definition of Becoming, as they may 
refer to no more than a fitting sequel, or even just the absence of contradiction 
among the different starting points.247 They may be a justification of its being 
chosen, rather than of its truth. Combined, however, with the repeated conceptual 
analysis of Becoming as what cannot maintain its own existence (and hence needs 
an efficient cause) they reveal Proclus’ desire to see the axiom of the efficient 
cause as the result of an analytic approach. The axiom of the efficient cause is 
introduced both as an extra assumption next to the definitions, and as a necessary 
consequence, possibly as resulting from a conceptual analysis, of the nature of 
Becoming. It is not, of course, a necessary consequence of the definition of 
                                               
244 In Parm. 998.7ff. 
245 A similar argument for the axiom stating the necessity of an efficient cause, from the 
incapacity of Becoming to preserve and maintain itself, is given in the second half of the 
proœmium, the application of the starting points to the universe. The axiom is there restated 
(Tim. 28c2-3; In Tim. I 296.13ff), and explained once more, this time with emphasis on the fact 
that Becoming is imperfect (ἀτελές), cf. El.Th. 45. For a detailed analysis see Lernould (2001: 
179ff.) 
246 In Tim. I 236.8-13, quoted above. 
247 See Hintikka and Remes (1974). 
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Becoming, as that definition did not already include Becoming’s incapacity of self-
maintenance.  
 
 
III.4.3 The paradigmatic cause 
 
T III.22 
“Anything of which the Demiurge makes the form and the character, by 
looking at eternal being which is always the same, and using that as a 
model, is thus necessarily made beautiful. But that of which he [makes the 
form and the character by looking at] something that has become and 
using that as a created paradigm, is not [made] beautiful.” 248 
 
After the efficient cause, thus Proclus, Plato presents another starting point 
consisting of these two opposite axioms, as he calls them, that together deliver the 
paradigmatic cause. This is the first starting point that receives no explicit mention 
of the geometrical method whatsoever, although its explanation is still couched in 
the technical terms associated with that method. There are several points of 
similarity between the discussions of this starting point and the previous one.  
As before, Proclus emphasizes the continuity between previous starting points and 
this one: the introduction of the paradigmatic cause is in line with the foregoing 
(συνεχές τοῖς εἰρημένοις, 264.10).249 One might think that there is no such 
continuity, since, as Proclus points out, Plato does not investigate the existence of 
the paradigmatic cause, which he assumes, but rather its character.250 In this sense 
the fourth starting point differs from the third. The existence of a paradigmatic 
cause, however, follows (ἕπεται, 264.15, 20, a somewhat stronger expression than 
συνεχής) from the existence of the efficient cause, since everything that creates 
something uses a pre-existing form – pre-existing to the product, that is, not 
necessarily to the creator – that it wants to insert in its creation.251 Without a 
paradigm the result of creation would be deprived of all order.  
Apparently according to Proclus we have to understand the concept of a 
paradigmatic cause to be included in that of the efficient cause – i.e. Proclus 
                                               
248 Tim. 28ab, In Tim. I 264.4-272.6. Note that Zeyl’s translation of this Timaeus passage is 
incorrect, as he takes the paradigm to be the object of ἀπεργάζεται, which leaves ὅτου 
untranslated. 
249 On the function of logic in revealing or reflecting the continuity (συνέχεια) of the layers of 
reality, see Gritti (2003: 296ff.).  
250 Cf. In Tim. I 320.26: θέμενος οὖν ὁ Πλάτων εἶναι παράδειγμα. 
251 In Tim. I 264.15-20.  
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assumes that no efficient cause works without a paradigm – and read ἕπεται in a 
stronger, logical sense. This is reinforced by the repetition of the argument in the 
exegesis of the demonstrations:252 Plato, according to Proclus, realizes that the 
order of the universe is a clear indication of an intelligent creator and hence also 
of a paradigmatic cause. Aristotle, on the other hand, denies the universe a 
paradigmatic cause – i.e. he rejects the theory of Forms – and thereby also 
deprives it of an efficient cause.253 What Proclus wants to point out here is that 
there is a strong relation of consequence between efficient and paradigmatic cause: 
deny the “consequent” and the “antecedent” is obliterated as well. This relation 
can be explained from the very nature of intelligent creation.254 As with the 
efficient cause, so here too Proclus assumes that conceptual analysis reveals one of 
the causes of the universe.  
 
Furthermore, just as in the explanation of the previous lemma, concerning the 
efficient cause, so too in this case Proclus presents a syllogism, this time to point 
to the consistency of the reasoning so far.255 He first formulates a list of 
conditionals (that in itself does not yet constitute a syllogism256), thereby creating 
an association with Parmenidean dialectic:257   
T III.23 
“if [something] is becoming, it has a Demiurge; 
if there is a Demiurge of the universe, there is also a paradigm; 
and if the becoming is beautiful, it has become with regard to eternal being; 
but if [the becoming] is not beautiful, with regard to a created 
paradigm.”258 
                                               
252 In Tim. I 266.30-267.1. 
253 Cf. In Tim. I 320.25-26. Romano (1993) tries to connect the latter passage to a concrete 
Aristotelian text, but I think the point is just that rejection of a paradigmatic cause of the universe 
has as a necessary consequence the non-existence of a rational efficient cause. Cf. however In 
Tim. I 404.7-21. 
254 In Tim. I 321.2-24.  
255 Cf. In Tim. I 264.23-24 ὁ λόγος...πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀκόλουθος; 264.27-28 συνεχῆ...τοιοῦτον 
συλλογισμόν.   
256 Pace Lernould (2001: 190-2). Strictly speaking, they are also not conditionals. See Barnes (1983: 
313 and n. 3) on the ancient custom of counting propositions of the form “If anything is F, it is 
G” among the conditionals.  
257 See the illustration of the method at In Parm. 1000.34ff.. Parmenidean dialectic is superior to 
Aristotelian syllogistic, according to Proclus, because it is more complete. Its hypotheses result 
from divisions and hence exhaust all logical possibilities (1007.10-34). For an assessment of the 
comparison see Lloyd, A.C. (1990: 13-17) and Steel (2006). 
258 In Tim. I 264.24-27.  
THE PROOEMIUM 
- 115 - 
 
Note that from the first conditional, which speaks of a Demiurge rather than an 
efficient cause in general, Proclus starts to introduce particular conditionals about 
the universe, rather than universal ones.259 He stops doing this when he reaches 
the paradigmatic cause, because the list of conditionals is presented when we are 
still in the middle of the exegesis of the relevant lemma of the Timaeus.  
The list of conditionals is consequently turned into a syllogism. Proclus does not 
choose the obvious next step, namely modus ponens – starting by affirming the first 
antecedent, “it is becoming”, which is what Plato does at Tim. 28b7, and 
concluding the consequents “therefore it has an efficient cause”, etc. Instead, he 
formulates what is on the face of it a categorical polysyllogism in Darii, rather than 
a hypothetical syllogism: 
T III.24 
“And so we get a coherent syllogism such as this:  
The cosmos has become 
Everything that has become has a demiurgic cause 
Everything that has a demiurgic cause also has a paradigmatic cause 
Therefore, the cosmos has a demiurgic and a paradigmatic cause.”260 
 
Proclus here switches from conditional to predicate logic, identifying premises in 
the former with premises in the latter. This is not common in ancient logic, but on 
occasion it is explicitly allowed.261 The switch is possible due to the fact that 
propositions in the particular kind of “conditionals” we find above are reducible 
to predicates:262 “If Becoming, then caused” etc. becomes “All Becoming is 
caused” etc.. Proclus does not consider hypothetical syllogisms to be as valuable 
as categorical ones (see III.4.2), but he does apparently sometimes take them to be 
interchangeable from a technical point of view.   
The obvious difference between the conditionals and this “syllogism” is that the 
axiom about the character of the paradigmatic cause plays no part in the latter. 
Instead, an axiomatic premise is added concerning the existence of that 
paradigmatic cause. A very simple explanation for this is again that when the 
syllogism is presented we are still in the middle of the exegesis of the paradigmatic 
cause, and Proclus gives us the status quo, as it were. The place of the syllogism – 
at this point, rather than after the exegesis of the character of the paradigmatic 
                                               
259 Cf. Lernould (2001: 190-1). 
260 In Tim. I 264.27-265.3. Note that, since the subject of the major premise is a particular, strictly 
speaking this is not even a syllogism. 
261 Lloyd (1990: 14 and n. 22). He refers to Galen (XI 499K). Cf. Barnes (1983: 312). 
262 Cf. Barnes (1983: 280). 
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cause – and the fact that on no other occasion in Proclus’ commentary we 
encounter such a syllogistic rendering of the starting points of the prooemium 
have a more interesting reason:263 the conclusion of the above “syllogism”, that 
the generated cosmos has a demiurgic and a paradigmatic cause, is for Proclus the 
harvest of the starting points.264 Thus the summary of the logical structure 
emphasizes an climactic point of the prooemium, and even of Platonic φυσιολογία.  
That Proclus wants to highlight the superiority of Platonic philosophy of nature 
over that of others shows also from the justification he offers for the fourth 
axiom, and which consists in part in a polemical demonstration of the 
incorrectness of the Peripatetic, Stoic and Epicurean view of the cosmos.265 The 
justification Proclus presents for the fourth axiom is slightly different from that 
for the third (see III.4.2), to the extent that in the case of the fourth Proclus 
argues more emphatically for its truth and self-evidence. He starts out by 
summoning the association with geometrical methodology – without explicitly 
mentioning geometry – in a rather ostentatious manner, referring to all technical 
denotations of the starting points at once, followed by a blunt truth claim:  
T III.25 = T III.19 
“And as in the case of the first set of axioms there were two hypotheses, 
‘what is that which always is’ and ‘what is that which is becoming’, and in 
the case of the second [set of axioms] there are two others, ‘all that which 
is becoming has a cause’ and ‘that which does not have a cause is not 
generated’, so too in the case of these axioms there are two common 
notions, ‘that which comes into being with regard to an intelligible [model] 
is beautiful’, and ‘that which comes into being with regard to a generated 
[model] is not beautiful’. And both of them are absolutely true 
(πανάληθες).”266  
 
With respect to the axiom concerning the existence of the efficient cause, as well as 
the implicit existence of the paradigmatic cause, Proclus justified the starting points 
by appealing to the concepts involved in the preceding axioms, i.c. the definition 
of Becoming and the axiom of the efficient cause respectively. In his justification 
of the axiom concerning the character of the paradigmatic cause, he takes a 
different angle. The argument he presents is hardly an actual argument, but rather 
an elaborate and roundabout way of restating the lemma in phrases which 
                                               
263 Cf. Lernould (2001: 192) 
264 Cf. Proclus’ preference for Plato’s φυσιολογία over others because only Plato identifies the 
proper causes of the universe, In Tim. I 2.1-4.5. See Steel (2003). 
265 Esp. In Tim. I 266.25-30, see also below, n. 272. 
266 In Tim I 265.3-9. 
THE PROOEMIUM 
- 117 - 
highlight its truth and self-evidence.267 Apart from the label “common notion”, 
which is used to underline the innateness and self-evidence of starting points (see 
III.4.1), and the emphatic πανάληθες in the quotation above, we find δῆλον,268 
δηλονότι,269 and ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἀξιώματα, διὰ τούτων 
ὑπομνηστέον.270 The only hint of a real argument is the explanation of beauty as 
deriving from the stability of the eternal paradigm, as opposed to lack of beauty 
caused by the change and motion of the generated paradigm.271  
Finally, after defending the choice of axiom, Proclus devotes quite some attention 
to the above-mentioned polemic against Peripatetic, Stoic and Epicurean theories 
which deny the existence of the Demiurge or the paradigm of the universe,272 by 
summarizing the views of his opponents and consequently arguing for the need of 
both transcendent causes.  
 
III.4.4 Intermediate conclusion – the starting points concerning the efficient and 
paradigmatic causes  
 
In the foregoing, we have seen how Proclus analyses the passages of the 
prooemium introducing the efficient and paradigmatic causes on the one hand as 
self-evident assumptions beside the definitions of Being and Becoming, 
comparable to the axioms of geometry, and on the other hand as the necessary 
consequents of a conceptual analysis of Becoming. The role of the geometrical 
method is less articulate than it was in the exegesis of the first two starting points, 
and consists in identifying the epistemological status of – and thereby justifying – 
the axioms concerning the causes of Becoming.  
                                               
267 In Tim. I 265.9-266.21. 
268 In Tim. I 265.15. 
269 In Tim. I 265.21. 
270 In Tim. I 266.20-1. 
271 In Tim. I 266.7-9. The main other points made in the context of the argument for the truth of 
the axiom are that the product of an eternal paradigm is always beautiful because it would not be 
a real imitation of the eternal if it were not beautiful (which is begging the question); that a 
paradigm that is itself created is filled with dissimilitude with respect to what is primarily beautiful 
(again); that the maker is responsible for similitude, and the paradigm for beauty; and that there 
are three kinds of paradigm: eternal of eternal products, eternal of generated products, and 
generated of generated products. 
272 In Tim. I 266.21-268.24. For an analysis of the whole exegesis of the lemma, see Lernould 
(2001: 187ff.). Lernould rightly argues that Proclus is especially interested in the existence of the 
paradigm of the universe, its ontological rank and its being external to the Demiurge. He 
underestimates, however, the role of the doxography as in fact it establishes, not only the 
necessity of the existence of the model, but also of the Demiurge.  
CHAPTER III 
- 118 - 
Proclus’ summary of the argumentative structure of the prooemium so far (see 
III.4.3) – and in fact the only specimen thereof – shows that for him the 
fundamental issue of the prooemium and of Platonic philosophy of nature is 
establishing the necessary existence of an efficient and paradigmatic cause of the 
universe. We will return to this below.273  
In the introduction to his commentary, however, Proclus’ praise of Plato’s 
physiologia involves the proper identification of all three true causes (κυρίως 
αἰτίαι), including the final cause.274 This brings us to the fifth starting point, that is 
in several ways the odd one out. The main question to be answered with respect 
to this final starting point is whether Proclus sees it as the introduction of the final 
cause.  
 
III.4.5 The fifth axiom – the final cause  
 
In what modern readers consider to be the transition from the starting points to 
the demonstrations, Proclus reads the introduction of a fifth axiom, thereby 
establishing an elegant parallel between the Timaeus and the five axioms of Euclid’s 
Elements. This last axiom (τελευταῖόν τῶν ἀξιωμάτων, I 272.10) in the prooemium, 
consists in the following lemma, which is in fact half a sentence of Plato’s text: 
T III.26 
“Ὁ δὴ πᾶς οὐρανὸς ἢ κόσμος ἢ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ποτὲ ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ΄ ἂν 
δέχοιτο, τοῦθ΄ ἡμῖν ὠνομάσθω”275  
 
In modern editions of the Timaeus the sentence does not stop here.276 Moreover, 
to the modern reader the partial sentence on the different terms for the universe 
does not qualify as a starting point in its own right, but merely as an aside in the 
transition to the demonstrations, introducing the universe as the subject matter of 
the Timaeus (e.g. “Now as to the whole heaven, or world order – let’s just call it by 
                                               
273 See below III.4.5(iii). 
274 In Tim. I 2.1-4.5, cf. above and n. 264.  
275 Tim. 28b; exegesis at In Tim I 272.7-274.32. Proclus uses a slightly different text: he does not 
have καὶ ἄλλο, reads μάλιστα instead of μάλιστ΄ ἂν, τοῦτο instead of τοῦθ΄. On the meaning of this 
textual variation see below. Furthermore, Proclus seems to read οὐρανός both as subject with 
attribute πᾶς, which the Greek suggests, and as a predicate of the nominalized ὁ πᾶς (apparently 
equivalent of τὸ πᾶν), which suits his interpretation better. Lernould (2001: 208 n. 2) takes 
Proclus to choose the latter reading, but it is clear especially from 272.27-8 that Proclus wants to 
have it both ways: “he calls τὸ πᾶν heaven and cosmos and says that ὁ πᾶς οὐρανός (…) should 
be called cosmos etc.” (also at 273.3-4).  
276 Burnet, Rivaud (1963) and Bury (1929). Rivaud does separate the two clauses in his 
translation. 
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whatever name is most acceptable in a given context – there is a question etc…”, 
transl. Zeyl).277 Our commentator, however, reads it as a full sentence, that can be 
rendered as “Let us call the universe heaven or cosmos, or the name that, would it 
ever be called just that, suits it best.” He moreover considers it an axiom in the 
geometrical fashion (κατὰ τοὺς γεωμέτρας), that “imposes a name on the subject 
matter” (In Tim. I 272.10-11).  
What kind of starting point is this imposition of a name, and why is it considered 
a starting point in the first place? A first answer to the latter question is of course 
that by merely dubbing this phrase an axiom, Proclus creates the parallel with the 
five axioms of Euclid’s Elements. But there is more. Proclus explains and justifies 
his claim with a reference to a particular instance of the geometrical practice of 
imposing a name on the subject (ὑποκείμενον), namely the definition of the gnomon. 
Just as geometers say about the gnomon in parallelograms: “let whichever one (i.e. 
of the 4 smaller parallelograms into which a parallelogram can be divided) 
together with the two complements (i.e. adjacent smaller parallelograms) be called 
a gnomon,”278 so Plato imposes names on the universe. The parallel drawn by 
Proclus is suggested, or supported, by the similar formulations: ὠνομάσθω here 
and καλείσθω in Euclidean demonstrations.279  
The passage quoted from Euclid’s Elements is part of a definition (see note 278), 
which suggests that Proclus considers the ‘naming of the universe’ to be 
                                               
277 Cf. Lernould (2001: 205). Translators Cornford (1937: 22), Taylor (1928: 65-6) and Zeyl (2000: 
14) read the remark on the third name as a parenthesis. Brisson (1992: 116), however, does have 
a full stop at this point. Note that in later Neoplatonists this same half-sentence is quoted. Simpl. 
in Cael. 7.280ff., on Cael. 278b11, see below; Philop. In GC 1.19ff, referring to the same passage, 
and Philop. Aet.Mund. 509.11ff. In these cases, there are no indications that the cutting up of the 
original sentence is done in the assumption that the phrase itself constitutes a full sentence. On 
the contrary, the quotation is often accompanied by another half-sentence (Plato Polit. 269d7f). 
Like Proclus, Cicero (Timaeus 2.4-5) separates the first half of the Platonic anacoluthon off into a 
separate sentence. 
278 ἓν ὁποινοῦν σὺν τοῖς δυσὶ παραπληρώμασι γνώμων καλείσθω, In Tim. I 272.13-14, which is a 
quote of the second half of def. 2 from book 2 of the Elements: Παντὸς δὲ παραλληλογράμμου 
χωρίου τῶν περὶ τὴν διάμετρον αὐτοῦ παραλληλογράμμων ἓν ὁποιονοῦν σὺν τοῖς δυσὶ 
παραπληρώμασι γνώμων καλείσθω. In Heath’s translation ‘And in any parallelogrammic area let 
any one whatever of the parallelograms about its diameter with the two complements be called a 
gnomon.’ Cf. Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 115), who quotes the entire definition in his translation. 
That Proclus does not quote the entire definition, but only the second half, has two reasons: 1. 
the beginning of Euclid’s definition (i.e. παντὸς δὲ παραλληλογράμμου χωρίου) may be said to 
have been replaced by what Proclus says just before the quote (‘in parallelograms’); 2. starting the 
quote from ‘ἓν ὁποινοῦν’ results in a nice match – both with respect to the indefinite pronoun and 
as regards rhythm, with the ‘definition’ starting ‘ὅτι ποτὲ’. It is not so much the meaning, as the 
ring of the definition that is relevant here. 
279 Cf. also Eucl. El. I, def. 22; II, def. 2; V, def. 6, etc. 
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comparable, at least in its formulation, to a (nominal) definition.  Readers would 
be hard put to believe him if he actually made this explicit, so instead he speaks of 
an axiom, and counts the phrase among the hypotheses.280 Nonetheless, the 
suggestion is present that the parallel goes beyond mere formulaic similarity 
between Plato’s utterance and Euclid’s definition: Plato προδιορίζεταί τι (272.17) 
and ἀφορίζεται...ὑπὲρ (272.26-7), he distinguishes, or even defines something 
concerning the names beforehand, in order to prevent confusion. If we compare 
this practice, as understood by Proclus, to the descriptions of definitions as they 
are used in Greek geometry, namely that of presenting formally usable 
abbreviations, or of giving an explanation of what one is talking about,281 it comes 
close to fitting the picture. It would go too far to suppose that Proclus interprets 
the Timaeus passage as presenting formally usable abbreviations, but he does take it 
to inform us on the fact that Plato will use both the terms ‘heaven’ and ‘cosmos’, 
and on what we should understand him to mean every time he uses either word.  
This clarification was necessary, Proclus continues, as the words οὐρανός and 
κόσμος were considered to be ambiguous even in antiquity (In Tim. I 272.17ff.). 
Οὐρανός, ‘heaven’ was taken to refer to everything supralunar, as opposed to the 
sublunary cosmos, or instead heaven was seen as a part of the cosmos. Again, 
some people saw heaven as extending down to the moon, others even called the 
“summits of creation” heaven.282 In Proclus’ view, Plato’s aim in explicitly 
equating the names “the cosmos” and “the whole heaven” is to prevent people 
from thinking that he is conceptually sloppy when using both words in the sequel, 
or that he is incorrectly assuming an extensional identity of the universe with the 
“divine body” (as does Aristotle).283  
Although the names will be used indifferently in the Timaeus, there is an 
intensional difference between “heaven” and “cosmos”, in that the two names 
express different aspects of the universe, namely in short the ἐπιστροφή to and the 
                                               
280 Proclus refers specifically to this principle only once, and he then calls it an axiom (272.10); 
when he mentions it as one of five starting points, he calls it either an axiom (236.10-27) or a 
hypothesis (274.21ff, 237.9-16, cf. 348.13).  
281 See above, n. 134. 
282 E.g. Arist. Cael. II 1, 283b26, on uncreated heaven, and ibid. I 9 278b9ff on three different 
uses of οὐρανός (not in relation to κόσμος): (1) as the (body at the) circumference of the universe, 
the abode of the divine; (2) as the region of the heavenly bodies; (3) as everything included in the 
circumference, i.e. the world. 
283 Aristotle presents three different meanings of οὐρανός (see previous note) and without 
warning uses οὐρανός in the sense of “divine body” (i.e. meaning (1)) at 286a11-12. Note that 
Proclus here uses the πᾶς from the Timaeus text both as noun and as adjective, see above n. 275.  
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πρόοδος from the intelligible respectively.284 And this brings us to another reason 
for Proclus to separate the phrase quoted in T III.26 off as a fifth axiom: the 
remainder of the phrase (ἢ καὶ…δέχοιτο), is read by Proclus as a reference to yet 
another name, namely the unspoken, ineffable name of the universe, which is 
known only to the gods, and is a sign of its remaining in its efficient cause, the 
Demiurge. This reading is possible due to a textual variation: the potential optative 
we find in Plato’s text, “or there may also be some other name which would suit 
the universe best, in the actual case that it is called just that (μάλιστ’ ἄν δέχοιτο)”, 
changes into an irreal optative in Proclus’ reading, “or the name that, would it ever 
be called just that – but it won’t – (μάλιστα δέχοιτο), would suit it best”.285 And 
with this reading the triad of emanation from, reversion to, and remaining in the 
Demiurge is complete.  
By way of conclusion and summary of the whole section on the axioms, Proclus 
states:  
T III.27 
“...through these things, as hypotheses, are delivered the kind to which the 
cosmos belongs (τό...εἶδος τὸ κοσμικὸν, i.e. Becoming) and the demiurgic 
cause and the paradigm and the apparent and the concealed names of the 
universe...”286 
 
(i) The axiom of the final cause within the prooemium 
From here, however, he moves on to explaining that through the three names (διὰ 
δὲ τῶν τριῶν sc. ὀνοματῶν), representing the metaphysical triad of the universe,  
T III.28 
“...you could obtain (ἔχοις ἂν) the final cause, through which [the universe] 
is full of the Good, remaining in the Good in an unspeakable manner, 
proceeding from it in a perfecting manner, and returning to it as to an 
object of desire.287 
 
                                               
284 In Tim. I 273.2ff. Proclus adds a subtle extra layer of meaning by assigning “heaven” as the 
common name, and “cosmos” as the more specifically Platonic one, that indicates the demiurgic 
activity. 
285 We cannot judge on the basis of the textual evidence whether the irreal optative is a cause or a 
consequence of the reading Proclus provides, but considering his interpretation and his general 
tendency to see the triad of emanation, reversion and remaining wherever he can, I find the latter 
more probable. 
286 In Tim. I 274.21-23.  
287 In Tim. I 274.25-31. 
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Proclus here replaces the Demiurge as the source and end of the triadic process 
expressed in the names of the universe with the Good. By this ingenious move, he 
introduces into the axioms of the prooemium something that is not there: a 
mention of the final cause of the universe.288 That Proclus wants the final cause to 
be mentioned among the starting points already shows in his introduction to the 
entire commentary, where he suggests in the οἰκονομία (division of the text) that 
the prooemium delivers all the true causes, i.e. efficient, paradigmatic and final.289 
If this were indeed the case, analogy with the efficient and the paradigmatic cause 
would require the presence of a – universal – teleological axiom such as ‘every 
maker has an aim’, or ‘every becoming has an end’, the application of which would 
in turn be found in the second half of the prooemium. Unfortunately for Proclus, 
neither such an axiom nor its application are anywhere to be found in Plato’s text. 
Plato’s actual treatment of the final cause follows immediately after the prooemium 
at Tim. 29d-e: “Well then, let us say for what reason (δι’ ἥντινα αἰτίαν) he who 
assembled Becoming (γένεσις) and this universe assembled them.” And this, one 
could say, is the application of an axiom that has remained implicit, to the 
universe as the subject matter of the exposition. Proclus does not mention such an 
axiom, but he does in a sense argue for its absence by pointing out its superfluity: 
just as in the case of the paradigmatic cause, so too with respect to the final cause 
is there no reason for Plato to justify the assumption that there is such a thing as a 
final cause. It is agreed on by everyone290 that where there is νοῦς, there is τὸ οὗ 
ἕνεκα.291 In other words, the existence of a final cause of Becoming is treated by 
Proclus as a common notion, and is supposed to be another consequence of the 
conceptual analysis of Becoming. 
Our commentator is clearly aware of this side of the Janus face of the final cause 
(i.e. as being both present and not present in the prooemium), namely, that it is 
not actually one of the starting points in the prooemium, and that it is thus not an 
explicit part of its results. This shows in the caution with which he introduces the 
final cause, first of all by not mentioning it directly as one of the hypotheses, but 
rather as a result of them (διὰ δὲ τῶν τριῶν), and secondly by his use of the 
                                               
288 Festugière explicitly denies that Proclus has this in mind (1966-8: 8, ‘Ceci ne corresponds plus 
à l’une des Causes…’). See however Lernould (2001: 205ff.). 
289 When describing the parts of the dialogue in the οἰκονομία Proclus says (I 4.26-29): “after 
these (Atlantis myth and Republic ‘summary’) he provides the efficient cause of the all, and the 
exemplary and final cause: these having been established beforehand (ὧν προϋπαρχόντων) the 
universe is created as a whole and in parts.” Both the context and the phrase ὧν προϋπαρχόντων 
suggest that the three causes are treated in the same section, i.e. the proœmium. 
290 In Tim. I 356.28-9 ὡς τούτου παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογουμένου. 
291 This is shored up with a common argument for teleology from analogy, namely that an 
intelligent human being does everything “for the best”, In Tim. I 356.16-357.2. 
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potential optative (ἔχοις ἂν in T III.28). It shows even more clearly on other 
occasions, which are discussed in the next section. 
 
(ii) The axiom of the final cause after the prooemium 
Proclus presents several overviews of the starting points of the philosophy of 
nature of the Timaeus, without ever including any mention of the final cause. We 
have already seen examples of that above.292 Likewise, already at In Tim. I 236.26-7 
Proclus summarizes the fifth axiom as “let the universe be called heaven or 
cosmos”. No sign here of the reference to the secret name, not to mention the 
final cause. Again, only a few pages after carefully introducing the final cause, 
Proclus signals the transition from starting points to demonstrations by describing 
the different aspects of the first half of the prooemium as corresponding to 
different dialectical methods.293 He includes among those methods the analysis of 
Becoming into its causes, but subsequently mentions only the efficient and 
paradigmatic cause. The lemma on the imposition of the names of the universe is 
instead characterized as name-giving in a Pythagorean vein.294 In other words, the 
final cause is not here considered to be part of the analysis in the prooemium. 
In the exegesis of the efficient cause, Proclus had already mentioned that the final 
cause would be displayed “later (ὕστερον), when it clearly emerges (ἀναφαινόμενον) 
from the λόγος and the demonstrations”.295 This remark is unclear in itself, as the 
“later” is not specified, and the λόγος could refer to a number of parts of the 
dialogue. Since it has to refer to a passage either in of after the demonstrations, 
the most likely candidate is the very first lemma of the κοσμοποιία, immediately 
after Socrates’ comments on the prooemium (Tim. 29d7). In the context of this 
passage Proclus argues for the evident existence of a final cause of the universe 
(see above).296 This much is clear, at least, that the final cause is again not 
                                               
292 In Tim. I 264.27-265.3 (T III.24). In Tim. I 274.21-23 (T III.27). 
293 In Tim. I 276.10-19, see also III.5. 
294 Proclus refers to the Pythagorean ἄκουσμα that “number is the wisest of things, and after that 
he who gives names”, In Tim. I 276.14ff.. Cf. Aelius VH 4.17. Cf. Iamb. VP 18.82.14-5; Proclus 
In Alc. 259.13ff, In Crat. 16.3ff. In this ἄκουσμα, Proclus tells us, number stands for intellect, and 
namegiving for the discursive soul, that contains images and discursive essential λόγοι (εἰκόνας 
καὶ λόγους οὐσιώδεις διεξοδικούς). For the comparison, in the Cratylus (436d2-7), of the namegiver 
to a geometer, see above III.3. More importantly, the legislator of the Cratylus (389a) is identified 
with the Demiurge as the primary namegiver (In Crat. 51.43). By connecting Timaeus’ namegiving 
to the Pythagorean ἄκουσμα, Proclus identifies Timaeus with the Demiurge. On ἀκούσματα in 
the τί μάλιστα format, and the question whether the second best is original or goes back only to 
the Cratylus, see Burkert (1972: 166ff., esp. 169, n. 22). 
295 In Tim. I 263.21-23. 
296 Festugière suggests 46c7 ff., but this passage is no more than a criticism of those who regard 
secondary causes as real causes, and the description of a particular final cause, namely of eyesight. 
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considered part of the starting points, as it “emerges” from the demonstrations 
following them. 
Finally, in his interpretation of Tim. 29b, where Plato vaguely points to the 
importance of the natural beginning (κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχή), Proclus interprets the 
notion of ἀρχή primarily in an ontological and textual sense, to mean that the true 
beginning, i.e. the origin of the universe is the final cause, and the right beginning, 
i.e. the place to start unfolding the text about the κοσμοποιία is with a discussion 
of the final cause.297 The right place for the final cause, then, is immediately after 
the prooemium (Tim. 29d):298  
T III.29 
“He was good (ἀγαθὸς ἦν), and no one who is good ever experiences any 
envy towards anyone.”299 
 
With that emphatic statement we have reached the summit of the philosopher’s 
ascent to the causes of the universe, its final cause.300 Proclus hastens to point out 
that one should carefully distinguish between the ultimate final cause, i.e. the 
Good, and the final cause as it exists in the demiurgic mind (In Tim. 359.22ff.). He 
does take the ἀγαθὸς ἦν, which expresses the demiurgic goodness, to contain a 
reference to its source, Goodness ἁπλῶς.301 He does not, however, take Plato’s 
account to ascend all the way to the Good itself as an unhypothetical principle.302 
This coheres with the fact that Proclus does not include the final cause into the 
results of the conceptual analysis he detects in the prooemium.  
As Steel points out, in the Timaeus the notion of causality is fairly narrow, because 
the main aim of this dialogue is to find the Demiurge as the cause of the sensible 
world. As a result of the vast influence of the Timaeus on Neoplatonic philosophy, 
“the efficient cause (if understood in the strong sense of ‘productive’ or ‘creative’, 
not just moving) has for the Neoplatonists primacy over the other types of 
causality. For matter, form and instrument are not really causes, but subservient to 
the causes, and the paradigmatic and the final cause are not directly causes of the 
                                               
297 In Tim. I 337.10ff. 
298 Cf. 285.21ff: of the different ἀρχαί archai of the world (Proclus mentions temporal, efficient, 
final, material, formal), the “certain ἀρχή” of Tim. 27b6 (ἢ γέγονεν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος) is 
the final ἀρχή, the most souvereign (κυριωτάτην) as Plato calls it (Tim. 29e4).  
299 Tim. 29e1. 
300 In Tim. I 357.11-12: καὶ μέχρι τούτου τοῖς φιλοθεάμοσιν ἡ ἄνοδος. Cf. Plato Rep. V 475e4, Τοὺς 
τῆς ἀληθείας...φιλοθεάμονας, i.e. philosophers.   
301 In Tim. I 360.15-26.  
302 See below, III.5. 
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effects, but are so only through the mediation of the producer-maker.”303 This 
primacy of the efficient cause can be observed everywhere in Proclus’ reading of 
the prooemium, in its being an ascent primarily to the Demiurge, the paradigm in 
him, and his goodness as the final cause of creation. The goodness of the 
Demiurge bestows goodness on the universe, makes it good.304 In other words, 
Goodness is portrayed not so much as a final cause in the sense of that to which 
the universe strives, its end, but rather as its ultimate beginning and the source of 
the goodness of the universe. 
 
(iii) Intermediate conclusion on the fifth axiom 
Both the fifth axiom and the final cause are eccentric elements of the prooemium 
in Proclus’ reading. The fifth axiom is the only starting point that is called an 
axiom and a hypothesis, while neither introducing a general rule expressed in a 
pair of opposite propositions, which is consequently applied to the subject matter, 
nor being a proposition that will function as a premise in the coming 
demonstrations. Thus its being called an axiom and a hypothesis does not match 
the sense in which the other starting points are axioms and hypotheses. The fifth 
starting point does, however, present a particular rule to be applied to the text, 
namely that the universe can also be called “heaven” and “cosmos”. The function 
of the fifth starting point in the reasoning of the prooemium is that it constitutes 
the transition from the general rules to their application, i.e. the demonstrations, 
through the introduction of the subject matter.  
The final cause, on the other hand, is never credited with an axiom, but occurs 
only in the applied form, i.e. the Good as the final cause of the universe. With its 
indirect and cautious introduction in the fifth axiom, the final cause is something 
of an outsider. It is not part of the argumentative structure of the prooemium in 
which the starting points of philosophy of nature are set out, and the reader’s 
knowledge of it is no more than a possible result (cf. the potential optative ἔχοις 
ἂν, 274.25) of the fifth starting point, the imposition of the names of the universe. 
Taking stock, we can now formulate the intermediate conclusion that for our 
commentator the first half of the prooemium of the Timaeus offers an analysis of 
the universe into its transcendent causes, but of those causes only the efficient and 
the paradigmatic, and especially the former. The final cause is implicated for those 
who are in the know, but is not part of the analysis.   
 
 
                                               
303 Steel (2003: 182). 
304 In Tim. I 359ff (on Tim. 29e1).  
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III.5 After the starting points – Proclus takes stock 
 
By way of transition to what Proclus calls “the demonstrations” he summarizes 
the prooemium with special attention for the methodology used therein. This time 
he does not have recourse to geometry, however, but more generally to the 
dialectical methods, i.e. those methods, or powers (δυνάμεις) as he also calls them, 
that belong primarily to the sphere of the science of dialectic, and are used 
derivatively in all other sciences: division, definition, analysis, and 
synthesis/demonstration: 305 
T III.30 
“Plato used all the dialectical methods in the hypotheses – for he 
distinguished (διεστείλατο) Being from Becoming, and by definition 
delivered (ὁριστικῶς ἀποδέδωκε) with regard to each of them what it is, as 
well as analytically (ἀναλυτικῶς): for (γάρ) from the things that become he 
reverted (ἀνέδραμε) to their causes, both demiurgic and paradigmatic – and 
he also showed himself, concerning both the unspeakable and the spoken 
names, to be truly in accordance with the Pythagorean sentence, which says 
that number is the most wise, but after that he who gives names to things. 
And now Plato turns to the demonstrations of the problems concerning 
the universe.”306 
 
This summary is somewhat untidily formulated, as not all methods are used in the 
hypotheses: the method of demonstration does not come into play until after the 
hypotheses, in, obviously, the demonstrations. But that need not bother us. Two 
issues are interesting in this passage. First of all, the addition of the method of 
analysis as describing the delivery of the causes of the universe. And secondly, the 
emphasis on the dialectical methods in general rather than on those of geometry.  
(1) Proclus gives very little insight, both in this passage and in general, into what 
he takes the method of analysis to consist in. It is introduced here as “reverting” 
(ἀναδραμεῖν) to the causes of the universe, as a way of showing what the universe 
is, i.e. what it is essentially – something the definitions of Being and Becoming 
could never reveal, as they merely describe our cognitive access to both (see 
III.3.2) – and hence a reverting to the universe as Becoming.307 What the 
“reverting” amounts to, how it is accomplished, we are not told.  
                                               
305 In Parm. 1003.21ff. See Beierwaltes (1979: 245, 248ff.), Lernould (1987: 515-6, 523).  
306 In Tim. I 276.10-19.  
307 It is not necessary to read ἀναλυτικῶς in T III.30 as a clause in itself (pace Festugière (1966-8), 
Lernould (2001: 229). Quite the contrary, it makes more sense to take it as a second adverb with 
ἀποδέδωκε τί ἐστιν. This reading requires no assumption of an implicit verb, and explains why 
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Proclus’ general notion of the “Epimetheus of dialectic”,308 the method of analysis 
(accepting some oversimplification in speaking of one method), can be 
summarized as a notion of an “upward” method – as opposed to downward 
synthesis/demonstration and division, in the sense that it proceeds towards 
principles in a wide sense, from the complex to the simple, from the particular to 
the universal, from the caused to its causes.309  
The analysis in the context of the prooemium is a reversion to causes,310 and 
hence one would expect it to be also the reverse of demonstration, an analysis in 
which the logically prior is the ontologically posterior. In fact, however, the ascent 
to the causes in the prooemium is no more than the result of a conceptual analysis 
of the notion of Becoming, a breaking down of the concept of Becoming into its 
essential (causal) components. This presentation of the concept of Becoming is 
capable of awakening in the interlocutors and us readers the knowledge of the 
causes of Becoming.311 
(2) This brings us to the second issue mentioned above: the introduction of 
dialectic. Opposite to what has been suggested in the past,312 the reference to the 
dialectical methods is no indication that Proclus sees dialectic, rather than 
geometry, as the paradigmatic science for the prooemium – that is, no more than 
to the extent that dialectic is the paradigm for all sciences. In the Republic (VI 510), 
Plato compares the two sciences from the point of view of their use of 
hypotheses. As mentioned earlier, geometry starts from hypotheses and from 
there moves ‘downward’ to their conclusions, without bothering with discussing 
                                                                                                                                      
Proclus does not hesitate to say that the definitions give the ‘what it is’, despite the fact that this 
is exactly what was denied of the definitions earlier (see III.3.2). It is very interesting that Proclus 
here distinguishes different manners of revealing the ‘what it is’. This issue deserves more 
attention than mere mention in a footnote, e.g. a comparison with Aristotle’s different ways of 
showing τὸ τί ἐστι (APo II, esp. 9 93b21-28). Now is not the time for that, however. For a 
discussion of the issue in Aristotle see Byrne (1997: ch. 6, 128ff.). 
308 Cf. Damasc. In Phil. 57 and 59, and Ritacco de Gayoso (1998).  
309 For the method of analysis in Proclus see In Parm. 1003.16-29, 980.17-982.30, In Eucl. 18.17ff., 
Theol.Plat. I 9 40.6-8 (on analysis as ἐπιστροφή), In Eucl. 69.17-19 (idem, and “from the sought to 
the principles”). Discussions of Proclean analysis are found in Hintikka and Remes (1974), 
focusing on geometrical analysis, Beierwaltes (1979: esp. 250-51, n. 20) – note that Beierwaltes’ 
choice of passages shows that he almost identifies analysis and recollection; Hartmann (1909: 
46ff.); Bechtle (2000), whose explanation of the relation of the four dialectical methods to one 
another in Iamblichus, dividing them according to the dichotomies up-down and static-dynamic, 
is remarkably similar to Hartmann’s on Proclus), Lloyd, A.C. (1990: 8-11). Cf. the summary of 
Alc. Didask. 5, and Dillon’s commentary (1993).  
310 In Parm. 982.24-5: ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτιατῶν ἀναλύουσα εἰς τὰ αἴτια. 
311 Cf. In Tim. I 242.26. 
312 Lernould (2001), see chapter I.  
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the truth of their hypotheses.313 The starting points are merely posited – as are the 
starting points in the prooemium of the Timaeus. It is the dialectician, instead, who 
starts from hypotheses and moves upwards to principles (Rep. 533c7ff.). 314 The 
fact that Proclus speaks of an analysis of Becoming consisting in a delivery of its 
causes, seems to point to a dialectical and theological, rather than a geometrical 
treatment of starting points in the sense just described. Thus we would have the 
following two structures of the prooemium:  
 Geometry Dialectic 
Posited starting points 1-5 1 and 2 (the definitions) 
Analysis - i) 3-5 (the causes) and  
ii) the demonstrations 
Demonstration The demonstrations After the prooemium, 
starting from the final 
cause 
 
On the basis of what we know about the details of the analysis, we can conclude 
that neither is in itself a correct reading Proclus’ understanding of the prooemium: 
the “geometrical” reading misses the aspect of analysis, whereas the “dialectical” 
reading does not fit the terminology applied by Proclus to the elements of the 
prooemium.  
The solution, very appropriately, lies in the middle. Within the scope of the entire 
prooemium, the method applied remains comparable to that of geometry, 
presenting demonstrations on the basis of hypotheses/axioms. And these 
demonstrations have all five hypotheses/axioms as their starting points in the 
given order,315 but do not start from the endpoint of the analysis (as would be the 
case in a methodological “circle” consisting of analysis and its reverse, 
synthesis).316 That leaves the element of analysis within the very starting points to 
be explained. Although Proclus does adopt Plato’s two opposed directions of 
geometry (downward) and dialectic (upward), his overall view of the sciences is 
more sophisticated: in every science we also find analysis, albeit not reaching an 
unhypothetical principle. The dialectical methods are applied in all sciences, with 
degrees of precision appropriate to the subject matter of the science in question.317 
Moreover, Proclus has a double approach to the method of φυσιολογία, a 
                                               
313 See above III.3.3(ii). 
314 On the question of the direction of Plato’s hypothetical method, see Robinson (1941: 136-7) 
and Rosenmeyer (1971).  
315 Although the fifth starting point does not actually function as such in the demonstrations.  
316 For the circular method discernible in Proclus’ reading of both halves of the prooemium see 
Lernould (2001). For a critical assessment thereof see chapter I.  
317 Cf. Lernould (1987). 
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superficial reading and an in-depth reading318 – or a students’ reading and a 
teacher’s reading. Methodologically following geometry, the philosopher of nature 
posits starting points and demonstrates facts concerning the subject matter of the 
science from them. The starting points may have been reached and chosen as the 
result of a prior dialectical exercise,319 but in the context of the prooemium they 
are merely posited (ἀποδέδωκε in T III.30). On the other hand, the teacher and 
advanced philosophers are capable of recognizing, within the very starting points, a 
short analysis comparable to the analysis in the Parmenides and in the first four 
propositions of the Elements of Theology.320 There is an important difference, 
however, between the dialectic of the latter two and the “dialectic” of the Timaeus: 
the analysis in the Timaeus does not lead all the way up to the unhypothetical One. 
Instead, as the result of a conceptual analysis of Becoming, a “conceptual 
introspection”,321 we ascend to the Demiurge, and to the paradigmatic and final 
causes as they are present in the Demiurge.322 Indirectly, we also ascend to the 
paradigmatic and final causes themselves, i.e. to the Forms and the Good – but 
not to the One as unhypothetical principle of thought.323 
 
III.5.1 The first demonstration: philosophy of nature as science 
 
After the starting points, thus Proclus, the next step is to present what follows 
them.324 In summary, the Timaeus text (Tim. 28b4-29b1) contains the application 
of what we called the first four starting points to the subject matter introduced in 
the fifth: the universe belongs to the realm of Becoming, therefore there is a 
Father and Demiurge of the universe (who is hard to find) and, in the light of the 
goodness of this Demiurge and the beauty of the universe, an eternal paradigm.325 
Proclus states that the starting points (definitions/hypotheses/axioms) form the 
basis for the consequent demonstrations of the nature and all the causes of the 
universe.326 An efficient, a paradigmatic, a final, a material, a formal and an 
                                               
318 Lernould (2001: 323). 
319 As suggested by Runia (1997: 113). 
320 See O'Meara (2000: 282ff.). 
321 O'Meara (2000: 290). 
322 Cf. In Remp. I 164.13-21. On the reversion within the Timaeus see chapter V. 
323 Theol.Plat. II 12 66.1-9: the One is the ultimate unhypothetical principle of thought, being the 
most knowable and most simple. In Remp. I 283.11-12. 
324 I 274.30-32; 275.3-6. 
325 Exegesis at In Tim. I 275.1-334.27. 
326 In Tim. I 236.8ff. The fact that they follow from the necessarily true hypotheses, ensure that 
the demonstrations are irrefutable and certain: In Tim. I 337.3-7, 337.15-17.  
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instrumental cause are thus demonstrated to belong to the universe.327 That the 
universe has all these causes is an immediate consequence of its being generated: 
If the universe is Becoming, it is a form participated by matter, and hence has a 
formal cause, a material cause, and a proximate cause of their motion, i.e. an 
instrumental cause.328 
In his exegesis of “what follows the starting points”, Proclus returns to the 
comparison of the method applied to that of a geometer, but far less frequently 
than in the first half of the prooemium. In addition, we find that Proclus gradually 
introduces a shift of focus: whereas earlier Timaeus’ exposition took its starting 
point from “what is known to us”, now Proclus signals an order of exposition in 
the dialogue that parallels the order of reality – albeit in the opposite direction. 
This change of focus, we will see, prepares us for Proclus’ interpretation of the 
“likely story” (Tim. 29b3-d3).329 
When Proclus does appeal to geometry, he has special attention for the structure 
of reasoning in the presentation of the consequences of the starting points, and 
uses a number of technical terms and logico-geometrical methods to emphasize 
that structure. The emphasis is not just a rhetorical manoeuvre to suggest a 
scientific character of philosophy of nature. As we will see, Proclus uses one of 
the methods, geometrical conversion, to solve an epistemological paradox that lies 
at the heart of the Timaeus, and subsequently obtain a scientific status for 
philosophy of nature. 
 
(i) The paradox of the Timaeus 
It is a paradox of the Timaeus that certain far reaching consequences which the 
definition of Becoming should have had for the whole account apparently go 
unnoticed. The division of the two genera Being and Becoming is made in order 
to answer the first and most fundamental question of φυσιολογία, namely what is 
the εἶδος, the character of the universe. In order to facilitate an answer to that 
question, consequently Being and Becoming are ‘defined’ using a description of 
the appropriate modes of cognitive access: summarily speaking, rational and 
empirical respectively. Subsequently, the subject matter of the dialogue is 
                                               
327 In Tim. I 237.9-16, 263.19-264.3. Cf. 348.13ff.; 355.24-25. In neither of these passages does 
Proclus distinguish between the demonstration that the universe has all these causes and the 
demonstration of these causes, i.e. of what they are. 
328 In short, the Demiurge (the efficient cause) imposes the form of Becoming (this is what 
Proclus calls the εἶδος), imaged after eternal Being (the paradigmatic cause) upon the receptacle 
(material cause) using Nature as a tool (instrumental cause, see ch. II ), in order that everything 
share in (his) goodness (final cause).  
329 In this chapter, we will merely touch upon the change of focus. Its role in Proclus’ exegesis of 
the likely story is treated in further detail in chapter V. 
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determined as belonging to one of the genera, the spatio-temporal Becoming. At 
this point in the dialogue, an immediate application of its content to itself would 
have implied the following conclusion: that the cognitive access, and therefore the 
‘scientific’ method appropriate to the universe is that of a combination of 
perception and opinion, rather than science.330 To a certain extent this is indeed 
what happens, since the allocation of the universe to one of the genera is based on 
sensory data:  
T III.31 
“It has come to be. For it is visible and tangible and it has a body—and all 
such things are perceptible. And, as we have seen, perceptible things, 
which are apprehended by opinion with the use of sense perception, are 
things that come to be, things that are generated.”331 
 
This point is not developed further, however, with regard to all of φυσιολογία. 
That is, the conclusion that therefore Timaeus’ account will not be more than a 
representation of opinions or judgments based on sense perception is not drawn. 
The intrinsic relative truth332 of the text that according to Timaeus is due to the 
relation between the text and its subject matter is brought up as a result, not of the 
universe’s epistemic accessibility, but of its ontological iconic status, i.e. as another 
result of its having become, plus the ensuing necessity of a paradigmatic cause.333 
By this I do not mean that epistemological considerations are not involved in 
Plato’s likely story, as they clearly are (Tim. 29c3ff), but that the primary and direct 
cause of the likeliness of the account is the ontological status of its subject matter.  
Plato seems not to be aware of the fact that already as a consequence of the 
definition of Becoming he should have concluded to the “opinable” status of the 
universe, but, as we will see, his commentator Proclus is. The question therefore 
arises how in that case Proclus, who interprets the Timaeus as a scientific treatise 
and φυσιολογία as an ἐπιστήμη,334 reconciles that scientific status with the fact that 
all Becoming (and therefore the cosmos as belonging to that realm) is said to be 
                                               
330 Cf. e.g. Cornford (1937: 24, 29), who concludes that the visible world is an object of 
perception and of judgments based on perception and incorrectly takes the remarks on the “likely 
story” to be a repetition of this very point. Johansen (2004: 161-2), who rightly refutes 
Cornford’s reading, nonetheless does not signal the paradox (he does come very close when he 
points out that “[Timaeus] is not just saying that the physical world has come to be, [but] that it 
has come to be as an εἰκών of an intelligible reality”). Cf. Lloyd, G.E.R. (1991: 346).  
331 Tim. 28b7-c2. 
332 Truth comes in degrees for Proclus. See chapter V. 
333 See chapter V on the topic of the iconic status of the universe. 
334 See chapter I. See also chapter V for Proclus’ explaining of the likely story in such a way that it 
does not detract from the scientific status of Plato’s cosmology. 
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graspable through opinion (δόξα) with perception (αἴσθησις) – and hence is 
apparently no ἐπιστήμη? 
Proclus obtains this reconciliation through an elegant analysis of what he calls the 
first demonstration. That analysis, which contains two at first sight rather puzzling 
remarks, makes a highly ingenious use of the concept of geometrical conversion, 
of the Neoplatonic concept of δόξα, and of the fundamental continuity that 
characterizes Proclean reality and knowledge.  
 
(ii) Geometrical conversion of the definition of Becoming 
The demonstrations take their start with the following lemma of the Timaeus:  
T III.32 
“γέγονεν· ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τέ ἐστιν καὶ σῶμα ἔχων͵ πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα 
αἰσθητά͵ τὰ δ΄ αἰσθητά͵ δόξῃ περιληπτὰ μετ΄ αἰσθήσεως͵ γιγνόμενα καὶ 
γεννητὰ ἐφάνη.”335 
 
With the word γέγονεν Timaeus “reverts to νοῦς” and anticipates in an intuitive 
grasp the conclusion of what he will consequently elaborate in discursive reasoned 
exposition.336 This unfolding of what is implicitly present in the conclusion is 
necessary because, as opposed to Timaeus who already has an intuitive grasp of 
the entire cosmos, his interlocutors – like ourselves – are in a less advanced 
epistemological state, and need assistance in their ascent to knowledge. This is the 
first instance of the gradual shift of the order of presentation, which leads up to 
Proclus’ reading of the ‘likely story’: the anticipation of the conclusion, and the 
consequent elaboration of the reasoning that leads up to that conclusion, follow 
the structure of reality rather than starting from “what is known to us”.337  
In the discursive and demonstrative phase of establishing that the world is 
generated,338 we find a last comparison of Plato’s method with the methods of the 
geometer.339 In order to conclude that the universe has become (is Becoming), the 
speaker Timaeus applies, according to Proclus, the geometrical technique of 
conversion. Whereas in the hypotheses the order of the definition was “Becoming 
is what is grasped through perception and opinion”, now Timaeus converts the 
                                               
335 Tim. 28b7-c2. 
336 In Tim. I 282.27-283.9. On anticipating the conclusion and its analogue in creation, see chapter 
V. 
337 Note that the change of direction is not complete, but only occurs with respect to each 
separate demonstration.  
338 In Tim. I 283.9ff. 
339 The inversed analogy at Tim. 29c3 is called geometrical as well, but the reference there falls 
outside the scope of the whole comparison. See V.4.2 (i).  
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definition and rephrases it as “the perceptible which is grasped through perception 
and opinion, is Becoming”. This, supplemented with the premise that the universe 
is visible and tangible, allows him to conclude that the universe has become (is 
Becoming):  
T III.33 
“So it is shown demonstratively (ἀποδεικτικῶς...δεδειγμένος) that the 
cosmos has become from the definition (ἐκ τοῦ ὅρου), according to the 
conversion of the definition (κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν τοῦ ὅρου): for (ἐπεί) 
geometers also use such proofs (δείξεσι).”340 
 
As Festugière points out, Proclus does not discuss ἐπιστροφή in the In Eucl., but 
what Proclus has in mind in the quoted passage is the so-called conversion of 
theorems, ἀντιστροφή.341 That the term used in the In Tim. is ἐπιστροφή, not 
ἀντιστροφή, is not a serious objection. This is the only place in Proclus or 
elsewhere where we find the expression ἐπιστροφή τοῦ ὅρου, and when Proclus 
returns to the issue of the converted definition of Becoming later in the In Tim. he 
does use the verb ἀντιστρέφειν.342 I therefore assume that at I 283 a scribe 
accidentally replaced the word ἀντιστροφή with the far more common ἐπιστροφή, 
and propose an emendation of ἐπιστροφή into ἀντιστροφή. 
The expression in the manuscript, κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν τοῦ ὅρου is an echo of an 
expression with a rather different meaning, namely of syllogistic conversion by 
switching terms of a proposition, which was a topic of discussion in the 
commentaries on the Organon: ἡ ἀντιστροφὴ ἡ κατὰ τοὺς ὅρους.343 
  
Conversion of theorems as discussed in the commentary on Euclid’s Elements is 
the creation of new theorems by changing the order of clauses of existing 
theorems. Strict and primary (προηγουμένως καὶ κυρίως) conversion is the creation 
of a new theorem B by exchanging the so-called hypothesis (the if-clause) of a 
theorem A with its conclusion.344 For example, “every isosceles triangle has its 
                                               
340 In Tim. I 283.15-18.  
341 Festugière (1966-8: 130 n. 6). In Eucl. 251.23-254.22, cf. Heath (1956: 256-7).  
342 In Tim. II 4.4ff., ad Tim. 31b. Cf. In Tim. I 292.19-21: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν θαυμάζειν 
ἄξιον, ὅπως ἐπιστημονικῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅρου προελήλυθε· διὸ καὶ ἀντέστρεψε τὴν τάξιν. 
343 Alex. In APr. 159.14-15, 173.23, Themist. In APr. (23.3) 23.31, Anon. In Cat. 32.27. On this 
kind of conversion (also called ἀντιστροφὴ τῶν ὅρων) see Lee (1984: ch. V, esp. 80), who 
mistakenly describes its meaning in Alexander as exchanging predicate and subject while retaining 
quality and quantity. Lee gives no references, but in his description of conversio simplex Alexander 
speaks only of retaining quality (In APr. 29.24-29). On syllogistic conversion see Arist. APr. I 2.  
344 In Eucl. 252.5-10. 
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base angles equal”345 can be converted to “every triangle having two angles equal 
also has the subtending sides equal and is isosceles”.346 By analogy, the definition 
of Becoming, with the definiendum Becoming in the hypothesis and the definiens 
“perceptible and opinable” in the conclusion, can be converted to “Everything 
that is apprehended by δόξα with the use of sense perception is Becoming and 
generated” (Tim. 27c1-2). 
The reference to geometrical practice above is intended as a justification of the use 
of conversion, as is suggested by the conjunction ἐπεί. This justification does not 
seem to be  the most appropriate, perhaps, as geometrical conversion pertains to 
theorems, not definitions. Instead, one would rather expect Stoic or Aristotelian 
conversion. Neither of these, however, fits Proclus’ reading of the first 
demonstration.  
Stoic conversion of definitions, also called ἀντιστροφή,347 is a topic in logical 
theory of the Aristotelian commentators.348 According to Antipater a definition 
should be an identity statement, and hence convertible. Proclus is not too 
forthcoming in acknowledging Stoic influences, but we can safely assume that the 
requirement of convertibility of definitions is implicit in Proclus’ discussion of the 
definition of Becoming, as an identity statement is also what Proclus is here 
assuming.  
A reason for preferring geometrical conversion to Stoic conversion, in addition of 
course to the fact that the former fits into the overall project of Proclus’ 
interpretation of the prooemium, is that the context of the definition of Becoming 
requires an operation (i.e. converting), not a relation (i.e. convertibility). Stoic 
conversion of definitions concerns equivalence relations between definiendum 
and definiens, but not the actual operation of swapping them in reasoning.349 And 
the latter is what Timaeus does in the prooemium.  
We do find conversion as a tool of inference in Aristotelian syllogistics, but this 
kind of conversion is even less adequate for Proclus’ purposes. Plato in the 
prooemium assumes equivalence between definiens and definiendum, and 
converts a universal affirmative proposition into a universal affirmative 
proposition. In logical conversion, however, the converse is never a universal 
                                               
345 Eucl. El. prop. I 5. 
346 Eucl. El. prop. I 6. The first is called the leading (προηγούμενον) theorem, because the genus 
is in the hypothesis and the property in the conclusion, the second, with the inverse order, is 
called the converse theorem (ἀντίστροφον), In Eucl. 254.6-20.  
347 SVF II 226. 
348 Starting with Alex. Aphr. (e.g. In Metaph. 531, In Top. 241 etc.). Porph. In Cat. 63.20-24 [REF]. 
Aristotle himself was aware of the convertibility of definitions as well, see below n. 350. 
349 On the intransitive and transitive use of ἀντιστρέφειν by the Commentators see also Lee (1984: 
89). 
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affirmative proposition. Therefore Proclus needs the strong conversion of 
geometry.350   
Proclus understood very well that the success of Plato’s reasoning in the 
prooemium depends to a large extent on the convertibility of some of the starting 
points: in the case at hand, if the definition were not an identity statement, the 
conversion would be invalid. He may seem to be vulnerable, however, to the 
accusation that he wants to have his cake and eat it: he wants to maintain that 
there are also things that are Becoming, but not perceptible (Soul, Time, Nature, 
and immanent forms).351 This is in itself of no consequence to the conversion, but 
it would disqualify the definition as such since it is no longer an identity statement. 
Proclus has an answer to this objection, however: first of all, the expression 
“Becoming” in the definition refers to what is becoming in the strict sense,352 i.e. 
composite, non self-sustaining, and subject to everlasting generation.353 Secondly, 
all psychic and noeric aspects of the universe which are not themselves perceptible 
(the World Soul, the immanent forms) are indirectly included because any 
composite consisting of the perceptible and the imperceptible is as a whole 
perceptible.354 Time is not mentioned in this argument, but the line of defence is 
clear: since Time is intrinsically bound to that which is Becoming in the strict 
sense,355 it is thereby included in that which is perceptible. 
The “problem of convertibility” in the Timaeus has been noted by today’s scholars, 
and has led to the accusation that the reasoning of the prooemium is fallacious.356  
                                               
350 For ἀντιστροφή in Aristotle in a sense closer to the geometrical conversion, see GC II 11 
337b23 and APo II 12 95b38-96a7, on necessary or natural reciprocation, discussed in Barnes 
(1976), see also next note. Note that Philoponus, when explaining the conversion of syllogisms, 
gives an example which is invalid, unless one specifies that one of the premises is in fact an 
identity statement (In APr. 40.15ff.). Lee (1984: 82-3). The passage in Aristotle APo I 12 78a6-13, 
where he says that in mathematics things convert more often because mathematicians assume 
nothing accidental but only definitions, plays a part in an ongoing debate on the extent to which 
geometrical analysis presupposes convertibility of theorems, see Byrne (1997: 5-9). It is 
interesting to note in this context that Proclus does not claim that conversion is always possible in 
geometry, as there is such a thing as fallacious conversion, where equivalence is wrongly 
presupposed (In Eucl. 253.16ff). Correct conversion is possible if a property inheres in something 
primarily and per se (In Eucl. 254.2-3). 
351 In Tim. I 256.30ff. and II.4.16ff. 
352 As defined at In Tim. I 280-282. 
353 In Tim. II 4.17-20. 
354 In Tim. II 4.20-5.17. 
355 Cf. In Tim. I 281.14-27. 
356 Ebert (1991: 46-7, 49). See also below n. 417. The argument offered by Runia (2000: 107-9) in 
Timaeus’ defence, reading the definition the other way round (everything that is sensible, is 
Becoming), is inadequate. In Runia’s reading the definiendum is the sensible, not Becoming. In 
that case, some Becoming might not be covered by the definition (some things may not be 
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Strictly speaking the reader of the Timaeus has no guarantee that the starting points 
are indeed convertible. Since in Proclus’ reading, however, the Pythagorean 
Timaeus presents us a didactic exposition based on his intuitive knowledge357 – i.e. 
a well-informed speaker whose specific aim is teaching, not e.g. persuading his 
audience – Proclus has strong external indications that the fact that the definition 
is converted means that it can be converted. Thus Proclus’ solution of the problem 
of convertibility, drawing a parallel with geometry in which extensional identity 
between things and their primary and per se properties is commonly used as a tool 
of inference, and thereby invoking Timaeus’ Pythagorean background, is both to 
the point and effective. 
 
(iii) The role of δόξα 
Plato’s use of conversion is praised highly by Proclus, who remarks how 
“admirably” (θαυμάζειν ἄξιον) Plato proceeds in a scientific manner 
(ἐπιστημονικῶς) from the definition: through the conversion, Plato gives the 
definition the function of a middle term, “as one should do in demonstrations”. 
Now the way Proclus illustrates this is the following:  
T III.34 
“For in the hypotheses he defined the generated as δοξαστόν,358 but for the 
demonstration of the being generated [of the world] he assumed the 
converse (i.e. “the δοξαστόν is generated”), so that he made a middle term 
of the definiens.”359 
 
The definiens of the original definition, δοξαστόν, is a middle term in the syllogism 
“all that is δοξαστόν is generated; the world is δοξαστόν; therefore the world is 
generated”.360 Thus from a purely formal point of view one could say that the 
term “δοξαστόν” enables the drawing of the conclusion. But Proclus does not 
credit only the formal role of the definiens in arriving at the knowledge that the 
world is generated. If that had been the case, his exuberant praise of the 
conversion would have been exaggerated, but more importantly, he should have 
                                                                                                                                      
sensible, but still be Becoming). The question the definition was to answer, however, was ‘what is 
Becoming’. Thus Runia’s defence ends in creating another problem, namely that of disqualifying 
the definition altogether. 
357 More on this topic in chapter V. 
358 For the time being I will leave the term δοξαστόν untranslated. The reason for this is that there 
is an important difference between Plato’s and Proclus’ notions of δόξα that is relevant to 
Proclus’ solution of the paradox. This difference will become clear later.  
359 In Tim. I 292.22-24. 
360 Cf. In Tim. I 296.20-21. 
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included also the second term of the definiens, “αἰσθητόν”, in his analysis of the 
converted definition. The fact that perception is not mentioned in this analysis is 
not due to coincidence or sloppiness, but is instead a deliberate choice. Proclus 
continues as follows:  
T III.35 
“Because δόξα possesses the rational principles (λόγοι) of things that are 
generated, it obtains the position of the cause with respect to them (τὴν 
αἰτίας ἀποφέρεται πρὸς αὐτὰ τάξιν). That is why, I think, Plato is not 
satisfied with “being perceptible” in order to designate the generated, but 
adds that it is also δοξαστόν, since perception knows the activities of the 
objects of perception because it is affected by them, but δόξα also 
recognizes their essences, because it has obtained their λόγοι beforehand 
(προείληφε); so in order to reveal the proper generated essence of the 
objects of sense perception, he built the argument from the [term] 
δοξαστόν.”361 
 
In this passage especially the awkward phrase “it obtains the position of the cause 
with respect to them” is puzzling. Festugière (1966-8: vol II, 143, n. 3) therefore 
takes the first sentence of this passage to be a repetition of the earlier point, that 
the δοξαστόν becomes the middle term, and in that sense the cause, of the 
demonstration that the universe is generated, and he sees δόξα here as a slip for 
δοξαστόν.362 But there is more to it than that. What we have here is no mere 
repetition concerning the formal role of the term δοξαστόν, but a statement 
regarding the epistemological role of the faculty of δόξα in the process of 
obtaining scientific knowledge of the world of sense perception. Proclus is 
drawing a parallel between the hierarchy of forms of cognition and the ontological 
hierarchy. When Proclus says that “δόξα…obtains the position of the cause with 
respect to [the things that are generated]”, he means that in the cognitive hierarchy 
δόξα is the faculty that is on the level parallel to that which the proximate cause of 
the things that are generated, i.e. φύσις, has in the ontological hierarchy:363 
T III.36 
“Whence, then, do rational souls produce these general notions (τὰ 
καθόλου) and make the progression from perceptible objects to the 
                                               
361 In Tim. I 292.26-293.5. 
362 On middle term as cause in a syllogism, see Arist. APo I 2 71b22. See also Leunissen 
(forthcoming 2007). 
363 Cf. El.Th. prop. 195.10-11, κατ’ αἰτίαν. On the position of φύσις in the ontological hierarchy 
see chapter I . 
CHAPTER III 
- 138 - 
formation of opinions (ἀνατρέχουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν), if 
they do not possess in their essence the reason-principles of things? For 
even as Nature posesses the power of creation of things of sense by having 
reason-principles inside, and thus moulds and holds together the objects of 
sense – by the power of the inner eye the outer eye, and the finger likewise 
and all other parts of the body – so also that which possesses the power of 
knowing them on the general level (κοινῶς),364 by possessing beforehand 
the appropriate reason-principles contemplates their common 
properties.”365 
 
Just as φύσις possesses creative rational principles of the objects of sense that it 
generates, so too does the faculty of δόξα have a prior conception (προειληφέναι) 
of the principles of those generated objects, but in a cognitive sense.366 From T 
III.35 and T III.36 the reader may already divine the direction Proclus’ solution to 
the paradox of φυσιολογία will take: his notion of δόξα is quite some distance 
removed from Plato’s at times negative view of ‘opinion’.  
In order to properly assess the role assigned to δοξαστόν “in the position of the 
cause”, let us take a closer look at that notion of δόξα.367 Quite a lot of the 
information we have concerning Proclus’ notion of δόξα is to be found in the 
exegesis of the definition of Becoming, In Tim. I 248.7ff. As a preliminary point, it 
is clear from the outset of Proclus’ discussion, which starts with the remark that 
δόξα “is the limit of all rational life” that his δόξα is a particular faculty, rather 
than the result of an act of that faculty (a belief or judgment).368  
In the Platonic use the word δόξα traditionally has a negative ring, associated as it 
is with error, relativity, and the realm of generation, not being. The most notable 
exception, of course, is the Theaetetus, in which we find a more optimistic notion 
of δόξα. Proclus’ concept of δόξα follows that optimistic line and owes a lot to the 
role δόξα plays in the definition of knowledge as justified true belief given in the 
                                               
364 Cf. Plato Tht. 185-7.  
365 In Parm 893.7-17, transl. Morrow and Dillon.  
366 Lautner (2002: 262-3). Cf. In Tim. II 298.29-31. This view of δόξα is closely connected to 
Proclus’ general view of the soul,  of course, which is in turn indebted to Tim. 36b-d (In Tim. II 
237.8-279.18). Note that δόξα’s λόγοι are not derived from sense data (e.g. by abstraction), as is 
clear from προειληφέναι. Cf. In Alc. 250.5-18. On this topic see Helmig (forthcoming 2007). 
367 See Lautner’s excellent paper Lautner (2002) for an analysis of that passage. For a more recent 
discussion of δόξα in Proclus see Helmig (forthcoming). Unfortunately, I have not been able to 
consult Helmig’s dissertation myself. 
368 Proclus does speak of ὀρθὴ δόξα (In Tim. I 248.20), which does not, however, refer to the 
result of a judgment, as he immediately ascribes an act of cognition to that ὀρθὴ δόξα: γινώσκει 
(248.21). 
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Theaetetus.369 Moreover, Proclus focuses on the role of δόξα in acquiring access to 
knowledge of the Forms.370 For a Neoplatonist, as for Plato, all knowledge is 
ultimately innate, based on the soul’s essential composition by the Demiurge from 
the Same and the Other.371 The knowledge resulting from this composition has 
the shape of λόγοι, rational principles, in the soul, which are dormant until they 
are awoken by some stimulus. In first instance, that stimulus comes from outside 
the soul, and reminiscence is triggered by the perception of λόγοι, or rational 
structures, in the material world that are similar to the λόγοι inherent in the soul. 
According to Proclus, and this is where his view differs from that of Plato, δόξα, 
the lowest rational capacity of the soul, which touches the summit of the irrational 
ones,372 is the faculty in which the two meet.373  
Δόξα possesses innate rational principles (λόγοι) and is thereby enabled to identify 
λόγοι in sense impressions by comparing them with its own λόγοι.374 Thus it 
knows the essence (οὐσία) of the objects of sense perception.375 This should not 
be understood in the sense that δόξα “entitle[s] us to say that the apple on the 
desk is the one I left in the basket yesterday”,376 i.e. that δόξα is that which 
informs us merely regarding unity and identity through time. In that case we 
would still not know that the object in question is an apple. Δόξα judges the 
information of sense perception to identify what an object is: it is τὸ κρῖνον ἐν 
ἡμῖν.377 On the other hand, δόξα is incapable of knowing the true nature of the 
individual as this would involve giving a definition, knowledge of the ‘why’: there 
is no such knowledge of individuals,378 and the knowledge δόξα has of universals 
does not involve knowledge of causes.379 Δόξα is able to subsume an individual 
under a universal, without really knowing the universal, since that is the territory 
                                               
369 See below.  
370 Lautner (2002: 258ff.).  
371 Cf. above n. 366.   
372 In Tim. 248.8-10, cf. III 286.30. 
373 In Tim. II 241.22-242.1. 
374 It is in this sense superior to the sensus communis, as the latter “merely distinguishes the 
differences between the affections of the senses, but does not know that the whole has a certain 
essence” (In Tim. I 249.21-22 αὕτη γὰρ διακρίνει μόνον τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν παθῶν͵ ὅτι δὲ τοιάνδε 
ἔχον ἐστὶν οὐσίαν τὸ ὅλον͵ οὐκ οἶδε). On the sensus communis see Arist. DA III 1, De memoria 1, 450 
a 10ff.  
375 In Tim. I 248.11-13: ὅτι τοὺς τῶν αἰσθητῶν λόγους τὸ δοξαστικὸν περιέχει καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τὰς 
οὐσίας αὐτῶν γινῶσκον, cf. 251.28. Δόξα and δοξαστικόν are used synonymously in this context. In 
Tim. I  248.18-19; 249.9-10; 251.5ff; 293.3.  
376 Lautner (2002: 258) 
377 In Tim. I 249.29.  
378 In Remp. I 263.19-20. 
379 Cf. Lautner (2002: 258-60).  
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of ἐπιστήμη.380 It exerts its function by forming a so-called “later-born concept” 
(τὸ ὑστερογενές), an image of its innate λόγος, triggered by an impression 
(φάντασμα) derived from sense-perception, in its turn an image of the universale in 
re.381   
Considering the task of the faculty of δόξα in Proclus’ epistemology, then, the 
standard Platonic translation ‘opinion’ is no longer appropriate. Instead, it is better 
translated ‘(faculty of) judgment’. The traditional translations of δόξα, ‘belief’, 
‘opinion’, and the like, can be maintained in the context of Plato’s philosophy. In a 
Proclean context, however, ‘belief’ has too subjective a ring.382 For Proclus δόξα 
stands primarily for a faculty of the soul that compares and matches sense 
impressions with innate λόγοι. Although ‘faculty of judgment’ has its own 
disadvantages as translation, as it suggests a Kantian Urteilskraft, and obscures the 
fact that Platonic notion does lie at the source of Proclus’ concept, it is preferable 
to ‘belief’ and ‘opinion’ in expressing an aspect of critique as opposed to mere 
conviction.383  
This faculty of judgment figures in ensuring the possibility of acquiring scientific 
knowledge of the realm of Becoming, by acting as a mediator. If the definition of 
Becoming had consisted only in “the generated is perceptible”, that is, if 
Becoming would have been accessible only to perception, we would not have 
been able to actually use that definition in any demonstration,384 as no cognitive 
capacity would tell us anything about the perceptible, and we would merely 
experience it. It is Becoming’s added accessibility to δόξα, i.e. the fact that 
Becoming is δοξαστόν, that provides us with the possibility of correctly judging 
the sensory data, and hence knowing the essence (οὐσία, εἶδος) of the perceptible 
as perceptible, and therefore as generated.  
We now understand the true significance of Proclus’ reading of the definition of 
Becoming: everything generated can be apprehended by judgment combined with 
                                               
380 See e.g. In Remp. I 263.15ff. On δόξα’s reflection on conflicting propositions see In Parm. V 
994.6-9. Cf. Philop. In DA 4.6-7: δόξα “knows the universal in the sensibles, as well as the 
conclusions of discursive [arguments] (dianoêta)”, transl. de Haas, as quoted in Sorabji (2004: 263). 
Cf. Plato Phdr. 249 b-c on reminiscence and induction. 
381 In Parm. IV 892.41-895.2, esp. 893.17-24 and 893.39-894.4. Cf. 894.19-23. Steel (1997). For an 
extensive treatment of the ‘later-born concept’ see Helmig (forthcoming 2007).   
382 The root of δόξα (δοκ-) is indeed related to subjective experience of ‘being appeared to’, and 
δόξα stands both for the resulting conviction and for the faculty of the soul capable of 
developing such a conviction. 
383 Cf. above, δόξα is τό κρῖνον ἐν ἡμῖν, and the exegesis of Tim. 37b6-c1, esp. In Tim. II 310.3-10, 
where ἡ ὀρθοδοξία is explained as a permanent and unchangeable judgement (ἡ μόνιμος καὶ 
ἀμετάπτωτος τῆς δόξης κρίσις) resulting from perception combined with “illumination” 
(ἐλλαμψάσης) from νοῦς.  
384 In fact, we could not even have formed the definition. 
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sense perception, because we experience it with our senses and identify the 
impression of the sensory data with our faculty of judgment. Thus δόξα is 
indispensible for answering the fundamental question of the prooemium, on 
which the entire cosmology depends: “what is the εἶδος of the universe?”385 It is 
clear, then, that Proclus’ remark “in order to reveal the proper generated essence 
of the objects of sense perception, [Plato] built the argument from the  δοξαστόν” 
386 should be taken quite literally.387  
Δόξα alone, however, cannot do more than identify essences. And this brings us 
to the second at first sight puzzling remark involving δόξα. It concerns what 
seems a case of scholastic completeness. After having discussed the definition of 
Being as “known through intellect and reasoning”, and of Becoming as “grasped 
through perception and unreasoning opinion”, Proclus introduces a class of things 
that is known through a combination of λόγος and δόξα, that together delimit “the 
whole level of rational being”.388 Just as definitions of Being and of Becoming 
were given by describing our cognitive access to them, so too is it possible to give 
a definition of the “intermediate” (τὸ μέσον) between pure eternal Being and pure 
Becoming, from the point of view of cognition:  
T III.37 
“If, after setting aside that which is always Being only and that which is 
generated only, you should wish to define what is intermediate as well, i.e. 
what is in a certain sense being and in a certain sense generated, by 
removing intellect from the one of the two definitions and sense-
perception from the other, you will produce the definition of the 
intermediate. This, in fact, is what is knowable by reason and judgment. 
Reason knows itself and judgment, while judgment knows itself and 
reason, the former knowing both together with the cause, the latter 
knowing both without the cause, for this is the difference between reason 
and judgment.”389  
 
                                               
385 In Tim. I 235.32-236.13 (quoted above, T III.3). 
386 In Tim. I 293.5, quoted above. Cf. In Remp. 287.24, where “what is in the cave” is called τὰ 
δοξαστὰ as opposed to τὰ γνωστὰ outside the cave, and In Eucl. 27.8. 
387 We now understand also why, in order to serve as criteria, the ‘definitions’ of Being and 
Becoming are necessarily related primarily to the subjective discrimination by the knower (see 
above III.3.2): a technical definition of Becoming would not have allowed the determination of 
the essence of the universe, since we need αἴσθησις and δόξα for that task.  
388 In Tim. I 251.17-18, cf. Lautner (2002: 260). 
389 In Tim. I 257.14-22, transl. Runia modified. 
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We obtain this cognition of the intermediate, or intermediate cognition, by 
coupling the lower faculty of cognition associated with the higher realm with the 
higher faculty associated with the lower realm. That is, by coupling λόγος, the 
lower faculty involved in knowledge of Being, to δόξα, the higher faculty 
concerned with Becoming. So the “intermediate” realm is known or knowable 
(γνωστόν) with λόγος and δόξα. 
On the face of it, this description is a scholastic filling out of the gap between two 
extremes, in which case it is trivial. I propose, however, that Proclus is here 
introducing an actual new level of cognition, and one that is crucial to the 
scientific status of philosophy of nature. Two questions need to be addressed in 
order to bring out the significance of Proclus’ remark. First of all, what is the 
intermediate realm to which we have cognitive access through λόγος and δόξα? 
And secondly and more importantly, what is the epistemological result of the 
combination of these two cognitive capacities, λόγος and δόξα?  
As to the first question, that is easily answered, since we have already encountered 
that intermediate realm in chapter II. In the passage preceding the one quoted in 
T III.37, Proclus brings up this same intermediate in the context of the division of 
Being and Becoming, but from an ontological, rather than an epistemological 
perspective.390 After discussing the extremes of the intelligible/intellectual and 
perceptible οὐσία, he states, “that which is in the middle” (τὴν ἐν μέσῳ φύσιν) 
should be studied. This consists of everything that in some way or other belongs 
to both realms, to wit, Time, Soul,391 Nature, and immanent Forms.392 Proclus 
here recalls Porphyry’s view on the matter:  
T III.38 
“So Porphyry correctly stated that in the present context Plato defines the 
extremes, i.e. the always Being in a primary sense and that which is 
Becoming only, but passes over the intermediates, such as that which is 
being and at the same time becoming and that which is becoming and also 
being. Of these the former, i.e. that which is being and becoming, is proper 
to the level of the souls (τῷ πλάτει τῶν ψυχῶν), whereas the latter, i.e. 
becoming and being, is proper to what is highest in the realm of the 
generated. Of such a kind is also the Nature of the universe (ἡ τοῦ παντὸς 
φύσις) that gives it life. Indeed, because she is divisible throughout bodies, 
                                               
390 In Tim. I 256.30ff. 
391 Cf. In Tim. I 256.30-257.2. 
392 Added ad In Tim. II.4.16ff. Cf. Syr. In Met. 4.37-5.2.  
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she is certainly generated, yet because she is completely incorporeal, she is 
ungenerated.”393  
 
The Nature of the universe, or universal Nature (see chapter II), which is the 
initial topic of Platonic φυσιολογία, together with the immanent Forms and Soul 
and Time, which also figure largely in the Timaeus, forms the intermediate realm of 
reality, that is known through λόγος and δόξα.  
The next question to be addressed is what form of cognition it is that combines 
δόξα and λόγος, the intellect which knows the Forms.394 The combination in itself 
recalls the highly influential definition of ἐπιστήμη as justified true belief, 
presented by Theaetetus in the dialogue carrying his name, and rejected by 
Socrates: “I had forgotten a definition I have once heard someone give, but now 
it’s coming back to me: he said that it is a true judgment accompanied by an 
account that constitutes knowledge” (τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην 
εἶναι, Tht. 201c8ff). This definition may very well be the source of Proclus’ 
definition of the intermediate form of cognition. Its definiens, ἐπιστήμη (taken 
now in the sense of a science), points to the intermediate cognitive faculty Proclus 
has in mind: the faculty that is involved in obtaining and processing scientific 
knowledge is of course διάνοια. And this faculty of discursive thought, which, 
incidentally, is nowhere to be found in the definitions of the prooemium,395 is in 
fact described by Proclus as the knowledge of the intermediate between the 
intelligible and the sensible.396 Moreover, it is said to know both the essences (as 
does δόξα) and the causes (as does λόγος).397  
I propose that our commentator takes the procedure applied in the Timaeus, and 
especially in the prooemium, to be an instance of just this combination of δόξα 
and λόγος – albeit in a sense quite different from what Plato had in mind in the 
Theaetetus. To summarize: the δόξα is no longer an (in itself unreasoned) 
                                               
393 In Tim. I 257.2-11 (fr. 31 Sodano, transl. Runia, slightly modified), also quoted in chapter II. 
As usual, it is not clear where exactly the transition to Proclus’ own opinions takes place. Cf. e.g. 
above, n. 36. Sodano ends his quote at 257.8, and apparently does not consider the reference to 
Nature to be Porphyrian. 
394 This is how Proclus reads the λόγος of the definition of Being. In Tim. I 246.10-248.6, esp. 
247.3ff. On Proclus’ view of this λόγος as cooperating with the different cognitive faculties and 
as criterion see Blumenthal (1989: 268-271) 
395 Cf. In Tim. I 249.4-8, where Proclus adds διάνοια after listing the four (hierachically ordered) 
cognitive faculties found in the definitions. 
396 In Tim. I 247.1-2: διάνοιαν τὴν τῶν μέσων γνῶσιν νοητῶν καὶ δοξαστῶν, referring to Plato Rep. 
511d-e. Cf. In Tim. I 249.4-5. Note that in the In Eucl. there is a parallel between διάνοια (rather 
than δόξα) and φύσις. Cf. MacIsaac (2001: 176) 
397 In Tim. I 248.14-15. On the relation between διάνοια and ἐπιστήμη Proclus is not very 
forthcoming. On διάνοια as the source of the mathematical sciences: In Eucl. 17.22ff. 
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conviction that something is true, but a capacity of identifying something’s 
essence; the λόγος is no longer a reasoned foundation for the conviction, but a 
capacity of thinking about the Forms. According to Proclus the activities of δόξα, 
which primarily establishes the εἶδος of the universe but in general recognizes the 
impressions of sense perception on the basis of her innate λόγοι, are combined 
with those of λόγος, resulting in discursive thought which builds arguments on the 
essences and causes of the λόγοι present in the objects of perception. Thus the 
conclusion regarding the εἶδος of the world rests on the (true) judgment that the 
world is perceptible, but the discursive rational method inspired on the method of 
geometry develops that conclusion into scientific knowledge.  
This procedure, in which the data of sense perception are subjected to the faculty 
of judgment, and the resulting universals are in turn used in discursive reasoning, 
may sound like Aristotelian abstraction or inductive reasoning. It is important to 
distinguish two things, however. (1) First of all, the universals are not abstracted 
from the sensory data, but are innate. That is, δόξα does not produce λόγοι, but 
singles out that universal among its supply of innate λόγοι that is relevant to a 
particular empirical context.398 (2) Δόξα’s identification of universals applies to the 
universals present in objects of sense perception,399 but any reasoning that is 
consequently exercised uses the universals in the soul.400 In the case of a syllogism 
containing a premise in which a particular figures (i.e. ‘the universe’), the 
conclusion holds if the allocation of that particular to a universal (i.e. Becoming) is 
correct. That allocation is the result of what one might call abductive reasoning.  
 
(iv) Intermediate conclusion – the first demonstration 
In conclusion, Proclus explains the first demonstration, of the essence of the 
universe as Becoming, as deductive reasoning that finds its ultimate foundation 
both in sense impressions and in innate λόγοι. Through this reading, Proclus 
obtains a guarantee for the scientific status of philosophy of nature: it is possible 
to acquire scientific knowledge of the objects of sense perception to the extent 
that they can be correctly identified as resorting under some universal.401 
Moreover, the cooperation of δόξα and λόγος, apart from guaranteeing the 
continuity of the hierarchy of cognition, reveals that scientific knowledge is 
                                               
398 On abstraction in Neoplatonic epistemology see Helmig (forthcoming). 
399 On δόξα’s proper object, see In Remp. I 263.19 referring to Arist. APo I 33, 80b30ff, and Plato 
Rep. 479d7-9. Proclus does say that δόξα by itself examines its innate λόγοι (In Tim. I 251.22-23), 
but this means no more than that in the absence of concrete perceptions, δόξα still possesses its 
λόγοι. 
400 In Parm. 978.29-31, cf. Syrianus In Met. 161.15ff.  
401 This justification of physics is similar to Proclus’ justification of what Mueller (1987: esp. 317-
8) calls ‘ordinary mathematics’ through projectionism.  
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knowledge of an intermediate realm of reality, namely of those entities that share 
in eternal transcendent and temporal immanent being: Soul, Time, Nature and 
immanent Forms.  
This is, then, how Proclus solves the paradox of the Timaeus, and ensures the 
possibility of a science of nature that is based on αἴσθησις and δόξα.402 The story he 
tells, however, seems to be at odds with another important element of his 
exegesis, namely the emphasis on the didactic nature of the dialogue. Timaeus 
does not take his audience outdoors to observe the universe and let δόξα do its 
work. Instead, he offers them his account which is ultimately based on ‘divine 
intuition’. That this second mode of acquiring knowledge of the universe, through 
teaching, is not incompatible with the empirically instigated mode, is further 
elaborated on in chapter V.  
 
 
III.5.2 The second and third demonstrations: a further shift of focus 
 
After the first demonstration, in which the universe is established to belong to 
Becoming, come the demonstrations concerning the efficient cause of the 
universe (In Tim. I 296.15-319.25) and the nature of its paradigmatic cause (In Tim. 
I 319.23-334.27). We can be very brief here about those two, as they have 
relatively little to offer regarding methodology and instead focus on resolving 
issues regarding the Demiurge and the Model of the universe that are summoned 
by the exegetical tradition, rather than by the Platonic text as such.403 The content 
of Proclus’ exegesis of the two demonstrations has been sufficiently discussed 
elsewhere.404 The purpose of the following discussion is to introduce some 
methodological issues concerning the second and third demonstrations, which 
point forward to Proclus’ interpretation of the fifth starting point, the theme of 
the ‘likely story’ (Tim. 29b3-d3): one of the main aspects of that interpretation is 
that there is a structural analogy between Timaeus’ account and the demiurgy. 
This explanation is prepared through the shift of focus mentioned already in the 
context of the first demonstration, from geometry to the analogy between text and 
subject matter.  
 
                                               
402 Thus according to Proclus φυσιολογία  is no “connaissance conjecturale” (pace Lernould 
(1987: 514ff.). See also Martijn (forthcoming 2008). 
403 Cf. Lernould (2001: 265, 288). 
404 For reff. see below. 
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(i) The second demonstration 
The twenty pages of commentary on the second demonstration consists for the 
most part of a treatise in its own right on the nature of the Demiurge.405 It offers a 
wealth of information on different Middle and Neoplatonic interpretations of the 
figure of the Demiurge, and ends in the Syrianic-Proclean theory of a single 
Demiurge,406 Zeus, who is the summit of the intellective gods, and both creates 
the form of the universe and endows it with life.407 Methodological remarks come 
in only at the outset, to emphasize that the order of the demonstrations follows 
the order of reality:  
T III.39 
“The argument proceeds in conjunction with the basic principles, or rather 
with the order of the realities from which the basic principles have been 
taken. For just as everywhere the form (τὸ εἶδος) is dependent on the 
efficient cause, so the primary basic principles are continuous with the 
secondary and in relation to the demonstrations they form a starting-point 
for those that follow them.” 408  
 
What Proclus explains here in a rather oblique manner is that the structure of 
reasoning in the prooemium corresponds to the structure of reality, and that the 
first demonstration, of the εἶδος, is a necessary condition for the second 
demonstration, of the efficient cause, while at the same time the εἶδος Becoming 
is a sufficient condition for an efficient cause. The reason for putting the point in 
this oblique way is to obscure the fact that actually the order in which the account 
proceeds is the inverse compared to the structure of reality: an εἶδος is dependent 
on an efficient cause, but the demonstration of the efficient cause of the universe 
is dependent on the demonstration of its εἶδος. This little bit of methodology 
shows a second step, after the remark on the anticipated conclusion in the first 
demonstration, in the switch from the geometrical method to the method which I 
will call “assimilation” (cf. chapter V), i.e. the analogy between a text and its 
subject matter.  
 
                                               
405 In Tim. I 303.24-319.21. 
406 Rather than the threefold Demiurge of Amelius, that is. 
407 In Tim. I 310.3ff. and 299.21-300.13. For a detailed analysis of the doxography of this passage 
see Lernould (2001: 250-270). For lucid and thorough analyses of the place of the Demiurge(s) in 
the Proclean pantheon, and of demiurgy as procession see Opsomer (2000), (2001). Dillon (2000) 
discusses the function of the Demiurge in Proclean metaphysics. Ritacco de Gayoso (1992). On 
the Demiurge and theurgy see van den Berg (2000). 
408 In Tim. I 296.15-20, transl. Runia.  
THE PROOEMIUM 
- 147 - 
(ii) The third demonstration 
As in the case of the second demonstration, Proclus’ exegesis of the third, in 
which we find out what the nature is of the paradigmatic cause of the universe, 
consists mainly in a discussion of issues central to the exegetical tradition.409 But 
after establishing that the universe was indeed created after an intelligible 
paradigm, and introducing his teacher Syrianus’ explanation of this paradigm as 
existing both prior to and within the Demiurge,410 Proclus does return to the 
logical progression of the reasoning of the prooemium. Proclus’ theory of the 
paradigmatic cause precedes his analysis of Plato’s argumentation, and its exegesis 
is clearly of minor importance.411  
The Timaeus passage concerning the demonstration of the paradigmatic cause is 
split up by Proclus into four lemmas, which (1) phrase the question to be 
answered (“is the universe created after an eternal or a becoming paradigm?”),412 
(2) rephrase the hypotheses of the first half of the prooemium,413 (3) present the 
conclusion (“the universe is created after an eternal paradigm”), followed by an 
argumentation, and (4) summarize the relations between Demiurge, Model and the 
universe as image.414 The second and third of these lemmas provide occasion for 
some methodological remarks, and as in the case of the first demonstration, those 
remarks in part aim at defending Plato against possible charges of committing a 
fallacy, but also, as in the case of both the earlier demonstrations, at preparing the 
reader for Proclus’ interpretation of the theme of the likely story. 
  
We are offered another instance of conversion, Proclus points out, in the second 
lemma. Tim. 29a2-4: 
T III.40 
“εἰ μὲν δὲ καλός ἐστιν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ὅ τε δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς 
τὸ ἀίδιον ἔβλεπεν· εἰ δὲ ὃ μηδὲ εἰπεῖν τινι θέμις, πρὸς τὸ γεγονός.”415 
 
The fourth starting point (see III.4.3) said that everything which is generated with 
an eternal paradigm is beautiful, and that everything which is generated after a 
generated paradigm is not beautiful. In the quoted lemma, however, Plato presents 
                                               
409 In Tim. I 319.26-334.27, doxography: 321.24-325.12. 
410 Esp. In Tim. I 322.18-323.22. For a somewhat repetitive analysis see Lernould (2001: 279-289).  
411 In Tim. I 320.26-321.2, esp. “καὶ πῶς μὲν αὐτὸς ποιήσεται τὴν εὕρεσιν καὶ δι’ οἵας ἀποδείξεως, 
θεασόμεθα μικρὸν ὕστερον. ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον αὐτὸ τοῦτο δεικτέον...” 
412 Tim. 28c5-29a2.  
413 Tim. 29a2-4.  
414 Tim. 29b1-2.  
415 Tim. 29a2-4. 
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us with inverse statements (ἀντιστρέφοντα), formulating two conditionals that start 
from the beauty (and its unsayable opposite) of the product, rather than the 
paradigm.416 Nonetheless, Proclus is convinced that Plato is not liable to the 
accusation of committing a fallacy.417 The first conversion, of the definition of 
Becoming, received an external justification, provided by the analogy with 
geometry, but this second conversion is fully self-justified:  
T III.41 
“For whenever (ἐὰν γὰρ) (a) the opposite of the consequent (τὸ 
ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἑπομένου) follows from the opposite of the antecedent (τῷ 
ἀντικειμένῳ τοῦ ἡγουμένου), (b) they are converse to each other, and (c) to 
the starting point (ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς), as can be 
shown with a reductio ad impossibile.”418 
 
In parts (a) and (b) Proclus echoes the formulation of what Alexander calls 
“conversion by opposition”,419 i.e. a kind of categorical version of modus tollens, 
which is found in Aristotelian commentators. As Alexander phrases it, “[a 
proposition] converts, because the opposite of the consequent follows from the 
opposite of the antecedent.”420 Proclus, however, has an idiosyncratic use of 
                                               
416 In Tim. I 328.16-329.13. Proclus’ explanation of the conversion is somewhat problematic, due 
to the transition from universal starting points to a particular application to the universe and due 
to the mixture of Peripatetic, Stoic, and geometrical logic. In the following the role of universality 
vs. particularity will be left aside, as in the context of the conversion Proclus involves only the 
universal axioms that are presupposed in the particular propositions. He switches to the 
particular statements at In Tim. I 329.13-15: τέτταρα δὴ ταῦτα ἀξιώματα θέμενος διορίζεται περὶ 
τοῦ παντὸς εἰκοτῶς.  
417 Proclus does not make mention of fallacies, but he is generally preoccupied with the logical 
progression of the Timaeus (see Festugière (1963)), as shows in our context from the fact that his 
very first remarks on the lemma concern the convertibility of the axioms. In the exegesis of the 
passage he seems to be responding to existing criticism, consisting in three objections: (1) Plato’s 
conversion of the starting points (response at In Tim. I 328.16-329.1), (2) his not using the 
converted propositions as starting points in the first place (329.1-13), (3) the introduction of the 
extra condition “and if the Demiurge is good” (329.18-27). Interestingly, these are three of the 
four points of criticism brought forward by Ebert, who concludes on the basis of this passage 
that Timaeus is “alles andere als ein guter Logiker” Ebert (1991: 49-51). Again, Runia (2000: 114-
6) responds to these criticisms, mainly by maintaining that the prooemium should not be read as 
a logically strict exposition. 
418 In Tim. I 328.22-24. 
419 ἡ σὺν ἀντιθέσει ἀντιστροφὴ, Alex. In APr. 29.10. Cf. for a clear description Simpl. In Cael. 29.4 
etc.  
420 Alex. In Metaph. 319.1-3. The conversion is supposed to be applicable both in categorical and 
in hypothetical propositions. Cf. Alex. In Top. 191.15-19. On the relation between categorical and 
hypothetical syllogistic in the commentators see Sorabji (2004: 250ff.). 
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ἀντιστροφή, and changes the order of antecedent and consequent: “what is 
beautiful is created with an eternal paradigm” converts with “what is not beautiful 
is created with a non-eternal paradigm”. This would be a fallacy of denying the 
antecedent, if Proclus had had in mind the conversion of the Aristotelian 
commentators. Rather than accuse him of burdening himself with the fallacy he is 
trying to exonerate Plato from, however, we should consider Proclus’ notion of 
conversion in the light of his earlier use of this tool of inference: as before, he is 
echoing Peripatetic phrasing but describing a geometrical practice421 in which 
biconditionals are presupposed.422 In Proclus’ defence we can moreover point to 
the conditionality of his statement. He does not claim that the opposite of the 
consequent necessarily follows from the opposite of the antecedent,423 but that 
whenever (ἐάν) the opposite of the consequent does follow from the opposite of the 
antecedent, the two convert.424 Clearly, the verb ἀντιστρέφειν applied to 
propositions in this context means converting in the sense of “being each other’s 
complement” rather than in the syllogistical sense.  
The point of (a) and (b) in T III.41 is that the rephrased versions of the fourth 
starting point are two parts of an exhaustive dichotomy: in that case each of them 
is a biconditional that is the other’s complement, and they can be converted 
without resulting in a fallacy. In order for there to be such an exhaustive 
dichotomy in Plato’s text, Proclus has to equate the terms τὸ ἀίδιον and the 
opposite of τὸ γενητόν, i.e. τὸ ἀγένητον.425 By adding (c) “and to the starting 
point”, Proclus extends the conversion: since the two phrases constitute an 
exhaustive dichotomy, they convert not only with each other, but each of them 
converts – this time in the sense of switching terms – with one of the original 
axioms of the fourth starting point as well.426 
                                               
421 Cf. Galen. Inst.Log. vi 4, who speaks of ἀναστροφή (conversion of terms or propositions) and 
ἀντιστροφή (conversion into opposite). 
422 Cf. In Eucl. 254.2-3 and above n. 350. Note that Proclus does know the proper use of the 
“conversion from opposition”: In Alc. 262.16, 265.12, In Parm. 1170.15 and especially In Remp. I 
29.26 and the use of ἀντιστρέφειν some 10 lines later. 
423 As e.g. in Simpl. In Cael. 29.4: ἀναγκαιῶς ἕπεται.  
424 This is hardly an argument in defence of the reformulations, of course, because it works only 
if the rephrased axioms are indeed true. 
425 Which was also assumed in the exegesis of the starting points, In Tim. I 265.30-266.1.  
426 We come full circle as follows: (axiom 1) “eternal paradigm > beautiful product” [through 
conversion by switching terms we obtain] (rephrasing 1) “beautiful product > eternal paradigm” 
[conversion by negation] (rephrasing 2) “non-beautiful product > non-eternal paradigm” 
[conversion by switching terms] (axiom 2) “non-eternal paradigm > non-beautiful product” 
[conversion by negation] (axiom 1) “eternal paradigm > beautiful product.” 
CHAPTER III 
- 150 - 
Thus the conversion as such receives its explanation through an adjustment of 
logical vocabulary to the context, but Proclus feels that a justification is in order 
also for why Plato uses the conversion in the first place:  
T III.42 
“For what reason, then, did he not adopt these principles directly among 
the starting points, i.e. “that which is beautiful came into being in relation 
to the eternal model”, and “that which is not beautiful did so in relation to 
the model that was not eternal”, but rather he adopted those of which 
these principles are the converse, even though for the demonstration he 
needed to use the former and not the latter? To this we should reply that 
the former, which start from the causes, are more akin to the starting 
points, whereas the latter, which start from what is caused, are more akin 
to what follows from the starting points.”427  
 
This justification relies on two principles, namely that of the priority of cause over 
effect, and of the analogy between the structure of reality and that of the textual 
reflection of our knowledge thereof: in the starting point “τὸ πρὸς ἀίδιον γεγονὸς 
καλόν ἐστιν”, the cause (ἀίδιον) is the antecedent, as Proclus calls it, and the caused 
(καλόν) the consequent. In the demonstrations, however, we find the inverse, and 
the caused is antecedent, but the cause consequent: “τὸ καλὸν πρὸς ἀίδιον γέγονε”, 
because “the caused is more akin to what follows from the starting points.”428 
Thus in the starting points logical priority follows ontological priority, but in the 
context of “what follows from the starting points,” i.e. the demonstrations, that 
which follows from the causes, i.e. the caused, has logical priority. This explanation 
of Tim. 29a2-4 seems rather ad hoc, especially as it contradicts Proclus’ earlier 
adoption of the Aristotelian dictum concerning the didactical order of 
presentation of knowledge, starting from that which is known to us, rather than 
from that which is known simpliciter. Here Proclus advocates the opposite, 
namely a one-on-one correspondence between textual order and order of reality.  
This change fits, however, in the overall adjustment of focus that can be seen to 
take place in Proclus’ exegesis of the demonstrations.   
Finally, the increasing role of the relation between text and reality shows once 
again in Proclus’ emphasis on the anticipated conclusion of the demonstration 
regarding the paradigmatic cause: the third lemma, which starts “παντὶ δὴ σαφὲς 
ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον” (Tim. 29a4-5) is an anticipated conclusion, through which 
                                               
427 In Tim. I 329.1-7, transl. Runia modified. Cf. In Tim. I 329.11-13. 
428 In Tim. I 329.7-11. 
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“reasoning takes its starting point from intellect”,429 a practice that by now is 
introduced as customary (ὥσπερ εἴωθεν, In Tim. I 330.13).430 
 
III.6 In conclusion 
 
The main topic in this chapter is Proclus’ comparison of Plato’s method in setting 
out the starting points of his cosmology with the method of a geometer, and the 
function of that comparison in establishing a theological philosophy of nature. 
Proclus identifies the starting points presented in the prooemium of the Timaeus as 
definitions, axioms, hypotheses, and demonstrations, and analyzes their 
introduction in terms of geometrical practices, most notably hypothesizing and 
conversion, and the so-called dialectical methods, division, definition, analysis and 
demonstration. These terms are often used in a not strictly technical sense, 
adapted to the context.  
Proclus works on a number of parallel tracks within the exegesis of the 
prooemium of the Timaeus. First of all, he analyzes Plato’s procedure within that 
passage of the dialogue as comparable to geometry in the sense that certain 
starting points are assumed, on the basis of which the nature and causes of the 
universe can be found. On the other hand, however, Proclus suggests that the 
starting points are related in such a way that from the concept of Becoming, 
through a conceptual analysis, we climb up to the efficient and paradigmatic cause 
of the universe. The delivery of these causes, but especially of the demiurgic cause 
is considered the summit of Platonic φυσιολογία. At yet another level, Proclus 
suggests that the information presented by Plato contains hidden references to 
even the final cause. And finally, towards the end of the prooemium Proclus shifts 
the scene from the didactic order of presentation necessitated by the anagogic 
function of the text to the natural order, fitting to the analogy between a text and 
its subject matter.431  
This stratification in Proclus’ interpretation of the Timaeus is related to the 
cognitive diversity of the participants of this dialogue.432 The speaker, Timaeus, 
possesses not only scientific knowledge of the universe, but even intuitive insight. 
His interlocutors, however, as well as the students of the Academy in general, 
need guidance in order to awaken that insight. Thus the speaker can anticipate the 
                                               
429 Festugières translation “irrationnel” for ἀπὸ νοῦ is in a sense correct, to the extent that Proclus 
aims at a supra-rational beginning, but a literal translation does more justice to the role of νοῦς in 
Proclus’ exegesis of the Timaeus. More on the topic of anticipated conclusions in chapter V. 
430 Cf. the earlier occurence at In Tim. I 282.27-283.9, see above III.5.1(i).  
431 On this topic see chapter V. 
432 Cf. Lernould (2001: 323), who speaks of a “lecture en profondeur” and a “lecture en surface”.  
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conclusion of a syllogism construed on the basis of the starting points, due to his 
intuitive insight. Subsequently, he has to spell out the syllogism in order to 
accommodate his students.433 
Let us return to our original question as to the role of the comparison with 
geometrical methodology that in first instance dominates the exegesis of the 
prooemium. At first sight, its significance lies primarily in the atmosphere of 
science that is summoned. Thus Plato’s treatment of the realm of Becoming, a 
realm in itself lacking in permancency and stability, is provided with an air of 
scientific certainty. As we have seen, however, on a deeper level the comparison is 
crucial to our understanding of Proclean philosophy of nature in two ways. First 
of all, the comparison is employed to set the methodological boundaries of 
φυσιολογία by showing the ultimate hypothetical nature of philosophy of nature, 
that consists in the assumption of the existence of its fundamental “genera”, Being 
and Becoming. Secondly, Proclus’ ingenious explanation of the first 
demonstration as a geometrical conversion, coupled to an original view of δόξα, 
allows him to nonetheless maintain that scientific knowledge of the natural world 
can be obtained.  
The δόξα mentioned in the definition of Becoming is explained as the faculty of 
the soul that possesses innate images, λόγοι, of the transcendent Forms. It is this 
faculty that provides epistemic access to the transcendent aspect of the natural 
world, namely the immanent Forms (λόγοι): the faculty of δόξα uses sense 
impressions by forming a universal from them with the use of the innate λόγοι of 
the soul, and thereby identifying the immanent λόγοι in the world. Δόξα 
consequently cooperates with intellect to form discursive thought, which forms 
arguments providing knowledge of the causes of the natural. Since together, δόξα 
and λόγος constitute ἐπιστήμη in a broad sense of the term, philosophy of nature 
is a science despite its generated, instable subject matter.434  
Combining this with the hypothetical nature of the starting points, and the 
analysis of Becoming into its transcendent causes, we can conclude that book II of 
Proclus’ commentary describes philosophy of nature in what is according to 
Proclus the most Platonic and most proper sense: reaching up and touching 
theology, while maintaining the boundaries imposed by its subject matter.435 
 
 
Appendix: Argumentative structure 
 
                                               
433 See on this topic chapter V. 
434 We will return to the question in what sense φυσιολογία is a science in chapter V.  
435 In Tim. I 204.4, 8, 217.25, 219.23, 228.30, 236.17, 20, 237.3-9, 289.15, 347.12-16. 
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By way of summary of this third chapter the table below contains an overview of 
the argumentative structure of the prooemium of the Timaeus as read by Proclus.  
 
0  “Division” (διάκρισις) 
1 Being is knowable with 
understanding and reason 
 
Definition, hypothesis (presupposing 
existence), will be demonstrated after the 
κοσμοποιία 
2 Becoming is graspable with 
perception and opinion 
 
Definition, hypothesis (presupposing 
existence), cannot be demonstrated? 
3a Becoming has an efficient 
cause  
 
Indemonstrable common notion, 
hypothesis (proposition in demonstration), 
assumed (παραλαμβάνει, 258.13; 
προστίθησι, 258.14) 
and shown to be implied by the nature of 
Becoming 
  3b no becoming without 
efficient cause 
The complement of 3a. 
 (Becoming has a 
paradigmatic cause) 
Implicit in 3a (ἕπεται, 264.15, 20) 
4a Paradigmatic cause is either 
eternal (beautiful product)… 
 
indemonstrable axiom, common notion  
  4b …or becoming (non 
beautiful product) 
The complement of 4a 
5 universe = kosmos, heaven, 
or [unsayable] (final cause?) 
geometrical imposition of name on subject 
matter (definition) 
1’ the world has become demonstration from first hypothesis; 
anticipated conclusion; argued on the basis 
of (geometrically) converted definition + 
αἴσθησις and δόξα 
3’ efficient cause demonstration from second hypothesis 
4’ eternal paradigmatic cause  demonstration from conversion of third 
hypothesis (I 328); anticipated conclusion 
 
 
IV AFTER THE PROOEMIUM:  
MATHEMATICS, THE SENSES, AND LIFE 
 
 
IV.1 Introduction  
 
In chapter III we have seen that philosophy of nature in Proclus’ reading is an 
exposition concerning the divine causes of the universe that starts from hypothetical 
starting points, uses dialectical methods, like geometry, and that nonetheless has its 
epistemological foundation in the activities of αἴσθησις and δόξα. Thus book II of 
Proclus’ commentary describes philosophy of nature in its most Platonic sense, namely 
theological philosophy of nature. Once the transcendent causes of the universe have 
been treated, however, Proclus’ view of the nature of φυσιολογία changes in accordance 
with the exegetical context, to the extent that every single book of Proclus’ 
commentary has its own notion of φυσιολογία. The changes have two reasons, one 
heuristic and one epistemological.  
(1) To state the obvious, Proclus presents his philosophy of nature within the confines 
of a commentary, so to a large extent he is bound to the text of the Timaeus. Moreover, 
in his exegetical practice Proclus adheres to Iamblichus’ heuristic principle which says 
that the interpretation of every element of a Platonic text should fit the general subject 
matter of that text, even when such a reading is not immediately evident.1 In those 
cases one should neither ignore the passage in question as irrelevant to the σκόπος of 
the dialogue, nor apply a mere superficial reading without connecting the passage to 
the whole. This principle gives commentators the freedom to reject earlier 
interpretations that to their minds do not obey that principle, but it also obliges them 
to always give eccentric passages both the superficial and the so-called appropriate 
reading. In our context, Proclus always has to study the Timaeus passages φυσικῶς.  
(2)  The second reason is more interesting from a philosophical point of view. Just as 
Nature, the subject of philosophy of nature, is present in different manners on 
different levels of Proclean reality, so φυσιολογία, which discusses them all, has 
different characters when covering different aspects of its subject matter.2 The 
theological/dialectical approach is suitable for giving an account of the transcendent 
causes of the natural world, but other ways of access to and modes of presentation of 
knowledge of nature have to be available for the ontological levels below the 
transcendent causes.  
                                               
1 On Iamblichus’ principle see I.3, n. 34. 
2 In Tim. I 2.29-4.5. For φύσις see chapter II. 
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This fourth chapter concentrates on Proclean philosophy of nature (φυσιολογία) as 
pertaining to those lower levels of the natural world, taking our cue from Proclus’ own 
characterizations of φυσιολογία after the second book. That is, I am interested 
especially in what Proclus thinks Plato is and should be doing. If anything, Proclus is 
extremely sensitive to fine distinctions, be it ontological, methodological or other. With 
regard to his conception of philosophy of nature this shows in his acute awareness of 
possible shades of the science and in explicit discussions concerning its limitations. For 
example, from the moment we embark on the exposition of what Proclus calls the 
second hypostasis of the universe,3 the perceptibility of the realm of generation is 
highlighted, following the first lemma discussed:  
T IV.1 
 “That which comes into being must be corporeal, and visible and tangible...” 
(Tim. 31b4) 
 
Since the corporeal nature of ‘the becoming’, and hence the perceptibility of the body 
of the world here comes to the centre of attention, it is not surprising that Proclus’ 
conception of philosophy of nature changes accordingly. Thus in the first pages of 
book III “concerning ourselves with φυσιολογία” is considered to be synonymous with 
“inquiring into the perceptible”.4 In the same breath, however, this φυσιολογία in the 
sense of inquiring only into the perceptible is rejected as being too narrow if it involves 
excluding certain aspects of Plato’s text.5 
In summary, apart from the theological/dialectical philosophy of nature of the second 
book of the commentary, the following characterizations can be distinguished in the 
remaining books of the commentary,  
 
Book III: mathematical philosophy of nature 
Book IV: empirical philosophy of nature 
Book V: biological philosophy of nature6 
                                               
3 Or the creation of aggregate wholes (τὴν τῶν ὅλων ποίησιν μερῶν) at Tim. 31b ff. 
4 II 23.9ff: τὸ πρὸς αἴσθησιν μόνον ἐπιζητοῦντας...φυσιολογίας μόνης φροντίζειν...τὸ αἰσθητὸν, where 
φυσιολογία (20) is used to refer exclusively to the study of the perceptible realm.  
5 Ibid. This passage is discussed in further detail below, under IV.2.2. 
6 The first book of the commentary falls outside the scope of the discussion here proposed. In a sense, 
the prooemia of the Timaeus (17a-27b) do not belong to φυσιολογία, and in a sense they do. The 
Timaeus is a Pythagorean dialogue, and it starts out in a Pythagorean fashion, in order to stimulate the 
reader’s soul and purify his eye. As the Pythagoreans would place an iconic and a symbolic exposition 
of the subject matter at hand before its scientific treatment, so Timaeus presents a summary of the 
Republic and the Atlantis story before moving on to φυσιολογία, in the narrow sense of the scientific 
treatment of the universe (In Tim. I 30.2-15). Thus the preparatory sections are not proper parts of 
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Relative to what can be called the summit of φυσιολογία, i.e. theological philosophy of 
nature, the first of these, mathematical philosophy of nature, is the intermediate, and 
the latter two are the lower philosophies of nature. In a sense intermediate and lower 
philosophy of nature are each others opposites. In the first phase, ‘intermediate 
philosophy of nature’, which concentrates around the mathematical description of the 
Body and Soul of the world (book III), Proclus distinguishes different kinds of 
explanation given for properties of the natural world, and emphasizes that φυσιολογία 
involves more than concentrating on the perceptible aspect of the universe alone. In 
the second phase, however, and especially in the ‘lower philosophy of nature’ of book 
IV, Proclus firmly sets the boundaries of philosophy of nature as a purely empirical 
discipline. Finally, in a kind of appendix of lower philosophy of nature, in book V 
Proclus excludes the part of psychology that pertains to the soul’s non-incarnate life 
from philosophy of nature.  
Intermediate philosophy of nature will be discussed most extensively, in section IV.2. 
Lower philosophy of nature and its appendix are discussed in IV.3. The question how 
they can be reconciled both with each other and with theological philosophy of nature 
is briefly addressed in the general conclusion, IV.4. 
 
IV.2 Book III: Intermediate Philosophy of Nature and mathematics 
 
IV.2.1 Introduction 
 
Intermediate philosophy of nature is found mainly in the treatment of the Body and 
Soul of the world (book III),7 where Proclus’ ideas on what φυσιολογία is are inspired 
by the need to find the proper reading of the mathematical passages of the Timaeus. He 
argues that one should deliver the explanations that are fitting to the subject matter, i.e. 
the elements and the World Soul, rather than the literal mathematical explanation, 
while at the same time doing justice to the mathematics of the text. 8  
                                                                                                                                              
philosophy of nature, but they do contain τὸ φυσιολογικόν, as they are a particular presentation of the 
universe (In Tim. I 30.15-18). Cf. In Tim., I 4.7-26 (esp. 25-6), I 13.26-28, I 19.25, etc. See Dillon (1976: 
248-9). 
7 Tim. 31b5-37c5, In Tim. II. 
8 “Fitting to the subject matter”, in the case of the body of the world, comes down to giving 
explanations φυσικῶς (II 20.20; 27.2; 39.16-17 etc.), but in the case of the world soul the exegesis is 
more generally divided into λέξις and θεωρία, where the λέξις is the explanation of the mathematical 
details, and the θεωρία the exegesis that is appropriate to the subject: οἰκείως τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις (II 
174.22), ‘substantial’: ἡ πραγματειώδης ἐξηγήσις (II 193.9-10, cf. II 237.11f., 238.10-12), or ‘physical or 
philosophical’ (φυσικῶς ἢ φιλοσόφως, II 212.3-4). The rare term ψυχικῶς is not used by Proclus in this 
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Mathematical descriptions are offered by Plato in three contexts, namely (1) Tim. 
31b5ff, on the body of the world, (2) the passages on the construction of the World 
Soul (Tim. 34bff),  and finally (3) what has probably been his most influential passage 
in the history of philosophy of nature: the description of matter in terms of the regular 
polyhedra (Tim. 53b5ff.). The latter will not be discussed in this chapter, as we do not 
possess enough relevant evidence of Proclus’ views of the matter within the confines 
of the commentary on the Timaeus.9  
Proclus’ commentary on the mathematics in the first two passages is interesting for its 
contribution to our understanding of his views on the relation between different 
sciences, and more specifically in the light of the age-old debate regarding the so-called 
mathematization of nature. The question central in this context is what according to 
Proclus is the explanatory power of mathematics, as the science of what is intermediate 
between the intelligible and the sensible, both for the perceptible elements and for the 
World Soul. A related question that will also be addressed, is what Proclus takes the 
ontological location of the mathematics involved in physical explanations to be.  
After a short presentation of some modern and ancient views on mathematization in 
the Timaeus (IV.2.2(i) and (ii)), I will focus on Proclus’ outlook on the role of 
mathematical explanations in the Timaeus, building especially on the more general 
account on mathematics and Pythagoreanism given by O’Meara in his astute Pythagoras 
revived (1989).10  In the last subsection, I will draw some conclusions regarding Proclus’ 
position on the mathematization of the natural world (IV.2.4). As part of those 
conclusions, I will further elaborate one of O’Meara’s main theses, namely that the 
                                                                                                                                              
context; it has a purely ontological meaning, referring to the hypostasis of Soul or its participations on 
other levels of reality.  
9 Those views are transmitted to us in a few passages of In Tim. (see de Haas (1997), remarks in the 
Platonic Theology (I 4 19.14-17, on this passage see Martijn (2006b)) and In Eucl. 23, 82 (and 68.21-3), 
166, 68.7-9. See Siorvanes (1996: chapter 4, 207ff.). We have indirect evidence in Philoponus’ 
Aet.Mund, and in Simplicius’ report in his In Cael. of another lost work, namely Proclus’ “Investigations 
of Aristotle’s refutations of the Timaeus” (mentioned at In Tim. II 279.3-4). See Cherniss (1944: 148-
163), Sambursky (1962: 50-59), Siorvanes (1996: 215ff.) and esp. Steel (2005). Siorvanes (215-6) points 
out that “Proclus, and the later Neoplatonists, following Iamblichus’ programme of the 
mathematization of all fields of knowledge, fully subscribed to the mathematical view of matter. 
However, they had also inherited Aristotle’s penetrating criticisms.” He subsequently formulates the 
concrete answers to those criticisms, but does not discuss the overall consequences of Proclus’ 
awareness of that criticism for his notion of mathematization. Steel (2005: esp. 185ff.) does address the 
question whether Proclus gave a literal reading of the geometrical figures. See below, IV.2.1(ii), n. 36. 
On Proclus’ theory of matter and its influence in the seventeenth century mathematization of nature, 
see Stewart (2000). 
10 See also Charles-Saget (1982), whose work is less accessible and less precise due to her love of 
metaphor, scholastic symmetry, and convolution. For an interpretation similar to mine see MacIsaac 
(2001: chapter IV). 
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mathematics ‘transposed’ to philosophy of nature concerns the projections in the 
human mind (IV.2.2 and IV.2.3),11 by arguing that a distinction should be made 
between the mathematics transposed in the context of the body of the world and that 
in the context of the World Soul. 
Since the main aim of this chapter is to show Proclus’ development of the notion of 
philosophy of nature, the mathematical practice displayed in Proclus’ exegesis of the 
passages in question will be all but left aside.12 An issue that will also not be addressed 
in this chapter is the role of mathematics in Tim. 36b-d, on the planetary circles. 
Although the relation between mathematics and astronomy is a topic worthy of 
attention in its own right, it falls outside the scope of this chapter, since Proclus 
himself does not connect it with the limitations of φυσιολογία.13  
 
(i) Mathematization in the Timaeus according to modern readers 
Readers of the Timaeus throughout the centuries, including well-known physicists such 
as Heisenberg, have considered Plato’s cosmology to be one of the first examples of 
the mathematization of nature, since in it for the first time mathematical models are 
presented as explanations of the structure of certain parts of the universe.14 The notion 
of ‘mathematization’ in this context is ambiguous. In philosophy of science, it is 
associated with two rather different positions, namely the instrumentalist and the realist 
attitude towards the explanatory power of mathematics.15 By realism and 
instrumentalism I here understand the following: the scientific realist holds that 
                                               
11 O'Meara (1989: 176, 193). 
12 See Festugière (1966-8: notes ad loc.), Lernould (2000), MacIsaac (2001: chapter IV), Baltzly (2007: 
8-21) for some mathematical detail.  
13 For references on this topic see note 40. The later passages on the planets (Tim. 39-40) belong to 
lower philosophy of nature. 
14 Heisenberg (1953), Koyré (1968: 35-6) For a challenge see Girill (1970); already in 12th century 
Timaeus exegesis: see Speer (2005: 221) and Kobusch (2005: 239-40), although the latter points out that 
Bernhard of Chartres saw the mathematization of nature as a contribution of his own. In today’s 
literature on the mechanical revolution of the Seventeenth Century, Plato is still considered the ancient 
paradigm of mathematization, see e.g. Bertoloni-Meli (2006: 10, cf. 135 ). Among exegetes of Plato a 
strong proponent of this position is Brisson (1992), (1994: 5, 40-41), Brisson and Meyerstein (1995), 
Brisson (2000). Cf. Lloyd (1991: 349-50), who holds that mathematization of physics in the Timaeus is 
present in no more than an embryonic form, as Plato does not explicitly state that physics should be 
mathematized (cf. Vlastos (1975: xiii), Sambursky (1962: 32)). His primary interest is in teleology, not 
mathematics. Brisson (2000: 306) disagrees and gives mathematics the primary position. Gregory 
(2000: 14-15 and passim) takes an intermediate position by maintaining that Plato ‘geometrises’ matter 
but does not aim at a quantified physics; where mathematics does not provide satisfactory answers 
teleology does.  
15 On realism and instrumentalism in antiquity, see below, IV.2.1(ii). 
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scientific explanations should be and are about the world as it is, whereas the 
instrumentalist claims no more than that her scientific explanations have a certain 
power of explanation and allow the prediction of phenomena.16  
The nature of the mathematical explanations in the Timaeus is not discussed explicitly 
in today’s literature very often, and when it is, the context is usually Timaeus’ theory of 
matter. Readers tend to be somewhat unclear on the sense in which they understand 
the mathematization they ascribe to Plato. Crudely speaking, two positions can be 
distilled, that can be mapped onto the concepts ‘instrumentalism’ and ‘realism’: the 
mathematical explanations are taken either to somehow represent certain physical 
qualities, or to lay bare a mathematical, quantitative structure of the perceptible universe. I 
will maintain the terms ‘instrumentalism’ and ‘realism’ for these respective readings.17 
Within the exegesis of the Timaeus in general, these two views can be related to the 
metaphorical and the literal reading of the dialogue in the following way:18 those who 
maintain a literal reading of the dialogue are held to a realist mathematization,19 
whereas those who see the Timaeus as a metaphor or as riddled with metaphors have 
the liberty of ‘translating’ the mathematical passages.20 Some readers confuse what I 
call realism and instrumentalism, and speak of mathematics as an instrument, a language 
of quantities describing or symbolizing physical qualities, while at the same time having this 
language describe physical quantities.21 In part such confusion can be explained from 
the differences between the occasions on which Plato uses mathematics in the Timaeus. 
The proportional relations between the elements, for example, can be explained as 
                                               
16 Of the latter term only the aspect of explanation is relevant to our context. 
17 Brisson (2000: 300-1) (see also n. 13), who does explicitly discuss the nature of the role of 
mathematics, uses different notions, namely those of a descriptive and a prescriptive use of 
mathematics in philosophy of nature, which he finds in Plato and modern science respectively. In the 
former, mathematical explanations function as metaphors, while in the latter, they serve to suggest and 
verify hypotheses. Brisson makes the distinction in the context of the debate concerning the question 
whether teleology or mathematization is the central issue in the Timaeus. I will not use Brisson’s 
distinction since the prescriptive use of mathematics, which involves verification of hypotheses, is alien 
to our context.  
18 On the literal and the metaphorical reading see chapter V. 
19 Cf. however Burnyeat (2000: esp. 55), who maintains that his reading of the harmonics of the soul as 
presenting abstract structures is a literal one. 
20 The passage in the Timaeus that most clearly suggests a connection between the theme of the ‘likely 
story’ and mathematics is Tim. 53 d 4-7, where the triangles are assumed as ἀρχαί, “as we pursue our 
likely account in terms of Necessity” (κατὰ τὸν μετ΄ ἀνάγκης εἰκότα λόγον πορευόμενοι, transl. Zeyl). 
See also chapter V. 
21 Sambursky (1962: 46, 32-34, 57), (1965: 2). Cf. Wright (2001: 17-19), whose reading is realist (“the 
mathematical structure of the universe”). She regards the role of the mathematics of Tim. 52ff. as the 
endpoint of a description of scientific advance within the Timaeus. 
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quantitative distributions, i.e. in a realist vein.22 These quantitative distributions can still 
be seen as distributions of physical qualities. As a consequence, this case is less 
problematic than a realist reading of the elementary triangles, as in the latter the 
physical qualities are reduced to geometrical quantitative properties.23  
Just as Proclus, Brisson distinguishes between the Body of the world and the World 
Soul. He takes the theory of the elements as an example of what we called 
instrumentalism, and specifies that mathematics is used as a metaphor or expression of 
causality, stability and symmetry.24 With respect to the World Soul, he has a more 
realist position, and maintains that it actually exhibits a mathematical structure.25 
 
(ii) Mathematization in the Timaeus according to ancient readers 
The ancient responses to the mathematics in the Timaeus can be roughly divided into 
four phases, all quite different from the modern attitude. 
(1) The earliest reaction in the Old Academy, Aristotle’s criticism of the use of 
mathematics in philosophy of nature,26 led to a downscaling of its function.27 Rather 
than seeing mathematics as a scientific instrument, early followers of Plato transformed 
its function into that of a provider of metaphysical principles.28 In terms of the notions 
of mathematization introduced earlier, they would have considered the Timaeus an 
example of instrumentalist mathematization, in the very narrow sense that 
                                               
22 As by Cornford (1937: 51) and Zeyl (2000: xxxix). Cf. Burnyeat (2000: esp. 66). Note that Zeyl, apart 
from this realist reading, tentatively proposes one remarkably like Proclus’ in a note (2000: n. 71), 
according to which the distribution would be qualitative. 
23 Nikulin (2000: 211, cf. 71) takes Plato to portray the triangular physical elements as ‘centauric 
entities’ having both geometrical and physical properties, and reproaches Plato for not explaining how 
two kinds of properties (i.e. geometrical and physical) that he himself considers to be radically different 
can coexist. Consequently, Nikulin concludes that Plato did not succeed at realizing his project of 
mathematization. Other readings combining physical and mathematical qualities: Cleary (1995: 36, 64-
5) who speaks of “ontological mathematics”, Gregory (2000: 187ff.), Johansen (2004: 163-4). 
24 Brisson (1974: 324ff.), Brisson (2000: 300, 306).  
25 In his earlier work, Brisson opposes the thesis that the World Soul is a mathematical entity (or 
number, or harmony), without making explicit what in that case is the function of the mathematical 
explanations for the soul (metaphor of what?), and he maintains that the mathematical construction of 
the elements is no more than a metaphor (“une solution théorique d’ordre métaphorique” (1974: 387). 
In later work, however, he has taken on a more realist position, that the soul “présente une structure 
mathématique” Brisson (2000: 306), or “exhibits a mathematical structure” Brisson and Meyerstein 
(1995: 29, cf. 31-35). 
26 Esp. Cael. III. On Aristotle’s criticism see Cleary (1995: chapter 2). 
27 On the earliest reactions see Brisson (2000). 
28 See esp. Brisson (2000: 306ff.). 
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mathematical concepts have explanatory power by being metaphors for metaphysical 
principles of the physical world (including the World Soul).29  
(2) A further development of this position on mathematics’ function for philosophy of 
nature is found in Iamblichus, who formulates an arithmetical physics on the basis of 
Aristotle’s Physics, using a concept of physical numbers, or physical manifestations of 
arithmetical numbers.30 On the basis of O’Meara’s analysis of Psellus’ excerpts of On 
Pythagoreanism V-VII, Iamblichus’ views on the relation between mathematics and 
philosophy of nature can be summarized as a combination of realism and 
instrumentalism. Iamblichus assumes an ontological connection, obtaining between 
mathematics as the paradigm and the physical world as its image,31 and thereby gives 
physical reality an arithmetical structure. Physical numbers differ from arithmetical 
ones, of course, so pure arithmetic is not applicable to the natural world as such. What 
allows us to call Iamblichus a realist nonetheless is the fact that for him the role of the 
arithmetical in the physical world is an ontological, not just a descriptive one. At the same 
time, Iamblichus pointed out that one should provide both a mathematical and a 
physical explanation of the mathematical description of the physical in the Timaeus,32 
because of the ontological difference between physical arithmetic and mathematical 
arithmetic.33 This advice is not only coherent with Iamblichus’ general exegetical 
attitude, it is also a reaction against a third approach to the mathematics of the 
Timaeus, namely (3) the trend that had developed among mathematicians, such as 
Eratosthenes and Theon of Smyrna, to take the mathematical passages of the Timaeus 
out of their context and explain them for mathematical purposes only.34  
(4) Afterwards the interpretations of Syrianus and Proclus lean more to the 
instrumentalist side. Syrianus, whose view of the relation between mathematics and the 
                                               
29 Cf. Tarrant (2000: 199, 204), who speaks of ‘the correct decoding’ of the mathematical passages as 
one of the main concerns of the first interpreters of the Timaeus.  
30 O'Meara (1989: chapter 3, 62, 69): “In general it appears that the physical universe is structured by 
immanent forms, called ‘physical numbers’, which derive their character and behaviour from the 
properties of mathematical numbers. Mathematical numbers in fact exemplify, in paradigmatic fashion, 
the organization of the universe. This means that physical theory can be found pre-contained in 
mathematics and that the elements of such a theory are instantiated in the various physical expressions 
of different mathematical numbers.”  
31 O'Meara (1989: 84). 
32 In Tim. II 36.20-27, cf. Comm.Math. 28.19ff. 
33 For Iamblichus’ syncretistic description of the use of mathematics for “attacking perceptible things”, 
which O’Meara aptly qualifies as “embarass[ing] both by its richness and by its poverty”, see 
Comm.Math. 32 (93.11) and O'Meara (1989: 49). 
34 Cf. Tarrant (2000: 61-2), Ferrari (2000). Proclus himself wrote a separate treatise to explain only the 
mathematical details of the Timaeus (entitled ‘συναγωγὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν Τίμαιον μαθηματικῶν 
θεωρημάτων’, In Tim. II 76.24), which he attached to the Commentary as an appendix.  
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physical world on the whole owes a lot to Iamblichus’,35 maintains e.g. that the five 
regular polyhedra brought in in the formation of the elements are described in 
mathematical terms (μαθηματικοῖς ὀνόμασιν), but indicate the efficient and creative 
powers of nature.36 Proclus’ position on the mathematization of nature, as it comes to 
the fore in his commentary on the Timaeus, is a sophisticated sequel to the views held 
by his predecessors Iamblichus and Syrianus in the sense that he takes the structure of 
physical reality to be mathematical, but does not consider mathematical explanations 
sufficient for our understanding of the physical world.37 In terms of realism and 
instrumentalism, his position is – how appropriately – something intermediate between 
the two.38 The critical reader may object that applying notions such as realism and 
instrumentalism to ancient thinking is unhelpful,39 but I will maintain the distinction 
because it allows us to distinguish two aspects of Proclus’ views on the role of 
mathematics in philosophy of nature: an ontological aspect and a methodological 
aspect. 
 
 
IV.2.2 The Body of the World 
 
The first passage in the Timaeus on the body of the world (Tim. 31b-34a) can be divided 
into four sections: (1) the necessity of four primary bodies for the visible and tangible 
nature of the world (31b-32c), (2) the reason why all four primary bodies are used 
exhaustively in fashioning the world (32c-33b), (3) the spherical shape of the world and 
                                               
35 See O'Meara (1989: 138-41). On mathematical number in Syrianus see Mueller (1998). 
36 In Metaph. 85.38-86.2, on Arist. Met. XIII 2 1076a38-b11. On Simplicius’ report of Proclus’ views on 
the geometrical figures and matter see Steel (2005: esp. 185ff.). Proclus does not maintain a 
“symbolical” reading of the geometrical figures, like Iamblichus, yet at the same time he does not give 
a literal reading either: the geometrical shapes are translated, as it were, into both qualitative and 
quantitative physical properties.  
37 See also O'Meara (1989: 48-51) on the different aspects of the relation between the mathematical 
and the physical: abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις), joining (ἐφαρμογή), perfection (τελείωσις), participation 
(μετοχή), division (διαίρεσις), comparison (παραβολή). 
38 In general, realism and instrumentalism when applied to views of ancient philosophers and scientists 
are summoned mainly in the context of astronomy. The instrumentalists are those like Ptolemy, who 
famously attempt at ‘saving the appearances’, with the use of models and hypotheses. As Segonds 
(1987b), (1987a) and Lloyd (1978) have shown, Proclus opposed this instrumentalist position on realist 
grounds. See esp. Lloyd (1978: 211 and n. 52): Proclus’ objection against hypotheses of epicycles and 
eccentrics is not that they do not provide a means of calculating the positions of the heavenly bodies, 
but that such hypotheses and the ensuing calculations do not constitute a consistent physical account of 
the heavenly bodies. Cf. V.5.2. On Simplicius’ defence of the role of mathematics in astronomy see de 
Haas (2000). 
39 Cf. Gregory (2000: 8). 
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the fact that it has no limbs or organs (33b-34a), (4) transition to the World-Soul (34a-
b).40 
 
For our purposes, section (1) is most interesting, and especially the following notorious 
passage, as it is there that mathematical proportions are brought in to explain the 
necessity of two mean elements (μέσα) between fire and earth to provide the natural 
world with three-dimensionality and unity: 
T IV.2 
“But it isn’t possible for just two things to be well combined, without a third; 
there has to be some bond between the two that unites them. Now the best 
bond is one that truly makes a unity of itself and the things bonded by it, and 
proportion by nature accomplishes this best. For whenever of three numbers or 
masses or powers the middle (μέσον) between any two is such that the first is to 
it as it is to the last, and again the other way around, the last is to the middle as 
the middle is to the last, then the middle becomes both first and last, and in 
turn the last and the first both become middles, and in this way everything turns 
out to be the same, and being in the same relation to each other everything will 
be one.” (Tim. 31b8-32a7, transl. allowing Proclus’ interpretation)41 
 
Before turning to Proclus’ views on the role of mathematics in the Timaeus, let us 
briefly go over his reading of this passage.  
In his interpretation of these proportional relations between the four elements,42 
Proclus introduces a distinction between three kinds of ‘bond’ (δεσμός), namely (a) the 
bond that pre-exists ‘in the cause’, (b) the bond that is immanent ‘in the things bound’, 
and (c) the intermediate bond, that proceeds from the cause and manifests itself in the 
things bound.43 By way of illustration Proclus offers an analogy with a living being, for 
                                               
40 Cf. Cornford (1937) and Zeyl (2000: xci ff.) for similar divisions of the Timaeus-text. The second 
passage in the Timaeus on the body of the world is 53cff, the construction of the four elements or 
primary bodies, earth, water, air, and fire from scalene and isosceles triangles.  
41 Note that the expression used for middle or mean (μέσον), as well as μεσότης, are used to refer both 
to any middle term and to an ἀναλογία. See Baltzly (2007: 10). 
42 In Tim. II 1-52.14. See for a translation of this passage with introduction and notes Baltzly (2007: of 
his introduction esp. 7-20). 
43 In Tim. II 15.12-17. For an extensive discussion of this passage and its sequel see Lernould (2000). 
Cf. MacIsaac (2001: 157-161). Lernould’s treatment of the passage is very detailed, but has two major 
general flaws, namely that he emphasizes the opposition mathematical – physical too fervently, without 
Repecting Proclus’ own explicit vision (II 23). For example, when Proclus uses terms such as 
“equality” (ἰσότης) and “unity” (ἡ μόνας, II 19.28-19.3) that is called by Lernould a brusque change of 
register from the physical to the mathematical, and the verb πέφυκεν is considered a slip back into 
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which there are three bonds that guarantee its unity, namely (a) the ‘one logos’, the cause 
of the living being, (b) the tendons and muscles which are in the things bound, and (c) 
the φυσικὸς λόγος, which proceeds from the cause and uses the tendons and muscles to 
maintain the unity of the living being. These three bonds, then, are in fact three causes 
of unity. 
Afterwards, Proclus emphatically excludes bonds (a) and (b) as the two bonds that 
Plato is not aiming at in Tim. 31b8-32a7. (a) The first kind of bond is a real cause and 
therefore transcends its effects. Such a cause cannot be intermediate as the 
intermediate is both immanent and transcending. This first kind of bond is called 
demiurgic and creative (δημιουργική, ποιητικόν).44  
(b) The second kind of bond, which is immanent, is not a true cause, but a conditio sine 
qua non (ὁ ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ λόγος) or instrumental bond (or organic, ὀργανικόν).45  
The example provided by Proclus of bond (b) recalls Phaedo 98c2-99b4, where Socrates 
mentions his bones and tendons as the conditio sine qua non (ἄνευ οὗ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ’ 
εἴη αἴτιον), but certainly not the real cause of his staying in prison.46 Likewise, in the 
example above, the physical parts of the living being are the necessary condition, but 
not the real cause, of its unity. The real cause is bond (a), the ‘one logos’. The 
intermediate bond that is not entirely transcendent is still something of a real cause.  
After the elimination of the two irrelevant bonds, Proclus moves on to the positive 
qualification of the intermediate bond. It is this bond which Plato calls “the most 
beautiful bond which truly unifies itself and what is bound by it,”47 and this bond is 
                                                                                                                                              
physical language (133-4). As a consequence of this strong opposition, Lernould misreads Proclus’ 
understanding of mathematics and concludes (144) that philosophy of nature is reduced to 
mathematics by our commentator. 
44 In Tim. II 15.25-30, cf.  δημιουργικόν: 16.8, ποιητικόν: 13. 
45 τὸν ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ λόγον: 15.24,  instrumental (ὀργανικόν): 15.30, 16.13. N.b. I do not agree with the 
interpretation of Lernould (2000: 131 and n. 9) and the translations of Festugière (1966-8: vol. III, 38 
ad loc.), Baltzly (2007: 58, ad loc.) who take the τὸν ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ λόγον ἐπέχων to refer to the 
intermediate bond. For this reading, the phrase τὸν ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ λόγον ἐπέχων has to fall outside the 
scope of the negation οὔτε in II 15.24. This is a possible, but not the only possible construction. My 
main reason for assuming that the phrase falls under the negation, which renders a meaning such as 
“nor is it, due to having the place of conditio sine qua non, excluded from the class of true causes”, is the 
parallel with the Phaedo (see below). Another argument, however, is the subsequent elaboration of the 
arguments against the relevant bond being either (a) or (b): μήτε...μήτε (II 15.25, 30), which suggests 
that the same two causes are mentioned in the foregoing οὔτε...οὔτε (II 15.23-24). 
46 The term οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ is not used often in ancient discussions about causes, but when it is, it usually 
refers to the physical instrument in a process (e.g. of generation). Cf. In Alc. 169.6-7 (on Alc. 106a), and 
Arist. Phys. 200a5ff. Simpl. In dA 111.5-7, Xenocr. frgm 232.6 (Isnardi Parente), apud Clem. Alex. Strom. 
II 22. 
47 Tim. 31c2-3. 
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“proportion” (ἀναλογία).48 Proportion, thus Proclus, is singled out as the best kind of 
bond because it uses a μέσον or μέσα, i.e. the instruments which are the lowest kind of 
bond, to constitute a unity of as well as with the extremes.49  
In order to illustrate how proportion achieves and becomes such a unity Proclus uses 
the three mathematical ratios (μεσότητες)50 from which Plato constitutes the soul, 
geometric, arithmetic and harmonic, as examples. In arithmetic ratios, there is a 
quantitatively equal increase (e.g. 1-2-3, increase of 1); in geometric ratios there is a 
qualitatively equal increase (e.g. 1-2-4, doubling); and in harmonic ratios the middle 
exceeds and is exceeded by the extremes by the same part (the ratio between first and 
last is the same as that between first-middle and middle-last, e.g. 3-4-6: the ratio 3:6 is 
identical to 4-3:6-4).51 All three, geometric, arithmetic, and harmonic, are characterized 
by equality, namely of the ratio, which stays the same regardless of the factors, and as 
such have a unifying quality.52  
In these illustrations Proclus shifts focus to mathematical ratios, and introduces the three 
kinds of ratio that are “now being spoken about (τὰ νῦν μεσότητες) and from which 
Plato establishes the soul” (II 19.5-7). At this point in the Timaeus text, however, it is 
not at all obvious that Timaeus is speaking about mathematical ratios, let alone the 
three kinds from which soul is established. The only reason Proclus gives for his choice 
of examples is that he wants to exclude novel kinds of ratios set out by “the likes of 
Nicomachus and Moderatus”.53 I propose that the shift to mathematics is inspired by 
the sequel:  
T IV.3 = part of T IV.2 
“(iii) For whenever of three numbers or masses or powers the middle between 
any two (ὁπόταν γὰρ ἀριθμῶν τριῶν εἴτε ὄγκων εἴτε δυνάμεων ὡντινωνοῦν ᾖ τὸ 
μέσον) is such that the first is to it as it is to the last, and again the other way 
around, the last is to the middle as the middle is to the last, then the middle 
                                               
48 Tim. 31c3-4, In Tim. II 16.1-13. Proclus first states that this bond has its power through proportion 
(16.3), but continues to say that it is proportion (16.5-7). On the central place of ratio (transl. of 
ἀναλογία) in Calcidius’ commentary on the Timaeus see Somfai (2004). 
49 In Tim. II 18.22-19.3. 
50 On the use of both μέσον and μεσότης as referring to either middle term in any sense or to ἀναλογία 
see above n. 41.  
51 In Tim. II 19.9-30. O'Meara (1989: 188), MacIsaac (2001: 166-168). 
52 In Tim. II 19.30-20.4. 
53 In Tim. II 19.3-5. Lernould (2000: 133-4) concludes from this remark that the elements do not 
actually have mathematical structures (“des proportions telles que le géomètre les déploie 
discursivement (dianoétiquement) dans l’imagination”). It is a clear indication, Lernould says, that 
Proclus is thinking of ‘essential’ rather than mathematical proportions. This conclusion is correct, but it 
cannot be drawn from this passage. 
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becomes both first and last, and in turn the last and the first both become 
middles, and in this way everything turns out to be the same, and being in the 
same relation to each other everything will be one.” (Tim. 31c4-32a7) 
 
Of this passage especially the phrase “εἴτε ὄγκων εἴτε δυνάμεων ὡντινωνοῦν” is a fertile 
source of discussions on the mathematization of nature in the Timaeus, because of its 
ambiguity. In the given translation, which fits Proclus’ reading, it is an apposition with 
μέσον, and δυνάμις is given a non-mathematical meaning, but the phrase allows other 
syntactic constructions and δυνάμις can easily be given a more mathematical sense.54 
Without going into the details – which have been amply discussed elsewhere - suffice it 
to say that the passage has shown to be ambiguous enough to provide support both 
for the realist and for the instrumentalist interpretation of the Timaeus. Regardless of 
the preferred syntactic construction and meaning of δύναμις, today the whole passage 
is today generally taken in a realist vein, to concern continuous geometric proportion 
(ἀναλογία συνεχής) and to express quantitative relations between the four elements. 
Proclus, we will see, makes good use of the ambiguity of the three terms (ἀριθμοί, 
ὄγκοι, δυνάμεις) and first matches them with the different ὑποκείμενα of the three kinds 
of ratios, arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic respectively – this explains why he used 
the three kinds of ratio to illustrate the unifying quality of ἀναλογία.55 Later, he will also 
explain the three terms in a physical sense.56  
                                               
54 For a thorough  discussion of the possible constructions and interpretations of this sentence, see 
Pritchard (1990), who puts it down as a methodical passage containing playful nonsense. On Proclus’ 
interpretation see Baltzly (2007: 13-15). See also Festugière (ad loc) and Lernould (2000: 135, n. 21) for 
other references. To name some other interpretations: Taylor (1928: 96-99) follows Proclus but 
considers the whole passage “simply a play of mathematical fancy”. Heath (1965: vol. 2, 294 and n. 1) 
takes the ὄγκοι and δυνάμεις to be square and cubic numbers. Cornford (1937: 45-52) follows Heath, but 
at the same time maintains that ὄγκων and δυνάμεων depend on τὸ μέσον, and even pays himself a 
compliment for this interpretation: “Here, as in many other places, Plato is compressing his statement 
of technical matters to such as point that only expert readers would fully appreciate its meaning” (47). 
Cornford (1937: 51-52) conjectures that Plato in this passage expresses actual quantitative relations 
between the four elements.  
55 See above. Proclus’ interpretation of the three kinds of means fares well with Taylor (1928: 99), 
according to whom it is “pretty clearly right”, but less well with Cornford (1937: 45, n. 1) who finds in 
Proclus’ discussion “an unfortunate attempt to drag in arithmetical and harmonic proportion”, 
“connected with the false notion that δυνάμεις in our passage has a physical sense”. This criticism is 
unjust, as Proclus clearly distinguishes the physical from the mathematical reading. See below. 
Pritchard follows Proclus’ syntactical reading, but not his interpretation of the three kinds of means. 
Pritchard (1990) gives an entirely physical reading of δύναμις as “powers”, but it is not clear to me what 
he takes these powers to be. 
56 In Tim. II 25.24ff., see below.  
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This passage T IV.3 which makes Proclus temporarily shift focus from philosophy of 
nature to mathematics, also triggers the first emphatic distinction in Proclus’ 
commentary between the mathematical and the physical reading: 57 
T IV.4 
“First we should speak about these things in a mathematical manner 
(μαθηματικῶς) and subsequently in a physical manner (φυσικῶς), which is more 
to the point (ὅπερ μάλιστα πρόκειται). For our discourse should not distance 
itself too much from the proposed inquiry.” (In Tim. II 20.19-21) 
 
Proclus here defends the need of a physical reading of the mathematical text, but it will 
become clear that he also feels the need to justify his attention for the mathematical 
details, and even the very presence of mathematics in the context of physical doctrine.  
The composition of his mathematical exegesis is ring-shaped: Proclus commences with 
the fact that geometrical proportion is proportion properly speaking (ἀναλογία γὰρ 
κυρίως ἐστὶν ἡ γεωμετρική, 20.26-7); he moves on to show how the three kinds of items 
(numbers, masses and powers) can be matched onto the three kinds of ratios 
(arithmetical, geometrical and harmonic respectively);58 he then returns to proportion 
as bond in the proper sense (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ μὲν κυρίως δεσμός ἡ ἀναλογία), and ends by 
pointing out once more that geometrical proportion is truly proportion, since the aim 
of all proportion is identity (ταυτότης), and “strictly speaking identity is set over the 
geometric proportion (...), but equality (ἰσότης) is set over the arithmetic proportion, 
while similarity (ὁμοιότης) is set over the harmonic.”59 In other words, proportion is a 
tool of reversion, and through geometrical proportion, which is closest to unity due to 
the identical intervals between the extremes and the middle, reversion is most easily 
obtained.60  
After this, Proclus turns to the physical interpretation of the passage, to conclude that 
the most beautiful ἀναλογία in the physical context is ‘a certain single life and single 
λόγος’ (μία τις ζωὴ καὶ λόγος εἷς), which is the containing cause of the universe and 
everything in it,61 and that the numbers, masses, and powers are in fact immanent 
                                               
57 In Tim. II 20.19-28.7, with the transition to the physical explanation at 23.9. 
58 Since all this is marked by Proclus as the mathematical, as opposed to the physical reading, 
Cornfords criticism (see n. 55) concerning the “false notion that δυνάμεις in our passage has a physical 
sense”, relies on a misconstrual of Proclus’ exegesis: the δυνάμεις here are still harmonic, i.e. numerical 
values. It is not until later (II 25.24ff.) that they are also explained as sensible qualities.  
59 In Tim. II 22.29-23.5, transl. Baltzly (2007), modified. We hear an echo here of Adrastus, apud 
Nicomachus, Introductio Arithmetica 21-24. On analogy and identity see Beierwaltes (1979: 65, cf. 73, 
153ff.). 
60 Cf. In Tim. II 23.6-8. 
61 In Tim. II 24ff. On this life see also chapter II. 
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forms (τὰ εἴδη τὰ ἔνυλα), their distributions over matter (αἱ ἐκτάσεις αὐτῶν καὶ αἱ 
διαστάσεις αἱ περὶ τὴν ὕλην), and the qualities that contain and form bodies (αἱ 
ποιότητες αἱ συνεκτικαὶ καὶ εἰδοποιοὶ τῶν σωμάτων) respectively.62 The transition from 
mathematical to physical explanation is even more emphatically marked than the 
beginning of the mathematical exegesis, in a page long discussion full of interesting 
remarks concerning both (i) the benefits and (ii) the limitations of mathematization in 
philosophy of nature. It begins as follows:  
T IV.5 
“After taking up the mathematical side of those words we should turn to the 
physical inquiry. (ii) For it is fitting neither to remain in mathematics, distancing 
ourselves from the text (for the dialogue is physical), (i) nor to disregard those 
words, inquiring further only into that which pertains to perception. Instead, we 
should connect both and always interweave the physical with the mathematical, 
just as the things themselves are interwoven, and are of the same kind (ὁμογενῆ) 
and related (ἀδελφὰ) due to the emanation from intellect.” (In Tim. II 23.9-17) 
 
It is worth our while to take a closer look at the further elaboration of the two issues 
raised here, and connect them to Proclus’ general theory of mathematics. We will start 
out with the use and benefits of mathematics for philosophy of nature, and treat the 
limitations of mathematics for philosophy of nature afterwards. 
 
(i) The use of mathematics  
Proclus’ defence of mathematics in philosophy of nature pertains not only to his own 
attention for the mathematical detail of the Timaeus passage: he is also justifying Plato’s 
use of mathematics in physical theory. In his initial summary of his position on the 
matter (T IV.5), Proclus says that we should not disregard (ἀμελεῖν) the mathematical 
passage and look only for that which pertains to perception. So the point is not so 
much that one should interpret the mathematical passages in a physical manner, but 
rather that one should not skip them altogether. In other words: the mathematical 
passages contribute something of their own to our knowledge of the physical world. 
That this is so is explained from the structure of reality: the physical and the 
mathematical are like siblings from the same father, Intellect (see T IV.5), and reality is 
not divided into separate compartments, each containing an entity of its own. Instead, 
everything is interwoven, in the so-called Pythagorean hierarchical scheme:63 
                                               
62 In Tim. II 25.1-5. Cf. 24.21. 
63 Cf. O'Meara (1989: 185-6). 
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T IV.6 
“For if in fact the Pythagoreans really placed mathematical being in between the 
intelligible and the perceptible, as being more developed than the intelligible, 
and more universal than the perceptible, then why should we concern ourselves 
only with φυσιολογία,64 ignoring mathematics? For how has the perceptible been 
organized (διακεκόσμηται)? According to what kind of principles (λόγοι) has it 
been ordered (διατέτακται)? From which principles (λόγοι) has it proceeded 
(προελήλυθε) if not from mathematical ones? Now these λόγοι are first in 
souls,65 having descended from intellect, and subsequently in bodies, having 
descended from souls.”66 
 
The use of mathematics for philosophy of nature, then, lies in explaining certain 
properties of the physical, namely its rational order and organization, and in revealing 
its proximate causes. In his more specific discussion of this topic in the In Eucl. Proclus 
enumerates the different contributions of mathematics to philosophy of nature as 
revealing the order (τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐταξίαν) according to which the universe has been 
constructed (δεδημιούργηται), and the proportional bonds that unite the opposites 
present in it; showing the primary elements of which it consists, and their properties; 
and discovering the numerical values of planetary cycles and the periods of 
generation.67 The majority of these contributions are referred to as manners of showing 
                                               
64 φυσιολογία here clearly has the more restricted meaning of “doing philosophy of nature starting from 
sense perception only”.  
65 The text has a plural, ψυχαῖς, but Festugière takes it to refer to the hypostasis of Soul. There is no 
need, however, to choose between individual souls and the universal hypostasis of Soul. The point 
made here is that the corporeal bodies display certain regularities due to λόγοι which they owe to 
(Intellect via) Soul, and more concretely the individual souls and the World Soul. On the relation 
between mathematics and souls see In Eucl. 16.16-18.14. 
66 In Tim. II 23.16-26. The link with the Pythagoreans was already established in the very first pages of 
the commentary, and in similar wording: In Tim. I 8.13-29. 
67 In Eucl. 22.17-23.11 Πρὸς δὲ τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν τὰ μέγιστα συμβάλλεται, τήν τε τῶν λόγων εὐταξίαν 
ἀναφαίνουσα, καθ΄ ἣν δεδημιούργηται τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ἀναλογίαν τὴν πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ συνδήσασαν, ὥς 
που φησὶν ὁ Τίμαιος, καὶ φίλα τὰ μαχόμενα καὶ προσήγορα καὶ συμπαθῆ τὰ διεστῶτα ποιήσασαν, καὶ τὰ 
ἁπλᾶ καὶ πρωτουργὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ πάντη τῇ συμμετρίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἰσότητι συνεχόμενα δείξασα, δι΄ ὧν καὶ ὁ πᾶς 
οὐρανὸς ἐτελεώθη, σχήματα τὰ προσήκοντα κατὰ τὰς ἑαυτοῦ μερίδας ὑποδεξάμενος, ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμοὺς τοὺς 
οἰκείους ἑκάστῳ τῶν γιγνομένων καὶ ταῖς περιόδοις αὐτῶν καὶ ταῖς ἀποκαταστάσεσιν ἀνευροῦσα, δι΄ ὧν τάς 
τε εὐγονίας ἑκάστων καὶ τὰς ἐναντίας φορὰς συλλογίζεσθαι δυνατόν. ταῦτα γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος 
ἐνδεικνύμενος πανταχοῦ διὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκφαίνει τὴν περὶ τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὅλων θεωρίαν 
καὶ τὰς γενέσεις τῶν στοιχείων ἀριθμοῖς καὶ σχήμασι κατακοσμεῖ καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ 
τὰς ποιήσεις εἰς αὐτὰ ἀναφέρει, τῶν τε γωνιῶν τὰς ὀξύτητας καὶ τὰς ἀμβλύτητας καὶ τῶν πλευρῶν τὰς 
λειότητας ἢ τὰς ἐναντίας δυνάμεις, τό τε πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῶν στοιχείων αἰτιώμενος τῆς παντοίας 
μεταβολῆς.  
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properties of the physical world (ἀναφαίνουσα, δείξασα),68 and hence do not aid in 
finding an answer to the question whether Proclus considers the contribution of 
mathematics to philosophy of nature in realist or instrumentalist terms. We do know, 
of course, on the basis of the Pythagorean picture sketched above, that there is an 
ontological relation between the mathematical and the physical, and that this relation is 
what makes the contribution possible in the first place. This becomes even clearer 
when Proclus restates the ontological relation and its epistemological consequences as 
“Plato rightly lends credibility to the physical λόγοι from mathematicals, for the latter 
are their causes, and the demiurgic procession is brought to completion through 
Soul”.69 A proper understanding of the proportional relations between the elements, 
and consequently of the unity of the universe, is provided by relating them to their 
demiurgic cause, through their proximate cause, i.e. the intermediate level of 
mathematical entities. The picture sketched here is well known. Following Republic 
book VII, like his teacher Syrianus and Iamblichus before him,70 Proclus holds that 
mathematical being (ἡ μαθηματικὴ οὐσία, In Eucl. 3.1) has a position intermediate 
between the intelligible and the perceptible.71 As Proclus tells us at the very beginning 
of his In Eucl., it is superior to the physical in that the objects of mathematics are 
immaterial. On the other hand, it is inferior to the intelligible in that these objects are 
not indivisible.72 The relation that it has with both its upper and its lower neighbour is 
one of paradigm and image.73 Mathematics displays images of the intelligible, and the 
intelligible is the cause of the mathematical. Likewise, natural things are images of the 
mathematical,74 and the latter are causes of the former.75 Due to that causal relation, 
the universe is a kosmos, an ordered whole, and it is this kosmos in which the 
mathematical cause of the visible world can be seen. That mathematical theory is 
                                               
68 The exception being the contribution to astronomy, which is described in more firm language as 
discovering (ἀνευροῦσα) the numbers of the periods of the heavenly bodies, with which syllogisms can 
be formed (συλλογίζεσθαι) about their trajectories, In Eucl. 22.26-23.2.  
69 In Tim. II 51.10-15, on Tim. 32b. 
70 Proclus’ theory of geometrical objects is already to be found in Syrianus, esp. In Metaph. 91. Mueller 
(2000: 72ff.). Cf. Iamblichus On Pythagoreanism, book III; analysis in O'Meara (1989: 44ff.). 
71 Mathematical reasoning is also intermediate: In Eucl. 3.16-4.8. Cf. O'Meara (1989: 172), Breton 
(1969: 110-123), MacIsaac (2001: 118ff.) 
72 In Eucl. 3-5, esp. 4.18ff. Cf. Plato Tim. 35 a 1-3, Arist. Met. A 6 987 b 14-18.  
73 In Eucl. 35.7ff. Cf. In Tim. I 349.24ff. τὰ μὲν γὰρ νοητὰ παραδείγματα τῶν διανοητῶν͵ τὰ δὲ διανοητὰ 
τῶν αἰσθητῶν. At In Eucl. 95.23-96.11 δόξα is mentioned as the faculty of arithmetical objects – this 
δόξα is the one described at In Tim. I 248.7ff. (rather than I 223.16-30, as suggested by Mueller (2000: 
73).  
74 In Tim. II 39.18-19, καὶ γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἰκόνες εἰσί. 
75 In Tim. II 51.12-13. 
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functional in the science of the irregular and temporal world of sense perception, then, 
is due to the ontological relation between natural and mathematical objects.   
Returning now to the passage we started from, a question remains to be answered: 
what kind of mathematical entities are the geometrical proportions described in the 
Timaeus? As O’Meara has shown, mathematical entities and principles are found in 
many guises in Proclus.76 He maintains that “mathematical principles are not for 
[Proclus] the direct model of the universe, but are quantitative discursive projections 
by the human soul of higher principles which, on the divine level, guide the making of 
the world.”77 What this thesis means exactly depends on how one understands 
“mathematical principles” in this context.78 Considering the use of mathematics for 
philosophy of nature discussed above, however (see IV.2.2), and regardless of our 
notion of “mathematical principles”, O’Meara’s view is too limited, because it does not 
account for the ontological role of mathematics and the World Soul in the shaping of 
the physical world. This is, however, due to a general problem in Proclus’ philosophy 
of mathematics. In his exposition on the body of the world and elsewhere, Proclus 
speaks of mathematical principles as paradigms and causes of the physical.79 Yet at the 
same time his In Eucl. strongly and continuously suggests that mathematics is the 
unfolding of the principles of the human soul onto or by φαντασία.80  
Unless we absurdly assume that the human mind as such is the cause of the physical 
world, this cannot but be taken to involve the assumption of a truly mathematical 
ontological realm, existing independently of the human mind, in between the physical 
and the intelligible.81 The mathematical principles in this context are those of the 
World Soul, intermediate between intellect and the sensible, ontologically analogous to 
both, and more exact than the sensible,82 that aid the intelligible in the ordering of the 
world. More specifically, it is the ἐνέργεια of the World Soul, or the unfolding of its 
                                               
76 O'Meara (1989: 186-7). 
77 O'Meara (1989: 193). 
78 For different meanings thereof see O'Meara (1989: 186-7). 
79 See above. Cf. also In Eucl. 82.23-25, where the scalene and the isosceles triangles are called the 
proximate causes of the four elements (τὸ οὖν ἰσόπλευρον τρίγωνον προσεχὲς αἴτιόν ἐστι τῶν τριῶν 
στοιχείων πυρὸς ἀέρος ὕδατος͵ τὸ δὲ τετράγωνον τῆς γῆς). 
80 The latter is clear from the discussion of φαντασία in MacIsaac (2001: 172-184). As MacIsaac (2001: 
176) points out, there is a conflict due to the difference between the World Soul and the partial soul. 
For the Aristotelian aspects of Proclus’ philosophy of mathematics see [Helmig (forthcoming)]. 
81 As O’Meara seems to think earlier on (1989: 186-7). There is no need to “hazard the thought” that 
there is a special realm of διάνοια, separate from Soul, as did Rosán (1949: 164), despite the fact that, as 
he admits, such a realm is not found in Proclus’ philosophy.  
82 Cf. 51.5ff, see also below. Note that the number of elements of the proportion (four) is maintained 
with mathematical precision, whereas the proportional division and separation of the elements is not, 
due to the material character of the physical elements. In Tim. II 52.15ff.  
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essential λόγοι, that are themselves mathematical only in a psychic sense: unified, 
without shape or extension.83 Note, however, that since it is impossible to present 
these mathematical principles in a text, the text of the Timaeus does describe them 
using the representations that are in our souls. Thus the text we have is a description of 
a mental representation of the higher psychic mathematical principles that are the 
causes of certain physical properties. 
That this is how we should understand the mathematical entities in question will be 
clear from the discussion concerning the World Soul (IV.2.3). First, however, let us 
turn to Proclus’ remarks on the limitations of mathematization regarding the body of 
the world. 
 
 
(ii) The limitations of mathematization 
 
From Proclus’ awareness of the fact that mathematical proportion has its particular 
function in the argument for the solidity and tangibility of the natural world, one can 
already surmise that he would deem the argument of Tim. 31b-c a failure if it were 
taken to have a mathematical meaning only: a mathematical solid is ἀναφές, it does not 
have these properties of physical solidity and tangibility.84 But Proclus has more 
general objections to offer to what we might call a ‘mathematicist’ approach to 
philosophy of nature, in the sense of the reduction of physical phenomena to 
mathematical facts, and the assumption that the former can be adequately explained 
with the use of mathematics only:85  
T IV.7 
“We should not (δεῖ δὴ οὖν μὴ) linger in mathematics, as some people do. (1) 
This both results in false convictions in the audience, namely that physical 
things are in fact mathematical shapes and numbers, and is otherwise out of 
place: (2) after all, philosophy of nature does not allow for the precision and 
firmness of mathematical objects.86 (3) Moreover, we would not be following 
                                               
83 In Tim. II 164.21-23, II 238.25-239.16. MacIsaac (2001: 150). Cf. Dörrie and Baltes (2002: 240). 
84 In Tim. II 13.3-6. 
85 As will be clear from the following quotation, Proclus does not distinguish clearly between reading a 
mathematical passage for its own sake, while disregarding the physical context, and assuming that a 
mathematical text gives a mathematical explanation of the physical. He does, however, present 
arguments against both.  
86 In Tim. II 23.28-30: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιδέχονται τῶν μαθημάτων τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ ἐρηρεισμένον οἱ λόγοι τῆς 
φύσεως. I take οἱ λόγοι τῆς φύσεως to stand for φυσιολογία. The sentence could also mean something 
like “the rational principles of nature do not receive the precision and steadiness of mathematical 
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the rules of demonstration, in which it is said not to transfer the pieces of 
knowledge of one genus to another. (4) So it is also not possible to study the 
physical in an arithmetical manner.” (In Tim. II 23.25-33) 
 
This passage contains (1) an ontological argument, (2) an argument that combines 
ontology and epistemology, (3) an epistemological argument, and (4) a concluding 
remark.  
(1) According to the ontological argument giving only a mathematical explanation of 
the proportions of the world body, i.e. without adding a physical explanation, does not 
suffice as it would instil in the audience the false opinions that natural objects consist 
of mathematical figures and numbers. This is a reference to a mathematicist 
(interpretation of) Pythagorean theory of matter, as it can be found criticized in 
Aristotle, who refers to a Pythagorean theory that all sensible substances are formed 
out of numbers with spatial magnitude.87 This theory is rejected also by Proclus: 
physical objects are themselves no mathematical figures or numbers. And reading the 
Timaeus as if it says that they are, Proclus seems to be saying, is doing injustice to Plato.  
(2) Accepting only mathematical explanations involves ignoring the fact that physical 
objects, as opposed to their mathematical counterparts, suffer from a well-known lack 
of exactness and permanence. This seems to be no more than a further elaboration of 
the previous argument, as it presents a clarification of the qualification ψευδεῖς δόξας, 
given to the epistemic result of a reduction of philosophy of nature to mathematics. In 
fact, however, it further narrows down the relation between mathematical and physical 
objects, adding a methodological argument against a mathematicist approach to the 
previous ontological one. Not only are physical objects themselves not reducible to 
mathematical objects (ontological argument), as a consequence of the difference between 
the two, and especially the imprecision and instability inherent in physical objects, it is 
moreover not possible to apply mathematical explanations as within philosophy of nature 
(epistemological argument). Thus it seems that both the realist and the instrumentalist 
approach are excluded. The point of this epistemological argument is not, however, 
that it is altogether impossible to use mathematical explanations in philosophy of 
nature because of the lack of exactness of the physical. Rather, Proclus is pointing to 
the different levels of certainty of different sciences and the consequent impossibility 
of applying mathematics to philosophy of nature immediately.88 Further on this is more 
emphatically stated:  
                                                                                                                                              
objects,” but as shows from the immediately foregoing καὶ ἀλλῶς ἀτοπον Proclus is offering another 
argument against lingering in mathematics, not a further explanation of the ontological distinction 
between mathematical and physical objects. 
87 Met. I 6 987b27ff., XIII 6 1080b16ff. See also Cleary (1995: 346ff.).  
88 Cf. In Eucl. 59.10ff.  
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T IV.8 
“...the proportion in mathematicals has a precise and scientific character; for the 
[mathematical] ratios (λόγοι) are immaterial. But the situation is different in the 
case of proportion in the physical: any proportion in heavenly things still has a 
degree of certainty, but proportion in sublunar things [partakes in certainty] less, 
as it is always engaged in matter. (...)89 ...and whereas the heavenly things are in a 
way more closely related to precise λόγοι, sublunar things have a murky reality.90 
So Plato appropriately added ‘insofar as possible’ (Tim. 32b4-5), to prevent that 
you in any way demand the same kind of precision in the case of physical λόγοι, 
that is in mathematical ones.”91 
 
Note that in this passage primarily epistemological properties such as scientific 
character, precision, and truth, seem to be equated entirely to ontological ones, which 
is comprehensible in the light of the fact that the ontological home of mathematics is 
the soul.92 The ontological distinction between the mathematical and the physical is 
directly related to that between scientific and εἰκότες λόγοι, in a revealing manner: 
when making the transition from the mathematical to the physical explanation, Proclus 
announces this transition as follows:  
T IV.9 
“Starting from these [mathematical explanations] let us see, how the physical 
notions are consonant (σύμφωνα) with them, and let us fit a likely account to the 
scientific one (τοῖς ἐπιστημονικοῖς λόγοις τοὺς εἰκότας συναρμόσωμεν).”93 
 
It is quite clear already at this point, that the mathematical passages are not considered 
mere metaphors, as they are called the scientific account, as opposed to the “likely” 
physical notions. That does not imply, however, that they cannot be instrumental to 
philosophy of nature.  
                                               
89 The passage left out is quoted above at n. 69. 
90 ἀμυδρὰν ἀλήθειαν: cf. In Eucl 4.4, where it is associated with the objects of sense perception and 
δόξα. The expression seems to be unique to Proclus, and may go back to Plato Rep. X 597a, where the 
carpenter’s bed is ἀμυδρόν τι, as opposed to truth/reality (the real bed). From ‘something murky and 
not truth’, through ‘murky imprints of truth (Plutarch, DIO 354.C.1 ἀμυδρὰς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας, cf. 
Amatorius 762.A.7-8 λεπταί τινες ἀπόρροιαι καὶ ἀμυδραὶ τῆς ἀληθείας), we reach Proclus’ ‘murky 
truth/reality’. Cf. chapter V on degrees of truth and on non-propositional truth. 
91 In Tim. II 51.5-10 and 15-19. 
92 Any soul, but primarily universal Soul. On the topic of the relation between epistemological and 
ontological properties see chapter V. Cf. also Taormina (2000). 
93 In Tim. II 36.20-22. On the translation of εἰκοτ- as “likely” and on likely λόγοι in general, see chapter 
V. 
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(3) A similar point is made in Proclus’ epistemological argument, which takes up 
Aristotle’s rule against kind-crossing (μετάβασις), but in a version adapted to 
Neoplatonic metaphysics. By presenting only mathematical explanations in the 
philosophy of nature, he states, one would be committing a methodological error:  
T IV.10 
“...we would not be following the rules of demonstration, in which it is said not 
to transfer the pieces of knowledge from one genus to another genus (μὴ 
μεταφέρειν τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου γένους ἐπιστητὰ εἰς ἄλλο γένος.).” (II 23.28-32) 
 
Aristotle’s rule against kind-crossing says that it is not possible to demonstrate 
something in science A using propositions from science B.94 Since each science 
demonstrates the attributes of its proper γένος or subject matter, different sciences do 
not share middle terms, and hence demonstration combining terms or propositions 
from different sciences is impossible.95 For example, it is not possible to prove within 
geometry that two κύβοι make a κύβος, since this can be proved only with the use of 
cubic numbers, and numbers form the genus of arithmetic.96 The crossing from one 
genus to another is referred to as μετάβασις. 97 Transposed to our context: it is not 
possible to demonstrate something in philosophy of nature using mathematical 
propositions.98 As is well known, there is an exception to Aristotle’s rule against 
μετάβασις: when one genus comes below the other in some way, the attributes that the 
lower genus owes to the higher genus should be proved in the higher genus. More 
precisely, this kind of μετάβασις consists in providing grounds (τὸ διότι) 99 for the 
pieces of knowledge (τὸ ὅτι) belonging to subordinate science A within superordinate 
science B, where the two have a genus in common, in a way (πῇ).100  
                                               
94 On Proclus’ formulation of the principle see below.  
95 APo I 7 75a38-75b1; I 10 76a37-38, cf. I 7 75b10-11.  
96 APo I 7 75b13-14.   
97 This rule is discussed in APo I chapter 7, 9 and 13. Barnes calls it the kind-crossing rule. Barnes 
(1999: 123, 130-1, 134-5, 158-60); McKirahan jr. (1978), see also McKirahan jr. (1992: esp. ch. V) and 
Hankinson (2005). 
98 Cleary (1995: 73) considers Aristotle’s mention of μετάβασις at Cael I 1 268b1 to be part of his 
criticism of Plato’s mathematization of physics, and especially his objections to construing the three-
dimensional from planes. This cannot be right, however, as at Cael. I 1 Aristotle is not making the 
methodological point of the Posterior Analytics, but merely denying the possibility of transition from 
bodies to a fourth dimension. 
99 ‘Ground’ is here used in a strong sense to allow for both causal and epistemic reasons. 
100 APo I 7 75b8-9, I 9 76a22-25, I 13 78b34-7. 
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Consequently, some sciences, the ‘subalternate’ ones as McKirahan calls them,101 are 
related to one another in the same way, so that one studies the pieces of knowledge, 
whereas the other investigates their grounds. This kind of μετάβασις is encountered in 
the theoretical and applied mathematical sciences. For example, applied sciences such 
as optics and harmonics are subordinate to geometry and arithmetic respectively, in 
that optics and harmonics study the pieces of knowledge, with the use of sense 
perception, but not their grounds, which are instead studied by geometry (for optics) 
and arithmetic (for harmonics).102 Μετάβασις is allowed here because in a way, the 
subordinate sciences deal with the same genus as the superior ones, but from a 
different perspective, with a different modus considerandi (Zabarella): optics is about lines, 
but not qua lines, and harmonics is about number, but not qua number. 
For a Neoplatonist like Proclus, whose division of the sciences is based on the Divided 
Line, and mirrors a reality characterized by a continuous hierarchy, all sciences are 
ultimately subordinate to dialectic or theology.103 More specifically, in Proclus’ 
philosophy we also find the position that mathematics contributes to the more 
mathematical aspects of philosophy of nature,104 because the mathematical is the 
proximate cause of the physical.105 What is more, the mathematical is even of the same 
genus (ὁμογενῆ, II 23.15-16) as the physical. Now if μετάβασις is allowed in those cases 
in which a superior science provides causes of the subject matter of an inferior science, 
because they have the same genus in some sense, then why would Proclus still invoke 
the rule against μετάβασις in this context?  
The answer to this question lies in the fact that the rule against μετάβασις, and more 
generally ideas on the autonomy of the sciences, have been adjusted to fit Neoplatonic 
metaphysics and epistemology. Due to the hierarchical structure of reality, in which 
every lower level is caused by every higher level, each science, conceived of as studying 
one particular level or part of reality, and studying it from the point of view of its 
causes, by necessity involves a higher level in order to actually be a science.106 As a 
consequence, the rule against kind-crossing looses its function of ensuring the 
autonomy of sciences that are not in a subordinate relation.107 Instead, its new function 
                                               
101 McKirahan jr. (1978: 198). 
102 Apo I 7 75b14-17; I 13 78b34-79a16. 
103 Cf. In Eucl. 30.10-32.20; In Tim I 350.8-20; prov. 27-32. See also Lernould (1987). 
104 In Eucl. 19.20-23. 
105 Cf. In Eucl. 62.18-22. 
106 Of course, the aim of a science, for Neoplatonists, is also not so much the cognitive content 
provided thereby, but rather the possibility of moving up to a higher level of reality and acquiring 
knowledge thereof, again not for its own sake, but to allow a further ascent. 
107 Cf. Gerson (2004: 112): “Of course, we cannot say without further ado that the demotion of 
physical science to second place entails a rejection of its autonomy. That is what the Neoplatonists 
assume.” 
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is to prevent the collapsing of all sciences into one another by pointing out that one 
cannot transport (μεταφέρειν) the pieces of knowledge (ἐπιστήτα) concerning one domain (in 
the more narrow sense of a particular level or part of reality) as such to another genus. 
Borrowing pieces of knowledge from science A by science B should always be 
accompanied by a ‘translation’, so to speak, that clarifies how the ontological 
counterparts of those pieces of knowledge are active on the level of the genus to which 
science B pertains. Thereby the kind-crossing rule has become the methodological 
version of “Everything in everything, but appropriately to each thing”.108 With respect 
to the mathematical explanations of the body of the world, the translation consists in 
finding a physical cause that possesses a nature and function analogous to what is 
characteristic of geometrical proportion.109 And although mathematics contributes to 
φυσιολογία by revealing order, proportion, and number, the study of quantity in the 
perceptible and of magnitude in bodies itself is considered to belong to φυσιολογία, 
rather than mathematics.110  
(4) The concluding remark of Proclus’ argument against using only mathematics in 
philosophy of nature is somewhat unexpected:  
T IV.11 
“So it is also not (οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ) possible to study physical objects in an 
arithmetical manner.”111  
 
The scope of the argument is here narrowed down to arithmetic, which is surprising as 
in the whole discussion Proclus speaks of mathematics in general, and in the wider 
context the main focus is on geometry (more precisely, geometrical proportions, cf. II 
20.21ff.), not arithmetic. Rather than explaining the reference to arithmetic here as an 
afterthought or even an interpolated gloss, I suggest that this sentence shows that the 
whole passage enumerating the arguments against mathematization of nature is 
ultimately taken from, or at least still closely based on, a discussion and rejection of an 
                                               
108 El.Th. prop. 103. 
109 Cf. O'Meara (1989: 189-90). See also Beierwaltes (1979: 166), who refers to In Parm. 1129.22-26 and 
In Tim. II 245.25ff:  “Dies heisst: Mathematische Gestalten wie Punkt, Gerade, Kreis und Spirale sind 
den Dimensionen des Geistes und der Seele angemessen zu verstehen. Sie können nicht unvermittelt 
ihrem Ursprungsbereich entnommen und in eine andere Dimension übertragen werden, so dass ein 
Verständnis ihres Sinnes nur eine Sache der Hinsicht wäre, die beliebig vertäuscht werden könnte. Sie 
sind vielmehr nur aus der jeweiligen Dimension heraus, in der sie Wahrheit aussagen, zu begreifen. Sie 
sind in der Seinsweise der jeweiligen Dimension.” 
110 In Eucl. 36.8-12. 
111 In Tim. II 23.32-33 οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τὰ φυσικὰ δυνατὸν ἀριθμητικῶς θεωρεῖν. 
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overly Pythagorean approach to the study of natural objects (see above), possibly from 
Syrianus.112  
 
(iii) Synthesis  
 
We can now return to Proclus’ shift from the physical to the mathematical at In Tim. II 
16.6ff., and see that the main motivation for it is the following. Proclus takes Plato to 
present a general account of means and proportions, before moving on to the 
application thereof to the construction of the sensible world. Since mathematical 
proportions concern a layer of reality that is characterized by exactitude, and the three 
kinds of proportions found on the ontologically higher level of the World Soul can be 
considered the causes of any lower kind of proportions, the former can serve as 
paradigms aiding our understanding of the latter, physical proportions.  
With the help of mathematics, we can display certain properties of the physical through 
analogy in Lloyd’s sense, “any mode of reasoning in which one object or complex of 
objects is likened or assimilated to another (of the two particular instances between 
which a resemblance is apprehended or suggested, one is generally unknown or 
incompletely known, while the other is, or is assumed to be, better known).”113 That 
this is possible, however, is due to an ontological analogy obtaining between the two 
realms, as the objects are not likened or assimilated to others by us in the first instance, 
but are in fact alike because they are ontologically related. The physical is caused by the 
mathematical, and (real) causation in Neoplatonism involves the transference of a 
number of properties of the cause to the effect. So on the one hand, there is no veil 
that can be lifted from the physical world in order to reveal its mathematical core. The 
physical is not a sum of mathematical objects and matter, but it is intrinsically and 
essentially different from the mathematical. On the other hand, the physical does 
possess a – mainly structural – similarity to the mathematical.114 The symmetries and 
proportionalities that characterize e.g. the elements115 can be described most accurately 
                                               
112 I take the conjunctive negation to suggest the previous general exclusion of any explanation 
concerning a genus in a science that has another genus, which is subsequently narrowed down to a 
specific science, arithmetic (“since it is not possible to study anything in a science to which it does not 
belong, it is also not possible etc.”), rather than the previous exclusion of geometry (“for the same 
reasons that exclude studying physical objects in a geometrical manner, it is also not possible to study 
them in an arithmetical manner”). There is no indication in the context that geometry alone has been 
excluded. 
113 Lloyd (1966: 175). 
114 On causation, parallelism of structure, and analogy see Gersh (1973: 85-86) 
115 In Eucl. 19.20ff; 22.17ff. 
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in mathematical terms because their proximate causes exist as mathematicals. This does 
not mean, however, that one has thereby given an explanation of physical phenomena.  
In the context under scrutiny so far, Tim. 31-32, the descriptions of mathematical 
proportions according to Proclus are analogical preparations of the physical ones, 
which relate to an immanent physical principle, namely the Life that is the containing 
cause of the universe and everything in it (analogous to geometrical proportion),116 as 
well as its manifestations, each analogous to the one of the three kinds of proportions: 
enmattered forms (‘physical numbers’117), extension and spatiality/distribution over 
matter (geometrical ‘volumes’), and containing and forming qualities (harmonic 
‘powers’).118 In order to find this proper physical explanation, the mathematics of the 
text needs to be translated into physical properties,119 with a loss of some of the 
certainty and precision inherent in the mathematical explanation. On the whole, the 
function of the mathematical proportions is mainly anagogic, even though it allows a 
descent to physical qualities, because it connects the physical as we know it to its 
causes. This anagogic function exists not by imposition but is due to the necessary 
ontological connection between the mathematical and the physical.  
It has been argued that in Proclus’ exegesis of Tim. 31c-d the distinction between 
mathematics and philosophy of nature, that is so emphatically made by Proclus, in fact 
disappears on every level except that of the conditions sine qua non.120 This 
interpretation is based on a confusion of what one might call two kinds of 
mathematics. First of all, there is the essentially mathematical character of 
Neoplatonism, as its monistic metaphysics is founded on concepts such as unity, 
equality, monad, etc. Secondly, there is what Neoplatonists themselves call 
mathematics, the science of (discrete and continuous) quantity, which is intermediate 
between the intelligible and the sensible. The distinction between mathematics and 
philosophy of nature, as well as the term ‘mathematization of physics’ refers to some 
                                               
116 In Tim. II 24.1ff, cf. chapter II. 
117 On physical numbers in Proclus see O'Meara (1989: 187).  
118 II.24.30ff. One could argue over the question whether the introduction of this Life to explain the 
bond of the elements is indeed a physical explanation, rather than a metaphysical one, as it concerns 
the cause of physical order, that is imposed by the demiurge. Since the direct cause of this order 
(Nature) is immanent (as opposed to its source, the demiurge), and is moreover the cause only of 
things physical, ‘physical’ is probably the adjective to be preferred. That the Life in question is 
immanent is clear from Proclus’ description of how it works from inside physical objects (II 24.1-6): ἡ 
μὲν οὖν ἀναλογία ἡ πρώτη (...) μία τίς ἐστι ζωὴ καὶ λόγος εἷς φοιτῶν διὰ πάντων καὶ ἑαυτὸν μὲν πρώτως, 
ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνα συνέχων, ἐν οἷς ἐστι...  
119 Cf. Charles (1971: 244). 
120 Lernould (2000: esp. 140-1). Lernould’s main thesis is that what Proclus is offering is a 
mathematization of physics, which, through a theologization of mathematics, leads to a theologization 
of physics.  
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application of the second kind of mathematics to philosophy of nature, not the first. In 
other words, when Proclus speaks, for example, of the source of proportion being 
equality (In Tim. II 18.29-30), that is not a mathematization of philosophy of nature.121 
Rather, it is a general description of proportion using terms that lie at the heart of 
Proclus’ metaphysical system. 
 
IV.2.3 The Soul of the World 
 
After the transition introducing the World-Soul as ‘inserted’ into the body of the world 
at Tim. 34a-b (see above, IV.2.2), Timaeus’ discourse shifts from the body of the world 
to the World-Soul. The following issues are considered: (1) the ontological priority of 
soul over body (34bc), (2) the composition of the World-Soul from Being, Sameness 
and Otherness (35a), (3) the division of the World-Soul according to harmonic 
intervals (35b-36b), (4) the rational motions of the World-Soul, described as the 
construction of the Circle of the Same, the Circle of the Different, and the planetary 
cycles (36b-d), (5) the connection of Body and Soul of the world (36d-e) and finally (6) 
cognition and discourse of the World-Soul (36e-37c). 
 
In the following, Proclus’ views on the role of mathematics in (3) the division of the 
World-Soul according to harmonic intervals will be at the centre of attention.122 The 
main thesis of this section IV.2.3 is that in the context of the harmonic division of the 
World-Soul, the role of mathematics in philosophy of nature does not differ from that 
in the context of the body of the world, but the mathematics we encounter does. After 
the ‘psychic’ mathematical principles that described the proportional division of the 
elements through their causes, we now find the use of enmattered and “imaged”123 
mathematicals, i.e. those projected in physical matter and in the human φαντασία 
respectively. From those enmattered and “imaged” mathematicals we can ascend to a 
proper understanding of Soul.  
 
(i) The intermediate position  
 
In its main theses, Proclus’ discussion of the role of mathematics in the context of the 
World Soul resembles what we have seen earlier: 
                                               
121 Pace Lernould (2000: 132-3). 
122 On Proclus’ reading of Tim. 35-36 see MacIsaac (2001: 136-157). 
123 “Imaged” is chosen here in order to avoid the use of “imaginary”, which suggests a fictionality that 
is not relevant in the context. 
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T IV.12 
“(1) The mathematical theory should not be spurned altogether, (2) nor yet 
should it be pursued in isolation, for its own sake; (1) for the first does not 
show us, as Plato wants it, reality in images, and (2) the latter makes the whole 
exegesis unbalanced; for it should be moored, as it were, to a steady cable, 
namely the essence of the subject of the text. (3) So let us, as we have said 
before, explain the present passage from an intermediate position, first 
mathematically, then fitting the subject matter (οἰκείως δὲ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις).”124 
 
As with the Body of the World, so too in the case of the harmony of the World-Soul, 
mathematical theory “should not be spurned altogether”, nor “pursued in isolation”. 
The arguments presented this time are somewhat more informative than the ones we 
encountered in the context of the Body of the World.  
(1) The first, ignoring the mathematical passages altogether, would result in not 
showing “reality in images” (τὰ πράγματα ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσι), which is apparently what Plato 
aimed at by inserting those passages. 125 What Proclus does not have in mind here, 
despite the fact that the expression “reality in images” immediately recalls it, is Tim. 
29b3ff., where the universe is called an image of Being and a treatise on such an image 
a “likely story”.126 Presenting reality in images here does not mean showing Being in its 
image Becoming, but is rather a rephrasing of “presenting the World Soul (τὰ 
πράγματα) in sensible mathematics (ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσι)”.127 This brings to mind a different 
parallel, namely the well-known exposition on the iconic mode of discourse on the 
divine in Theol.Plat. I 4, more on which below.  
(2) The second approach, limiting ourselves to mathematics only, is rejected on the 
grounds that it would make our exegesis like a ship that is adrift (ἀνερμάτιστον128 ποιεῖ), 
as it needs to “be moored to a steady cable” (ἐπ’ ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος ὁρμεῖν129). These 
                                               
124 In Tim. II 174.15-20. 
125 Festugière (1966-8: vol. III, 219) mistakenly takes the phrase to be a first of two arguments against 
pursuing mathematics in isolation, and translates “d’ un côté, en effet, elle ne nous fait pas voir, 
comme Platon le veut (29 B 3 ss.), la réalité (sc. intelligible) dans les images (sc. sensibles), d’un autre 
côté...”. Not ἡ μαθηματικὴ θεωρία is the subject here, however (the pronoun would have had to be 
feminine rather than neutral), but the verbal adjective. The structure of the whole sentence (τὸ μὲν...τὸ 
δὲ) repeats the opposition of the previous sentence (οὔτε...οὒτε...), resulting in one argument each for 
οὔτε ἀτιμαστέον and οὔτε ζηλωτέον.  
126 Cf. Festugière (also previous note) and Diehl ad loc.  
127 On the “presence” of mathematics in the Soul, see In Tim. II 239.5-14.  
128 Said mainly of ships, metaphorically used for people or their souls, after Tht. 144a8. Cf. Plot. Enn. I 
8 8. 
129 The image of the steady cable, which occurs also elsewhere in Proclus, is borrowed from Laws 
893b4ff., where the Athenian stranger asks the gods to be a steadying rope upon crossing a river of 
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two Platonic references present in a beautiful, albeit mixed metaphor the principle of 
εἷς σκόπος, by pointing out that the literal exegesis of a passage is useless unless it is 
connected to the main subject of the entire text, or in Proclus’ words, to “the essence 
of the things of which the account treats”.  
(3) The proposed anchoring of the exegesis to the essence of the subject matter can be 
attained by starting from “an intermediate position”, i.e. neither rejecting mathematics 
entirely nor pursuing it in isolation, but, after a preliminary explanation of the 
mathematics per se, subsequently moving on to an approach that is appropriate to the 
actual subject matter (οἰκείως τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις). That approach is also called 
‘substantial’ (πραγματειώδης, In Tim. II 193.9), a revealing choice of words.130 The term 
is not uncommon in Proclus, and he often uses it to distinguish between an empty 
(ψιλός) logical approach and an approach with substance.131 As in the case of empty 
logic, one could say that the purely mathematical explanation is empty with respect to the 
physical matter at hand.132 As such, it gives us no more than an attractive and correct 
formal representation of relations within the text, but no real knowledge until the relata 
are ‘translated’, as it were, into the subject matter (πράγματα) relevant in the context.  
 
(ii) Mathematical images  
 
The description of mathematical proportions Plato uses to portray the structure of the 
World Soul is taken by Proclus to represent perceptible, ‘enmattered’ harmony, rather 
than the actual noeric one. From this portrayal of perceptible harmony, as an image, 
the exegesis should ascend to the paradigm which is the essential, immaterial harmony 
of the World Soul:   
T IV.13 
                                                                                                                                              
discourse (ἐχόμενοι δὲ ὥς τινος ἀσφαλοῦς πείσματος ἐπεισβαίνωμεν εἰς τὸν νῦν λόγον). In general, it 
stands for something that provides epistemic certainty or grounding.   
130 Cf. In Tim. II 206.13-14 ἔτι δὲ προσεχέστερον τοῖς πράγμασιν εἴποις ἄν κτλ.; ib. 213.8 Μετὰ δὴ 
τούτους ἄλλο πλῆθός ἐστιν ἐξηγητῶν πραγματειωδεστέρων λόγων ἀντεχόμενον. Whereas in the earlier 
opposition between a mathematical and an appropriate interpretation, the appropriate one was always 
called φυσιολογικῶς or φυσικῶς, φυσιολογία is not once referred to in relation to the ‘appropriate’ 
explanations of the world soul, and instead Proclus uses descriptions such as ‘substantial’ 
(πραγματειώδης). Cf. above n. 8. 
131 E.g. in the debate on whether the second half of the Parmenides is a mere logical exercise, or really 
has a philosophical content. In Parm. 635.31 etc. Cf. Theol Plat I 9 34.15 and Proclus’ harsh judgment of 
Aristotelian logic at In Crat. 2: τὰς τοῦ Περιπάτου ψιλὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μεθόδους διαλεκτικάς.  
132 The “empty” mathematics is comparable to what Mueller (1987) calls “ordinary” mathematics, 
which predominates in the Euclid Commentary after the prologues (p. 85ff). Cf. MacIsaac (2001: 119, 
n. 278). 
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“For the mode of exegesis about the World Soul should be adapted to its 
essence (τῇ οὐσίᾳ συμφυής), that is, it should separate itself from perceptible 
(φαινόμενη) harmony, ascend to the essential and immaterial harmony, and from 
images send itself up to their paradigms. For the harmony (συμφωνία) that flows 
in through our ears and consists of sounds and impressions, is completely 
different from the vital and noeric one.”133 
 
Proclus’ subsequent description of the transition from perceptible to essential 
mathematics gives a good idea of what he takes the method of analogy to consist in in 
this case: the ascent is a gradual one, initially through a stripping away (ἀφελεῖν),134 as it 
were, of those properties suggested by the analogy that are obstacles (ἐμπόδια) to our 
understanding of the World Soul, as they are not appropriate to its essence 
(corporeality, dimensionality, quantity, etc.).135 The second step is, interestingly, a 
‘calculation’ (ἀναλογιζέσθω, almost a ‘translation’) of the indications (ἔνδειξιν,136 
στοχάζεται) of the essence of the Soul provided in the remaining aspects of the 
different kinds of proportion.137 This should lead, in third instance, to the 
understanding of the causes involved in the construction of the World Soul, with the 
demiurge at the top of the list.138 Just like the conceptual analysis of Becoming (see 
chapter III) the method of exegesis of a given analogy leads to knowledge of causes, 
but on a more modest scale. Mathematics serves as anagogic tool, then, also in the 
study of the World Soul, and as in the case of the physical proportions of the body of 
the world, physical harmonies are not a mere sum of mathematics and corporeality: 
stripping the physical of its typically physical aspects does not yet yield the “essential” 
mathematics of the World Soul.  
 
This conclusion allows us to solve a little puzzle in the Euclid Commentary, where 
Proclus describes the role of mathematics in theology/philosophy as follows:  
T IV.14 
“...Plato teaches us many wonderful lessons about the gods through 
mathematical forms. And the philosophy of the Pythagoreans shrouds its 
                                               
133 In Tim. II 195.11-17; cf. In Tim. II 211.15-16.  
134 Note that Proclus is here sketching an Aristotelian picture of abstraction (ἀφαίρεσις). See on this 
topic Helmig (forthcoming).  
135 In Tim. II 193.8-194.4, esp. 193.8-13. 
136 Cf. Theol.Plat. I 4 20.2 and In Tim. I 8.22. 
137 In Tim. II 195.22-24.  
138 In Tim. II 211.10-30. The causes are enumerated at II 208.20ff. 
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mystical initiation to the divine doctrine, using them (i.e. mathematical forms) as 
veils.”139 
 
Contemporary readers are puzzled by the fact that Proclus speaks of Plato’s many 
wonderful doctrines about the gods by means of mathematical forms, and refer to 
‘unwritten doctrines’.140 Morrow tells us in a footnote: “We have, I believe, no writing 
of Plato’s in which such teachings can be found, and it is significant that Proclus does 
not name any. He may be referring to versions of Plato’s “unwritten doctrines.” Such 
accounts were easily subject to contamination in this era of revived Pythagoreanism.” 
This footnote reveals a miscomprehension of Proclus’ reading of Plato: there is no 
need for having recourse to the much abused “unwritten doctrines”. It is the Timaeus 
that Proclus has in mind, and the gods he speaks of are probably primarily the planets, 
but also divine principles in general. That Proclus “does not name any” is significant 
not because it reveals their “unwrittenness”, but simply in that he took it to be obvious 
what he meant. That the Timaeus is indeed what he has in mind is clear from In Tim. II 
246.4-9, where we find a remark very similar to that in the Euclid Commentary: 
T IV.15 
“By way of concealment (ἐπίκρυψιν) of the words Plato used mathematicals, as 
veils (παραπετάσμασιν) of the truth about reality, as the theologians use their 
myths, and the Pythagoreans their symbols: for in images one can study the 
paradigms, and through the former make a transition to the latter.”141 
 
In this passage, we find again the combination of Plato’s use of mathematics, of 
mathematics as veil of reality,142 and of the Pythagoreans.143 This time, it is Plato who 
uses the veils, not the Pythagoreans, but of course the Timaeus is a Pythagorean 
dialogue for Proclus.144 The references to concealment, veils, and mystical doctrine 
suggest that mathematics is used according to Proclus to hide, rather than reveal, the 
                                               
139 At In Eucl. 22.9-16. 
140 Morrow (1992: 19, n. 41), Cleary (2000: 94). 
141 ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων δι΄ ἐπίκρυψιν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς τῶν ὀνομάτων οἷον παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσατο τῆς 
τῶν πραγμάτων ἀληθείας͵ ὥσπερ οἱ μὲν θεολόγοι τοῖς μύθοις͵ οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι τοῖς συμβόλοις· ἔστι γὰρ 
καὶ ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσι τὰ παραδείγματα θεωρεῖν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἐπ΄ ἐκεῖνα μεταβαίνειν. I take τῶν ὀνομάτων as 
apposition of δι’ ἐπίκρυψιν. Its position suggests that it be taken with τοῖς μαθημτικοῖς, but that does 
not make any sense. The combination δι’ ἐπίκρυψιν with a form of ὀνομα or νομιζεῖν occurs several 
times in Proclus. In Remp. I 91.19, Theol.Plat. V 18.17, In Tim. III 28.3. 
142 For the use of παραπετάσματα see Plato Prot. 316e. 
143 Cf. Beierwaltes (1979: 166). 
144 See chapter I and O'Meara (1989: 179-181). 
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nature of the subject in question.145 That this is not the case, however, and that the 
veils are not meant to stay in place, but rather to be lifted, can be gathered from 
Proclus’ addition that the veils, like theological myths and Pythagorean symbols, serve 
as a means of transition to the study of ontologically higher objects that are not 
immediately accessible – provided of course that we have the proper preparation and 
guidance.146 
The terms in which Proclus phrases his assessment of the mathematical explanations 
of the World Soul recall the iconic mode of discourse about the divine.147 In a well 
known passage of the Platonic Theology, Proclus distinguishes 4 kinds of Platonic 
discourse about the gods:  
T IV.16 
“Apparently he does not pursue the instruction about the gods everywhere in 
the same way, but sometimes he unfolds the truth about them in an inspired 
way, and sometimes dialectically, sometimes he conveys their unspeakable 
properties symbolically, and sometimes he ascends from images (ἀπὸ τῶν 
εἰκόνων) up to them and reveals the primary causes of the wholes in them.”148 
 
Plato, Proclus says in this first description, has four ways of teaching about the gods: in 
an inspired way (ἐνθεαστικῶς), dialectically (διαλεκτικῶς), symbolically (συμβολικῶς) and 
from images (ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκόνων).149 In the first two modes Plato presents us with the 
truth about the gods; in the third mode, what cannot be spoken about is expressed in 
symbols; and in the fourth the causal role of the gods is shown with the use of images. 
Later on all this is rephrased in a second description, where the former two modes are 
combined under the heading ἀπαρακαλύπτως, and the latter two are further qualified as 
δι᾿ ἐνδείξεως: 
T IV.17 
                                               
145 Cf. Beierwaltes (1979: 171, n. 23). 
146 The remarkable similarities between the two passages on Pythagorean veils, one of which regards 
the role of mathematics in theology, not philosophy of nature, might tempt one to conclude that the 
study of the World Soul belongs to theology rather than physiologia. As has been argued in the previous 
chapter, however, all of Procline φυσιολογία is a study of the divine, not as such, but as it is present in 
the natural world – including the World Soul. 
147 The following discussion of Theol.Plat. I 4 appeared as section 3 of Martijn (2006b). On Theol.Plat. I 
4 and especially the iconic mode of discourse see also Dillon (1976), Gersh (2000), Pépin (2000), 
Sheppard (1980: 196-201). 
148 Theol. Plat. I 4 17.18-24. 
149 Cf. In Parm. 646.21ff, where a similar division is made.  
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“For those who speak about the gods by indication (δι᾿ ἐνδείξεως)150 speak 
either symbolically and mythically or through images (δι΄ εἰκόνων), whereas of 
the ones who advance their thoughts unveiled (ἀπαρακαλύπτως) some write 
scientifically, and others through inspiration from the gods.”151  
 
After the passage quoted above as T IV.16 (Theol. Plat. I 4 17.18-24), Proclus continues 
with an illustration of these four modes of discourse about the divine, among others by 
mentioning dialogues as well as non-Platonic texts in which they can be found, and 
including a third description of each of the modes. For the treatment of the divine in 
images, i.e. διὰ τῶν εἰκόνων, which following Gersh I shall call the iconic mode,152 he 
mentions the Timaeus.153 This mode of discourse is further characterized as “teaching 
through mathematics (...) and a treatise about the gods from ethical or physical λόγοι 
(τῆς διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων διδασκαλίας (…) καὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν (...) φυσικῶν λόγων περὶ τῶν 
θείων πραγματείας.)”. This description picks up two earlier qualifications of the iconic 
mode of discourse about the divine in T IV.16 and T IV.17: δι’ εἰκόνων and ἀπὸ τῶν 
εἰκόνων, which refer to different aspects of that mode of discourse, namely its starting 
point and its procedure respectively. The images started from are “the physical λόγοι”, 
i.e. both the entire κόσμος, filled with ‘creative reason principles’ (λόγοι) and, 
consequently but not primarily, the exposition (λόγοι) about it.154 The images through 
which we are taught are the mathematical ones, which “picture the powers of the 
gods”.155 Note, however, that it is not the discourse which pictures the divine, but 
mathematics itself. Mathematical discourse is not a literary image, but a description of 
ontological images, εἰκόνες.  
                                               
150 Following Pépin (2000: 3-4) I suggest that the formula δι᾿ ἐνδείξεως, expressing what the symbolical 
and the iconic modes of discourse have in common, is to be translated as ‘by indication’ or ‘through 
signs’, rather than ‘dans un langage allusif’ (‘in allusive speech’, Saffrey and Westerink (1968), and 
Lernould’s). Allusion is indirect reference, but the iconic mode is one that directly refers to ‘signs’ in 
our world, thereby providing understanding of a transcendental reality. More on this below.  
151 Theol Plat I 4 20.1-5. The switch from ἀπό τῶν εἰκόνων to δι’ εἰκόνων here and διὰ τῶν εἰκόνων in I 4 
19.10-11 may depend merely on the following verb (ἀνατρέχων in I 17.22; λέγουσιν here; γινώσκειν in 
19.11) rather than on any difference in the function or nature of the εἰκονες. Another option will be 
discussed below. 
152 Gersh (2000: 15). 
153 Theol. Plat. I4 19.6-13 Εἰ δὲ βούλει καὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων διδασκαλίας μνησθῆναι καὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν 
ἠθικῶν ἢ φυσικῶν λόγων περὶ τῶν θείων πραγματείας͵ οἷα πολλὰ μὲν ἐν Τιμαίῳ πολλὰ δὲ ἐν Πολιτικῷ 
πολλὰ δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις διαλόγοις ἐστὶ κατεσπαρμένα θεωρεῖν͵ ἐνταῦθα δήπου σοι καὶ ὁ διὰ τῶν εἰκόνων τὰ 
θεῖα γινώσκειν ἐφιέμενος τρόπος ἔσται καταφανής. Ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα τὰς τῶν θείων ἀπεικονίζεται 
δυνάμεις. 
154 In the In Tim. the expression φυσικοὶ λόγοι stands for φυσιολογία (e.g. I 19.23; 337.25 etc.), but more 
often for the productive reason principles of nature (e.g. I 27.27; 51.28 etc.).  
155 Theol.Plat. I 4 19.12-13, cf. 20-21. 
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To return to Proclus’ views on the role of mathematics in our understanding of the 
World Soul, there is a good polemical reason for Proclus’ repeated emphasis on its 
instrumental and ‘anagogic’ role. This reason shows through his fairly casual 
explanation of it as being necessary due to the disagreement among exegetes on how to 
interpret the passages on the proportional divisions of the World Soul.156 Proclus 
wants at all cost to avoid one particular interpretation of the mathematical passages, 
namely a simplistic and literal one,157 which would result in the vulnerable position of 
Plato describing a World Soul that is a physical magnitude. This position had been 
ascribed to Plato and consequently criticized by Aristotle, whose criticism is in turn 
vehemently rejected by Proclus as the result of a faulty interpretation, as great absurdity 
(πολλῆς ἀλογίας, 250.10), and a waste of time (οὐδὲν ἡγοῦμαι δεῖν περιεργάζεσθαι πλέον, 
278.30).158 As so often, Proclus explains away problematic passages in a Platonic text 
by proposing a non-literal exegesis. 
The relation between the World Soul and the mathematical ratios that describe how it 
was divided, at first sight seems similar to the relation between the elements and the 
mathematical proportions, namely an ontological iconic relation. There is a crucial 
difference, however, regarding the ontological level of the mathematics involved. The 
relation image – paradigm between World Soul and mathematical ratios is the inverse 
of the one we saw in the case of the elements. In the passages on the physical 
elements, certain properties of those elements are the images of, and are caused by 
geometrical, and to a lesser extent arithmetical and harmonic, proportions. 
Mathematization in the sense of a description in mathematical terms of the elements 
provided an analogy from which to descend to understanding of the physical.  
The World Soul, however, is ontologically prior to the mathematicals used to describe 
it and instead has certain of its properties reflected in both the enmattered 
mathematical ratios, and those in the human mind, that Soul in fact causes itself.159 
That is, the images presented in the context of the World Soul are not entities on a 
higher ontological level, or the paradigmatic causes of a lower level, but are themselves 
entities on a lower rung of reality:  
                                               
156 In Tim. II 212.3ff. 
157 Literal is not used here as opposed to metaphorical, unless we take the latter to have a strong 
ontological sense, i.e. that certain levels of reality are metaphorical for others. 
158 Arist. dA I 3 406b26-407b10; In Tim. II 249.31ff.; 278.27ff. For a reconstruction of Proclus’ now 
lost polemical treatise refuting Aristotle’s ciriticms of the Timaeus see Steel (2005), for the psychogony 
(168-9). 
159 In Tim. II 174.23-28 οἱ μὲν οὖν Πυθαγόρειοι μέγα φρονοῦσιν͵ ὡς τὴν τοῦ κανόνος κατα τομὴν 
ἀνηυρηκότες· ὁ δέ γε Πλάτων ψυχῆς κατατομὴν ἐν τούτοις παραδίδωσι͵ τὰς αἰτίας τὰς οὐσιώδεις καὶ τοὺς 
λόγους τοὺς γεννητικοὺς τῶν μαθηματικῶν θεωρημάτων ἀναπτύσσων. Note the beautiful image of the 
κατατομή of the World Soul as an unfolding of the causes and principles that it contains. 
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T IV.18 
“All these mathematical ratios and numbers are images (ἀπεικονίζονται) of the 
true essence of Soul.”160 
 
Mathematization, now in the sense of describing and studying an entity in its 
mathematical images, will allow us to ascend from them to a higher ontological level,161 
or in other words, to be led by imagination (φαντασία) to scientific apprehension.162 
Thus the difference between the two discussions of mathematics is essentially based on 
the different referents of the words μαθήμα, μαθηματικός and the like, in both: 
regarding the World Soul Proclus maintains that mathematics (i.e. applied mathematics 
as we find it in harmonics) presents us with μαθήματα in the sense of mathematical 
objects as they are projected in matter and human mind, and of which the World Soul 
itself is the cause. 163 In the context of the body of the world, however, the 
mathematical explanation consisted of λόγοι μαθηματικοὶ, mathematical principles, i.e. 
the creative principles that reside in the World Soul itself. 
 
(iii) Particular souls 
A final occurrence of the issue of mathematization in the study of the soul in Proclus’ 
commentary deserves our attention. At Tim. 43d Timaeus recounts the effect of 
encounters of the human body with material obstacles on the soul, namely that of 
disturbing and confusing the ratios of which the soul consists. Proclus, in his exegesis 
of this passage emphasizes the fact that the psychic ratios should be explained 
appropriately to each kind of soul (divine, demonic, particular), in the sense that they 
are more multiplied in lower souls, while retaining the ratio, which is not influenced by 
multiplication.164 Consequently, he points to the need of a physical 
(φυσικῶς) explanation of these mathematical ratios. Considering the priority of the soul 
over the physical, this physical explanation seems irrelevant. A closer look shows that 
                                               
160 II 212.5-9, cf. ἀπείκασται, 218.9-10.  
161 Cf. μαθηματικῶς...πρῶτον γυμνάσωμεν τὴν τῶν ἀκουόντων διάνοιαν, II 174.28-9. 
162 In Tim. II 237.13-15. Festugière’s translation of ἡ φαντασία as “la représentation figurée” is 
unfortunate, as Proclus is here referring to our faculty of projection of extension, the imagination. See 
Lautner (2002: esp. 263ff.). 
163 There is an exception: at II 214.30ff Proclus has in mind a different set of image and reality, namely 
not mathematical theory presenting an image of the reality of the world soul, but the mathematical 
(more precisely diatonic) nature of the world soul as an image of a higher ontological level, of ‘things 
divine, in just the same way as the body is admittedly spherical, but also, through being spherical, an 
image of νοῦς.’   
164 In Tim. III 336.3-340.27, esp. 24-25: καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐξηγήσεως τρόπος, πλὴν ὅτι τὴν ἰδιότητα 
προσθήσομεν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ. 
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on this occasion the mathematical explanation is not a methodological analogy for the 
physical (or the other way around), but an ontological analogy only. The ratios of the 
soul produce certain physical manifestations:  
T IV.19 
“…we should see this not in a mathematical, but in a physical manner. For the 
mathematical ratios are one thing, and the relations (αἱ σχέσεις), that the souls 
produce because they have those ratios are another.”165  
 
In this case, then, both explanations are valid in their own right, on their appropriate 
ontological levels, and neither is given merely by way of an anagogic tool.  
 
 
IV.2.4 Conclusion: Mathematization in the Timaeus according to Proclus 
 
On the basis of the foregoing, we can now sketch a picture of Proclus’ explicit views of 
mathematization of philosophy of nature, and of his intermediate philosophy of 
nature. As opposed to most of today’s readers, but like his teacher Syrianus, Proclus 
has a view that combines of elements of realism and of instrumentalism: physical 
reality is caused by, but not identical or reducible to, a mathematical reality (realism); 
and mathematics as such can be used to describe physical reality, but not in isolation 
(instrumentalism).166 Mathematical theories, according to Proclus, are instrumental167 in 
the philosophy of nature, due to a real (ontological) relation between the mathematical 
and the physical. Mathematical theories as such, however, represent or explain the 
mathematical, and not the physical world, as it is. In order to obtain an explanation of 
the physical world as it is, mathematical theories as such do not suffice. More precisely, 
the relation between mathematical and physical theories is one of ontological ἀναλογία, 
                                               
165 In Tim. III 337.25-27. 
166 MacIsaac (2001: 189-190) makes a similar point, but in comparing Proclus’ ideas with those of 
modern physical scientists obscures the difference between instrumentalism and realism: 
“...mathematical number is a convenient, useful and precise way of representing in our thought the 
reality which is both above and below mathematical number itself. For modern physical scientists to be 
realists, i.e. to hold that their equations actually do reveal the structure of physical reality in some way, 
they must at least implicitly hold a similar ontological doctrine as Proclus with regard to the 
homologous or analogous structure between mathematical and physical reality, otherwise language 
drawn from one sphere would be inapplicable to another.” 
167 Or useful, χρήσιμον (In Tim. II 32.1-2). 
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i.e. the theories are analogous, due to the ontological (causal) ἀναλογία existing between the 
physical and the source of the mathematical.168 
In the case of philosophy of nature concerning the body of the world, we are offered 
mental representations of the mathematical principles from the World Soul. These 
representations can be used as an analogy to descend to certain physical properties.169 
On the other hand, the role of mathematics in the part of φυσιολογία that concerns the 
World Soul is the inverse. In this case, too, there is an ontological relation between 
Soul and mathematicals, which provides us with the tool of analogy. The mathematical 
theories in question concern the projections in the material world, images of the 
principles that are primarily present on the level of Soul.170 Through them, again by 
analogy, we comprehend the character and structure of Soul. In both cases, of course, 
the mathematics actually used in the theories is the one projected in the human soul. 
At the heart of these two kinds of mathematical philosophy of nature lies the 
ontological relation between the mathematical ἐνέργεια of the soul, and its 
manifestations on the physical level. As a consequence, the analogical function of 
mathematics is far stronger than one of chance similarity.171 One might wonder why 
the ἀναλογία works in two directions, both from the higher level of Soul down to the 
material level, and from the material level up to Soul.172 The answer to this question is 
that the ultimate aim both in the case of the body of the world, and in that of the 
World Soul, is to trace the qualities revealed by ἀναλογία back to their intelligible 
causes, the one Life and the Demiurge respectively.173 In other words, the direction is 
ultimately upwards in both cases.  
                                               
168 Cf. Beierwaltes (1979: 158, cf. 333). MacIsaac (2001: 184, 186) uses the expression ‘metaphor’ as a 
translation of analogia, in the sense of “language drawn from one sphere of reality applied to another 
sphere of reality, which keeps its truth because of the homologous structure which holds between each 
level of reality.”  
169 Cf. Steel (2005: 188) on Simplicius’ view that the mathematical explanation is an ἔνδειξις, and that 
the elements are not themselves geometrical figures, but that the latter indicate quantitative structures 
of the physical.  
170 On Proclus’ projectionism see Mueller (1987). Cf. the discussion of In Eucl. 121.2-7, 141.2-19 as a 
reception of Tim. 70e ff. in Sheppard (2003: 211-2).  
171 Bechtle’s emphatic statement that with the “Transposition von Mathematika” to other domains of 
reality mathematics retains only its name and its symbolic meaning (2000: 33f. and n. 75) is thus too 
simple a representation of the role of mathematics as it ignores the ontological relation between the 
domains of reality that allows for the transposition in the first place. As Gersh (1973: 87) points out, 
whereas the English word ‘analogy’ “has a certain connotation of vagueness”, the Greek word 
ἀναλογία has the opposite meaning, deriving from its mathematical context, and “convey[s] the idea of 
precision”.  
172 Cf. MacIsaac (2001: 184). 
173 Cf. Plotinus who allows understanding of the sensible through the intelligible, Schroeder (1996: 
348). 
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IV.3 Books IV and V: Lower Philosophy of Nature, the Senses, and Life 
 
After the first phase of Proclus’ second notion of φυσιολογία, in which the 
mathematical passages of the Timaeus are given their due attention, Proclus’ concept of 
philosophy of nature changes once more. This second phase, or lower philosophy of 
nature, is to be found in books IV and V, which treat the heavenly bodies and human 
body and soul respectively. At first sight the main aim of lower philosophy of nature is 
to explain away omissions in the Timaeus. Both the omissions explicitly announced by 
Plato, i.e. what the Germans call Aussparungsstellen, and those signalled in the 
commentary tradition, are justified by demarcating the boundaries of φυσιολογία. In 
fact, two shades can be distinguished: philosophy of nature is defined as an empirical 
science in book IV, 174 and as ‘biology’, a science pertaining to living being in book V. 
There is more to lower φυσιολογία, however, than Proclus’ embarrassment at certain 
shortcomings of the Timaeus: the different notions of φυσιολογία are actual expressions 
of different aspects of its subject matter.  
The first, or empirical, lower philosophy of nature is the main subject of section IV.3.1. 
The second lower philosophy of nature, biology, which is more of an appendix 
because it is only referred to on two occasions in what is left of the commentary, is the 
subject of the section IV.3.2. 
 
IV.3.1 Book IV: Empirical philosophy of nature 
 
In book IV, on time and the planets (Tim. 37c6-40e5, In Tim. III 1.5-161.6), Proclus 
defines φυσιολογία as an empirical discipline, or sometimes in a somewhat wider sense 
as a discipline that has only the perceptible as its subject matter (which neither 
guarantees nor necessitates an empirical approach). On several occasions in this book, 
Proclus connects φυσιολογία with empiricism, mainly to justify omissions, but also to 
explain certain apparent inconsistencies, in Timaeus’ account. 
 
(i) Parts of time 
T IV.20 
                                               
174 Tim. 37c6-40e4, In Tim. III 1-161. In fact, already in the description of the division of the World 
Soul into the planetary circles empirical φυσιολογία, or rather empirical astronomy, is introduced (II 
266.1). And at In Tim. II 57.25ff. Proclus even explicitly acknowledge the empirical nature of 
philosophy of nature. These are exceptions, however. 
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“For there were no days and nights, months and years, before the Heaven came 
into being; but he planned that they should now come to be at the same time 
that the Heaven was framed.” 175  
 
Plato’s claim that the parts of time did not exist before the generation of the universe, 
confronted Proclus with an apparent metaphysical inconsistency. The claim as it stands 
seems to contradict the principles of creation, since it denies the existence of the 
transcendent paradigmatic causes of the parts of time. Proclus’ solution to this 
inconsistency consists of three elements: first of all, paradigmatic Day, Night, Month 
and Year do in fact exist before the creation, but not as parts of eternity, since eternity 
has no parts.176 Secondly, if Plato had wished to speak about the paradigms instead – 
and that he could have done so is demonstrated with reference to Laws 899b2 ff. –, he 
would have used the singulars ἡμέρα, νύξ, μήν, and ἐνιαυτός, rather than the plurals we 
find at Tim. 37e1.177 And thirdly, Plato has good reason not to discuss the paradigms, 
since he is here ‘concerned with philosophy of nature’:  
T IV.21 
“We should not be surprised about the fact that Plato here speaks rather about 
appearances (τὰ φαινόμενα), because now he is concerned with philosophizing 
about nature (φυσιολογεῖν πρόκειται).”178  
 
Since Proclus takes this argument to be cogent, it seems reasonable to assume that 
φυσιολογία in this part of the commentary no longer primarily concerns the 
transcendent causes of the natural, but rather enmattered reality itself.  
 
(ii) The ἀποκατάστασις 
This impression is reinforced by Proclus’ response to another omission: Plato’s failure 
to provide any concrete (numerical) information concerning the ἀποκατάστασις of the 
fixed stars (i.e. their return to the same point after a full period), or even to mention 
their contribution to the measurement of time. The ἀποκατάστασις is important 
because the revolutions of the fixed stars, like that of the wandering stars, contribute to 
the measurement of “the whole of time”, ὁ σύμπας χρόνος.179 This omission is justified 
                                               
175 Tim. 37e1-3, transl. Cornford, exegesis at In Tim. III 34.14-36.33. 
176 In Tim. III 34.19.23. 
177 In Tim. III 36.4-5.  
178 In Tim. III 36.28-9. 
179 In Tim. III 129.16-27. This may refer to ὁ τέλεος ἑνιαυτός of Tim. 39d4, the Perfect Year, also known 
as the Great Year throughout antiquity and after. Cf. II 290.6-17 and Kukkonen (2000: 124).  
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with an appeal, not only to the perceptibility of the subject matter of philosophy of 
nature, but to the very empirical nature of the discipline.180 The proper method of 
φυσιολογία, Proclus maintains, is an empirical one, and whereas perception does 
provide us with information on the ‘number’, i.e. the duration of the revolutions of the 
wandering stars, it does not do so with regard to the fixed stars.181 The existence of an 
ἀποκατάστασις of the fixed stars is not in question, despite the fact that we have no 
empirical evidence for it. It follows from the metaphysical presuppositions concerning 
the division of the World Soul. The precise arithmetical quantity of that ἀποκατάστασις, 
we can, by Proclus’ account, unearth neither on the basis of those same 
presuppositions, nor on that of sensory information – although the latter would be the 
suitable approach.182 
 
(iii) Δαίμονες  
T IV.22 
“...as to the other divinities (δαίμονες, more on the term below), to know and to 
declare their generation is too great a task for us” (Tim. 40d4-5) 
 
After the account on the visible and generated gods (i.e. the planets), Timaeus states 
that discussing the generation of the lower divinities is beyond his abilities.183 
Concerning this explicit omission, Proclus raises four aporiai, and, as in the case of the 
ἀποκατάστασις,  responds to two of them with reference to the source of the 
philosopher of nature’s evidence in sense perception.184  
The first aporia Proclus brings up concerning Tim. 40d4-5 again arises from an 
apparent contradiction, this time Plato’s denying the possibility of knowing and 
describing the origins of “the other divinities”, i.e. the traditional sublunary gods, after 
having discussed the ontologically higher celestial gods and the intelligible paradigm,185 
describing which should have been “too great a task” a fortiori. The assumption 
                                               
180 Tim. 40b4ff, with In Tim. III 129.16-130.3. 
181 Note that the mathematics involved is that of celestial numbers, or celestial instantiations of 
number, which partake, as Proclus mentioned elsewhere, in a fair amount of precision. Theol Plat IV 
86.12-15, In Tim. II 51.5ff. (quoted above). 
182 Cf. In Tim. III 308.20-24, where Proclus argues for the dissemination of souls in the fixed stars by 
explaining that the fixed stars, too, are instruments of time (and since Plato states that souls are 
disseminated in the earth, the moon, and the other instruments of time, souls are disseminated also in 
the fixed stars), while admitting that we have no empirical data for their revolution.  
183 Tim. 40d6-7 Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γνῶναι τὴν γένεσιν μεῖζον ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς. 
184 In Tim. III.152.5ff. 
185 In Tim. III 152.16-19. 
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resounding in the background is that knowledge of what is closer to us is more easily 
acquired.186 Proclus’ reaction to the omission, however, is that perhaps “the eye of the 
soul” remembers the ontologically more remote more easily than what is nearby, due 
to its greater impact on us, 187 just as we gaze at the stars rather than at what is lying 
right at our feet.188 Thus the soul would recall the celestial gods better than the 
sublunary ones, and discussing the origin of the latter would thereby be more 
demanding.189  
After this more general argument explaining what makes a discussion of the lower 
gods so “great a task”, Proclus continues with a second argument in defence of Plato, 
which states that this is not the proper place anyway for such a discussion. It turns on 
the somewhat incongruous fact, from a Platonic point of view, that, although they are 
ontologically lower than the perceptible celestial gods, the sublunary gods are not 
perceptible. Discussing the generation of the sublunary gods is more difficult (than 
discussing the higher, celestial gods) due to the fact that we cannot reason about them 
from their manifestations in the perceptible realm (μηδὲ ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμφανῶν 
συλλογίσασθαι190), but only from inspired and intellectual intuition.191 Not only does 
that increase the difficulty, however, it also disqualifies the sublunary gods as a topic of 
philosophy of nature: 
T IV.23 
“...we have no clear indication of their existence from the appearances. (...) 
Now it goes beyond philosophy of nature (μεῖζον...φυσιολογίας) to discuss that 
about which natural things do not give us a fixed conviction, and for this reason 
he says that, as a philosopher of nature (ὡς φυσιολόγος), talking about them is 
beyond him (ὑπὲρ αὑτὸν).”192 
 
                                               
186 Cf. Arist. APo I 2 72a1-4. 
187 In Tim. III 152.31-153.18. Cf. El.Th. prop. 7. Note that physical distance and ontological priority are 
equated.  
188 In Tim. III 153.1-4. Note that this position is supported with an argument that reminds of Aristotle’s 
argument against “like is affected by like”, Gen.Corr. I 7, dA II 5.  
189 Another solution to the aporia, namely that the δαίμονες are in fact not sublunary gods, but superior 
ones, is discussed and rejected at III 156.6-21. 
190 Cf. In Tim. III 40.18, συλλογίζεσθαι in the sense of reasoning.  
191 In Tim. III 153.17-21. This is not to suggest that reasoning about the higher divinities excludes the 
use of such intuition, as that would result in the incongruity of the ontologically lower being know 
through a higher form of cognition, which flies in the face of the basic principles of Platonic 
epistemology. 
192 In Tim. III 156.26-29. This argument is presented in the context of the third aporia, “what is the 
ontological rank of the δαίμονες?”, but is in fact a return to the first aporia, as is clear from the phrase 
“why he stated beforehand that he passes over the discussion about them” (156.22-23). 
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The topics of nature are, it seems, not necessarily only those that are themselves 
perceptible, but those concerning which the objects of perception at least give us a 
“fixed conviction” (πίστιν ἀραρυῖαν); and since in the Timaeus Plato is being a 
philosopher of nature, as such (ὡς φυσιολόγος) the discussion concerning the lower 
gods is “beyond him”.193  
This argument is meant not only to explain why Plato refuses to go into the generation 
of the sublunary gods, but also to protect Plato’s reputation by suggesting that he 
could give an account of those more difficult issues, no doubt using his “inspired and 
intellectual intuition”, if he thought the context were apposite. In order to enhance the 
latter effect, Proclus in the following paragraph puts Plato and “the theologians”, i.e. 
Orpheus, the Chaldaeans, and the Egyptians,194 on a par, something he does not do 
explicitly anywhere else in the Commentary on the Timaeus.195 The association of Plato 
with these alleged first writers of theogonies is elicited by Timaeus’ statement that 
when it comes to knowledge of the invisible gods, we have to trust the early 
theologians who claim progeny from the gods (40d7ff.). The irony in this statement, 
namely that these theologians are in fact unreliable according to Timaeus because they 
have evidence for their claims neither from perception nor from reasoning196 is wasted 
on Proclus. Proclus has the opposite view, and (naturally) takes the theologians to be 
superior to the philosopher of nature, exactly because their knowledge derives not from 
“probable and necessary demonstrations”, but from inspiration. 197 
                                               
193 A similar argumentation is used by Calcidius, In Tim. 127, Waszink 170.9-12, although his 
explanation differs to the extent that he adds a qualification of the method with which one would 
study these divinities, namely “epoptica”, the method to be applied also to the Parmenides. On this 
topic, see Pépin (1974: 326-7), Somfai (2004: 206).  
194 In Tim. III 157.9-10 καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸν ὥσπερ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους θεολόγους. This need not mean that 
Plato is here considered a theologian, as ἄλλος need not be inclusive, but the association is present 
either way.  
195 Or in other commentaries, with the exception of In Remp. II 255.25, In Parm. 1106.29 (where the 
theologians seem to be summoned by way of argument ad auctoritatem) and 1173.6. On the other hand, 
in the Platonic Theology, which after all deals specifically with Plato’s theological doctrines, treating Plato 
as one of the theologians is not uncommon. Theol.Plat. I 43.26, IV 110-111, V 123.11ff., 133.26ff, etc.   
196 Thus Cornford (1937: 138-9), who among others refers to Phaedr. 246c6-d 2 and Laws 886c. Cf. 
Lloyd (1991: 348-9), who takes the remark to be an indication that the likely story (more on which in 
chapter V) has a higher status than the subjects isolated in the omissions concerning particulars and 
myths about traditional gods. 
197 In Tim. III 160.5-12 αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ καὶ ἐπιστρέφουσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν προγόνους καὶ πληροῦνται 
παρ΄ ἐκείνων ἐνθέου νοήσεως͵ ἡ δὲ γνῶσις αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐνθουσιαστική͵ διὰ τοῦ θείου φωτὸς τῷ θεῷ 
συναπτομένη͵ πάσης ἄλλης ἐξῃρημένη γνώσεως τῆς τε δι΄ εἰκότων καὶ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ περὶ 
τὴν φύσιν διατρίβει καὶ τὰ καθ΄ ὅλου τὰ ἐν τοῖς καθ΄ ἕκαστα͵ ἣ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ 
ἐπιστητά· μόνη δὲ ἡ ἔνθεος γνῶσις αὐτοῖς συνάπτεται τοῖς θεοῖς. Proclus ignores the concessive 
connective καίπερ at Tim. 40e1. 
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The fact that Proclus dodges the most interesting question of why we have no 
empirical access to the sublunary gods, as well as his ultimate preference for arguments 
from authority above the senses, shows that the main aim of the discussion concerning 
the sublunary divinities is defending Plato.198 Nonetheless, we can assume that he 
himself took the defence to be adequate. 
 
(iv) Δαίμονες once more 
 
In this discussion of Tim. 40d6-7 the emphasis on sense perception as sine qua non for 
φυσιολογία occurs one more time, in response to the second aporia: “why are these 
lower divinities called “δαίμονες”? Proclus explains that the word δαίμονες refers to 
gods, not to proper demons – the common meaning of δαίμων in his day and age. 
Using the word δαίμων in its proper sense would mean: 
T IV.24 
“...speaking as if he did not know their physical principles (ἀρχαὶ φυσικαί) from 
sense perception, from which philosophy of nature (οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι) should 
commence.”199  
 
That is, we do have evidence from sense perception about demons, and treating them 
would be appropriate in this context.200 Therefore the statement that δαίμονες cannot 
be treated here must imply that the word δαίμονες is used in a different sense than the 
usual. Whereas in the previous examples the role of sense perception in theory of 
nature was brought in as an argument to explain away an omission, here it is 
presupposed within another argument, which presents, one could say, a lectio difficilior 
rather than an ad hoc solution.  
 
 
                                               
198 Cf. Philop. Aet.Mund. 633.14-636.2, where Philoponus accuses Proclus of using double standards in 
his explanation of this passage. The question is brought up later, however, in the context of Tim. 41a3-
6 (In Tim. III 194.31ff). For acquiring knowledge of the generation of those gods, which is what the 
Timaeus passage speaks of, such empirical access hardly seems sufficient, but Proclus’ point is that we 
have no clear indication from sense perception of the existence of these sublunary gods. 
199  In Tim. III 153.28-154.3 καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τε περὶ τῶν ἰδίως ὀνομαζομένων δαιμόνων ἰδίᾳ φαίνεται μὴ 
λέγων, ὡς ἂν οὐκ ἔχων αὐτῶν ἀρχὰς φυσικὰς ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀφ' ἧς ὡρμῆσθαι δεῖ τοὺς φυσικοὺς 
λόγους.... The ‘as if’ (ὡς ἂν) suggests it to be common knowledge that δαίμονες properly so called are in 
fact known through sense perception.  
200 On the visibility of δαίμονες see III 194.31ff (on Tim. 41a3-6). On δαίμονες in Proclus, see 
Siorvanes (1996: 128, 169-70). Cf. Lernould (2001: 44 and n. 34). 
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IV.3.2 Book V: Philosophy of nature and living being 
 
About book V we can be brief. At first Proclus seems to forget all about φυσιολογία. 
The section on lower gods (Tim. 40e-41a) is said to be a natural and immediate 
consequent of the treatment of the heavenly gods, and to obtain its scientific character 
(τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν) from the ontological continuity between the higher and the lower 
levels of divinity.201 The report of the speech of the demiurge,202 in turn, is 
characterized as a verbal representation of the demiurge’s creative λόγοι, separating the 
creation of the universe as a whole from the creation of the parts.203 As such, it is not 
even taken to be a proper part of Timaeus’ exposition.  
On two later occasions in book V, however, Proclus does invoke the boundaries of 
φυσιολογία to justify certain omissions on Plato’s part, just as in book IV. In book V it 
is not the perceptibility of the natural world that constitutes his main argument, but 
rather the fact that φυσιολογία deals with what is corporeal, and with living being 
(ζῷον). As opposed to other dialogues, most notably the Phaedo and Republic, Plato’s 
treatment of the human soul in the Timaeus, like that of Aristotle in de Anima, does not 
contain any information, according to Proclus, on the events before and after 
incorporation, or the related moral issues.204 Instead, at 43b Plato discusses the 
incorporation of the soul without further ado. This is because, thus Proclus, Plato 
includes only what is in accordance with the purpose of the dialogue: 
T IV.25 
“Someone might ask ‘So what is the reason for this omission?’ And my answer 
is that [Plato] maintains what is fitting to the purpose of the dialogue, and 
includes the theory of the soul in this context only insofar as it is physical, by 
presenting the communion of the soul with the body.”205  
 
Psychology is treated only insofar as it is physical, i.e. insofar as it pertains to the soul’s 
association with the body. Likewise, when at 44c Timaeus cuts his discussion of the 
afterlife short with the words “But these things come about at a later stage”, Proclus 
explains the omission of such “ethical questions” by pointing to the task of the 
philosopher of nature to teach us about the life of the body (περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος 
                                               
201 In Tim. III 162.1ff. 
202 Tim. 41a-d, In Tim. III 199.29-200.27. 
203 The transition to the creation of parts takes place at In Tim. III 242.9. 
204 In Tim. III 323.16-324.3. This point is in itself contestable, but Proclus apparently reads the Timaeus 
this way, perhaps by way of contrasting it with other dialogues, or as an ad hoc explanation of an 
omission. See below. 
205 In Tim. III 323.27-31. 
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ζωῆς), or in other words, about the living being (περὶ τοῦ ζῴου), that consists of body 
and soul.206  
Thus we can discern in book V a final notion of φυσιολογία as a biological discipline, 
the subject matter of which is the living being, both in a macrocosmic and in a 
microcosmic sense.207  
 
IV.3.3 Conclusion: ad hoc philosophy of nature? 
 
Generally speaking, the passages discussed, which emphasize the empirical foundations 
of φυσιολογία and its embodied, living subject matter, could be given two 
interpretations, one weaker and one more substantial. (i) The weaker reading of the 
passages would be that they merely present ad hoc explanations of omissions in the 
Timaeus, and cannot be taken in evidence of Proclus’ conception of φυσιολογία. (ii) The 
more substantial reading is that in the fourth and fifth books of the commentary, the 
notion of φυσιολογία acquires new meanings, i.e. that of an empirical science, one that 
bases its theories on observations, and that of ‘biology’. The evidence seems to point in 
the direction of the first option, among others because the second reading seems to 
create a tension with the earlier books, most conspicuously with the theological 
φυσιολογία of book II. Moreover, Proclus has a tendency not to maintain the 
boundaries he himself imposes on philosophy of nature in his exegesis of the Timaeus. 
For example, he sees no harm in presenting details the source of which is not sense 
perception, but rather the “inspired and intellectual intuition” of Plato and the 
theologians, when he dedicates some twenty-five pages of his book V to the sublunary 
gods (In Tim. III 162-197.26).  
An heuristic reason for nonetheless rejecting the former, weaker reading is that an 
interpretation of the passages as mere ad hoc explanations assumes a sacrifice of 
conceptual clarity to authority on Proclus’ part. Thus choosing the second option is 
preferable on the basis of the principle of charity. The question is, then, whether this 
preferred reading can be maintained. It can, in our view, if we can reconcile especially 
Proclus’ emphasis on the empirical character of philosophy of nature with his earlier 
attempts at giving the discipline a scientific, rational, foundation. Such a reconciliation 
is obtainable by keeping four things in mind. First of all, in book IV Proclus demands 
that philosophy of nature deal with a subject matter for which sense perception gives 
us a clear indication (γνώρισμα) – leaving ample room for the discussion of non-
perceptible causes that are perceptible in their effects. Secondly, despite the fact that 
the core of book II can be said to be giving philosophy of nature a scientific 
                                               
206 In Tim. III 353.13-22. 
207 In Tim. III 355.7-19. 
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foundation as revealing knowledge of causes, at the same time the empirical 
foundation of philosophy of nature was shown to be crucial: Becoming is primarily 
known through perception and judgment (δόξα). Thirdly, the scientific nature provided 
to philosophy of nature in the second book is transferred to intermediate and lower 
φυσιολογία due to the continuity in the exposition of the κόσμος.208 And finally, there is 
a distinction between Plato’s notion of philosophy of nature as found by Proclus, and 
Proclus’ exegetical practice which is not bound by that notion. 
Thus the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle: Proclus understands different 
sections of the Timaeus to presuppose different notions of philosophy of nature, 
without those notions being mutually exclusive, and without them being imposed to 
their full extent on Proclus’ own exegesis. They are a matter of emphasis dictated by 
the context.209  
 
 
IV.4 General conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have seen the intermediate and lower levels of philosophy of 
nature, which are witness to the fact that φυσιολογία, following its subject, φύσις, 
pertains to different levels of reality and as such is more than theology alone. We can 
now conclude that Proclus has four explicit notions of philosophy of nature, that are 
hierarchically ordered, each with its own method: theological philosophy of nature 
(book II), mathematical philosophy of nature (book III), empirical philosophy of 
nature (book IV) and biological philosophy of nature (book V).210 In this chapter the 
latter three have been studied. There is no rigid division in Proclus’ exegetical practice: 
the transition from one kind of φυσιολογία to another is not marked, and on occasion 
the purity of the division is marred by the presence of e.g. an empirical explanation in 
the context of intermediate philosophy of nature.  
With respect to ‘intermediate’, mathematical philosophy of nature, I have argued that 
the role of mathematics is one of ontological analogy, i.e. a strong analogy that is based 
                                               
208 On this topic see chapter V and cf. above at n. 201.  
209 Note that for Proclus philosophy of nature does not end with the account of the incorporated soul 
– and that we cannot conclude that Proclus’ commentary beyond Tim. 44 was perfunctory (as does 
Lernould (2001: 21-2)): its lowest parts are where it discusses the basic principles of medicine, by 
establishing what is in accordance with and what goes against nature. See In Tim. I 6.7-21 and Tarrant 
(2007: 98 n. 30).  
210 Note also that the three levels do not match the division of the commentary into the creation of the 
whole, the creation of wholes, and the creation of parts (starting at III.97.1, see also appendix III), and 
that we do not know whether Proclus added further distinctions to the concept of physiologia in the 
exegesis of Tim. 45ff. 
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not on chance similarity, but on ontological similarity due to a relation of causation. 
Within mathematical philosophy of nature, two versions can be discerned, with respect 
to this relation of causation. In the case of proportional division of the body of the 
world, mathematics is brought in as the cause of the order, regularity and cohesion to 
be found in the corporeal. As such, it prepares us for an understanding of the physical 
properties themselves (top-down). With regard to the World Soul, however, the 
relation is the inverse: the mathematics brought in is read by Proclus as the projections 
into the material world, that are analogous to the actual structure of the World Soul 
(bottom-up). In general, I have argued that Proclus’ position on the mathematization 
of nature is one that combines aspects of realism – physical reality is caused by, but not 
identical or reducible to, a mathematical reality – and instrumentalism – mathematics as 
such can be used to explain physical reality, but not in isolation. Both versions of 
mathematization, i.e. in the context of the body and the soul of the world, ultimately 
serve the same purpose of facilitating understanding of the transcendent causes of their 
subject matter. 
Philosophy of nature that starts from mathematics is ‘intermediate’ in two senses: from 
a methodological point of view it is intermediate between ignoring mathematics 
altogether in favour of the perceptible, and focusing exclusively on it. From an 
ontological and epistemological point of view it is ranked between theological 
φυσιολογία on the one hand and lower φυσιολογία on the other, just as mathematical 
objects are intermediate between the divine and the corporeal. 
After this intermediate philosophy of nature, we find in the In Tim. a concept of lower 
φυσιολογία, that falls into empirical and biological philosophy of nature. Both seem 
conjured up for the sake of explaining away omissions in the Timaeus. On the other 
hand, since they are related to certain aspects of φύσις as the subject matter of the 
discipline, they can, and I propose they should, be taken as serious aspects of the 
overall notion of φυσιολογία.  
On the whole, we could say that in every new book of his Commentary on the Timaeus 
Proclus’ notion of philosophy of nature is adjusted to the subject matter at hand, or, 
from an epistemological point of view, that the manner in which a science is delimited 
and set apart from other sciences is not a monolithic whole, but a sophisticated chain 
of different scientific levels covering the different aspects of its subject matter.  
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IV.5 Appendix: The Elements of Physics  
 
Now that we have discussed the four different notions of philosophy of nature, 
theological, mathematical, empirical, and biological, we should briefly turn to Proclus’ 
other physical work, the Elements of Physics, and the question how it is related to the In 
Tim.211 Although the Elements of Physics has been compared with its brother, the Elements 
of Theology, a comparison with the Timaeus commentary has as yet to be made. The reader 
will not find such a comparison here, but only some suggestions. 
Proclus’ Elements of Physics is for all appearances an attempt at reducing Aristotle’s 
Physics to an exposition more geometrico. As has been argued by O’Meara and others, it is 
in fact a study manual on motion, the exposition more geometrico of which serves only a 
methodological purpose, in order to reinforce Aristotle’s argumentation by imposing a 
syllogistic rigour. It is neither a commentary, nor an epitome, but rather a treatise on 
motion in its own right, based on Aristotelian material (Physics books VI and VIII, as 
well as parts of De Caelo I).212 In fact, its alternative title in antiquity was Ἡ περὶ 
κινήσεως.213 Proclus chose to leave out other problems discussed in the physical works 
of Aristotle, because “in realtà investono la metafisica,”214 and when it comes to 
metaphysics, Aristotle is by far the inferior of Plato. Instead Proclus concentrated on 
motion, because this is what constitutes the true heart of Aristotelian philosophy of 
nature as such.215 After all, nature is ‘that which has its principle of motion and rest 
within itself.216 The ultimate value of Aristotle’s philosophy of nature, as is clear from 
the propositions in the second book of the El.Ph.,217 is the inference to an unmoved 
mover, in whom, due to its immaterial nature, we find the transition to Platonic 
metaphysics. This can be seen clearly in the conclusion of the work, that is presented 
as the argumentation for the last proposition, but in fact contains the culmination of 
Aristotelian physics: 
T IV.26 
                                               
211 See Reale in Faraggiana di Sarzana (1985: xlv-lviii). For other references see Steel, et al. (2005: 49-
50) 
212 O'Meara (1989: 177-9), Nikulin (2003).  
213 Faraggiana di Sarzana (1985: 33) 
214 Reale in Faraggiana di Sarzana (1985: xlvii-viii). 
215 Cf. In Tim. II 121.25ff. 
216 Arist. Met. VI 1 1025b 18ff, 1026a 10 ff, XI 7 1064a15ff. 
217 For example, the last proposition of the work is “the first source of circular motion is without 
parts”, II 21. 
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“Therefore the first mover of circular motion is not a body; it is incorporeal, 
and has infinite power, quod erat demonstrandum.”218  
 
Little can be said as regards the relation between the In Tim. and the El.Ph., since 
Proclus himself is never explicit about it. We can surmise a little from the content, 
however.  
Faraggiana di Sarzana (1985: 31) at the outset of her translation of the Elements of Physics 
suggests a connection between the account of the animation of body in the In Tim. and 
the analysis of the relation between bodies and motion in the Elements of Physics, by 
quoting as a motto for her translation In Tim. III 119.17-23:  
T IV.27 
“The account about motion (ὁ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως λόγος) follows the one about 
animation: because each of the stars is ensouled, for this reason it has also 
obtained its proper motion; for soul is the source of motion. It also hangs 
together with the theory of figures, because what has a proper circular form and 
has received that form from the demiurgic cause by necessity also has an 
activity that is proper to that form and a circular motion.” 
 
This may seem an indication that for Proclus the Elements of Physics could be attached 
directly to the account about the soul in the Commentary on the Timaeus, but in fact ὁ περὶ 
τῆς κινήσεως λόγος refers to the Platonic account of motion, as starting at Tim. 40a7, 
where Plato has the demiurge bestow circular motion and axial rotation on the planets.  
The treatment of motion in the Elements does give insight into the principles of motion, 
but because it does not reveal the true, transcendent causes of that motion it will never 
provide scientific knowledge. Thus the kind of philosophy of nature it presents is 
inferior to even the lowest we encounter in the In Tim., due to the fact that Platonic 
philosophy of nature derives everything from the transcendent causes of Becoming. 
We have seen an illustration of this difference in chapter III. Platonic philosophy of 
nature, we said, starts from the hypotheses of two genera, Being and Becoming. The 
inferior Aristotelian philosophy of nature, however, as it is referred to in the Euclid 
Commentary, has as its definite starting point that motion exists,219 a starting point which 
is no more than Aristotle’s effort to imitate Plato. 220  
                                               
218 El. Ph. II 21.16-7: οὐκ ἄρα σῶμά ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν τὴν κύκλῳ κίνησιν· ἀσώματον ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ 
ἀπειροδύναμον, ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι. 
219 In Eucl. 75.19-20. Cf. Arist. Phys. 185a12-3. See III.3.3(ii).  
220 In Tim. I 237.17ff. 
  
V DISCOURSE AND REALITY: THE ΕΙΚΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ 
 
 
V.1 Introduction1 
 
In chapter III, we have seen how Proclus uses the prooemium of the Timaeus to 
demonstrate that φυσιολογία is a hypothetical science which provides knowledge 
of the causes of the universe, primarily the demiurgic cause, that starts from the 
information of sense perception. In that chapter we disregarded the last lines of 
the prooemium, concerning what Proclus tentatively considers ‘the fourth 
demonstration’ (Tim. 29b3-d3, In Tim. I 339.3-353.29).2 The present chapter offers 
an analysis of Proclus’ understanding of that passage, in which Timaeus famously 
refers to his exposition on the universe as no more than a ‘likely account’ (εἰκὼς 
λόγος),3 and warns his audience not to expect an exposition about the universe to 
be entirely consistent and accurate, due to the nature of its subject, the universe, 
which is an εἰκών of Being, due to the nature of discourse, which may not be 
incontrovertible and irrefutable, and finally due to human nature:  
T V.1 
(T V.44) “Concerning an image and its paradigm, a distinction should be 
made in the following manner:” (T V.7) “accounts are related to that very 
thing of which they are the interpreters” – (T V.10) “for a text concerning 
the permanent, and stable, and what is evident to the mind is itself 
permanent and irrefutable – insofar as it is possible and appropriate for 
words to be irrefutable and invincible, it should not fall short of that;” (T 
V.14) “but a text which concerns that which is copied from it and is an 
image, is likely,” (T V.17) “and standing in proportion to them: as Being is 
to Becoming, so truth is to belief.” (T V.19) “If then, Socrates, in many 
respects concerning many things – the gods and the generation of the 
universe – we prove unable to render an account at all points entirely 
consistent with itself and exact, you must not be surprised.” (T V.25) “If 
we can furnish accounts no less likely than any other, we must be content, 
                                               
1 Parts of this chapter appeared as Martijn (2006a). 
2 Proclus sees the determination of the εἶδος of the text (i.e. a likely story) as a demonstration 
from the nature of the universe, In Tim. I 355.25-28. 
3 Plato uses the expressions εἰκὼς λόγος and εἰκὼς μῦθος, see below. Occurrences of εἰκὼς 
λόγος: Tim. 29c2, 8; 30b7; 48d2 (bis); 53d5; 55d5; 56a1; 56b4, cf. d1; 57d6; 59d1, cf. d3; 68b7; 
90e8; cf. 40e1. εἰκὼς μῦθος: Tim. 29d2, 59c6, 68d2. 
4 These numbers are crossreferences to the places elsewhere in this chapter where the phrases in 
question and Proclus’ analysis thereof are discussed in further detail. 
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remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human, and 
consequently it is fitting that we should, in these matters, accept the likely 
story and look for nothing further.” (Tim. 29b3-d3, translation based on 
Cornford.) 
 
Like the starting points given earlier in the prooemium,5 this statement can be 
divided into a general principle, concerning the relation between account and 
subject matter, and a ‘demonstration’, the application to the realm of Becoming as 
the subject matter of Timaeus’ exposition.  
Considering Proclus’ efforts to emphasize the scientific nature of φυσιολογία, 
Timaeus’ statement concerning the status of an account about Becoming as an 
εἰκὼς λόγος may pose a threat for his position. The main questions of this chapter, 
therefore, are in what sense, according to Proclus, Platonic φυσιολογία is a ‘likely 
story’, and how Tim. 29b3-d3 can be reconciled with the scientific status of 
φυσιολογία.  
Part of the answer lies in the fact that Proclus focuses far more on theorizing 
about the general principle of the relation between account and subject matter, and 
about human accounts and knowledge in general, than on what is today 
considered the core of the above passage, namely the specific status of an account 
about Becoming.  
In the following I will refer to the general principle that accounts are like their 
subject matter as the principle of discourse, and to the specific application thereof 
to accounts concerning Becoming as the εἰκὼς λόγος.6  
A further distinction to be made is that between two strands present in Proclus’ 
interpretation of the principle of discourse, and that I will call ‘resemblance’ and 
‘assimilation’. By ‘resemblance’ I refer to those aspects of discourse and reasoning 
and their relation to reality in Proclus’ interpretation of the ‘likely story’ that are 
due to natural and necessary properties of language, reality, and the human make-up. 
                                               
5 See chapter III. 
6 I will not present a general Proclean theory of discourse, as that would go far beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. I will, however, discuss some principles that can be distilled from Proclus’ 
interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3 and that might figure in such a general theory of discourse. - 
When translating εἰκώς I have chosen ‘likely’, as a fairly theory-neutral rendering (as opposed to 
‘verisimillitude’ or ‘probabiliy’) and to indicate its root in ἔοικα and its relation to εἰκών. - I will 
not use the expression εἰκὼς μῦθος as the word μῦθος hardly plays a part in Proclus’ 
interpretation. Its occurrence at 29d2 is considered a metaphor, and no serious alternative for 
λόγος. See below V.5.2(ii). - As to λόγος, we should at all times be aware of the fact that Proclus 
makes extensive use of the polysemy of this word, as referring (in the context of Tim. 29b3-d3) to 
metaphysical, epistemological, logical and verbal concepts. When it refers to verbal expressions, I 
usually translate ‘account’ (in the sense of a verbal description, rather than an explanation), 
‘discourse’, or (in plural) ‘words’. 
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‘Assimilation’ is the term I use for the remaining aspects of discourse and 
reasoning in Proclus’ interpretation, that are related to what we could call the 
practice of discourse, i.e. its use and manipulation, serving to increase the similarity both 
of discourse to its subject, and of the human soul to reality.  
After a summary of recent explanations of the εἰκὼς λόγος (V.2), and some 
introductory remarks on the ancient εἰκὼς λόγος (V.3), sections V.4, V.5, V.6 and 
V.7 discuss the details of Proclus’ exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3. Section V.4 and V.5 
are devoted to ‘resemblance’. Section V.6 shows to what extent and in which 
manner Proclus understands the principle of discourse to apply to the Timaeus, 
and section V.7 treats the second main aspect thereof: ‘assimilation’.  We will 
conclude the chapter by bringing together some of the results of this chapter with 
those of chapter III (V.8). 
The main argument of this chapter is that Proclus interprets Tim. 29b3-d3 in such 
a way that it reinforces his reading of the dialogue as a reversion to the demiurgic 
cause of the natural world. Λόγοι in the sense of verbal expressions are primarily 
natural emanations of higher levels of reality, like any other λόγοι, and therefore 
naturally similar to their source (which I called ‘resemblance’), and secondarily a 
didactic tool of man, with which he tries to imitate reality and establish a reversion 
of his own and other souls (which I called ‘assimilation’). Thus Tim. 29b3-d3 is no 
longer a statement of the inadequacy of discourse of philosophy of nature, but 
instead an addition lending support to Proclus’ overall interpretation of the 
Timaeus as a theological philosophy of nature. 
In the literature on Neoplatonic literary theory and theory of language, in which 
the relation between text and metaphysics takes a central place, the interpretation 
of Tim. 29b3-d3 has so far hardly been taken into account.7 In general, and 
especially in Proclus’ case, it is in the context of his reception of the Republic and 
the Cratylus, rather than the Timaeus, that that relation is extensively discussed. The 
issues involved in such discussions are generally the true meaning and value of 
myths and poetry in the former, the nature of words and symbols in the latter, and 
in addition the role of language in theurgy.8 These issues and their contexts are 
                                               
7 Esp. Coulter (1976), Sheppard (1980: 296-318), Beierwaltes (1985: 296-318, with review of 
Coulter and Sheppard), Kuisma (1996), Rappe (2000: esp. 170-80), van den Berg (2001), 
Sheppard (2002). The lacuna signalled by Beierwaltes (1985: 301, cf. 308-9), regarding the 
philosophical implications of Neoplatonic theories of literature and exegesis, has in part been 
filled by Kuisma, Rappe and van den Berg, but a lot of work is yet to be done.  
8 In Remp/poetry: Coulter (1976), Dillon (1976), Hirschle (1979), Sheppard (1980), Kuisma 
(1996), Halliwell (2002: 323-34), Sheppard (2002), Brisson (2004) In Crat./naming: Hirschle 
(1979), van den Berg (forthcoming). Theurgy: Struck (1998), van den Berg (2001: esp. 120ff.), 
Struck (2002). 
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treated in this chapter only insofar as they are subsidiary to our understanding of 
Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3.  
Of the In Tim., if anything, the two prooemia, i.e. the “summary” of the Republic 
and the Atlantis story have been the subject of further investigation concerning 
Proclus’ theory of discourse. Proclus introduces them as representations of the 
universe in images (εἰκόνες) and in symbols (σύμβολα) respectively, and they have 
therefore been studied for the sake of a comparison of his notions of image and 
symbol.9 The exception is a recent paper by Lernould (2005), which focuses 
entirely on the theme of the εἰκὼς λόγος, and the question how it is compatible 
with the claim for a scientific status of philosophy of nature. The paper contains 
valuable analyses and a wealth of material, but since the author emphasizes the 
opposition, rather than the continuity, inherent in Proclean metaphysics and 
epistemology, he has to conclude that Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3 is 
incompatible with the rest of his commentary. In this chapter it will become clear 
that such a conclusion can be avoided. 
 
 
V.2 The εἰκὼς λόγος today – a selection 
 
To allow an appreciation of how different Proclus’ interpretation of the εἰκὼς 
λόγος is from some of the modern readings, and how close to other, especially 
more recent ones, let us briefly walk through some of those modern readings. 
This section highlights different interpretations of the εἰκὼς λόγος, but should not 
be considered to be an exhaustive discussion.  
In the modern debate on Tim. 29b3-d3 three issues are raised. (1) Plato speaks 
both of an εἰκὼς λόγος and of an εἰκὼς μῦθος, and this may, or may not, refer to 
different aspects of his cosmology or different senses of being likely.10 (2) 
Considering the position of the εἰκὼς λόγος remark at the end of the prooemium, 
Plato may be taken to exclude the prooemium from that qualification.11 Moreover, 
certain other parts of Timaeus’ exposition may be excluded as well, most notably 
                                               
9 Esp. Dillon (1976), Sheppard (1980), Kuisma (1996: 54ff.), Sheppard (2002: 196-201). Cf. 
Beierwaltes (1979: 171, n. 23). 
10 See the discussions in Morgan (2000: 275-9), Johansen (2004: 62-68). According to Vlastos 
(1964: 382) εἰκώς is the important word. See also Brisson (1994: 104-5). Johansen (2004) (see 
below and n. 26) connects μῦθος to the context of human nature, and Brisson (1998: 129-30) 
comes up with very different descriptions: “falsifiable discourse describing the present state of 
sensible things” (εἰκώς λόγος) and “non-falsifiable discourse presenting, in an explanatory model, 
the state of sensible things before and during their constitution” (εἰκώς μῦθος). 
11 Berti (1997: 119-20 and n. 5, 127), Reale (1997: 152). Cf. Hackforth (1959: 18f.), Vlastos (1964: 
402-5), Runia (1997: 113). 
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the introduction of the third kind at Tim. 47eff.12 (3) The central issue, of course, 
has been the meaning of εἰκώς. 
 
Timaeus’ remarks on the status of an account about nature are the subject of 
extensive discussion in their own right, but above all they have figured in an 
ongoing debate among Plato’s modern-day audience, on the question whether we 
should read his cosmogony literally or as one great metaphor. In general, those 
who prefer the metaphorical reading of the Timaeus find one of their clues – or 
arguments – in the word εἰκώς, that tells them, among others, that Plato never 
meant the world to have a beginning in time.13 On the other hand, literalists – as 
we may call them – try to defend their interpretation against the threat of the εἰκὼς 
λόγος, and, rather than focus on the λόγος’ being εἰκώς, concentrate on its 
refutability.14 Between these two extremes a rainbow of interpretations has been 
                                               
12 Runia (1997: 111-2) sees the introduction of the third kind as an application of the method 
advocated in Socrates’ ‘second sailing’ (Phaedo 99d-102a). For the position that both the 
proœmium and the principles at 47eff are rationally established principles, and hence (or this is 
suggested) free from εἰκοτολογία, see Leinkauf (2005: xii, n. 4): “Die Unterscheidung zwischen 
eikôs mythos und logos ist schon im text des Platons selbst deutlich festzumachen: die 
fundierenden Passagen zur Unterscheidung von Sein und Werden (27Dff) oder zu den Prinzipien 
der Weltentstehung (47Eff: nus und anankê) gehören zur rational erfaß- und darstellbaren 
Ontologie und Prinzipienlehre, nicht, wie die Demiurgen-Schilderung, zum Mythos.“ Leinkauf 
has this distinction mirrored in the use of λόγος and μῦθος for the respective kinds of discourse. 
His reading is inspired by Gadamer (1974: 245). 
13 See Zeyl (2000: xx-xxv) for an extensive and insightful discussion of this debate. Zeyl’s own 
reading will be discussed below. Baltes (1996: 94-5), who opts for the metaphorical reading, does 
not explicitly play the εἰκώς μῦθος card, but the argument is present in his reasoning. He refers to 
Timaeus’ repeated stressing of the difficulties involved in understanding what he says, despite the 
fact that in the Timaeus, more than in any other dialogue, the interlocutors are more or less on an 
equal level. Moreover, it is worth noting here that Baltes mentions Timaeus’ statement that it is 
impossible for the description of the universe to be entirely free of contradiction. Baltes explains 
this as involving ‘dass Timaios sich gelegentlich unscharfer kolloquialer Ausdrucksweise bedient’. 
Cf. Tarán (1971: 391 and n. 165), who sees the metaphorical character as a choice masking the 
likeliness, and Finkelberg (1996). Dillon (1997), who emphatically sides with the non-literal camp, 
does not avail himself of the likely story, but of other indications, mainly inconsistencies, as ‘clues 
sown’ by Plato.  
14 This camp of the literalists, of which Aristotle is famously the first adherent, has few followers. 
Of course their forte – to try and explain a text from its very words – is also their disadvantage: 
discrepancies are hard to get rid of. Roughly speaking two versions of the literal view can be 
distinguished, on the one hand the view that only the account is cosmogonical (e.g. Vlastos 
(1964)), on the other hand the inference that Plato’s genuine position was cosmogonical (e.g. 
Hackforth (1959)). Robinson (1979) proposes a hybrid reading that is the inverse of and less 
successful than that of Dillon: he interprets the text literally, unless the text itself explicitly 
indicates otherwise. 
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offered, from a reading of Tim. 29b3-d3 as indicating poetic license,15 through the 
suggestion that Plato is not presenting us with his cosmological views, but instead 
challenges his readers to examine their own views,16 to the anachronistic reading 
of the Timaeus in probabilistic terms or as verisimilitude, “the nearest 
approximation which can ‘provisionally’ be made to exact truth,” and which is 
subject to perpetual revision.17 
In the recent surge of interest for the εἰκὼς λόγος question,18 apart from readings 
that fit in the dichotomy sketched above, a certain trend is detectable. In two 
respects a shift has occurred, that, as we will see, brings us closer to the Proclean 
interpretation.  
(a) First of all, the word εἰκώς is explained as expressing the likeliness not so much 
of the exposition, but of the content of physical theory.19 Still, the qualification 
εἰκώς is explicitly given to the text, not to its subject. Considering that this 
qualification is due to the subject matter, it has been pointed out that the 
distinction made is not one between literal and metaphorical, but between 
consistent and accurate vs. less consistent and less accurate, between apodeictic 
certainty and plausibility.20 This is an important modification, since, assuming that 
the likeness of the text is of the same sort as that of the subject matter, it 
invalidates the εἰκὼς λόγος remark as arguments for the ‘metaphoricalist’ position.  
(b) Secondly, more attention is given to the validity expressed in εἰκώς, i.e. the 
positive side of some kind of similarity, as opposed to the mere limitation of 
dissimilarity.21 The ontological structure sketched in the prooemium necessitates 
the like(li)ness of discourse about the universe, but also supports and justifies this 
                                               
15 Cornford (1937: 28-32), cf. Atzpodien (1986: 113, cf. 8-9), who thinks the Timaeus is one great 
metaphor that allows the readers to see the “gedanklich-logischen Vorstellungswelt” of the 
harmonic structure of the cosmos and of the soul. 
16 Gregory (2000: 241-2, 259). 
17 Taylor (1928: 59-61), pushed to extremes in Ashbaugh (1988), more moderate versions in  
Sorabji (1983: 272), Wright (2000: 14-19), Morgan (2000: 271-281), and Runia (1997: 111-2).  
18 For example, in ‘Interpreting the Timaeus/Critias’, the Proceedings of IV Symposium 
Platonicum, five out of 31 contributions are to a large extent devoted to the εἰκώς μῦθος: Berti, 
Reale, Runia, Santa Cruz, and Vallejo.   
19 To be fair, this was already pointed out by Tarán (1971: 400-1 n 104). Tarán does, however, 
belong to the team of those who read the Timaeus as a metaphor (‘creation myth’), triggered by 
the word μῦθος.  
20 Zeyl (2000: xxxii), Johansen (2004: 51). 
21 Cf. already Rivaud (1925: 11-12), who refers to Brochard (1902). 
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discourse.22 It is, in fact, what makes sensible discourse about Becoming possible 
in the first place.23 
Almost all of the readings discussed in the foregoing are rooted in the modern 
conception of cosmology or science of nature in general: science of nature is 
supposed to be a science par excellence that requires, if not certainty, at least 
exactitude. Therefore Plato’s qualification of his science of nature as a mere 
like(li)ness has been regarded as a serious issue, with far-reaching consequences 
for not only the dialogue, but Plato’s doctrine about the generation of the universe 
and physics in general – to the extreme of qualifying the entire cosmology as 
fiction.24  
The most recent interpretation, put forward by Johansen (2004), does not suffer 
from such modern presuppositions, but provides an interesting and rather 
Neoplatonic angle, namely that, as a source of knowledge of the transcendent Forms, 
the sensible world is only moderately useful, since it is an image thereof, but in a 
different ontological medium.25 This is an interesting interpretation because it 
considers the Timaeus as ultimately also aiming at knowledge of the Forms, and as 
valuing cosmology to the extent that it provides that knowledge, rather than 
knowledge of the sensible world as such. In this respect Johansen is quite close to 
Proclus. Moreover, also like Proclus, Johansen emphasizes the role of the 
limitations of human nature (as opposed to divine nature), which so far has not 
been very present in the debate.26  
                                               
22 Santa Cruz (1997: 133ff.), Van Ophuijsen (2000: 128), Zeyl (2000: xxxii-xxxiii), Burnyeat 
(2005), cf. Reale (1997: 152).  
23 Gadamer (1974: 10) 
24 A very different approach is the interpretation of the Timaeus as a (re)creation of the or a 
universe in words. This is a scintillating reading, and one that easily relates to the Neoplatonic 
exegesis of the Timaeus. See V.7.1. When applied rigorously to the Timaeus, however, it inevitably 
runs into problems due to lack of evidence and even evidence to the contrary. Osborne (1996) 
considers the ‘likeliness’ of Timaeus’ discourse to lie in the extent to which it succeeds in 
moulding a world (if I understand her correctly, one that is independent of the material world) to 
match its paradigm, the Forms. A similar approach is to be found in Brague (1985), who analyses 
Timaeus’ exposition in detail in order to map it on the male human body. Unfortunately, his 
apparent success is to a large extent due to his begging several questions. Most importantly, as 
Brisson (1987: 127) points out, there is no reason to assume that the animal in question should be 
a human. Nor, I would add, a male. In this respect the anonymous author of the prolegomena 
understood the principle formulated in the Phaedrus better when he concluded that a text should 
assimilate the universe as the perfect living being (see below V.7). More credible versions of this 
interpretation, that are not associated with the theme of the εἰκὼς λόγος, are to be found in 
Johansen (2004: 186ff.) and Hadot, P. (1983) (see below and n. 266). Cf Friedländer (1975: 355) 
“Schon in seinem Aufbau ist der Timaios ein Abbild der Kosmos, den er deutend nachdichtet.”  
25 Johansen (2004: chapter 3, esp. 56, 59-60). 
26 Johansen (2004: 55, 60, 62-63). 
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V.3 Proclus on the εἰκώς λόγος: preliminaries 
 
From the moment the Timaeus was written, the polemics about whether the 
generation of the cosmos should be taken literally or in some metaphorical sense 
thrived. However, the theme of the εἰκὼς λόγος does not figure in any way in the 
ancient debate on this question.27 For this reason Proclus’ views on the 
generatedness of the cosmos will not be treated in this chapter.28  
Moreover, the ancient scholars do not seem to have struggled all that much with 
the notion that the account is not ‘truth’, but an approximation or an image 
thereof.29 On the contrary, writers after Plato have borrowed several expressions 
(εἰκοτολογία,30 κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα, etc.) from the Timaeus, as implying the 
validity, if within certain limits, of what is said. For example, the expression ‘κατὰ 
λόγον τὸν εἰκότα’ implies that something is probable, that it agrees with the facts, 
however incomplete they may be.31 So being εἰκώς means being fitting, seeming, 
probable: it does not imply a negative judgement. Proclus’ optimistic reading of 
the ‘like(li)ness’ of an account of the physical world fits in this picture. The more 
interesting part of the theme of the εἰκὼς λόγος for its ancient readers, as we will 
see, is the general principle according to which accounts are related to and 
interpreters of their subject matter. 
 
Before we move on to Proclus’ reading of Tim. 29b3-d3, a cautionary remark is in 
order. In interpreting his views on this theme, more than anywhere else in Proclus’ 
                                               
27 As shows from the fact that in the testimonia of this debate discussed in Baltes (1976), (1978) 
the εἰκὼς λόγος has no role whatsoever. Cf. Dörrie and Baltes (1998: 122-9 (texts and translation) 
and 426-36 (comments)) and Sorabji’s lucid discussion of the ancients’ dispute (1983: 268-282). 
28 For a thorough treatment of the issue in Proclus see Baltes (1978) and Lernould (2001: 129ff.). 
See below, n. 294 on the sense in which Proclus’ interpretation of the εἰκὼς λόγος and his reading 
of the generation of the cosmos do at times almost intertwine.  
29 Sceptics did make use of the notion εἰκώς for their own purposes, as can be seen from Anon. 
Proleg. 10; it is significant here, however, that there is no hint that they had the Timaeus specially in 
mind, and no suggestion that the author is worried by the implications of their argument for this 
important Platonic text. For a discussion of the role of εἰκώς in the Fourth Academy see Tarrant 
(1985). 
30 This word is not used in the Timaeus, but is clearly derived from it. Cf. Theophrastus Frg. 
51.1.1-3, Philo Heres 224.3-7, Stob. Anth. 1.41.5.19-22 etc. Cf. also εἰκοτολογικῶς at In Tim. I 
340.26, where Gaius and Albinus are said to think that Plato can ‘express doctrine’ (δογματίζειν) 
in this fashion. 
31 It does so in Plato at Tim. 30b7, 53d5, 55d5, 56b4, 90e8. Cf. Philo, Plant. 75.1, Aet. 44.2; 
Plut.Rom. 28.10.8; Sext.Emp.Math. 9.107.4 etc. 
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work, we encounter a hermeneutic difficulty due to what one might call an 
extreme case of Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν: Proclus’ main argument in his 
interpretation of the Tim. 29b3-d3 is that very passage. That is, he keeps justifying 
Plato’s and his own position regarding the account of philosophy of nature on the 
basis of the Platonic axiom that “words are related to their subject matter” (Tim. 
29b4-5), even when this is the very statement that needs justifying. A clear 
example is his reading of Tim. 29b2-3:  
T V.2 
“Μέγιστον δὴ παντὸς ἄρξασθαι κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχήν.” 
 
This sentence, which forms the transition from what Proclus calls the ‘hypotheses’ 
or the ‘demonstrations’ to the ‘likely story’, is ambiguous enough to allow him to 
explain it as pertaining to each of the elements playing a role in his reading of Tim. 
29b3-d3: discourse, reasoning, and reality. The universe, he states, proceeds from 
a natural beginning, namely “the eternity of the gods and the source of beings” 
and the final cause.32 Likewise, knowledge starts by deriving suitable conclusions 
from suitable starting points, namely the hypotheses as the natural starting point 
of demonstration;33 and the didactic account (ὁ διδασκαλικὸς λόγος) starts from 
“the distinction concerning the nature of the teaching (διδασκαλία): whether it 
should be understood to be fixed and unalterable and precise or as a likely account 
(εἰκοτολογία), i.e. not as truth, but as persuasion (πίστις) and as made alike to truth 
(πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὡμοιωμένην).”34 Thus “knowledge follows the order of reality, 
and the didactic account follows the order of knowledge.”35 The principle behind 
this explanation is that a text is essentially related to its subject matter, i.e. Tim. 
29b4-5. Likewise, when discussing Plato’s motivation for bringing up the relation 
between text and subject matter in the prooemium in the first place, Proclus 
explains it as an application of that same principle:  
T V.3 
                                               
32 In Tim. I 337.29-31, 338.26-27. 
33 In Tim. I 338.2-4, 27-8. 
34 In Tim. I 338.27-339.2, which I take to be parallel to I 337.31-338.2, where Proclus speaks of ὁ 
ἐπιστήμων λόγος, picked up almost immediately by ὁ διδασκαλικὸς λόγος (338.5). What Proclus 
has to say about the scientific account in the earlier passage (“starting from the natural beginning 
as from a root, it makes the following reasonings about the cause consistent with that 
beginning”) can be explained as referring both to the εἰκὼς λόγος, so parallel with I 338.27-339.2, 
and as referring to any of the other ‘beginnings’ Proclus identifies: Timaeus’ reversion to νοῦς 
(see V.7.1), the hypotheses, and the question whether the universe is generated or not, cf. In Tim. 
I 219.23-31 and III.3. 
35 In Tim. I 338.4-5. 
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“Now some people say that it is a part of speech writing to distinguish 
beforehand of what kind the account is, and what kind of attitude the 
audience should have, and that Aristotle emulated this,36 as well as many 
other, more recent philosophers. I, however, would say that the account 
imitates (μιμεῖται) the demiurgy itself: just as the latter first brings forth the 
invisible lifes of the cosmos, and then establishes the visible, and contains 
its definition before the whole cosmos itself, so too Timaeus possesses the 
theory of things, and renders the kind of account appropriate to the things, 
and has assumed and distinguished the mode of speaking before the entire 
study, in order to adjust the entire teaching (διδασκαλία) to that definition.” 
(In Tim. I 339.18-29)  
 
This passage touches on a number of issues relevant in this chapter, and we will 
return to the details of the text later.37 What is important at this point is Proclus’ 
rejection of the option that the principle of discourse is a rhetorical topos, and his 
proposal to consider it instead as a practice that imitates the demiurge’s 
conception of the ‘definition’ of the universe prior to his creative activities. Thus 
in the interpretation of the Timaeus the principle introduced at Tim. 29b4-5 occurs 
both as an explanandum and, since it had become embedded in the very heart of 
Neoplatonism, as an explanans of the relation between discourse and subject 
matter, both in general and with respect to the passage containing that very 
principle at Tim. 29b3-d3.  
 
 
V.4 The nature of the εἰκώς λόγος: resemblance 
 
T V.4 
“… concerning an image and its paradigm, a distinction should be made in 
the following manner... (ὧδε...διοριστέον)” (Tim. 29b3-4) 
 
Contrary to his habit of ending a lemma at a punctuation, Proclus breaks off the 
sentence from the Timaeus at the word διοριστέον and turns the first half into a 
single lemma, thereby creating a neat parallel with the ‘division’ of Being and 
Becoming made at 27d5 (διαιρετέον), that is highlighted even more with the use of 
                                               
36 Probably a reference to Arist. Rhet. I 3 1358a36ff (as Diehl proposes), which is about speeches, 
and a speech is what Timaeus will offer us (cf. Tim. 19d-20a).  
37 See V.6. 
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verbal echoes in the following exegesis.38 Thus the reader is reminded of the 
correspondence between the couples image-paradigm and Being-Becoming.  
In his exegesis of this passage, however, which is Timaeus’ transition to the theme 
of the εἰκὼς λόγος, Proclus in first instance does not discuss the distinction 
between image and paradigm, but instead distinguishes three domains that are 
naturally ‘grown together’,39 and that are all involved in the principle of discourse: 
“things, thoughts, and words” (τὰ πράγματα, τὰ νοήματα καὶ οἱ λόγοι).40 By 
breaking off the sentence Proclus also creates room for an emphatic introduction 
of this Aristotelian trio “things, thoughts, and words”, which is central to his 
exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3.41 In addition, in a somewhat repetitive passage that gives 
the impression of a chant, the connection of the three domains “things, thoughts, 
words” is mapped onto the earlier division into two realms: since cognitions stem 
from the things cognized, and different accounts from different cognitions, and 
since there were two kinds of things, Being and Becoming, and therefore two 
kinds of cognitions, summarized as intellection (νόησις) and opinion (δόξα),42 
there are also two kinds of accounts, permanent and likely (λόγους διττούς, 
μονίμους καὶ εἰκότας).43  
That the trio requires such an extensive introduction is due to the fact that, as 
pointed out in chapter III,44 our epistemological access to Becoming does not 
figure as such in Timaeus’ remarks on the εἰκὼς λόγος. Instead, it is the ontological 
status of Becoming as an εἰκών that is brought forward as necessitating an account 
that is εἰκώς. For Proclus, however, it is crucial to underscore that the account 
does receive its status from reality, but mediated by our thoughts, because the 
addition of the cognitions will later allow him to emphasize the epistemological 
                                               
38 τὸν διορισμόν (339.8), διέκρινεν (ib.), ὅτε δὲ τὰς ἡμετέρας γνώσεις διώριζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι, νῦν 
δὲ τοὺς λόγους μερίζων κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους γνώσεις τῶν λόγων ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξει τὴν διωρισμένην φύσιν 
(10-13). Proclus extends the parallel and reads Tim. 29b4-c2 as an axiom followed by a division. 
See V.7.1.  
39 συμφυῶς ἐχόμενα, In Tim. I 339.5, cf. ὁμόλογα (339.14), and in the next lemma συγγενῆ 
(340.22), ὅμοιον (341.4), συγγενῶς (341.6), συμφυῆ (341.10), συγγενής...καὶ οἷον ἔγγονος (341.19-
20), cf. προσήκοντες (342.13, more specific context of λόγοι about intelligibles). On this natural 
relation see below, V.4.2. 
40 In Tim. I 339.5-6. This trio is inspired on Arist. Int. 1 16a3ff. (to which Proclus refers at In Crat. 
XLVII), but the Aristotelian φωναί have been replaced with the λόγοι that are relevant in the 
context of Tim. 29b. Cf. Alex. Quaest.. 59.12-13, who has the same trio in a discussion of 
definitions (σημεῖα γὰρ τὰ μὲν νοήματα τῶν πραγμάτων, οἱ δὲ λόγοι τῶν ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων νοημάτων).  
41 Note that the trio is already present implicitly at In Tim. I 337.8-339.2. 
42 The summary may be inspired by Rep. 534a3-5.  
43 In Tim. I 339.5-18. 
44 See III.5.1 (i).  
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side of the whole issue of the εἰκὼς λόγος, and change its focal point into the 
didactic value of Timaeus’ account.  
 
The following discussion of the natural relation between the three domains is 
roughly structured on the Timaeus text. In the discussion of Tim. 29bc, the first 
issue broached is, inspired by the text of the Timaeus itself, the sense in which the 
world of sense perception is an ontological image of the intelligible (V.4.1). 
Secondly, just as the world of sense perception is somehow a likeness of the 
Forms, so too discourse has a certain formal and semantic resemblance to its 
paradigm, i.e. the subject it deals with (V.4.2). This semantic/syntactic 
resemblance – syntactic insofar as it is detectable not in meaning but in form, e.g. 
length and order of sentences – is later subsumed by Proclus under the third 
logical aspect of the principle of discourse: the relation between cognizing subject 
and object of cognition. This third aspect, in which especially the downside of the 
principle of discourse comes to the fore, i.e. unlikeness, will be treated in section 
V.5, which deals with the question of unlikeness from different angles. 
 
 
V.4.1 The cosmos as image  
 
In order to understand the relation between the account about the universe and 
that universe properly, it is worthwhile first to have a closer look at how Proclus 
sees the ontological status of the sensible world as an image of the intelligible 
realm. We enter here into a vast territory at the very heart of Neoplatonic 
metaphysics, but will cover only a minute part thereof, which is especially relevant 
for the εἰκὼς λόγος.  
We will briefly look at three issues: 1) the positive side of being an image, 2) the 
activity of paradigm and image and 3) the ontological level of the images in the 
sensible world.  
1) When explaining in what sense “the world is necessarily an image of 
something” (Tim. 29b1-2), Proclus focuses primarily on the difference between 
having a paradigm and being an image.45 The difference, he states, lies in the 
success of the imitation. Something can be made after a paradigm without being a 
real image, but “that which is not dissimilar but similar and resembling is an 
image.” Saying that the universe is an image is saying that it is in fact similar to the 
intelligible, that it is “mastered in terms of form”, and really is an imitation (ὄντως 
                                               
45 In Tim. I 334.30-337.5 (ad Tim. 29b1-2). Proclus also uses this passage to elucidate the relation 
in this context between the intelligible paradigm and the demiurge (for the latter see esp. 
335.19ff.). 
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μεμίμηται) of the paradigm.46 Moreover, the similarity of the universe to its 
paradigm is “marvelous and ineffable and truly indissoluble”.47 As Opsomer 
points out, Proclus here emphasizes the resemblance rather than the differences 
between the levels of reality.48 
2) A second factor of the universe’s being an image, besides it being a successful 
imitation of the paradigm, is the fact that for it to be an image is no mere end 
result of a process of imitation, but a state of continuous activity both on the side 
of the causes, the paradigm and the demiurge, and on that of their effect, the 
universe as image. Proclus takes the world to be “the kind of image that we 
consider the image of souls to be,”49 in the sense that the paradigm is “neither 
barren nor weak”. He elaborates this in a truly Proclean triad: it is primarily the 
generative power of the paradigm that gives the cosmos its resemblance to the 
intelligible, which by its very being (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι) brings forth the image;50 secondly, 
the activities (αἱ ἐνέργειαι) of the demiurge in making the universe as alike as 
possible to the intelligible;51 and thirdly,  
T V.5 
“...the reversion (ἡ ἐπιστροφή) of the cosmos itself to the production of 
forms and the participation of the intelligible. For it makes itself resemble 
them, by “hastening” (ἐπειγόμενος), as the Oracle says, to put on the 
“impression” (τὸν τύπον) of the images, the impression which the 
intelligible gods hold out to it.”52  
 
Of this triad of remaining, proceeding and reversion, especially the last is 
interesting for the principle of discourse. Reversion in the sense of establishing 
                                               
46 In Tim. I 335.8-12.  
47 In Tim. 337.3-7. Proclus takes this to be one of the meanings of  ἀνάγκη (Tim. 29b1), the other 
being logical necessity of the conclusion expressed in 29b1-2. The word ‘indissoluble’ (ἄλυτον) is 
a reference to Tim. 32c3, 41a8, b3.  
48 Opsomer (2000: 356). 
49 In Tim. I 340.1-4. Rather than “au sense où nous pensons que les âmes sont des copies” 
(Festugière’s translation of ὁποίαν τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν εἶναι νομίζομεν). The disadvantage of F.’s 
reading is that the illustration is hardly helpful. I take it that Proclus uses an example more 
familiar to us, namely images made by souls using their own ideas as paradigms, as opposed to 
those created by e.g. a mirror, to illustrate his point that the universe is not an image made after a 
lifeless paradigm. Cf. In Tim. III 335.26-27 ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς εἰκὼν ἔμψυχός ἐστιν. Festugière’s 
reading probably refers to Soul’s being an image of Intellect, for which see e.g. In Parm. 745.2-3.   
50 In Tim. I 340.5-7, see also 335.26-8. Cf Plot. Enn. II 9 [33] 8.17-26. 
51 In Tim. I 340.7-9. Cf. In Remp. I 77.13-19, where Nature is compared to a mimetic artist.  
52 In Tim. I 340.9-13, with ref. to Or. Chald. fr. 37.7–9 Majercik. Cf. Plotinus, for whom the haste 
of universe towards Being is an image of its incomplete and partial participation, Enn. III 7 [45] 
4.28-33 and Wagner (2002: 301).  
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similarity with one’s source is the core of all non-selfsubstantiated existence, and 
therefore the world, as an image of the intelligible paradigm, actively assimilates 
itself to that paradigm.53   
Note that the expression “the world is an image of its intelligible paradigm” is in 
fact not entirely accurate. In a casual but important remark further on Proclus 
provides limits the extension of “image of the intelligible”:  
T V.6 
“…that which is copied with regard to the intelligible are the products of 
nature, but not also what is produced in accordance with art, and likewise 
not the particulars, separately (διωρισμένως), but the common properties in 
them (αἱ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς κοινότητες).”54  
 
Two lower limits to the images involved in the εἰκὼς λόγος are here set. (a) The 
first excludes what one might call “second-degree” images, namely the products of 
craft (τεχνή), and (b) the second excludes particulars.  
(a) The first limitation comes at the conclusion of a polemic against the famous 
Plotinian thesis that a good craftsman is capable of creating artefacts using the 
intelligible itself as his paradigm.55 This limitation, we will see, positively affects 
the status of the account of φυσιολογία (V.5.1(i)). (b) The second limitation 
imposed says that what is made alike to the intelligible paradigm is not the 
particulars taken severally, but αἱ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς κοινότητες. The term κοινότης is not a 
common one in Proclus. This passage aside, it occurs only in the In Parm., where it 
refers to a common quality between coordinate entities,56 the common quality 
itself being in the coordinate entities, but belonging to a higher ontological level 
than the particulars of which it is a common quality: a universal in re.57  
                                               
53 El.Th. prop. 32. It is the similarity to which the cosmos owes its preservation: In Tim. I 336.28-
29. On the mutual substantiation of image and paradigm through similarity see Theol.Plat. VI 4 
24.13-20, cf. In Parm. IV 848. The ‘paradigm’ here is a summary for both the intelligible paradigm 
itself, and the paradigm existing within the demiurgic mind, which he “looked at” (335.6) when 
shaping the universe. Cf. In Tim. I 335.19-28 and 322.18-323.22. 
54 In Tim. I 344.22-24. The context is the distinction between natural images and artefacts (on 
which see V.5.1(i)), so the second half of Proclus’ remark is a little out of place, and he adds “we 
have spoken about this elsewhere”. A candidate for this “elsewhere” could be the In Parm., but 
only because universals are there at the center of attention. For reff. see below, n. 57. 
55 In Tim. I 343.18-344.18.  
56 Cf. the use of κοινωνία in Proclus, which can be used to describe a relation both (a) between 
similar particulars and (b) between a particular and a Form, e.g. for (a) El.Th. prop. 21 (24.13), 
and for (b) prop. 28 (32.19),  prop. 32 (36.4ff), prop. 125 (112.6-7).  
57 In Parm. 880.14-16 ἡ γὰρ κοινότης ὁμοταγῶν μέν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁμοταγὴς δὲ τοῖς ὧν ἐστι κοινότης. 
Cf. the exegesis of Prm. 132a1ff, against the “one over many” argument (esp. In Parm. 885.8ff), 
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The images of the intelligible which are the subject matter of Timaeus’ account, 
then, and which Proclus calls the κοινότητες in (ἐπί +dat.) the sensible particulars, 
are the immanent universals. As is well known, Proclus harmonizes Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s theories of universals by arguing for the existence of both transcendent 
universals and immanent universals. What is important in the context of the 
principle of discourse is the cognitive tool we have at our disposal with respect to 
these immanent universals. Proclus, like Syrianus, maintains that they are not 
accessible to scientific knowledge, but instead, just as Nature, to ‘cognition 
through the likely’ (γνώσις δι’ εἰκότων).58 We will return to this later, when, after 
the analysis of the relation between text, subject matter, and human cognition, the 
time comes to determine in what sense and to what degree φυσιολογία is a likely 
story (V.6).  
 
In summary, 1) the universe is an image of the intelligible, in the sense that it is 
really similar to it; 2) the relation between image and paradigm (both in itself and 
in the demiurge) consists in constant activity from both sides; 3) the ontological 
level on which we find the image that is the universe is that of the immanent 
universals. A lot more could be said about the relation between image and 
paradigm, but I will limit my treatment to these three topics, not only because they 
are brought up by Proclus within the confines of his exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3, but 
especially because all three are crucial for the pedagogic value of an account of 
philosophy of nature, and allow us to explain Proclus’ optimistic outlook 
concerning the status of philosophy of nature as science. 
 
V.4.2 The resemblance of discourse 
T V.7 
“...accounts are related (συγγενεῖς) to that very thing of which they are the 
interpreters (ἐξηγηταί).” (Tim. 29b4-5)59  
                                                                                                                                      
and In Parm. 714.23-28, where ἡ κοινότης is equated with τό καθόλου. Perhaps the term has its 
source in Tht. 208d5-9, where Socrates distinguishes between differentia and common property. Cf. 
Porph. In Cat. IV 1, 81, 14ff.  
58 In Tim. III 160.7-12 ἡ δὲ γνῶσις …ἐνθουσιαστική…πάσης ἄλλης ἐξῃρημένη γνώσεως τῆς τε δι΄ 
εἰκότων καὶ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὴν φύσιν διατρίβει καὶ τὰ καθ΄ ὅλου τὰ ἐν τοῖς καθ΄ 
ἕκαστα, ἣ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ ἐπιστητά· μόνη δὲ ἡ ἔνθεος γνῶσις αὐτοῖς συνάπτεται 
τοῖς θεοῖς. This passage is part of the exegesis of Tim. 40d-e, Plato’s ironic remark concerning the 
theologians who claim to know all about their divine ancestors without any evidence whatsoever 
(see IV.3.1). Cf. Syr. In Met. 5.2-7, also discussed below, at V.6. Note that in ch. III the cognitive 
faculty of which immanent universals were found to be the subject was δόξα. 
59 Proclus suggests that this passage is the source of the distinction employed by Platonists in the 
school of Albinus and Gaius between two kinds of “δογματίζειν” or presenting doctrine by Plato: 
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This phrase – rather than the actual reference to the likely story at Tim. 29c7-8 – in 
Proclus’ view constitutes the core of the last section of the prooemium. In this 
phrase a general principle is formulated according to which two properties are 
ascribed to discourse: it is an interpreter (ἐξηγηταί) of some thing, and it is related 
(συγγενεῖς) to that thing. These are two different, yet connected properties. For 
Proclus, the latter is a requirement for the former: discourse has to (δεῖ) be related 
to its subject matter in order for it to be its interpreter.60 The two properties are 
two aspects of the way in which discourse reveals reality: (1) first, it is inherent in 
discourse that it is an image of reality, and that it therefore displays a certain 
similarity to reality. This is what I called ‘resemblance’. (2) Second, the very 
function of discourse is to interpret reality, but a speaker or author can increase 
the extent to which it does that by manipulating his discourse and creating a 
greater similarity between it and its subject matter. This feature I called 
‘assimilation’. In the following, we will look at the metaphysical foundation of the 
resemblance of discourse to its subject matter. The second aspect, assimilation, 
will be discussed under V.6. 
 
(i) The hierarchy of λόγοι  
According to Proclus’ naturalistic view of language as described in the In Crat. 
words (ὀνόματα and ῥήματα) are naturally related to the reality they refer to.61 
Likewise, the λόγοι that are constituted of them are also naturally related (συμφυῶς 
ἐχόμενα, In Tim. I 339.5) to reality, in the sense that they have a natural similarity 
                                                                                                                                       
scientifically and “εἰκοτολογικῶς” (In Tim. I 340.23ff). See Dörrie and Baltes (1996: 357-9) and, 
for Albinus and Gaius’ understanding of (the Timaeus as) εἰκοτολογία see Lernould (2005: 119-
29). It is interesting that Albinus and Gaius see the εἰκὼς λόγος as a methodological principle the 
application of which is limited to Plato’s own work, rather than a general point regarding the 
nature of discourse, which is how Proclus reads it. As Dillon (1996: 270) points out Proclus 
seems to be quoting from Albinus. It is hard to see where the quote would end, but probably not 
before 341.4, since that is where we find out in what sense Tim. 29b4-5 is related to their 
distinction.  
60 In Tim. I 340.22-23. For more reff. see below, V.7.1.  
61 For the natural relation between ὄνομα en πρᾶγμα see In Crat., esp. XLVIII 16.17ff. For Proclus’ 
theory that names refer primarily to the Forms, and his criticism of Porphyry’s semantics see In 
Parm. IV 849.16-853.12 with van den Berg (2004). I will not give a detailed account of the 
relevance of the theory expounded in the In Crat. for Proclus’ interpretation of Tim.29b3-d3, but 
merely point out some parallels. I do assume that that theory about ὀνόματα does apply to λόγοι 
in the sense of a verbal account composed of ὀνόματα (and ῥήματα), cf. In Crat. XLVII 15.29-30. 
For λόγοι as composed of ὀνόματα and ῥήματα see Plato Crat. 425a2-4 (de Rijk (1986: 272 n. 34) 
suggests that ὁ λόγος here is a story and refers to Arist. Rhet. III 2 1404b26). 
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to it. That the relation between λόγοι and reality is indeed natural is not only 
emphasized repeatedly in our passage,62 it is moreover argued for on the 
assumption that discourse is capable of revealing the nature of things: an account 
would not be able to do that if it were not similar (ὅμοιον) to them.63 Now being 
similar to something in fact comes down to being the same thing, albeit in a different 
manner:  
T V.8 
“For it is necessary that what the thing is in a contracted manner 
(συνῃρημένως), the account be in a developed manner (ἀνειλιγμένως), so 
that it reveals (ἐκφαίνῃ) the thing, while it is inferior to it in nature. For in 
this manner also the divine causes of discourse both reveal (ἐκφαίνει) the 
essences of the things above them, and are related (συμφυῆ64) to them.”65 
 
Leaving the inferiority of discourse aside for the time being, let us see how 
Proclus explains the partial identity between discourse and reality by firmly 
assigning discourse its proper place in the metaphysical chain of λόγοι.66  
The “divine causes of discourse” (τὰ θεῖα αἴτια τοῦ λόγου)67 are the λόγοι that 
mediate, on higher levels of reality, between a primary and a secondary entity. This 
asymmetrical mediation, like the relation between an account and its subject, 
consists in revealing to the secondary entity the essence of the primary entity, 
through a (non-Wittgensteinian) family resemblance (συμφυῆ). Paraphrasing 
Proclus’ explanation (In Tim. I 341.11-21): Zeus’ messenger (ἄγγελος) Hermes is 
“the λόγος to the intellect of the father”, as that which proclaims (ἀπαγγέλλει) his 
will to the secondary gods;68 among the essences Soul is the λόγος of the 
                                               
62 συγγενη (340.22), συγγενῶς ἔχων (341.6), συμφυῆ (341.10), συγγενής...καὶ οἷον ἔγγονος (341.19-
20). 
63 In Tim. I 341.5-6. Cf. also In Remp. II 354.27 (interestingly identical to Scholia In Remp. 621b,bis), 
where Proclus posits that myths are true, because they are the interpreters of reality. See below n. 
222. Cf. however In Tim. I 343.1-2, discussed under V.5, where Proclus adds that words cannot 
actually comprehend the nature of their subject matter as it is.  
64 For συμφυῆς cf. Tim. 45d, on the connection of the visual ray with its object. 
65 In Tim. I 341.6-11 
66 In Tim. I 341.11-24, ad Tim. 29b4-5. 
67 Despite the practically endless semantic range of λόγος in Greek and Proclus’ play on its 
polysemy in this passage, I think translating it as ‘discourse’ here is justified, because ὁ λόγος, 
which is the subject of the immediately preceding sentence, clearly picks up Tim. 29b4-5. For the 
different meanings of λόγος in Plato, see de Rijk (1986: 225-231). 
68 On the demiurge’s speech to the lower gods, see below. On speech as messenger and the 
influence of the subject of the message on the medium, cf. Porph. In Cat. 58.23-24, Ὅτι αἱ φωναὶ 
ἀγγέλῳ ἐοικυῖαι τὰ πράγματα ἀγγέλλουσιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὧν ἀγγέλλουσι, τὰς διαφορὰς 
λαμβάνουσιν.  
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Intelligibles, and it reveals the unifying cause of the λόγοι that are in the 
Intelligibles, and from which Soul has its existence, to the essences;69 one level 
above us, the “angelic” or messengers’ order, which receives its existence from the 
gods, “immediately expresses and transmits70 the ineffable of the gods”. Likewise, 
“down here” the account of reality (ὅδε ὁ λόγος ὁ τῶν πραγμάτων) is related to 
(συγγενής) reality.71 At this point Proclus adds an important adjustment, namely 
that our accounts are not immediate descendants of things, but “their 
grandchildren, as it were” (οἷον ἔγγονος αὐτῶν), as they are produced from our 
cognitions, which in turn correspond with reality.72 According to Proclus verbal 
accounts are mediators in a series, caused by a higher ontological level. Naturally, 
such accounts can be “about” any level of reality: discourse can be an explicit and 
discursive expression of material reality, of divine beings, and even of the One – 
but always mediated through the immediate cause of the λόγοι: our thoughts. We 
will return to this issue later (V.5.2). 
The hierarchy of λόγοι is difficult to understand, as it plays on the polysemy of 
λόγος. Proclus’ discussion of the λόγοι of the Demiurge to the younger gods (Tim. 
41aff.) in the Platonic Theology, which also uses that polysemy, may help elucidate 
                                               
69 I agree with Festugière that there is no need to change λαβοῦσα (N) into λαχοῦσα (Diehl). On 
the other hand, I also see no reason to change τῶν λόγων into τῶν ὅλων, as he does.  
70 συνεχῶς ἑρμηνεύει καὶ διαπορθμεύει echoes Plato Symp. 202e3-4 where, however, the 
communication established by Eros is symmetrical: ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ᾽ 
ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν.  
71 As Festugière points out, τὰ πράγματα here not in the narrow sense of the Intelligible, because 
in the sequel Proclus points forward to the division of λόγοι into two kinds, following τὰ 
πράγματα. ὅδε ὁ λόγος (341.18) can refer either to “logos in the sublunary realm” or more 
specifically to the account of Timaeus. Arguments for the latter are the circular construction of 
the discussion of this lemma (Tim. 29b4-5): at the outset of the discussion (340.18-19), we read 
that the λόγος of Timaeus, which is made similar to Beings, starts from one common and 
universal axiom concerning λόγοι; at 341.18ff, the end of the discussion, we read that “this 
λόγος” is related to τὰ πράγματα, followed by the conclusion that “this (i.e. that λόγοι are related 
to their subject) is the common axiom”. Arguments for reading ὅδε ὁ λόγος as referring to the 
logos in the sublunary realm are first of all the fact that the λόγος is said to issue from the 
knowledge “in us” (ἐν ἡμῖν), and secondly that at this point Proclus is still speaking in general 
terms: the direct context is the universal axiom concerning λόγοι, not yet the character of the 
particular λόγος about nature.  
72 In Tim. I 341.19-21. Cf. Arist. dI I 16a3-4. For νοήματα as paradigms of ὀνόματα, see In Crat. 
XLIX, esp. 17.21-23 καὶ γὰρ ὡς εἰκὼν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἐξαγγέλλει αὐτὰ διὰ μέσων τῶν 
νοημάτων; LXXI, esp. 33.10-11 καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἡ νόησις, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, καὶ τὸ μὲν εἰκόνος, τὸ δὲ 
παραδείγματος ἔχει τάξιν. 
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it.73 The aim of that discussion, determining what kind of λόγοι the Demiurge 
‘expresses’, since it cannot be human discourse, makes Proclus pay more attention 
to the general metaphysical nature of λόγοι. He concludes as follows:  
T V.9 
“It is these efficient powers and activities, that advance from the one 
universal demiurgy into the demiurgic multitude of the gods, which 
Timaeus represents (ἀποτυποῦται) through words (διὰ τῶν λόγων). Indeed, 
words are images of thoughts (οἱ λόγοι τῶν νοήσεών εἰσιν εἰκόνες), because 
they unfold the folded being of the intelligibles,74 bring the undivided into 
divided existence, and transfer what remains in itself into a relation with 
something else.”75 
 
Just as a speech is an image of our thoughts, so the demiurgic λόγοι, i.e. the 
powers and activities advancing from the demiurge, are images of the νοήσις that 
remains in him.76 Λόγοι in general are the emanating potencies (δυνάμεις) and 
activities (ἐνεργείαι) of their source (and as such images of the remaining 
ἐνεργείαι), that convey the main character of the source to the receiver and 
transform the receiver accordingly.77 This latter aspect is important for Proclus’ 
reading of the Timaeus, since transposed to the context of Timaeus’ discourse, it 
explains the possibility of teaching through discourse. Discourse, like any other 
λόγος, has the capacities of transforming its receiver.78   
Since the resemblance of discourse is ultimately caused by transcendent λόγοι (τὰ 
θεῖα αἴτια τοῦ λόγου), it is thus rooted in a necessary and metaphysical likeness. This 
likeness, which as we will see consists in an ἀναλογία, in the sense that the 
relations among the paradigms are the same as those among the images,79 explains 
the capacity of language to transfer information. We can also gather from the 
                                               
73 Theol. Plat. V 18, p. 65.23-66.2, on Tim. 41a-d (the speech of the demiurge), cf. In Tim III 
197.26-199.12 and 242.8-244.8, concerning the same Timaeus passage. See also below. Cf. In Parm. 
IV 853.1-12 on different degrees of names. 
74 Proclus uses the same terminology (ἀνελίσσει τὸ συνεσπειραμένον) of διάνοια, cf. In Eucl. 4.11-
14. 
75 Theol.Plat. V 18 65.23-66.2. On the relation between namegiving and creation by the demiurge 
see Beierwaltes (1975: 166), referring to In Crat. LI 19.25ff., LXXI 30.8ff, 31.29ff, 32.18ff. 
76 Theol.Plat. V 18 64.25-65.7, 65.23-66.2, and 66.12-16. Cf. In Tim. I 218.13-28.  
77 See also Theol.Plat. V 18 66.2-67.13 and In Tim. III 198.6-16. For an allegorical interpretation of 
the framing of the λόγοι in the Parmenides as representing the hierarchy of metaphysical λόγοι, or 
creative rational principles, see In Parm. I 625.36ff. 
78 Cf. Crat. 388b.13ff on names as instruments for teaching, διδασκαλικόν τι ὄργανον. On the 
place of the teacher as elevated above his audience see V.7.1. 
79 Cf. Opsomer (2000: 358). 
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above that for Proclus, just as for Plotinus, an uttered λόγος is an image (εἰκών) of a 
λόγος in our soul.80 Proclus’ choice of words is significant: as Sheppard observes, 
for Proclus εἰκόνες are generally speaking ‘good images’, i.e. not the kind of images 
one should reject because they somehow misrepresent their paradigms.81 This 
does not imply, of course, that images are identical to their paradigms. 
 
V.5 Unlikeness 
 
As Socrates says in the Cratylus, an image can only be an image if it is not only like, 
but also unlike its paradigm.82 Proclus is well aware of this and maintains that, as a 
result, any image is inferior to its paradigm.83 This has consequences for discourse 
in general, but far more for discourse about Becoming. The latter account is 
                                               
80 Cf. for a similar relation between ‘names’ (ὀνόματα) and their referents In Crat. IX (3.10-11), 
περὶ ὀνομάτων …καθ΄ ὃ εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῶν πραγμάτων; 48, esp. 16.15-17 (Pasquali), δεῖται … ὡς δὲ 
εἰκὼν τῆς πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἀναφορᾶς (of course already Plato Crat. 423b9-11 Ὄνομ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐστίν, 
ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμεῖται, καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ ἂν μιμῆται, cf. 
430a10ff., 439a1ff.) In Parm. 687.2-11, 851.8-9 Τὰ ἄρα ὀνόματα, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀγάλματα τῶν 
πραγμάτων λογικὰ, 851.31-32. For Plotinus see Enn. V 1 [10] 3.8-9: “...just as λόγος in its 
utterance (ἐν προφορᾷ) is an image (εἰκών) of λόγος in the soul, so soul itself is the λόγος of 
Intellect.”; I 2 [19] 3.28-31: “As the spoken (ἐν φωνῇ) λόγος is an imitation (μίμημα) of that in the 
soul, so the λόγος in the soul is an imitation of that in something else. As the uttered (ἐν 
προφορᾷ) λόγος, then, is broken up into parts as compared with that in the soul, so is that in the 
soul as compared with that before it, which it interprets (ἑρμηνεὺς ὢν ἐκείνου).” Cf. I 2 [19] 3.27-
30, where Plotinus also speaks of language as μίμημα and ἑρμηνεύς of the λόγος in the soul. The 
best examples of semantic likeness according to Plotinus are the ideogrammatic symbols in 
Egyptian temples, Enn. V 8 [31] 6.1-9, with Armstrong’s note. On Plotinus’ theory of language 
see Heiser (1991), Schroeder (1996).  
81 Sheppard (1980: 196-201) discusses the distinction between good and bad images in the 
context of the 6th essay on the Republic, Proclus’ defence of poetry. See also Dillon (1976), who 
points out that there is no strict division between the different terms used for images (more 
specifically icon and symbol). The term εἴδωλα, which in that essay refers to bad images, does not 
have the same negative connotation in the In Tim., where we find it used mainly in non-literary, 
ontological context. E.g. I 285.17, 323.16. See also below, V.5.1(i). For a comparison of εἰκων and 
εἴδωλον regarding words, see In Parm. 852.7-11. 
82 Plato Crat. 432a8-d3. Cf. In Parm. II 743.11-21, II 746.6-9 πα̃σαι γὰρ εἰκόνες ἐξηλλαγμέναι κατ' 
οὐσίαν βούλονται ει̃̓ναι τω̃ν οἰκει ́ων παραδειγμάτων, και ̀ μηκέτι τὸν αὐτο ̀ν λόγον έ̓χειν, ἀλλα ̀ το ̀ν 
ο ̔́μοιον τοι̃ς ἀφ' ω̃̔ν προη̃λθον, cf. 816.26-8.  
83 That an image is necessarily inferior to its paradigm is the core of Platonic metaphysics, of 
course, and is comprehensible especially in the context of causation, and the principle that the 
cause is superior to the effect (El.Th. prop. 7). Cf. In Parm. 816.17-20. On dissimilarity in Proclus’ 
metaphysics see Gersh (1973: 85). In our context: In Tim. 336.26-29, where Proclus adds that 
“Becoming is still an image”, as opposed to the original, and that its existence depends on the 
paradigm. 
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inferior to an account about Being, due to the fact that Becoming is an image of 
Being. Moreover, since the account itself is an image of its subject, it is also 
inferior to its subject. These two elements are found by Proclus in the passage that 
nowadays is considered the heart of εἰκὼς λόγος:  
T V.10 
“(1) ...for a text concerning the permanent, and stable, and what is evident 
to the mind is itself permanent and irrefutable – insofar as it is possible and 
appropriate for words to be irrefutable and invincible, it should not fall 
short of that.84 (2) But a text which concerns that which is copied from it 
and is an image (εἰκόνος), is likely (εἰκοτάς).” (Tim. 29b5-c2) 85 
 
This passage brings up the general refutability of discourse in a parenthesis, but its 
main aim is to introduce the parallel between subject and discourse – the 
metaphysical source of the εἰκὼς λόγος. Proclus, however, explains this passage, 
which he cuts into two lemmas ((1) and (2) in T V.10), in such a way that it no 
longer evolves around the deficiencies of the metaphysical resemblance of 
Becoming to Being, or even of an account to its subject matter. Instead, by a 
double strategy, he turns our attention to the general limitations of discourse, and 
of human cognition.  
(1) The first half of this ‘division’, as Proclus calls it, which describes the status of 
a text dealing with the intelligible realm, elicits no comments on the metaphysical 
aspect of the principle of discourse, but is instead used to illustrate Proclus’ theory 
of discourse, especially concerning the ‘unlikeness’ inherent in λόγοι.  
(2) Subsequently, in his exegesis of the second part of the ‘division’ Proclus 
prepares a shift to an epistemological approach that will dominate the remainder 
of the exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3, by narrowing the gap that he himself created 
earlier between text and cognition, and setting Timaeus’ account apart from 
accounts about artefacts.  
                                               
84 The only reference we find to Tim. 29b3-d3 in Syrianus, on the truth of Pythagorean and 
Platonic doctrine of principles, picks up this passage and combines it with a quote from the 
Gorgias (473b10): In Met. 81.3-5 οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐλέγχεταί ποτε κατὰ τὸν θεῖον ἐκεῖνον (i.e. 
Plato) καὶ τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγους ἐξομοιοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν οἱ πατέρες (Pythagoreans and 
Platonists) αὐτῶν μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους καθ᾽ ὅσον προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι κατεστήσαντο.  
85 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μονίμου καὶ βεβαίου καὶ μετὰ νοῦ καταφανοῦς μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους - καθ΄ 
ὅσον οἷόν τε καὶ ἀνελέγκτοις προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι καὶ ἀνικήτοις, τούτου δεῖ μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν - τοὺς 
δὲ τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἀπεικασθέντος, ὄντος δὲ εἰκόνος εἰκότας... Note that Proclus has ἀκινητοις, 
a textual variant of Tim. mms. FY, in his paraphrase of this passage at In Parm V 994.26-30. As at 
Tim. 29b4 Proclus here again cuts a sentence in half, in order to be able to start the next lemma, 
on the proportion between truth and belief, with the word ἀναλόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας, which is in 
fact the end of the sentence here quoted.·  
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V.5.1 Metaphysical unlikeness and the unlikeness of λόγοι 
 
The core of T V.10 is that due to the relation between text and subject matter 
some properties of the subject are transferred to discourse, influencing its 
epistemic status: its degree of stability and fixity. Proclus is hardly interested in this 
metaphysical side of the principle of discourse. He does not treat it in his 
explanation of either part of T V.10, but instead summarizes it elsewhere in 
parentheses in passages that on the whole pertain to the role of the cognizing 
subject and its faculties in the Timaeus passage: 
T V.11 
“...<cognitive> processes involving sense-perception miss their mark and 
fail to attain precision because of sense-perception and the instability of the 
object of knowledge itself. How would one express in words the material 
realm which is always changing and in flux, and indeed by nature is unable 
to remain at rest even for a moment?”86 
 
Precise knowledge of the sublunary cannot be obtained because the sublunary is 
constantly changing. And the heavenly bodies, Proclus adds, which are not subject 
to that same flux, are “far away from us” (πόρρω ἡμῶν), so we have still to be 
satisfied with approximating and plausible ‘knowledge’ (τὸ ἐγγύς...τὸ πιθανόν).87 
For that which has a spatial existence to be fully known the presence of that 
which is acquiring knowledge of it is required. As a consequence, if certainty is 
attainable at all concerning the celestial, it is with regard to that aspect of it that 
does not have a spatial existence and therefore does not require our physical 
presence: we can know it insofar as it partakes in Being, and is therefore graspable 
through νόησις. “For wherever one places one’s thought, it grasps truth as if it 
were present everywhere”.88 Insofar as they are perceptible, however, the heavenly 
bodies are “hard to grasp and hard to observe”.89  
This very argument on the distance between us and the heavenly bodies recurs 
only a few pages later, in roughly the same terms,90 but with some modifications 
that only seem insignificant: the context has changed from ontological unlikeness to 
                                               
86 In Tim. I 346.18-21, referring to Phaedo 82e-83a and Heraclitean flux. Cf. I 353.1-3: due to the 
instability (ἀστάθμητον) of the sublunary world we have to make do with τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολῦ. Cf. 
Arist. Rhet. I 2 1357a22ff., where τὸ εἰκός is defined as “that which happens in most cases”. 
87 In Tim. I 346.21-31.  
88 In Tim. I 346.27-29. 
89 In Tim. I 347.1-2.  
90 Cf. the repetition of ἐγγύς and πόρρω close together at In Tim. I 353.6.  
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the limitations of human knowledge, and therefore the perspective is inverted: it is 
us who are far away from the heavenly bodies (πορρωτάτω ὄντες ἐκείνων), rather 
than the other way around.91   
Just before that passage, we find another, almost perfunctory summary of the 
metaphysical unlikeness of the images of Being:  
T V.12 
“Timaeus has mentioned that the account about nature is neither certain 
nor precise (μὴ ἀραρὸς μηδ᾽ ἀκριβές) for two reasons: from the essence of 
the things of which it treats – for since the immaterial became enmattered 
and the undivided divided and the separate “in an alien setting”92 and the 
universal atomic and particular, it is not suitable for a scientific and 
irrefutable account, as such an account fits the universal and immaterial 
and undivided Forms – and from the impotence of those who study it.”93 
 
It is the “impotence of the students” that is subsequently elaborated. As said 
before, these remarks regarding metaphysics are made in contexts other than the 
actual Timaeus lemma expressing the metaphysical aspect of the εἰκὼς λόγος (i.e. 
29b5-c2, quoted above). In his exegesis of that passage Proclus instead displays a 
far greater interest in showing how the text itself is an illustration of the general 
principle of discourse formulated in the prooemium. By spelling out the details of 
the manner in which Plato fits the passage under examination to its subject, i.e. 
how he applies the principle of assimilation, Proclus creates a neat transition to 
the unlikeness of discourse. The details of the principle of assimilation will be 
elaborated on in V.7, but here we will briefly walk through Proclus’ lexical analysis 
of the first part of T V.10, because it gives a clear indication of the direction 
Proclus wants what he calls the fourth demonstration to take.   
He starts off by showing how Plato replaced the ontological attributes given to 
Being in the definition (Tim. 28a) with the corresponding epistemological 
attributes: “always being” is substituted by “stable”, “always remaining the same” 
by “firm” and “understandable with intelligence” by “clear to the intellect”.94 In 
the corresponding adjectives predicated of accounts, the purpose of the repetition 
of “stable” is to indicate (ἵνα...ἐνδείξηται) the similarity (ὁμοιότης) between subject 
and discourse, “unchanging” is used because accounts about Being should image 
                                               
91 In Tim. I 352.1, cf. 353.6. More on the context below V.5.2(ii). 
92 Cf. Plato Rep. 516b5. 
93 In Tim. I 351.20-27. On the second source of imprecision, human cognition, see below. Note 
that discourse itself is not mentioned as a source of imprecision.  
94 In Tim. I 342.3-7.  
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(ἵνα ἀπεικονίζωνται95) the firmness of reality, and “irrefutable” because they should 
imitate (μιμῶνται) the accessibility to intellect and proceed scientifically 
(ἐπιστημονικῶς).96 Note that the scientific proceeding is added because what we 
grasp with intellect can as such not be expressed in an account.  
The exegesis of this passage is layered, and what we have here is in fact a triple 
likely story. First of all there is the semantic likeness of Plato’s words to their 
subject, accounts about Being; secondly, these words express the resemblance of 
any account about Being to Being; finally, and for Proclus most importantly, the 
properties in question, the being stable, unchanging and irrefutable of the 
accounts, show that underneath the resemblance lies an epistemological correspondence, 
because, Proclus continues:  
T V.13 
“...a λόγος is unfolded cognition.”97 
 
And since our knowledge of eternal reality is unchanging, so is our account of it.98 
This positive statement, however, brings Proclus to the downside of resemblance.  
Because a text is unfolded cognition, it has the same properties as that cognition. 
Because it is unfolded, it has these properties to a lower degree. This second aspect, 
the consequences of the unfolding of discourse, Proclus also finds illustrated in 
Tim. 29b5-c2 (quoted under T V.10). Note that in his explanation thereof Proclus 
immediately switches back to λόγοι as an unfolding, not of thoughts, but of reality. 
This switch is not due to mere carelessness. For an explanation of why Proclus 
might think it justified to make that switch, however, we have to wait until the 
next lemma (part (2) of T V.10, see below). First let us look at how Proclus takes 
the consequences of the unfolding itself to be imitated in Timaeus’ words, this 
time with the help of morphological and lexical quantity, at Tim. 29b5-8. 
In Proclus’ view the addition of multiplicity and of composition and the ensuing 
diminished unity and “partlessness” of discourse as compared to reality (τοῦ 
πράγματος) are represented by the juxtaposition of the singular (ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἑνικῶς 
μόνιμον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ νῷ καταφανὲς προσεῖπε) and the plural (τούτων δὲ 
                                               
95 The sentence is something of an anacolouth. The subject of the first clause, ἵνα...ἐνδείξηται, is 
Plato (or Timaeus), but the subject of this plural ἵνα ἀπεικονίζωνται, as well as the following 
ἵνα...μιμῶνται...καὶ...προέρχωνται, are λόγοι about Being (not the specific λόγοι of the lemma, 
since in that case the addition ἵνα...ἐπιστημονικῶς προέρχωνται does not make sense). Proclus 
starts out discussing the semantic likeness of Plato’s words (Tim. 29b) to their subject (λόγοι about 
Being) and switches to the resemblance between any account about Being and Being itself.  
96 In Tim. I 342.7-12.  
97 In Tim. I 342.16...ὁ λόγος· ἀνειλιγμένη γάρ ἐστι γνῶσις.  
98 In Tim. I 342.15-16. 
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πληθυντικῶς μονίμους λόγους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους καὶ ἀνελέγκτους εἰπών).99 Note that 
the exegesis of the text again has several strata. In this case the morphological 
assimilation of different words to their different subjects (things and words 
respectively) aims at expressing the unlikeness of words in general to their subject 
matter. In order to illustrate the fact that the dissimilarity of λόγοι exceeds their 
similarity to the subject, Proclus explains, only one out of the three adjectives 
remains identical (τὸ μόνιμον).100 Especially this last addition to the interpretation 
of Tim. 29b5-8 seems a case of pointless exaggeration due to exegetic zeal. 
However, the whole exercise has two specific purposes. It is an illustration of the 
principle of assimilation and the different manners in which a text is an image of 
its subject matter on a microlevel, namely semantically, lexically and 
morphologically, and it allows a smooth introduction to the unlikeness of λόγοι.  
Since the relation between λόγοι and their subject matter is in principle a natural 
one, and one of resemblance, like any image discourse also necessarily suffers 
from dissimilarity to its paradigm. As we saw above, the dissimilarity of an image 
in discourse to its subject matter is caused primarily by what we could call a 
change of medium.101 Discourse is in an unfolded (discursive) manner what its 
subject is in a unitary manner, no matter what the subject matter: “For it is 
necessary that what the thing is in a contracted manner (συνῃρημένως), the 
account be in a unfolded manner (ἀνειλιγμένως), so that it reveals (ἐκφαίνῃ) the 
thing, while it is inferior (ὑφειμένος) to it in nature.”102 The particular medium of 
spoken and written language is too poor to incorporate all at once the simplicity 
and fullness that reality possesses.103 This weakness of language, which is famously 
criticized in the Seventh Letter, is most notable – and most discussed – with 
respect to the expression of the fullness and unity of the One,104 but holds for 
lower levels of reality as well. Whenever it is possible to approximate in language 
the unity of, for example, the final cause of the universe, it is nonetheless 
                                               
99 In Tim. I 342.19-21.  
100 In Tim. I 342.21-25. 
101 Cf. Johansen (2004: chapter 3, esp. 56, 59-60). Johansen speaks of the medium in relation to 
the difference between Being and Becoming, but it is just as applicable to the difference between 
text and subject matter.  
102 In Tim. I 341.6-9, quoted under T V.8.  
103 In Tim. III 244.12-22, 27 ἡ ἀσθένεια τοῦ λόγου. Cf. Plato Epist. VII 343a1 τὸ τῶν λόγων 
ἀσθενές. 
104 Plato Parm. 142a. On this topic see Heiser (1991: 59-72), Rappe (2000). On negative theology 
see Steel (1999) Martin (2001), (2002). On language and its incapacity of expressing the divine, cf. 
e.g. In Tim. III 243.5-13. Cf. Plot. Enn. V 5.6.15-16. 
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impossible to include in that unitary linguistic expression the wealth that is present 
in the ontological unity.105 In language, riches and unity are mutually exclusive. 
Thus there is a certain unlikeness in discourse regardless of its subject matter. That 
unlikeness is described in terms that are familiar from descriptions of the soul and 
its discursive thought. Proclus follows Plotinus in calling the soul ‘unfolded 
intellect’,106 and the terminology in which he frames the unlikeness of λόγοι is the 
same as that which he uses elsewhere to portray διάνοια.107 Moreover, in the 
exegesis of the rest of T V.10 it becomes more and more clear that, after first 
introducing it, Proclus makes an effort to eliminate the distinction between 
discourse and thought.108  
An analysis of Proclus’ explanation of the second half of what he calls the division 
(see below T V.14), will clarify why the casual switch from λόγοι as unfolding 
thoughts to λόγοι unfolding reality is deemed harmless. Afterwards, we will further 
scrutinize how Proclus deliberately highlights epistemology in a way that puts the 
εἰκὼς λόγος in perspective and brings the scientific and the likely account much 
closer together. 
 
(i) Images of images 
 
T V.14 
“(2) But a text which concerns that which is copied (ἀπεικασθέντος) from it 
[i.e. from the permanent, and stable, and what is evident to the mind] and 
is an image (εἰκόνος), is likely (εἰκοτάς).” (Tim. 29c1-2)109 
 
Despite the fact that Proclus is well aware of the consequences of the iconic status 
of discourse, he does not have a pessimistic outlook on the epistemic value of 
discourse – even if it discusses a subject matter as fleeting as the natural world. 
The main reason for Proclus’ optimism is his view of the nature of the images in 
question. As mentioned above, εἰκόνες are ‘good’ images, and they represent their 
paradigms faithfully. Moreover, when it comes to λόγοι as representations of our 
                                               
105 In Tim. III 105.4-6 ποτὲ μὲν τὴν ἕνωσιν αὐτῶν, ποτὲ δὲ τὴν διάκρισιν ἑρμηνεύων, ἐπειδήπερ 
ἑκάτερον ἅμα περιλαμβάνειν οὐ πέφυκεν οὐδὲ οἷός τέ ἐστι. See also below, V.7. 
106 Cf. Plot. Enn. I 1 [53] 8.7-8, cf. Proclus In Remp. I 111.22, In Tim. II 249.9. There is an 
interesting semantic circle here: the word ἀνελίσσω, which is central in this context, is originally 
associated with discourse, as it refers to the unfolding of a book scroll. 
107 Cf. In Eucl. 4.11-14, mentioned also above.  
108 We will return to his reasons for introducing it nonetheless at V.7.2. 
109 Quoted above as the second part of T V.10. 
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thoughts, Proclus is convinced that their being a representation does not put them 
at a further remove from Being.  
As opposed to the ‘summary’ of the Republic and the Atlantis story, which in 
accordance with Pythagorean tradition present the cosmos in images and symbols 
respectively,110  
T V.15 
“Timaeus was going to offer an account of the demiurgic chain in a more 
universal and sublime way, and not through images (οὐ δι΄ εἰκόνων)…”111  
 
Timaeus does not use images representing the cosmos and its causes, i.e. literary 
images, in his exposition on the universe. In other words, Timaeus’ account is not 
a metaphorical, allegorical, or otherwise indirect representation of reality.112 
“Timaeus is not composing myths.”113   
This outlook comes to the fore also in the interpretation of Tim. 29c1-2 (T V.14), 
and the distinction Proclus there introduces between accounts that are likely 
(εἰκώς) and accounts that are merely conjectural (εἰκαστικός). Moreover, in that 
interpretation Proclus takes another important step in ‘upgrading’ the account of 
philosophy of nature. Rather than explaining the like(li)ness itself, i.e. the sense in 
which accounts about images of Being are εἰκότες, which he takes to be crystal 
clear (καταφανές), Proclus distinguishes it from a kind of like-ness that is further 
removed from truth, namely that of images of images. In doing so, he emphasizes 
the proximity of likely accounts to truth.114  
One might wonder, Proclus says, what kind of accounts could be given of images 
of sensible paradigms, that is, the objects of conjecture (τὰ εἰκαστά) of the lower 
part of the Divided Line,115 and artefacts (τὰ τεχνητά).116 What follows is a short 
                                               
110 In Tim. I 4.7-25, 30.11-15. Dillon (1976: 255). 
111 In Tim. I 63.8-9 Τίμαιος γὰρ καθολικώτερον καὶ ὑψηλότερον καὶ οὐ δι΄ εἰκόνων ταῦτα 
παραδώσειν ἔμελλεν…Note the sequel, in which Proclus adduces as an argument for this thesis 
the direct analogy between Timaeus and the Demiurge, who “decorates (διαζωγραφοῦντα) the 
heavens with the dodecahedron, and creation with the appropriate figures” (cf. Tim. 53cff, esp. 
Tim. 55c4-6). This is a surprising choice, because it refers to a passage which could very well be 
taken as a description “in images”, in the sense of metaphors. I take it, then, that Proclus is here 
emphasizing that the description of the demiurge’s activities should instead be taken literally. For 
the analogy between Timaeus and the Demiurge, see V.7.1.  
112 As is argued extensively also by Lernould (2005: 122-128 et passim).  
113 Theol.Plat. V 36, 133.11 ὁ Τίμαιος, οὐ μύθους πλάττων. N.b. this does not prevent Timaeus 
from using signs or metaphors every now and then, e.g. at Tim. 36a, the passage referred to at 
Theol.Plat. V 36. Cf. In Tim. II 256.29ff. 
114 On truth see below V.5.2(i). 
115 Rep. 511e, 534a, the objects of εἰκασία. 
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but dense discussion of objects at different ‘removes’ from the Forms, and the 
corresponding accounts.  
Proclus distinguishes between images of intelligibles, to which Plato just assigned 
likely accounts, and images that do not have intelligible paradigms (the εἰκαστά 
and τεχνητά). To the latter Proclus assigns λόγοι εἰκαστικοί, while stressing the 
difference between ἐοικέναι (“to be like”) and εἰκάζειν (“to portray”, or “make 
oneself like”), and the corresponding adjectives εἰκώς and εἰκαστικός.117 The 
Platonic passages that are in the background here are of course book X of the 
Republic (esp 596bff.), where Socrates distinguishes three metaphysical levels 
(Form, object resembling the Form, and imitation of that object), and the Sophist 
(esp. the adjective εἰκαστικός).118  
Note that for the verb ἐοικέναι in this context a translation such as ‘avoir 
probabilité’ (Festugière) is not correct. Proclus deliberately highlights the root of 
εἰκώς in ἐοικέναι and thereby its relation to εἰκών, and it is better to translate 
ἐοικέναι in the above distinctions as “to be like”. The difference Proclus is after is 
that between a natural and an artificial ontological likeness, or between resemblance 
and imitation. This difference may be illustrated by quoting the juxtaposition of 
the two verbs in Phaedo 99e6-100a1. Socrates there states “ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω 
τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν,” which is best translated as something like “perhaps that 
to which I liken it is in a way not really like it”. The accounts of the images of 
Being, which ‘ἐοικέναι’, are not somehow an educated guess, which therefore have 
probability, as opposed to random guessing (cf. ‘conjecturer’, Festugières 
translation for εἰκάζειν). Instead, they are the expressions of everything Becoming, 
which has a natural metaphysical resemblance to Being. The difference between 
the accounts lies in the nature of their content.  
Proclus subsequently adds a further distinction within the group of the τεχνητά, 
between primary ones and secondary ones. His description is somewhat 
confusing, but it comes down to the distinction between an artefact and a work of 
art, e.g. a bed and a painting of a bed. To Plotinus is traditionally ascribed the 
thesis that an artist can use intelligible paradigms, but Proclus here emphatically 
denies this possibility: when in the Republic Socrates speaks of an artisan using ideas 
(ἰδέαι), he is not referring to transcendent Forms.119 Nonetheless the products of 
                                                                                                                                       
116 In Tim. I 343.18-22. 
117 In Tim. I 343.21-27. At In Eucl 40.18 Proclus mentions an εἰκαστικὴ γνώσις, which is involved 
in the science called general catoptrics, i.e. the science of reflection of light. 
118 The word εἰκαστικός is not very common, and in classical Greek occurs only in Plato, in the 
context of technai: Soph. 235c8ff, esp. 235d6, 236b2, 264c5, 266d9; cf. Leg. 667c9, 668a6. 
119 In Tim. I 344.8-18, with ref. to Rep. X 596b and Prot. 312b-319c. Cf. Sheppard (1980: 196). For 
Plotinus’ famous thesis that an artist can use an intelligible paradigm, see Enn. V 8 [31] 1, esp. 32-
39, cf. Arist. Phys. II 8 199a15-17. As Sheppard points out, Plotinus does not apply his theory to 
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the artisan are on a higher ontological level than secondary artefacts, because the 
paradigms used by the artisan are the ideas existing in his own mind, not sensible 
objects. Thus accounts of these primary artefacts are likely (εἰκότες), just as 
accounts of the images of Being. The secondary τεχνητά, which do have sensible 
paradigms, are “at three removes from truth”, and accounts of them, as of the 
natural copies of the sensible, are conjectural (εἰκαστικοί).120  
Interestingly, both in In Parm. and in In Alc. we find paraphrases of the εἰκὼς 
λόγος in which Proclus uses the very word εἰκαστικός, in the In Tim. reserved for 
accounts at a third remove, to refer to the likeliness of accounts about the images 
of Being. This choice can be explained from the context: the occurrences of the 
εἰκὼς λόγος at In Parm. and In Alc. are contained in passages which emphasize the 
contrast between the intelligible and the sensible.121 In the In Tim., however, 
Proclus’ main interest is the continuity between metaphysical levels.122  
This striving for continuity shows also from the fact that in the entire discussion 
in In Tim. of different kinds of accounts and different degrees of removal from the 
truth, the fact that the accounts in question are themselves images is not brought 
up. Despite the fact that, as we have seen, accounts are ontological εἰκόνες of their 
subject matter, they are not at a further remove from the truth. The reason for this 
is probably that they are actually εἰκόνες of our knowledge. Considering the 
terminology used – εἰκόνες as good images – and the Platonic view of thinking as 
internal dialogue,123 it is not unreasonable to assume that for Proclus the gap 
between thoughts and uttered λόγοι is quite small. We may assume that according 
to Proclus the main difference between thoughts and uttered λόγοι is that the 
division which is unifiedly present in the former is given a temporal ordering in 
the latter, and that this difference is innocent enough to sometimes equate λόγοι 
as images of thoughts with λόγοι as images of reality.124 Somehow there is a point-
                                                                                                                                      
texts. For a balanced discussion of Plotinus’ aesthetic notion of mimesis see Halliwell (2002: 316-
323). On the Neoplatonic discussion and rejection of Forms of artefacts, see In Remp. II 86.4-
87.6 and In Parm. 827.27-829.21 and D'Hoine (2006a: 185-211), (2006b), on the In Tim. passage 
here discussed see D'Hoine (2006a: 209-210), (2006b: 300-301). 
120 In Tim. I 344.1-5, after Plato Rep. X 597e3-4. For ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας instead of ἀπὸ φύσεως cf. 
Rep. X 599d2, 602c2. Proclus cannot use φύσις in that sense here because he is also discussing the 
distinction between φύσις and τέχνη.  
121 In Parm. 994.26-30, In Alc. 22.3-11, echoing Tim. 28a1-4, 29b3-c2 and 34c3, ἡμεῖς πολὺ 
μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος.  
122 As well as between cognitive faculties, and between kinds of discourse. 
123 Plato on thought as internal dialogue: Soph. 263e3-8, Tht. 189e6-109a2. 
124 Cf. In Parm. 809.17-19: Ως γὰρ ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ λόγος τὸ ἓν καὶ ἁπλοῦν νόημα μερίζει, καὶ 
διεξοδεύει κατὰ χρόνον τὰς ἡνωμένας τοῦ νοῦ νοήσει. Cf. Heiser (1991: 45-6) on Plotinus.  
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to-point correspondence between the accounts and thoughts.125 As a consequence 
of his short discussion of different kinds of likeness, the proximity of accounts 
about images of Being to truth has been increased. The next question imposing 
itself is what is the relation between thoughts and reality?  
 
 
V.5.2 The unlikeness of thoughts 
 
Let us return to Timaeus’ remark that a text about Being is irrefutable, “insofar as 
it is possible and appropriate for words to be irrefutable and invincible” (Tim. 
29c7-8).126 Proclus uses this passage to quite conspicuously establish the definite 
shift from λόγοι as uttered accounts to λόγοι as the reasoning that forms the 
foundation thereof. He does so by moving in three steps from accounts about 
something (λόγοι περὶ...), which suggests a verbal account, through ‘the scientific 
account’ (ὁ ἐπιστημονικὸς λόγος), to knowledge itself (αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη).127  
A scientific account may be irrefutable (ἀνέλεγκτος), says Proclus, but is so merely 
in a relative sense, namely with respect to our cognition (ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν 
γνῶσιν).128 It cannot be refuted by us. It can, however, be refuted (ἐλέγχεται), which 
here means that it is incorrect, in two respects. (1) First of all, with respect to the 
very subject of our knowledge, and (2) secondly with respect to higher 
cognitions.129  
(1) As to the first, the account can “be refuted by the subject itself” (ἐλέγχεται δὲ 
ὑπ΄ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, 342.27-343.1), because accounts are incapable of 
comprehending the nature of their subject as it is (ὡς μὴ δυνάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν 
ὡς ἔστι περιλαβεῖν, 343.1-2) due to the above mentioned discursivity which 
diminishes the similarity between subject and account (ὡς ἀπολειπόμενος αὐτοῦ τῆς 
ἀμερείας, 343.2).130 This argument is in turn argued for, not with reference to the 
nature of discourse, but of knowledge: the second kind of refutation is offered as 
argument for the first.131 
                                               
125 At In Tim. I 353.17-22 Proclus even seems to suggest that a point-to-point correspondence 
between account and reality is possible. 
126 Quoted above as part of T V.10. 
127 In Tim. I 342.7-8 (discussed above), 342.25 and 343.3 respectively. 
128 In Tim. I 342.25-26. 
129 In Tim. I 342.27-343.15. 
130 As a result of discursivity, the soul loses not only the unitary grasp of its object, but also the 
real nature (φύσιν) thereof, as its nature is in fact that which gives a thing unity. Not grasping a 
thing’s unity implies not grasping its nature. Cf. Siorvanes (1996: 172).  
131 As shows from καὶ γὰρ, In Tim. I 343.3. 
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(2) Our knowledge, and consequently the account we give thereof, are both 
correctable by νοῦς, as the highest form of cognition, but one that is exterior to 
our souls.132 Every lower level of cognition adds a modification to the mode of 
knowing of the previous level, resulting in a diminution of cognitive power.133 Or 
as Proclus put it: imagination corrects (ἐλέγχει)134 perception, because perception 
works with affections, aggregation and separation,135 whereas imagination does 
not; opinion corrects imagination, because the latter needs form and impression; 
science corrects opinion, because the latter does not know causes; and intellect 
corrects science (ἐπιστήμη), because the latter uses division and discursivity. Only 
intellect “will say what Being is in essence (ἐρεῖ τὸ ὂν ὅπερ ἐστί).”136 And only 
intellect is really invincible (ἀνίκητος, cf. n. 85). All this is well-known Neoplatonic 
epistemology, and the surprise is not so much in the content, as in the location. 
With this discussion, Proclus has completed the shift started earlier, from λόγοι to 
ἐπιστήμη: while the deficiency of the εἰκὼς λόγος initially concerned specifically 
discourse and images of Being, i.e. the objects of δόξα and αἴσθησις, Proclus has turned 
it around so that the deficiency concerns all of human knowledge, including and in 
fact especially ἐπιστήμη, and its inferiority to νοῦς. This shows from his concluding 
statement:  
T V.16 
“Scientific knowledge (...) and a scientific account, are always the lesser 
(κρατεῖται) of intellect.”137 
 
We will take a closer look at the different aspects of the refutability of our 
knowledge in the next sections, after first following the further development of 
the new epistemological angle in the exegesis of Tim. 29c2-3. 
 
(i) Truth and belief 
T V.17 
“And standing in proportion to them: as Being is to Becoming, so truth is 
to belief.” (Tim. 29c2-3)138 
                                               
132 In Tim I 343.3-4.  
133 Kuisma (1996: 47) calls what is here described “the principle of cognitive relativity”. 
134 On this meaning of ἐλέγχειν see LSJ sv.  
135 Ref. to Democritean theory, cf. A 120 DK, Plato Tim. 67e5-6, Arist. Met. X 7 1057b8-9, Top. 
VII 3 153a38-b1, Plot. Enn. VI 3 [44] 17.19-24. 
136 Cf. Plotinus: Intellect is identical to what it says: V 3 [49] 5 25-26, cf. V 5 [32] 2.18-21; Heiser 
(1991: 27-8).  
137 In Tim. I 343.3-15. 
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The motif of truth and falsity, which runs through both Timaeus and Critias, 
culminates in this famous ἀναλογία that “as Being is to Becoming, so truth is to 
belief” (Tim. 29c3).139 Proclus explains this ἀναλογία as a geometrical alternation 
(γεωμετρικῶς...τὸ ἐναλλὰξ προσέθηκεν) of terms that are related as ratios (what 
truth is to the intelligible, belief is to the generated).140 What the value is of such 
an alternation, Proclus does not reveal, but it will turn out to be instrumental to 
one of his aims in the exegesis of Tim. 29c2-3: bringing closer together the forms 
of cognition related to Becoming and Being, belief and truth.141 
Proclus’ reading of this ἀναλογία starts out with a surprising summary. He lists the 
division of two realms, the intelligible and the generated, and the coordinate 
division of their ontological relation, paradigm and image, followed by the 
corresponding epistemic predicates ἐπιστήμη and εἰκοτολογία, or ἀλήθεια and 
πίστις, which he later calls γνώσεις. Although this reminds us of the earlier systoichia 
of reality and knowledge, some adjustments have been made to facilitate a 
continued epistemological angle.142 At the beginning of his exegesis of Tim. 29b3-
d3 Proclus used the terms ‘truth’ and ‘belief’ as referring to two kinds of accounts, 
rather than forms of cognition.143 Moreover, he there identified the two forms of 
cognition (γνώσεις) corresponding to Being and Becoming as νόησις and δόξα, 
based on the ‘definitions’ of Tim. 28a1-4.144 Instead, he now leaves out the 
‘definitions’, but adds the relation paradigm–image and two new forms of 
cognition: ἀλήθεια and πίστις, equating them with ἐπιστήμη and εἰκοτολογία 
respectively. In support of his new coordinate series Proclus quotes from 
Parmenides’ poem, whose description of ἀλήθεια he adjusts to fit the picture.145  
                                                                                                                                      
138 ἀνάλόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας. ὅτιπερ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια. On the strange 
distribution of text over the lemmata, see above n. 85. For the ἀναλογία, cf. In Remp. I 284.5. 
139 Within Timaeus’ exposition: Tim. 37b9, 51d6, 53e3. On truth in Timaeus-Critias, see Runia 
(1997). 
140 In Tim. I 344.28-345.7. Cf. Arist. EN 1131b5-7. On alternation in Euclid see In Eucl. 357.9-13. 
The comparison with geometry, which was so present in the exegesis of the first part of the 
prooemium, has now receded entirely into the background. I think this reference to geometry is 
not part of it.  
141 On these two as a pair of cognitions see below.  
142 On systoichia see Steel (1984: 7).  
143 In Tim. I 338.82-339.2, τῶν λόγων ὁ διορισμός, in which the pairing off of both εἰκοτολογία 
and πίστις with αλήθεια suggests that εἰκοτολογία and πίστις are interchangeable.  
144 In Tim. I 339.15, discussed above, V.4. On the definitions see chapter III. 
145 The quotations from Parmenides’ poem are frg. 1, ll. 29f, and frg. 4 (In Tim. I 345.15ff). In the 
first, Proclus has the textual variant Ἀληθείης εὐφεγγέος (“shiny truth”) rather than εὐπειθέος 
(Sextus Emp. adv. Math. VII 111, Simpl In dC 557.26 has εὐκυκλέος). O’Brien (1987: 316-7 and n. 
10) argues convincingly that Proclus replaced εὐπειθέος in order to maintain the separation of 
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That the pair ἀλήθεια and πίστις, which to 21th century minds look like the 
combination of a propositional property and a mental or cognitive attitude,146 is 
by Proclus seen as a pair of γνώσεις, cognitive faculties or states,147 is surprising, 
considering his earlier use of the terms πίστις and ἀλήθεια as applying to 
accounts,148 but fits the overall development of his exegesis. In the earlier passage 
he was concerned with introducing the systoichia of “things, thoughts and words,” 
which he has dropped at this point in favour of a purely epistemological approach.  
In the following, we will determine how the two pairs ‘intellection and opinion’ 
from the definitions and ‘truth and belief’ from the ἀναλογία can be reconciled. 
First, however, I will discuss the two notions, (1) πίστις and (2) ἀλήθεια, 
themselves and show how Proclus brings them closer together by elevating belief, 
the lower cognition, and lowering truth, the higher one.  
(1) Since πίστις at Tim. 29c is coordinate with perceptible Becoming, the first 
notion of belief that comes to mind is the one we find in the Divided Line, where 
Plato ascribes πίστις to the second lowest segment of the divided line, as the 
cognition of the higher visible objects.149 Proclus, however, explicitly rejects that 
notion of irrational belief as irrelevant for the Timaeus passage and states that “it 
seems that” (ἔοικε) here Plato adopts a notion of rational belief (λογικὴ πίστις) 
instead.150 He does not tell us what indications he has for that suspicion, but I 
propose that there are two reasons. First, the presence of the original predication 
of ἀλήθεια and πίστις/εἰκοτολογία to accounts (λόγοι), which are by nature 
                                                                                                                                       
πίστις and ἀλήθεια. Moreover, εὐφεγγέος gives him a nice parallel with the light metaphor at 
347.20ff., as shows from 346.1-2. On Proclus’ use of Parmenides’ poem see also Guérard (1987). 
On parallels between Tim. and Parmenides’ poem see Gregory (2000: 252). The contribution of 
Parmenides’ poem to Proclus’ point is rhetorical, rather than systematic, as the quotation cannot 
be made to match the distinctions Proclus is introducing, and Proclus even seems to misread 
Parmenides by suggesting an identification of Becoming with non-being (346.1). We will 
therefore leave the details of Parmenides’ lines aside.  
146 E.g. Johansen (2004: 50f.). Van Ophuijsen (2000: 127-8) discusses the apparent discrepancy 
and convincingly argues for a reading of ἀλήθεια at Tim. 29c3 as well as elsewhere in Plato as a 
state of the knowing subject. 
147 Leaving the question whether he has in mind faculties or states for later we will translate 
γνώσις as ‘(form of) cognition’ for the time being. 
148 In Tim. I 338.27-339.2. See above V.3. 
149 Plato Rep. 511e1, 509d. At Theol.Plat. I 25, 109.4-113.10 Proclus distinguishes four kinds of 
πίστις: divine faith, which is part of the Chaldaean triad Love, Truth, and Faith (Or. Chald. 46 
Majercik (=26 Kr.), see Hoffmann (2000); the belief of the Divided Line; the conviction we have 
of (innate) common notions; and the ἐνέργεια of intellect. 
150 In Tim. I 346.3 ἔοικε δὲ ἡ πίστις ἑτέρα τις εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ...ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ ἄλογός ἐστι 
γνῶσις...αὕτη δὲ λογικὴ...and 348.4-5. That Proclus calls the πίστις from the Republic irrational 
(ἄλογος), although Plato does not, is due to the fact that it is “distinguished from conjecture, but 
(...) classified in terms of sense-perception” (346.6-8).  
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rational, is still felt in the background. We will return to this point below. And 
second, this is where the geometrical alternation of the ἀναλογία comes in. In 
explaining the geometrical alternation Proclus reconstructs the original ἀναλογία to 
which the alternation is applied from Tim. 27d5ff. as “as truth is to the intelligible 
paradigm, belief is to the generated image”, even though there is no mention of 
paradigm and image at Tim. 27d5ff yet.151 After the alternation, we get “as Being is 
to Becoming, truth is to belief”. The  ‘ratio’, so to speak, is the relation paradigm-
image which Proclus added to the original ἀναλογία.152 Due to the alternation we 
know this same relation of paradigm-image to hold between truth and belief. And 
since truth is rational, therefore belief, as an image thereof, is here also rational, 
albeit in a lower degree.153  
That lower degree, of course, is due to the connection πίστις has with the realm of 
Becoming, and consists in its commixture (συμμίγνυται) with irrational forms of 
cognition, namely perception (αἴσθησις) and conjecture (εἰκασία). The rationality 
of πίστις lies in the fact that it uses these two for obtaining the fact (τὸ ὅτι), and 
from there moves on to providing causes (τὰς αἰτίας ἀποδίδωσιν).154 This is a 
strange form of cognition: it is a ‘belief’ associated with perception and conjecture, 
which reminds of the earlier description of δόξα, but it cannot be synonymous 
with that δόξα, since it is also capable of providing causes, which δόξα is not.155 It 
therefore has to be more elevated than δόξα. At the same time, the use of 
perception and conjecture seems to exclude that πίστις is here a synonym for 
διάνοια. Nonetheless, I propose that this is the case, and that πίστις here is 
something like a lower activity of διάνοια. Proclus’ διάνοια is more varied than 
Plato’s, and consists of different layers.156 The πίστις we encounter in Proclus’ 
explanation of the ἀναλογία of Timaeus 29c3, fulfils part of the role Plato gives to 
διάνοια in the Republic: reasoning discursively, and finding causes, while using the 
visible as images of higher realities.157 An argument in favour of reading πίστις 
here as a lower kind or part of διάνοια is the earlier description of διάνοια as 
                                               
151 In Tim. I 345.2-3. Proclus construes the original ἀναλογία from the definitions by replacing the 
definition of Being with truth, and the definition of Becoming with belief: “That which is 
apprehensible by thought with a rational account is the thing that is always unchangeably real; 
whereas that which is the object of belief together with unreasoning sensation is the thing that 
becomes and passes away, but never has real being.” (Tim. 28a1-4, transl. Cornford) 
152 Cf. the alternation 2:4 :: 3:6 to 2:3 :: 4:6, where the ratio is 1:2 of the original pairs. 
153 Perhaps Tim. 37b8 is playing in the background. See In Tim. II 315.6-10 and II 310.10, where 
πίστις is the ‘permanent and unchanging judgement of opinion’ (ἡ δὲ πίστις ἡ μόνιμος καὶ 
ἀμετάπτωτος τῆς δόξης κρίσις). 
154 In Tim. I 346.8-12. For the link of giving causes and rationality cf. In Tim. II 120.23-28. 
155 E.g. In Tim. I 257.19-21. On δόξα see III.5.1. 
156 On a recent and detailed treatment of διάνοια in Proclus see MacIsaac (2001). 
157 Plato Rep. 510d5-511a1. 
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cognition of the intermediaries, both intelligible and opinable (δοξαστά).158 As a 
consequence of the adjustment of the form of cognition associated with 
Becoming, from δόξα which knows essences to πίστις which delivers causes (here 
taken as not including the essence), Proclus now comes very close to identifying 
Becoming, at least from an epistemological point of view, with the intermediate 
realm distinguished earlier, Becoming-and-Being.159 Perhaps this adjustment can 
be explained with regard to context. In the definitions the cognitions ascribed to 
the different realms were the ones with which we grasp those realms. When it 
comes to Becoming, however, its respective forms of cognition, δόξα and 
αἴσθησις, will not suffice to giving an explanation (λόγος) of that realm. That role of 
thinking about and giving an explanation of Becoming is here given to πίστις. 
Despite the shift to epistemology, then, the whole discussion still regards the 
epistemological background of the account given.  
 
(2) Truth is the cognition that in the ἀναλογία of Tim. 29c2-3 is coordinate with 
Being. As an adherent of the so-called ‘Identity theory of truth’, Proclus generally 
speaking sees truth primarily as an ontological and cognitive property, in the sense 
that absolute truth is where cognizing subject and reality as object of cognition 
coincide.160 This notion of truth, which has its roots in Alexander’s reading of 
Metaphysics XII and de Anima III,161 is also associated with the contemplation of 
Being as “the plain of truth” (τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας πεδίον).162 On every level other than 
that of Intellect, we find only what Siorvanes calls “compromised” or partial truth, 
and truth as a relational property, rather than identity.163 On lower levels the 
                                               
158 In Tim. I 247.1-2 διάνοιαν τὴν τῶν μέσων γνῶσιν νοητῶν καὶ δοξαστῶν, discussed in III.5.1 (iii). 
159 In Tim. I 257.14ff. On this intermediate realm see III.5.1. 
160 Proclus on truth: Theol.Plat. I 21, with Taormina (2000). Künne (2003: 102) calls Proclus’ the 
“least felicitous” of a number of ancient formulations of correspondence theories of truth, as “the 
knower cannot sensibly be called true” (with ref. to In Tim. II 287.3-5). This is unfair criticism, as 
Proclus’ is an identity theory of truth. For different kinds of truth in Proclus and Plotinus and the 
importance of identity see Blumenthal (1989). 
161 Cf. Emilsson (1996: 237-9), who calls it the ‘Internality Thesis’ in his discussion of Plotinus’ 
notion of truth. Cf. Plot. Enn. V 5 [32] 2.18-20.  
162 In Tim. I 347.27-28, quoting Phaedr. 248b6. Cf. Plato Phil. 65d, where νοῦς and ἀλήθεια are 
tentatively identified. Proclus is generally following Phaedrus 247c3ff., here and elsewhere, e.g. In 
Parm. 1015.35ff. Truth itself, i.e. in the intelligible hypostasis, is what makes all the Forms 
intelligible, In Parm. 944.27-9. Cf. Siorvanes (1996: 157, 194). 
163 Siorvanes (2000: 53). Siorvanes passes over this “compromised” or partial truth later on in his 
paper, when he objects that according to the requirement of isomorphism “the criterion for truth 
is a whole and complete correspondence”, in which case there should be a one-to-one relation 
between words and things (causing several problems, such as how to explain for different 
languages and synonymy). The solution is simple: there is no complete isomorphism between 
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relation consists in “the agreement (ἐφάρμοσις) of the knower with the known”, 
i.e. as in a coinciding of two geometrical figures, without complete identity,164 and 
some kind of contact with the object of knowledge.165  
In his exegesis of the ἀναλογία of Tim. 29c2-3, Proclus distills three kinds of truth 
of beings (ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων, 347.20166) from Plato’s works. Using well-known 
imagery of light, he presents an emanation of unitary truth, as a light proceeding 
from the good and providing the intelligibles with unity and purity, followed by 
truth proceeding from the intelligibles, shining on the intellectual orders, and 
finally the truth in souls.167 It is this last kind of truth which Proclus takes Plato to 
have had in mind in the ἀναλογία “what Being is to Becoming, truth is to belief”, 
as it is the highest one attainable by human beings:168 
T V.18 
“... the [truth] that is innate (συμφυής) in souls, which through intuitive 
thought (διὰ νοήσεως), fastens (ἐφαπτομένη) on being and by means of 
scientific knowledge (δι’ ἐπιστήμης) has intercourse (συνοῦσα) with the 
objects of knowledge. (...) ...it is this truth found in souls that we must 
assume in the present context too, since we assumed this kind of belief as 
well, not the kind that is irrational and is denied all rational observation.”169  
 
Note that of the forms of cognition here associated with truth intellection (νόησις) 
is known from the definition of Being, but knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is not.170 A 
number of Platonic passages where it does occur in the context of truth may be in 
the background, such as Plato’s description of “the plain of truth” in the Phaedrus 
and in the Timaeus the description of the circle of the Same.171  
                                                                                                                                      
language and subject matter; complete, and therefore metaphysical, truth exists only on the level 
of Intellect. Cf. Blumenthal (1989: 276).  
164 See e.g. In Tim. II 287.1-5; cf. In Tim. II.315.21ff (γνώσις instead of ἀληθεία). In Crat. XXXVI 
11.30-12.17 (ad Crat. 385b-c). In Perpatetic writings, ἐφαρμόζειν and relatives are commonly used 
of accounts and definitions, and often almost synonymous with ‘being true of’. E.g.Top. VI 10 
148a10ff.  
165 Cf. In Tim. II 287.9-10. Theol.Plat. I 21 100.8 and 25 109.20 (συναπτεῖν), cf. Siorvanes (2000: 
54).  
166 Cf. In Crat. LXIII 28.5, CX 60.19. 
167 In Tim. I 347.20-348.3 Plato’s Rep. VI (507bff); for truth as illumination cf. In Tim. III 114.19-
23. See Runia (forthcoming) ad loc. for more reff. For a division of four objects of the predicates 
‘true’ and ‘false’ see In Crat. XXXVI 11.30-12.17 (ad Crat. 385b-c). 
168 In Tim. I 343-4. Cf. In Parm. 946.26-30; Theol.Plat. I 21 97.17-21.  
169 In Tim. I 347.29-348.6, transl. Runia slightly modified. 
170 Note that in Theol.Plat. I 21 97.17-18 psychical truth is associated with opinions and sciences. 
171 Plato Phdr. 247d1f., Tim. 37c. Cf. also Rep. VII 533c7, another ἀναλογία, where ἐπιστήμη is the 
highest section of the line, and νοήσις the combined highest two, ἐπιστήμη and διάνοια.  
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At this point we can return to the question whether Proclus has in mind cognitive 
states or faculties when he calls the truth and belief of Tim. 29c2-3 γνώσεις. 
Proclus clearly describes πίστις as an agent (χρωμένη 346.9, λαμβάνουσα 10, 
ἀποδίδωσιν 11-12), which suggests that we should read γνώσις in this context as a 
cognitive faculty. The case of truth is less clear cut, as the verbs attached to it 
could express both activity and state (ἐφαπτομένη 347.29, συνοῦσα 30), but this fits 
the nature of higher cognitions in which ultimately thinking activity and state 
coincide. Therefore by ἀναλογία we can tentatively conclude that both γνώσεις are 
primarily to be taken as cognitive faculties. 
 
In sum, according to Proclus the ἀναλογία of Tim. 29c2-3 distributes two cognitive 
faculties, rather than kinds of discourse, over the two realms of reality. The one, 
πίστις, which is coordinate with Becoming, is the faculty which combines 
rationality with perception (αἴσθησις) and conjecture (εἰκασία), and is capable of 
providing causes, whereas the one coordinate with Being, ἀλήθεια, is the form of 
cognition in our souls that works through both intellective insight (νοήσις) and 
scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The main differences between the two, truth and 
belief, lie in the respective levels of precision of the resulting knowledge,172 due to 
the ‘instrumental’ cognitions associated with them.  
The upshot of Proclus’ interpretation is the following: he brings the notions of 
truth and belief closer together by elevating the lower cognition, πίστις, to a 
“rational belief” by distinguishing it from its traditional Platonic level of 
association with the illusions of sense perception. On the other hand, he locates 
the relevant notion of the higher cognition, ἀλήθεια, at the lower end of its 
semantic spectrum, taking it as a cognitive truth on the level of human souls, 
rather than the primary metaphysical truth of Being. Apart from the introduction 
of ἐπιστήμη as ‘instrument’ of truth, this explanation of the notion of truth is not 
surprising in itself, and the sketch of the apparently irrelevant higher forms of 
truth serves to emphasize the elevation of πίστις.173 The most important aspect of 
Proclus’ interpretation, and what differentiates it from Plato’s descriptions, is, of 
course, the addition of the delivery of causes by πίστις.  
 
(ii) La condition humaine and the εἰκὼς μῦθος  
 
                                               
172 In Tim. I 346.10 ἀστάτου; 12-13 τὸ συγκεχυμένον...καὶ τὸ ἄστατον; 14-15 οὔτε ἀκούομεν ἀκριβές 
οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; 15-20 σφἀλλεται καὶ διαπίπτει τ’ἀκριβοῦς. Cf. 346.3, on πίστις in Parmenides’ 
poem, frg. 1.29f and frg. 4. See above n. 145. 
173 Cf. In Tim. I 348.3-7. 
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After adjusting the focus of Tim. 29b3-d3 to its epistemological side, and elevating 
πίστις to the lower limits of διάνοια, Proclus has paved the way for a reading of the 
εἰκὼς λόγος which makes full use of Plato’s introduction of human weakness: 
T V.19 
“(1) If then, Socrates, in many respects concerning many things – the gods 
and the generation of the universe – we prove unable (μὴ δυνατοὶ 
γιγνώμεθα) to render an account at all points entirely consistent with itself 
and exact, you must not be surprised. (2) If we can furnish accounts no less 
likely than any other (μηδενὸς ἧττον...εἰκότας), we must be content, 
remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human (φύσιν 
ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν), and consequently it is fitting that we should, in these 
matters, accept the likely story (τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον) and look for nothing 
further.”174 
 
That accounts of the natural world, both sublunary and celestial, are unfixed and 
imprecise is due to the impotence (ἀδυναμία, picking up μὴ δυνατοί) of its 
students,175 and which is a consequence primarily of our enmattered state, forcing 
the use of particular tools upon us, as well as spatiotemporal limitations. Proclus 
twice presents a mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian passages to illustrate this, and 
in the process expands the imprecision of our accounts to those about the 
intelligible.  
In the cosmological and eschatological myth in the Phaedo, Plato has Socrates 
describe how we humans live at the bottom of valleys on the earth, filled with mist 
and water, and perceive the heavenly bodies through those substances, like 
someone who lives at the bottom of the ocean (ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους) 
and thinks that the sea is the sky. He perceives the heavenly bodies through water, 
thinking he has a clear view of them. Our own slowness and weakness, like that of 
our hypothetical ocean-dweller, prevents us from actually reaching the heavens 
above the sky and getting a direct view of the beauty and purity up there.176 The 
up there, in the case of us earth-dwellers, refers not to the heavenly bodies, of 
course, but to the transcendent realm of Forms. The issue at stake, as in the image 
of the cave of Rep. VII, is ontological rather than physical distance.177 
Aristotle also remarks upon the disadvantages of our particular location in the 
universe, from his own non-otherworldly, empiricist point of view. Our position 
                                               
174 The numbers indicate the separation into lemmas: (1) Tim. 29c4-7 and (2) 29c7-d3 transl. 
Cornford, discussed at In Tim. I 348.8-351.14 and 351.15-353.29 respectively. For (2) see T V.25. 
175 In Tim. I 351.20-27. 
176 Phaedo 108cff, esp. 109b4-110b2.  
177 Cf. Hackforth (1955: 174-5). 
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far away (πόρρω) from a different ‘up there’, namely the celestial bodies, or rather 
this position in combination with the weakness of our organs of perception, 
prevents us from having accurate empirical data and therefore accurate 
knowledge, of all the properties of those heavenly bodies.178 In Aristotle’s case, 
then, the issue is primarily relative physical distance, as opposed to the 
metaphysical distance in the Phaedo,179 although in both cases the larger issue is 
that of cognitive problems as resulting from ontological differences. 
In Proclus’ exegesis of the prooemium we find two references to our position in 
the universe and its effect on the reliability of our knowledge. On both occasions, 
however, Proclus combines the theme of the Phaedo-myth with Aristotelian 
material and brings up the issue in the context of the study, not of the Forms, but 
of “the images of Being” (ἡ θεωρία τῶν τοῦ ὄντος εἰκόνων), which he describes in 
terms of distance.180  
The first instance is an odd reversal of the Platonic original. It concerns 
‘knowledge’ of physical objects, which can be gathered only with the use of the 
corresponding form of cognition (σύστοιχος γνῶσις), perception.181 If we had not 
been “living down here at the end of the universe” (ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ τοῦ παντὸς 
κατῳκισμένοι) and “very far away” (πορρωτάτω) from the Forms, Proclus states, 
we would not have made so many mistakes.182 Note that we also have a 
fascinating reversal of perspective here: Aristotle calls the outer limit of the 
universe the ἔσχατον τοῦ παντός.183 In Proclus, this anthropocentric perspective is 
replaced by the perspective of emanation: the ‘end of the universe’ is that which is 
the furthest removed from the One.184 Interestingly, Aristotle himself indicated 
that the common expression ἔσχατον τοῦ παντός as referring to the outer limit of 
the universe is in fact incorrectly used, since that which we call the end of the 
universe is in fact in nature primary.185 
The mistakes we make in studying the ‘images of Being’ are obviously not 
primarily caused by the distance between us and the objects of perception, since 
                                               
178 Distance from the celestial bodies: Arist. Cael. 286a4-7, ib. 292a16-17; PA I 5, 644.22ff. 
Unreliability of perception of things far away: dA 428b28-30. The distance to the object of 
perception is a topos throughout the history of epistemology. In Epicureanism it is related to 
clarity of perception ap. Sext.Emp. adv. Math. vii 208ff. (=Us. 247). 
179 Note, however, that Simpl. In Cael 396 explaining the Cael. passage turns it into an example of 
the likely story: the distance is cognitive rather than spatial, referring to Tim. 29c2. 
180 In Tim. I 352.29-30. 
181 That is, by us humans, and insofar as they are perceptible. On divine knowledge of the 
perceptible see below.  
182 In Tim. I 351.30-352.1.  
183 Cael. IV 1 308a21, cf. Plato Tim. 36e2. 
184 Cf. Theol.Plat. V 27 102.6.  
185 Cael. 308a21-2. 
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we live among them,186 but by the ontological distance between us and reality, due 
to our enmattered state: we have a ‘coarse and faulty’ (παχέως καὶ ἡμαρτημένως) 
use of perception, imposed on us by our human nature, which is ‘eclipsed by 
body, divided, and in need of irrational cognitions.’187 Had we been ‘up there’, we 
would not have been enmattered humans, but divine transcendent beings, who 
perceive everything, including Becoming, in a divine manner:  
T V.20 
“Let us not think that the knowledge they have is characterized by the 
natures of the objects of knowledge, nor that what has no reliability is not 
reliable in the case of the gods, as the philosopher Porphyry says (fr. 45). 
(...) Let us rather think that the manner of knowing differs according the 
diversity of the knowers. For the very same object is known by god 
unitarily, by intellect holistically, by reason universally, by imagination 
figuratively, by sense-perception passively. And it is not the case that 
because the object of knowledge is one, the knowledge is also one <and 
the same>.”188 
 
Proclus here follows Iamblichus’ principle that the nature of knowledge depends 
on the knower, not on the object known.189 Since divine intellection is not a 
‘surplus’, i.e. is not distinct from what they are, the gods know as they are, 
undivided, unenmattered and eternal.190 As opposed to us humans, they are 
capable of knowing everything, including the perceptible, the individual, future 
contingents, even matter, in a unitary, non extended, undivided, ungenerated, 
eternal and necessary manner.191 The distance from the Phaedo passage, then, is 
used by our commentator to express the essential deficiency of enmattered human 
souls regarding knowledge of any realm, including the realm of generation. 
                                               
186 For the ‘images of Being’ that are farther away, the heavenly bodies, see below. 
187 In Tim. I 352.1-5.  
188 In Tim. I 352.11-16.  
189 In Tim. I 352.3-353.11. Cf. El.Th. prop. 124, Theol.Plat. I 21 98.7-12, and reff. in Saffrey and 
Westerink (1968: 156, n. 1,2). De Prov. chapter 63, 64, 82 (Isaac), Decem Dub. q. 2, El.Th. 124. Cf. 
In Parm. 961.19ff ad Parm. 134cd. A weaker version of the principle, in which knowledge is given 
a relative property of being ‘higher, lower than or on the same level as the thing known’, is 
ascribed to Iamblichus by Ammonius (in Int., 135.14ff, on future contingents). Sorabji (2004: 72-
3) points out that it is a version of “all in all but appropriately to each”, which we do find in 
Porphyry. See Sorabji (2004: 72-6) for more reff. on divine knowledge in the commentators. 
190 In Tim. I 352.19-24. cf. 352.32-353.1. 
191 In Tim. I 352.5-8, cf. In Tim. I 351.29-30, 352.24-27, 353.22-3. In Amm. In Int. 136.15-17 we 
find a similar series. 
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A little further, we find the second reference to our position at the bottom of the 
universe, this time in the context of our knowledge of the heavenly bodies. Lack 
of precision in the study of those images of Being results, again, from our 
weakness (παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν), but in a different sense,192 which Proclus 
explains in an beautiful oxymoron: 
T V.21 
“…with respect to [the heavenly bodies], we have to be satisfied with the 
approximate (ἐγγύς), far away (πόρρω) settled as we are at the bottom, as 
they say, of the universe (ἐν τῷ πυθμένι, φασί, τοῦ παντός)” 193  
 
The disadvantage οf our – enmattered and distant – position is that we have to use 
perception and physical tools (ὄργανα), and fill ourselves with ‘likelihood’ (τοῦ 
εἰκότος) concerning the heavenly bodies.194 Although they are unchanging, and 
thus do not suffer from unknowability due to flux, they are still hard to know.195 
The cause of the problem, in this case, is physical distance combined with the 
weakness of perception, as in Aristotle. The solution, however, is Platonic. By way 
of illustration of the mistakes that are made as a consequence of our physical 
distance to the heavenly bodies combined with a research method using 
perception and astronomical instruments, Proclus refers to the astronomers he 
criticized also elsewhere: they formulate many different hypotheses, of epicycles, 
eccentrics, and contrary motions, but always as explanations ‘saving’ the same 
empirical data (τὰ φαινόμενα σῳζόντων).196 Proclus implies that, since only one 
explanation can be true, at least some of them (and in fact all) must be mistaken. 
The method described is of course in Proclus’ eyes not the best approach to the 
study of the heavenly bodies, nor is it Timaeus’ approach, but it is the only one 
available for their perceptible aspects. Even at what is often perceived as the height 
                                               
192 In Tim. I 352.29-30. 
193 In Tim. I 353.5-7 (πυθμήν from Phaedo 109c5). Cf. idib. 23-24 ἡμῖν δὲ ἀγαπητόν, εἰ καὶ ἐγγὺς 
αὐτῶν βάλλομεν. Cf. Philop. Opif. 206.3. For a similar claim, using similar expressions, cf. Philop. 
In APo. 300.25-30. 
194 In Tim. I 353.3-5. Cf. the earlier reference to the distance between us and the heavenly bodies, 
with inverse perspective, In Tim. I 346.21-31, see above V.5.1. 
195 Proclus does not say this in so many words, but this must be what he has in mind, considering 
that immediately preceding this argument he mentioned the ‘instability’ (ἀστάθμητον) of 
sublunary objects (353.1-3), despite the fact that considering the context (i.e. that the nature of 
knowledge is determined by knowing subject, not known object) that instability is in itself 
irrelevant.  
196 In Tim. I 353.7-11. On Proclus’ criticism of ‘low’ astronomy see Segonds (1987b), (1987a) and 
ch. IV, n. 38. On Timaeus’ ‘hyperastronomy’ (ὑπεραστρονομεῖν, inspired on Theaet. 173e6) see In 
Tim. I 202.15f., also III 277, In Parm. III 828.26-40, Hyp.Astr. I 1. Cf. Syr. In Met. 88.21f. 
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of precision, i.e. mathematical explanations, for example of the circles of the same 
and the different (Tim. 36c), our speaking of circles and points is imprecise. Since 
the passage in which Proclus explains this is rather complicated, but makes an 
important point, let me quote it entirely in the translation of Runia, who I think 
understood very well what Proclus has in mind: 
T V.22 
“But what is this?, someone might say. Do we not give precise accounts 
about the heaven, such as that the celestial circles bisect each other? And 
when we are content not to obtain precision but what is close to it, is it not 
through our own weakness and not through the nature of the object that 
we fail to reach precision? But the fact is that whenever we take our 
starting-points not from sense-perception but from universal propositions, 
in the context of sense-perceptible reality the accounts we give on the 
heaven do reveal precision and irrefutability, but in the context of the 
objects of science these too are refuted by means of the immaterial forms. 
Let us look at the very statement that has just been made. The largest 
[heavenly] circles, they say, bisect each other. The intersection, therefore, 
necessarily takes place at [two] points. But this point is indivisible. What, 
then, is such a thing doing in the realm of the divisible? What is a 
substance without extension doing in the realm of the extended? After all, 
everything that comes to be in the bodily realm is physically divided 
together with its substrate. [But the response might be again]: What have 
we here? Is there not such as thing as a physical point? But this departs 
from what is truly indivisible. A point does exist in the physical realm, but 
it is not a point in absolute terms, with the result that the account of the 
point does not harmonize precisely with such a thing (i.e. the physical 
point). In general terms, just as the accounts about the intelligibles do not 
harmonize with the objects of discursive thought, so the accounts of the 
objects of science do not harmonize with the objects of sense-perception, 
for the intelligibles are models for the objects of discursive thought, while 
the objects of discursive thought are models for the sense-perceptibles. 
After all, it is a soul which has ordered the mighty heaven and it continues 
to do together with the Father. As a result, whenever we speak about 
circles in heaven and contacts and bisections and equalities, from the 
viewpoint of speaking about sense-perceptibles we are speaking with 
precision (ἀκριβῶς). But in the perspective of the immaterial realities (τὰ 
ἄϋλα), all such expressions are idle chatter. 
But if someone were to ask us: What have we here? Is not that which is 
truly equal a λόγος, and is not the true circle non-extended? After all, each 
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of them is universal, and the universal is λόγος and indivisible form. But 
what is in the heaven is divisible and bisected and in a substrate, so again 
we say that here in the sense-perceptible realm there are no [true] circles or 
equalities or any other such thing, and it is in this way that we furnish our 
own accounts that are ‘not consistent with each other’” (cf. 29c6). 197 
  
The main point Proclus is here making, using among others “cutting circles” to 
illustrate it, is that our speaking of certain mathematical operations, such as 
“cutting”, which require a material substrate, are really part of physical or in this 
case astronomical explanations, and do not provide real knowledge. The subject of 
real knowledge is the intelligible, and explanations involving cutting and the like 
are nonsense (φλήναφος) when applied to the intelligible. On the other hand, the 
use of certain universals, such as “circle”, reasoning about which would lead to 
real knowledge, will never apply to the physical, because there are no real circles in 
heaven. Either way, in our astronomical account we combine expressions that 
apply to the intelligible (in the example “circle”) with those that apply only to the 
sensible (in the example “cutting”), and thus do not give consistent accounts. The 
passage is highly complex, as Proclus discusses several issues in one go. I agree 
with Runia, however, that Diehl’s reading allows us to make good sense of it.198 
Hence, I do not agree with the interpretation of the passage provided by Lernould 
(2005: 116-8), who follows Festugière. Festugière adopts textual variants (μὴ 
ἀκριβῶς in 349.30 where Diehl has ἀκριβῶς, and in ἐνύλων 350.1 instead of 
ἀύλων).199 As a result, the conclusion of the first half of the passage quoted above 
changes into one concerning the inappropriateness of expressions concerning 
intelligibles to perceptibles. This has two disadvantages: (1) it does not make sense of 
the beginning of the passage, which concerns the inappropriateness of 
terminology involving divisibility to the intelligible; (2) it does render Proclus’ 
argument more simple, but also repetitive, since the point made at 350.1-8 (“But if 
someone were to ask us, etc...”), which is in fact introduced as a further step, also 
concerns the inappropriateness of expressions concerning intelligibles to 
perceptibles. 
From the above we gather that the ultimate blame for the imprecision of any 
account, be it of the physical world or of the intelligible, lies with us, humans, not 
with reality, because in the end the nature of knowledge is not only determined by 
                                               
197 In Tim. I 349.6-350.8, ad Tim. 29c4-7, translation Runia, slightly modified.  
198 Runia (forthcoming)snote ad loc.  
199 Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 209 n. 3) 
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the object, but also by the knowing subject.200 As we saw above, Proclus follows 
Iamblichus in maintaining that the character of knowledge is determined by the 
essence of the knower. Emphasizing this once more, Proclus concludes his 
exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3 and the prooemium as follows, with an echo of 
Aristotelian and Platonic pleas for pardon of the weakness inherent in human 
nature:  
T V.23 
“The gods know reality in a superior manner, but we have to be satisfied if 
we come close to the mark. We are humans and we are inserted in a body 
and we have before ourselves a partial kind of life and are replete with a lot 
of likeliness (αὐτοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ εἰκότος ἀναπεπλήσμεθα), so that as is to be 
expected we will also give accounts that resemble myths (μῦθοις 
ἐοικότας...λόγους). For the human account is replete with a lot of thickness 
(παχύτης201) and confusion, which the word ‘μῦθος’ (i.e. in Tim. 29d2) 
indicates, and we should forgive human nature (δεῖ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει 
συγγινώσκειν).” 202  
 
Proclus here echoes Aristotle’s discussion of equity as making up for the 
shortcomings of written laws: equity is also to forgive human nature (καὶ τὸ τοῖς 
ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές).203 The legal context is quite appropriate for the 
exegesis of Tim. 29c7-d3, since Timaeus is referring to his audience as οἱ κριταί 
(d1).204  
In the above conclusion we find Proclus’ only remark on the εἰκὼς μῦθος. The 
ancient debate on the εἰκὼς λόγος did not include, so far as we know, the issue of 
the significance, if any, of Plato’s use of both λόγος and μῦθος when referring to 
                                               
200 I disagree with Lernould (2005: 115) on this point, who takes it that it is the imperfection of 
the object of knowledge that is emphasized most by Proclus. His reading of the passage that is the 
source of his statement (In Tim. I 346.21-29), is based on the textual variant adopted by 
Festugière, but which does not make better sense of the passage, see the foregoing. That 
accepting this variant is crucial for Lernould’s interpretation shows from the fact that he keeps 
using the expression ‘bavardage’ (φλήναφος) in the context of explanations of the sensible (117, 
118, 122, 151). For my thesis that Proclus readjusts the focus of the principle of discourse to 
epistemology, see above. 
201 Παχύτης as metaphorical thickness, as opposed to precision, and due to corporeality: In Remp. 
II 281.4, Syr. In Met. 25.34, Iambl. Protr. 124.18. Cf. In Tim. 352.1-2 παχέως καὶ ἡμαρτημένως τῇ 
αἰσθήσει χρώμεθα. Παχέως is a rare adverb that is semantically rather vague, but used as opposite 
of ἀκριβῶς, Galen Plac. 9.9.33.4. 
202 In Tim. I 353.22-29, ad Tim. 29c7-d3.  
203 Rhet. 1374b10-11. Cf. EN 1136a5ff: involuntary mistakes made from ignorance are forgivable. 
204 Cf. in Plato: Crit. 107d5-e3.  
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the εἰκὼς λόγος.205 This is not to say that the Ancients agreed with Vlastos that 
εἰκώς is the relevant word, rather than either λόγος or μῦθος.206 Instead, they 
consistently speak of an εἰκὼς λόγος, rather than a μῦθος, which seems to imply a 
choice, if perhaps not always a conscious one.207 In the case of our commentator, 
the all but complete ignoring of the role of μῦθος fits into the overall picture of a 
‘scientifization’ of the Timaeus: Timaeus “is not forging myths”,208 but presenting a 
certain type of scientific knowledge of the natural world.209 Here, in the only 
comment Proclus makes on the εἰκὼς μῦθος, he explains it as pertaining to a 
property of the human account (λόγος), and indicating (ἐνδείκνυται) the 
weaknesses inherent in human discourse.210 By using the word μῦθος, Proclus 
explains, Plato indicates that our accounts of reality resemble myths (μύθοις 
ἐοικότας...λόγους) – even, I take it we can supply, the ones that attempt at being 
‘unveiled’ and scientific.211 An example of such weakness of our accounts was 
given elsewhere, when Proclus emphasized that even when speaking of the 
intelligible we are forced to abandon truth and precision by dividing it and 
‘temporalizing’ it.212  
 
 
V.6 How likely is the story of physiologia? 
 
The upshot of Proclus’ explanation of Plato’s εἰκὼς λόγος is that there are two 
kinds of accounts or teachings, scientific and likely, with their respective 
cognitions: ἀλήθεια and πίστις, and epistemic properties: certain, irrefutable, exact, 
vs. uncertain, refutable, inexact.213 In his exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3 Proclus 
                                               
205 See above, V.2. 
206 Vlastos (1964: 382). 
207 See the indices to Dörrie (1987), Dörrie and Baltes (1990), (1993), (1996). 
208 Theol.Plat. V 36 133.11, quoted above at n. 113. 
209 On Timaeus’ exposition as science see chapter III and V.8. 
210 In Tim. I 353.26-29, quoted above. For a μῦθος as an image of a λόγος see Plut. dGA 348B1, or 
of truth see Simpl. In Gorg. 237.14-23 Westerink).  
211 I think this makes more sense of the phrase ἣν ὁ μῦθος ἐνδείκνυται than having the μῦθος refer 
to any specific myth or account, or myth as a genre (as Festugière seems to do). On myths as 
presenting veiled truth, cf. e.g. Theol.Plat. V 36 131.24ff.  
212 In Tim. I 348.30-349.5. ‘To temporalize’ is here used in the sense of ‘to place or define in 
temporal relations’ and is a translation of ἔγχρονον ποιεῖν. 
213 In Tim. I 338.28-339.2 περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς διδασκαλίας, εἴτε ἀραρυῖαν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον 
καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένην ὑποληπτέον, εἴτε εἰκοτολογίαν, ἀλήθειαν μὲν οὐκ οὖσαν, πίστιν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν ὡμοιωμένην;  340.25ff (on Albinus and Gaius) ἢ ἐπιστημονικῶς ἢ εἰκοτολογικῶς, καὶ οὐ 
καθ᾽ ἕνα τρόπον οὐδ᾽ ὡς μίαν ἀκρίβειαν τῶν παντοίων ἐχόντων λόγων; 345.1 ἐπιστήμην καὶ 
εἰκοτολογίαν ἢ ἀλήθειαν καὶ πίστιν. Cf. also 355.25-28; cf. In Remp. I 284.4-7 λόγους μὲν τοὺς 
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gradually and deliberately shifts the scene of the εἰκὼς λόγος from an ontological 
to an epistemological viewpoint, to conclude that the main source of the 
incertainty, refutability and inexactness in accounts about Becoming – as, to some 
extent, in those about Being – is the embodiment of the human soul. At this 
point, however, it is not clear yet why the epistemological viewpoint is so 
important, and how this interpretation hooks up with Proclus’ view of the Timaeus 
and of philosophy of nature in general. We know the source of ‘like(li)ness’, but 
not yet how likely an account of philosophy of nature is, or what it means that such 
an account is likely.  
 
V.6.1 A true and likely story 
 
Part of the answer to these questions consists in an analysis of the Proclean use of 
the words εἰκώς and εἰκοτολογία, which we have so far not investigated, the 
contexts in which it occurs, and the adjectives with which it is primarily associated 
in the exegesis of the εἰκὼς λόγος.  
 
(i) Demonstration vs. likeliness 
Let us take a look at the latter first. Of the properties mentioned by Plato in the 
passage on the εἰκὼς λόγος: permanent, unchanging, irrefutable, invincible (29b), 
consistent, and exact (29c), and their opposites, the property which Proclus 
associates most with the likelihood of the account about the sensible is its lack of 
exactness,214 followed by its refutability.215 Interestingly, Proclus frequently adds a 
property that is not mentioned by Plato, namely fixity (ἀραρ-), a Homeric word 
that is not common philosophical vocabulary, but does occur in Iamblichus in 
connection with mathematical and demonstrative certainty.216 That consistency, an 
internal property, does not play a part in Proclus’ reading can be explained from 
his adherence to Iamblichus’ exegetical principle of εἷς σκόπος according to which 
by definition every text is internally consistent.  
                                                                                                                                      
ἀνελέγκτους τοῖς οὖσιν, λόγους δὲ εἰκοτολογικοὺς τοῖς γενητοῖς; Cf. In Tim. II 36.20-24 where 
physical vs. mathematical is equated with likely vs. scientific, and In Tim. III 160.7-12 on 
knowledge from inspiration, demonstration and ‘likely things’. 
214 ἀ-/ἀπηκριβ- within the exegesis of the likely story: In Tim. I 338.9-339.1; 340.27, 30; 342.13; 
346.14, 16, 17, 19; 348.18; 349.6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 24, 31; 350.30 (selective quote from lemma); 351.3, 
20; 352.30  Cf. for a beautiful illustration In Tim. II 51.5ff., where analogy, exactitude and truth 
come together in a passage that slides from the ontological into the propositional.   
215 Within the exegesis of the likely story: 342.25, 27; 343.4 (bis), 7; 347.6; 348.27; 349.14, 15; 
351.25.   
216 Within the exegesis of the likely story: 338.29; 342.14; 346.29; 351.20; 352.12. Cf. Iambl. 
Comm. Math. 5.18. Other terms occur no more than three times each.  
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Turning now to the word εἰκώς, we see that in Proclus’ use of that word the lack 
of precision,217 irrefutability and demonstrative certainty are most present, but that 
he tends to contrast it especially with demonstrative certainty. As we have seen 
Proclus describes the epistemic status of the account of the images of Being, i.e. 
nature and immanent forms, as ‘cognition through likely things’, γνώσις δι’ 
εἰκότων, as opposed to demonstration, ἀπόδειξις.218 The source of this distinction 
can be found in two Platonic passages. First of all, Phaedo 92d1ff,219 where 
Simmias makes a distinction between a thesis that is based on demonstration 
(ἀπόδειξις) and one that is based on probability and likeliness. The latter, which is 
also called “an argument that demonstrates through likely things” (ὁ διὰ τῶν 
εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένος λόγος, 92d2), is in first instance rejected by 
Simmias as pretentious (ἀλαζών), but subsequently accepted on the condition that 
it start from an acceptable hypothesis (δι᾽ ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας, d6). Note that Proclus 
modifies Plato’s remark on “demonstrations through likelihoods” and turns it into 
a distinction between knowledge through likely things vs. knowledge through 
demonstrations, perhaps influenced by Aristotle’s requirements for the starting 
points of demonstrations, and the Aristotelian notion of inference from signs.220 
This modification is visible also in Proclus’ phrase “without likelihoods and 
demonstrations”,221 as opposed to Plato’s “without likely and necessary 
demonstrations” (Tim. 40e1). The rephrasing suggests that, whereas 
demonstrations have necessary conclusions by definition, reasoning through 
likelihood may have conclusions that are not necessary in some sense. Moreover, 
Proclus explains this passage as concerning two different cognitions (γνώσεις), 
demonstrative (ἀποδεικτική) and ‘through likely things’ (δι’ εἰκότων).222 There are 
                                               
217 For the opposition of precision and the likely cf. Plato Crit. 107d6-8. 
218 In Tim. III 160.7-12, see above V.4.1. Cf. Syr. In Met. 5.2-7.  
219 Quoted in In Eucl. 192.12. 
220 APo 71b21-22 ἀληθῶν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ 
αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος. Plotinus, on the other hand, seems to maintain the opposition, 
although he speaks of syllogisms, not demonstrations: περὶ μὲν ἐκείνων (i.e. γένεσις) λέγων ἄν τις ἐξ 
ἐκείνης τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἀξιουμένων συλλογίζοιτο ἂν εἰκότως δι᾽ εἰκότων εἰκότας καὶ 
τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ποιούμενος, Enn. VI 5 [23] 2.16-19. On inference from signs see Morrison 
(1997) with De Haas (1999). 
221 ἄνευ τε εἰκότων (λόγων) καὶ ἀποδείξεων, In Remp. I 185.16, II 340.29, 355.5. 
222 In Tim. III 160.8-9, where they are compared to a third, ἡ ἐνθουσιαστική. This version is found 
already in Syrianus, In Met. 42.25, where Aristotle’s statement that myths need not be taken 
seriously (Met. III 4 1000a19) is criticized with reference to Tim. 40e1. The same discussion seems 
to be in the background at In Remp. II 354.27ff. (=Scholia in Remp. 621b,bis), mentioned also 
above, where the truth of myths, which speak without likelihoods or demonstrations (ἄνευ 
εἰκότων καὶ ἀποδείξεων διδάσκοντες), is defended by pointing out that they are useful because they 
are “interpreters of reality”, an interesting use of Tim. 29b4-5. Cf. above n. 63. 
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no indications that Proclus takes on board Aristotle’s notion of the ‘likely’ as 
related to τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, and the material of inferences from signs.223 
Nonetheless, considering Proclus’ view of particular demonstrations presented in 
the Timaeus as likely, rather than truth (see below V.7), I propose that we should 
not read “likelihoods and demonstrations” as diametrically opposed, and as 
expressing two different kinds of reasoning, but as two kinds of demonstration, 
say demonstration simpliciter and likely, using the same kind of reasoning but from 
different kinds of starting points. Demonstration simpliciter, starting from necessary 
starting points, in a formally necessary way leads to (materially) necessary 
conclusions, whereas demonstration from likelihoods renders, in a formally 
necessary way, possibly (materially) non-necessary, likely, conclusions. 
This interpretation finds support in the connection Proclus makes elsewhere 
between the pair εἰκοτολογία - ἐπιστήμη and Aristotle’s distinction between the 
different sciences on the basis of the level of precision of their subject matter, and 
the subsequent characterization of the reasoning appropriate to that subject 
matter. Aristotle mentions demonstration in geometry and πιθανολογία in 
rhetoric.224 Proclus adjusts that distinction to his own purposes and to 
Neoplatonic theory of science. Within mathematics – as, we will see, in 
philosophy of nature – different degrees of precision are to be found, depending 
on the subject matter at hand.225 Moreover, Proclus states that, in accordance with 
the principle that every scientist should choose the appropriate kind of account 
(λόγοι) Plato demands (ἀπαιτεῖ) a likely account of the good philosopher of nature, 
and an irrefutable account of he who teaches about the intelligible.226  
This brings us to an aspect of the εἰκὼς λόγος that is crucial for a proper 
understanding of Proclus’ reading of the Timaeus as a whole, namely the sense in 
which Platonic φυσιολογία is itself a likely story.  
 
                                               
223 At one point (In Tim. I 353.2) Proclus qualifies the sublunary as that with regard to which we 
have to be satisfied with τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, but his notion of τὸ εἰκός is more extensive, cf. 353.3-
5. For Aristotle’s definition of τὸ εἰκός as τό ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον see APr II 27 70a10ff, Rhet. 
I 2 1357a31ff. 
224 In Eucl. 33.21-34.15 (cf. 192.9-11), which is very close to Iambl. Comm.Math. 86.2-22 (Klein) 
and refers to Arist. EN I 3 1094b22-28, which in turn has its source in Theaet. 162e (which, 
ironically, is a reference to Protagoras’ statement of ignorance concerning the gods). Another 
passage that is present in the background is Arist. Met. II 3 995a14-19 (cf. APo 87a), on the fact 
that mathematics and philosophy of nature do not allow the same degree of precision. Cf. 
Alexander, who quotes the EN distinction between demonstration and πιθανολογία when 
explaining the Met. passage (In Met. 169.3ff.). 
225 In Eucl. 34.11ff. 
226 In Eucl. 34.1-7. 
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(ii) True and likely  
Entirely in line with his overall interpretation of the dialogue, Proclus does not 
simply earmark philosophy of nature as εἰκοτολογία, tied to πίστις, and inexact. 
According to our commentator, that Plato does in fact call Timaeus’ account 
εἰκοτολογία is of course related to the subject matter, the nature of words, and 
human nature, but it is also the result of a deliberate choice he made:   
T V.24 
“...Plato sometimes defines science (ἐπιστήμη) as ‘providing causes’, 
sometimes as ‘the subject matter also having an entirely permanent 
essence, on top of giving account of the causes’, sometimes as ‘the 
principles not being hypotheses’.”227  
 
By the first definition, and only by that one, would φυσιολογία be a science. It will 
never be an unhypothetical science, since this is a prerogative reserved for 
theological dialectic; it can also never be a purely dianoetic science (as are the 
mathematical sciences), since the subject matter of φυσιολογία does not have a 
permanent essence. The only sense in which philosophy of nature can be a science 
is by providing the causes of natural phenomena. Proclus supposes that, although 
in the Timaeus causes of natural phenomena are indeed provided,228 Plato 
nonetheless demands that we call it a likely account (ἀξιοῖ καλεῖν αὐτὴν 
εἰκοτολογίαν), because he here adopts the narrower second definition.229 In 
Proclus’ view, Plato uses the terms ‘science’ and ‘likely account’ as mutually 
exclusive, although something that is a likely account from one point of view is 
science from another. Proclus himself, however, has a more liberal use of the 
terms, and does not take them as mutually exclusive.  
This shows again clearly from the explanation given by Proclus of the conclusion 
of the εἰκὼς λόγος, some aspects of which we discussed also above:  
T V.25 
“If then, Socrates, in many respects concerning many things – the gods and 
the generation of the universe – we prove unable to render an account at 
all points entirely consistent with itself and exact (αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς 
ὁμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους), you must not be surprised.” 
(Tim 29c4-7, quoted above as T V.19 (1)) 
 
                                               
227 In Tim. I 350.8-12. 
228 In Tim. I 2.1-4.5 etc. See chapter III.  
229 In Tim I 350.12-20. Plato may, of course, have used the third definition, but must at least have 
used the second. 
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According to Proclus with these words Timaeus prepares his audience for the 
coming speech on the natural world. He indicates how they should receive it, 
namely not as a perfectly finished (ἀπηκριβωμένοι) and really scientific (ὄντως 
ἐπιστημονικοί) account, but as similar (ἐοικότες) to it.230 Proclus adds, however, 
that Timaeus also wants the audience to know that the account will not be a 
purely likely story, but a mixture (σύμμιξιν) of πίστις and ἀλήθεια, just as the 
universe is blended (συγκέκραται) out of “physical powers and intellectual and 
divine essences”.231 The seemingly innocent adverb ὄντως turns out to be telling: 
the account may not be pure science, but it is science in some way. It is surprising 
that Proclus would claim that the announcement of a mixture is to be found in the 
above quotation, and it seems that his only argument for this would be the fact 
that Timaeus mentions both gods and the generation of the universe – and 
perhaps also the phrase ‘at all points entirely consistent’. What is not surprising, is 
that Proclus sees the cosmological account as a mixture of truth and likely story.  
As Proclus repeatedly emphasizes, the true causes of the natural world are 
transcendent, and hence true philosophy of nature as treated in the Timaeus does 
not study only Becoming, but Becoming insofar as it is caused by Being. As a 
consequence, if the division likely story-truth is parallel to and dependent on the 
division Being-Becoming, the dialogue cannot be a pure likely story.232 Thus 
Timaeus’ account produces a combination of truth and belief, and all aspects of it 
that are based in perception partake in a great deal of likelihood (πολλῆς μετέχει 
τῆς εἰκοτολογίας), whereas everything starting from the intelligible possesses some 
(ἔχει) irrefutability and infallibility.233  
Note that in these carefully phrased statements both truth and likelihood, as 
dependent on the respective objects of study, are a matter of degrees.234 The two 
properties are not absolute and mutually exclusive, and what is more, the mixture 
of truth and likelihood is not determined only by the subject matter, but also by 
what we may call the human factor: discursivity and the structure of reasoning. 
Thus Proclus immediately adds the modification that even our discourse about the 
demiurge is far removed from reality because we say “that he deliberates and 
                                               
230 In Tim. I 348.16-20. 
231 As was emphasized in the exegesis of the preceding lemma, at In Tim. I 410.3-7. Cf. I 348.20-
25.  
232 Assuming for the moment the narrow sense of the principle of discourse, since as we have 
seen in the end all human accounts are likely.  
233 In Tim. I 348.25-27; cf. In Tim. III 356.17-22. On the translation of ἔχει see note 235. 
234 It seems that in Proclus we find a forerunner of Donini’s suggestion that there are levels of 
εἰκὼς λόγος in the Timaeus. Donini (1988: 47) connects the degrees of ‘verisimiglianza’ primarily 
to the source of our knowledge (φρόνησις, mathematical reasoning, perception, 
hearsay/traditional mythology). Cf. Runia (1989: 437). 
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thinks and does this before that”.235 Even when it comes to the truth of the 
intelligible we are forced to “divide the undivided and temporalize the eternal.”236 
We will return to this human factor again at a later point.  
The best illustration of the fact that the mixture of truth plus likely story is 
determined on two levels, reality and discourse, is found after the prooemium, in 
the exegesis of Tim. 30b6-c1. For now, we will concentrate on the level of reality 
and see how there truth and likelihood come together. The passage in question is 
Timaeus’ conclusion that the universe is an animated intelligent living being:  
T V.26 
“So we should say in accordance with the likely account (κατὰ λόγον τὸν 
εἰκότα) that this cosmos truly (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ) came to be an animated 
intelligent living being (ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν) due to the providence of the 
god.”237  
 
This conclusion seems to be qualified contradictorily as both adhering to the likely 
story, and offering the truth. Contemporary readers tend to pass over this 
apparent contradiction,238 or, following Proclus, take the likeliness and the truth 
each to pertain to different parts of the sentence, namely the cosmos and divine 
providence respectively.239  
T V.27 
“Just as the cosmos itself is a compound (σύμμικτος) consisting of both 
images and divine essences, and of both natural and supranatural things, so 
too did Plato call the account about it ‘likely’ and again dubbed it ‘truth’. 
For insofar as it is moved in a discordant and disordered manner the 
account requires an εἰκοτολογία, but with respect to the noeric essence in 
it, and the divine cause from which it proceeds, it requires ‘truth’, and for 
this reason when he intended to speak about the cosmos he added the 
adjective ‘likely’, but when about divine providence ‘truth’.”240  
                                               
235 The modificatory sentence starts with a γὰρ, which is out of place, unless we translate ἔχει in 
the previous sentence as “contains (some)”, as this way the modification is already announced 
and picked up by the γὰρ.  
236 In Tim. I 348.27-349.5 
237 Tim. 30b6-c1. 
238 Taylor and Johansen, e.g. lets it pass in silence. So does Gregory (2000: 250-1), who does 
point to other apparent contradictions (Tim. 37b, 47c, 56b). Cornford (1937: 34), adds a note that 
does not really explain anything, “it is literally true (not merely ‘probable’) that the world is an 
intelligent living creature.”  
239 Thus Runia (1989: 441-3). 
240 In Tim. I 410.11-19. 
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Not surprisingly, considering the careful phrases we have seen before (“a great 
deal of likelihood” and “some irrefutability”), for Proclus this combination of 
truth and account on metaphysical grounds is merely a first step, summoned to 
dispel the apparent contradiction in the lemma. As above, he immediately widens 
the scope after this first step, by pointing out that “moreover, you may observe 
them in the account itself, the likely as well as truth, not just dividing them on the 
basis of the nature of the things [treated].”241 We will here discuss the first step, 
and again leave the addition concerning likeliness and truth of the account itself 
for later.  
In the elaboration of the combination truth-plus-likely account on metaphysical 
grounds Proclus distributes the two predicates on the basis of the different aspects 
of reality. He divides the different aspects of the universe into two sets of things: 
on the one hand images, physical things and the discordantly and disorderly 
moving substrate, which correspond with the account that is “likely”, and on the 
other hand divine essences, supranatural things (ὑπερφυῆ πράγματα242), the 
intellectual essence and the divine cause of the cosmos, which correspond with 
“truth”. Although this list is presented as a neat dichotomy, it is more of a 
spectrum which ranges over all aspects of Timaeus’ exposition of the cosmos, 
from the ontologically most base to the most elevated. At the high end of the 
scale, we find the demiurge as the divine cause of the universe, and at the low end 
the disorderly moving substrate, on which the demiurge imposes order.243 In 
between, in descending order, we meet the intellect of the world, the immanent 
forms (i.e. which Proclus identified as the images of Being),244 and the objects 
informed by nature.  
Thus the explanation for Timaeus’ speaking the truth as well as the likely account 
in one and the same sentence is that that sentence contains information both 
about divine providence and about the kosmos, in the sense of the order of what is 
in essence unordered. Since the universe is a composite, consisting of both Being 
                                               
241 In Tim. I 410.20ff. The whole passage, I 410.11-411.2, can be divided into three parts, picking 
up the earlier division of reality, thoughts and words, although the latter two are almost merged 
into one. See below. 
242 This literal use of ὑπερφυής, which is originally used as meaning “growing aboveground”, but 
occurs mainly metaphorically in Classical Greek to indicate excellence, is found also in 
Iamblichus, e.g. Myst. 5.8.13. 
243 Tim. 30a3-6. 
244 See above V.4.1. 
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and Becoming, consequently the text about the cosmos is a composite of the likely 
and the true.245  
As said before, Proclus’ assumption of a mixture of the likely and the true in 
philosophy of nature is intimately connected with his characterization of the 
dialogue, introduced in the very first pages of the commentary, as being both a 
physical and a theological study of the natural world. Interestingly, the arguments 
adduced in favour of this characterization are derived directly from Tim. 29b3-d3, 
and more specifically from the principle of assimilation: the dialogue combines 
philosophy of nature and theology, in imitation (μιμούμενον) of nature itself, 
because the account should make itself alike (δεῖ ὁμοιοῦσθαι) to reality, of which it is 
the interpreter (ἐξηγηταί);246 and again, at the end of the first book of the 
commentary: real φυσιολογία should depend on theology, like nature on the gods, 
“in order that the account (οἱ λόγοι) be an imitation (μιμηταί) of the things which 
it signifies (σημαντικοί)”.247 
These are crucial passages, for two reasons. First of all, we here find the very 
principle that Plato uses to draw our attention to the limitations of the account of 
philosophy of nature, namely that an account is an exegete of reality, reused by 
Proclus to explain why, in some sense, and to some extent it surpasses such 
limitations and is related to theology. And secondly, Proclus here introduces the 
‘assimilation’ aspect of the εἰκὼς λόγος. Apart from being naturally related to its 
subject matter, a text should make itself alike to it, it should be a mimesis of reality. 
This brings us to assimilation and the practice of the εἰκὼς λόγος, and to the sense 
in which philosophy of nature is a mixture of likely story and truth with respect to 
what I called the human factor: the level of reasoning.  
 
 
V.7 The practice of discourse: assimilation 
 
The natural relation between discourse and reality discussed earlier (V.4) makes 
possible the second property of discourse ascribed to it in Tim. 29b4-5 (quoted as 
text T V.7): its functioning as an interpreter (ἐξηγήτης) of reality. 248 The principle 
                                               
245 Note that the truth and likeliness relevant here are not the cognitions of the ἀναλογία (see 
V.5.2(i)), but instead properties of the account (λόγος, I 410.13). 
246 In Tim. I 8.4-5, 9-13. The infinitive ὁμοιοῦσθαι is here and in the following taken as a middle 
form, but as we will see for Proclus it is not so much the text itself that ‘does’ the assimilating as 
its speaker or author. 
247 In Tim. I 204.8-12. I take the plural οἱ λόγοι here to refer to Timaeus’ account as a whole.  
248 Apart from the passages mentioned in V.6: In Tim. I 343.25 (λόγοις...ἐξηγηταῖς), 27 
(ἑρμηνεύεται); cf. Theol.Plat I 10 46.2-9, VI 1 5.18-19; In Alc. 22.10-11, ib. 119.25-27, where 
Proclus likens the progression of the text to the circular processes in reality, quoting Timaeus’ 
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that an account is an interpreter of things is understood by Proclus to mean, not 
only that there is a natural resemblance between a text and reality which allows a 
transfer of information regarding reality, but also that the user of discourse can 
and should actively try to increase the resemblance between discourse and reality. 
Thus the relation between discourse and its subject consists in opposite 
movements mirroring the metaphysical movement of emanation and reversion: 
just as the world is an image of the intelligible, coming forth from it and actively 
striving to return to it,249 the text is both a natural image of a higher reality and an 
active reversion to it.  
Before looking at the details of the application of the principle of assimilation in 
Proclus’ exegesis, let us subject the principle itself to a closer inspection.  
The principle is related, but certainly not identical, to what Coulter calls ‘literary 
organicism’, the influential literary theory according to which a text is a 
microcosmos.250 In the Phaedrus we find the famous demand that a good text 
resemble a living being, with the proper body, a head and feet.251 In Neoplatonic 
literary theory this requirement was merged with Timaeus 92c (quoted below as T 
V.29), and the animal of choice became the cosmos, as the most beautiful Living 
Being.252 Consequently identifying the constituent elements of the cosmos within 
the dialogue: the Good, the Intellect, the Soul, the form, and the matter of the 
dialogue, became part of the Neoplatonic schema isagogicum.253  
                                                                                                                                      
phrase of words as ἐξηγηταί of reality. Cf. Ammonius, who has the inverse relation because he is 
explaining the necessary truth of propositions expressing necessities: In Int. 154.18-20 εἰσὶν 
ἐξηγηταὶ τῶν πραγμάτων οἱ λόγοι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μιμοῦνται αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ 
Ἀριστοτέλους ὁ Πλάτων ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξεν (cf. 152.9-11, 153.12-13). Cf. Porphyry on definition as 
explanatory (ἐξηγητικός) of things, In Cat. 63.7-8 (Busse), cf. 73.19-20 and 31-35. 
249 See above V.4.1. 
250 Coulter (1976: 95ff.) 
251 Plato’s Phaedrus 264c. 
252 In Tim. I 29.11-13, In Remp. I 11.9-10, In Parm. 659.12-19. On this topic see Gersh (1973: 87-
8), Coulter (1976: 95-103, 120-11), Brisson (1987: 122), Mansfeld (1994: 28-9), Kuisma (1996: 66-
68), Sheppard (2002: 641-44). Cf. Anon. Prol. 4, 15.1-16, where it is not any text, but the Platonic 
dialogue that is compared to the perfect living being. Olymp. In Alc. 56.14-22.   
253 In Alc. 10.4-19, cf. Hadot (1987: 107). In the Anon. Prol. (an introduction to Platonic 
philosophy, dated by Westerink in the 2nd half of the 6th century AD), more details are provided 
on the analogy. Interestingly, Proclus does not name Nature as one of the constituents, whereas 
the anonymous author of the Prolegomena does. The latter distinguishes the Good (i.e. the end or 
purpose), an Intellect (the problem under discussion), a Soul (the demonstrations), a Nature (the 
manner or form of discussion), a form (the style) and a matter (characters and setting). Anon.Prol. 
16-17, cf. Westerink (1962: xxxii and xxxv-vi). The same method was applied to the ‘frames’ of 
Plato’s dialogues: every speaker and every embedding level was identified as an aspect of reality. 
In Parm. I 625.37-627.39, 644.1-645.8, In Tim. 8.30-9.24 and 14.5ff., Anon. Prol. 8 20.2-18. Cf. 
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As Gersh describes the role of this principle in Proclus’ work:  
 
“...a work of Proclus (for example, a commentary on a dialogue of Plato or 
a treatise in a freer form) functions as a map of the real world with a point 
by point correspondence between its own constituent elements and those 
of its counterpart. This usage is obviously related to that in which one 
order within the spiritual world is said to mirror that of its prior, the only 
difference being that the context of discourse itself is viewed as taking the 
place of the lower order.”254  
 
Although Gersh illustrates the practice matching the principle with the 
‘organicism’ of the In Alc. (10.3-14), in Proclus’ work the ramifications of the 
principle extend far beyond its formal application in the introductions to his 
commentaries, among others because, as Sheppard points out, the parallel is “no 
mere device of literary criticism,” but has a metaphysical foundation.255  
We encounter the principle that a text is an ἐξηγήτης of reality throughout Proclus’ 
writings, providing an argument for many instances of a speaker’s increasing the 
similarity of parts of a text, and even a dialogue or treatise in its entirety, to reality. 
It knows two versions. 
T V.28 
“δεῖ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὧν εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί.”256 
 
This sentence, in which the principle of assimilation is expressed, can be read in 
two ways, corresponding to two versions of the principle found in Proclus. The 
relative subclause can be either (1) explanatory or (2) limitative.  
(1) In the former reading, “accounts should make themselves similar to things, as 
they are their interpreters”, the principle has a general application according to 
which the structure of proper accounts mirrors the structure of reality as a whole.257 
This reading fits the above sketched practice of identifying parts of the cosmos in 
any text, but also other parallels. For example, according to Proclus the very 
                                                                                                                                       
Dillon (1976: 254) on Proclus’ interpretation of the characters of the Timaeus and Parmenides as 
images or symbols of reality. See also chapter I and V.7.1. 
254 Gersh (1973: 87-8).  
255 Cf. Sheppard (2002: 642). The fact that Gersh just before the quoted passage (87 and n. 2) 
states that “the structure of discourse mirrors that of reality itself” (my italics), and refers to the 
analysis of the structure of Proclus’ arguments in Festugière (1963), which is not limited to the 
schema isagogicum, suggests that Gersh is aware of this wider application.  
256 In Tim. I 8.9-10.  
257 On the relation between Proclus’ concept of image and parallelism of structure see Gersh 
(1973: 85-6) 
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introduction at Tim. 29b4-5 of the principle of discourse, or the “common axiom” 
(κοινὸν ἀξίωμα) as Proclus calls it, is similar to (ὁμοιούμενος) the emanation of 
everything from the One, or the development of (physical) number from the 
monad. Timaeus first posits one general axiom regarding λόγοι, and subsequently 
introduces a division (διαίρεσις) of two different kinds of λόγοι, on the basis of “the 
quality (ποιότης) of things”.258 The parallel here is merely that of numerical 
progression from any monad to any dyad, but as we will see Proclus considers 
such logical relations within the Timaeus to be crucial for its anagogic function.  
(2) In the latter, limitative reading of the sentence, “accounts should make 
themselves similar to those things of which they are the interpreters”, the principle 
of assimilation has a more narrow sense, to the extent that a text should be similar 
to exactly that part of reality of which it treats. Accordingly, as we saw, it explains why 
Plato’s cosmological dialogue is a mixture of philosophy of nature and theology: 
this is because the discourse makes itself alike (ὁμοιοῦσθαι) to Nature, of which it 
is the interpreter and contemplator (θεατής),259 in order to become an imitator 
(μιμηταί) of things which it signifies (ὧν εἰσι σημαντικοί).260 Likewise, this narrow 
sense of the principle dictates that a text about the universe is itself an image of that 
universe in more than a formal sense.  
As a consequence of this second version of the principle of assimilation, in the In 
Tim. we find one of its most extensive applications. Every Platonic dialogue is a 
microcosmos that imitates its subject with semantic and syntactic tools,261 but 
since the Timaeus has the cosmos as its subject matter, it is a microcosmos in two 
different ways: (1) the dialogue as a whole has the same constituents as reality (it is 
a cosmos), in the more common and superficial vein of the schema isagogicum. (2) 
More importantly, Timaeus’ exposition is also a microcosmos, because it imitates 
                                               
258 In Tim. I 340.16-23 and 341.22-24. Note that, despite the presence of an ἀξίωμα and a 
διαίρεσις, which remind of the comparison with geometry in Proclus’ exegesis of the first half of 
the prooemium, the geometrical method is not explicitly involved at this point. The reason for 
this is that, as indicated in chapter III, in the course of discussing the prooemium Proclus 
gradually shifts from a comparison with the geometrical method to a comparison between the 
structure of a text and the structure of the universe. See also below, V.7. 
259 In Tim. I 8.9-13. Cf. III 104.30-31 ὁ λόγος ὁ τῶν θείων ἐξηγητὴς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἀπεικονιζόμενος φύσιν, ὧν ἐστιν ἄγγελος. On discourse as ἄγγελος cf. above V.4.2(i). Theol.Plat. VI 
1 5.14-18: the treatment of the gods should be imaged after reality (ἀναγκαῖον...τοῖς πράγμασιν 
ἀπεικάζειν τοὺς λόγους, ὧν εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί), In Remp. I 86.5 (of μῦθοι). 
260 In Tim. I 204.8-12. Λόγοι as μιμηταὶ also at In Alc. 22.10-11. On the range of μίμησις in 
Proclus’ interpretation of Plato see Halliwell (2002: 332).  
261 See Festugière (1963).  
DISCOURSE AND REALITY 
- 261 - 
its subject matter (it is the cosmos).262 Proclus sees a deep structural similarity 
between the syntactic/logical structure of the text and its subject matter, the 
universe as the specific analogue of this dialogue, as well as numerous smaller 
semantic and morphological parallels.263  
In the following Proclus’ elaboration of the second version of the principle of 
assimilation in the In Tim. will be discussed, taking two central issues as our 
starting points: the ἀναλογία between Timaeus and the Demiurge (V.7.1); the 
structural parallels between reality and the text of Timaeus’ account (V.7.2). These 
two issues will be shown to be intimately connected with a third issue, the didactic 
and anagogic nature of the dialogue (V.7.2). Plato’s cosmology is for Proclus 
primarily a didactic text, a λόγος διδασκαλικός,264 in the sense that, like the second 
half of the Parmenides, it trains the soul for the vision of a higher reality – the One 
in the case of the Parmenides, and the causes of the natural world, but the 
Demiurge in particular, in the case of the Timaeus. The role of the principle of 
assimilation in this anagogy cannot be overestimated, as the speaker employs it to 
facilitate the reversion mentioned at the beginning of this section by establishing 
the likeness of a text to its subject matter through his knowledge thereof. This  in 
turn paves the way for a reversion of the soul of the audience.  
 
 
V.7.1 Timaeus as demiurge, the Timaeus as cosmos 
 
In ancient literary theory the demiurge, the divine creator of the cosmos, whose 
activities were described as those of an artisan, himself in turn became the 
paradigm for the inspired literary creator.265 Already in the Timaeus, however, there 
seems to be a deeper parallel between the demiurge as the creator of the cosmos 
and Timaeus, not only as the creator of his text, but as the recreator in words of 
the demiurge’s creation:266  
                                               
262 As such, it is a successor of Homer and Hesiod’s poems, which according to Proclus imitate 
Nature’s mimesis of the Intelligible, see In Remp. I 77.13-28. Note that the Timaeus as a whole, so 
not just Timaeus’ speech, is also considered the analogue of the κοσμοποιία, In Tim. I 73.16-21. 
263 Another example of a dialogue in which Proclus sees this structure is of course the Parmenides, 
from the first hypothesis ‘if the One is’ at 137c onwards, see below V.7.2. Note that the principle 
is even used to explain the relation between Plato’s dialogues as mirroring reality, with the 
Parmenides at the top (Theol.Plat. I 7 32.6-12). As is well known, Proclus structured his own 
systematic works, most notably El.Th. and Theol.Plat., in accordance with the structure of 
emanation. Cf. O'Meara (2000).  
264 In Tim. I 338.5. See also below. 
265 Cf. Coulter (1976: 96). On the demiurge as artisan see Brisson (1994: 30ff.). 
266 Johansen (2004: 186ff.) shows that there is a structural parallel between Timaeus’ account and 
the world, as well as verbal correspondences between the tasks of Timaeus and the demiurge. Cf. 
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T V.29 
“And so now we may say that our account of the universe has reached its 
conclusion (τέλος). This world of ours has received and teems with living 
beings, mortal and immortal. A visible living being containing visible living 
beings, a perceptible god, image of the intelligible Living Being, its 
grandness, goodness, beauty, and perfection are unexcelled. Our one 
heaven, indeed the only one of its kind, has come to be.”267 
 
The parallel between the work of the demiurge and Timaeus’ exposition is of 
paramount importance to Proclus, which shows from the fact that it is brought up 
extensively in the introduction of the commentary. In what we could call the 
metaphysical prosopography, i.e. the description of the metaphysical stratum each 
persona represents in the microcosmos of the dialogue, Timaeus is made the 
analogue of the Demiurge, while the three members of the audience are analogous 
to the demiurgic triad consisting of Demiurgic Intellect, Soul, and universal 
Nature,268 with Socrates as the summit of the triad and the other two ordered 
below him, according to their verbal contribution: first Critias, who ‘does say 
something’, then the taciturn Hermocrates.269 Socrates, Critias and Hermocrates 
receive the words of Timaeus as the demiurgic triad receives the λόγοι of the 
Demiurge.270 
Of course, the parallel between Timaeus and the demiurge goes deeper than this 
mere symbolic hierarchy suggested by the quantitative differences between the 
contributions of the four men.271 It is in fact of great importance for the didactic 
nature of the text, as may be shown on the basis of Proclus’ second elaboration of 
the parallel, at the beginning of the second book of the commentary: the prayer, 
the exhortation of the audience, and the commencement of Timaeus’ exposition 
proper.272  
                                                                                                                                      
Hadot, P. (1983), who proposes that due to the imperfection of human nature the nearest 
approximation of creation obtained in an account is an imprecise imitation thereof, cf. above n. 
24. On the literary artisan as analogous to the Demiurge see Coulter (1976: 105). 
267 Tim. 92c4-9, transl. Zeyl, slightly modified. Cf. Crit. 106a4. 
268 In Tim. I 12.1-5. 
269 In Tim. I 23.11-16. 
270 In Tim. I 9.15-22. Cf. I 55.5ff, 57.31-59.6, 62.5-63.12, 199.31-200.3 and after the prooemia: I 
354.19-20. Note that both Plato himself and the dialogue itself are also compared to the 
demiurge, e.g. In Tim. I 423.24-29, and In Tim. II 98.18ff. On the λόγοι of the Demiurge see 
V.4.2(i). 
271 Although it is also a symbolic reading: In Tim. I 200.2-3.  
272 Tim. 27c1-d1, d2-4 and d5 respectively.  
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The invocation of the gods at the beginning of Timaeus’ account (Tim. 27c6-d1) is 
an imitation of the demiurge’s “entering the oracular shrine of night” before 
creation, as well as of the remaining of all beings with the gods before 
emanation.273 Its function is to establish in Timaeus a unitary view of reality, the 
“supreme end of philosophical speculation” (τὸ ἀκρότατον θεωρίας τέλος) in order 
for him to be able to arrange the coming account, primarily according to Intellect, 
and secondarily, where that is not possible, according to human intellect and 
science.274 Proclus is referring to the fact that Timaeus’ exposition combines 
expressions of intuitive knowledge with discursive argument, more on which 
below. 
On a textual level, the prayer, representing the reversion to Intellect, provides the 
exposition of Timaeus with an ἀρχή that imitates (μιμεῖται) the ἀρχή of the 
universe.275 It is followed by the exhortation of the audience (Tim. 27d1-4), 
explained by Proclus as the preparation of “that which will be filled”, in order to 
facilitate both the contribution of Timaeus and the reception by his audience.276 
This preparation is comparable to a first phase of emanation. Together, the prayer 
and the exhortation which constitute a combination of an upward and a 
downward motion starting from Timaeus, constitute a chain that reflects the 
demiurgic chain and ensures that Timaeus’ account is connected with its divine 
source and will be received as such.277 Thus by taking the place analogous to that 
of the demiurge, who is the highest mediator between the intelligible and the 
sensible,278 Timaeus, becomes a mediator for his audience through his λόγος, and 
opens up an ally to knowledge.279 In this sense of being the teacher and the 
mediator between a higher level and those whom he informs, Timaeus is slightly 
elevated above the level of his audience.280 
Once the chain to the divine source is established, Timaeus’ self-moving soul can 
take over and express its scientific knowledge (further emanation).281 This is the 
                                               
273 In Tim. I 206.26-207.2 (with reference to Orph. frg. 164-5 Kern), 214.23-26. On the prayer and 
the invocation see also Lernould (2005: 142-4) and the summary in Cleary (2006: 141). 
274 In Tim. I 221.1-8. On prayer as an essential condition for the transition from the study of the 
cosmos to theologia see Beierwaltes (1979: 10, 329). 
275 In Tim. I 214.23-26. 
276 In Tim. I 222.11-15, esp. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ πληροῦν ἐξηρτημένον τῶν οἰκείων αἰτίων προανεγείρειν τὰ 
δεξόμενα καὶ ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς ἑαυτὸ πρὸ τῆς πληρώσεως. Cf. El.Th. prop. 134. 
277 Cf. In Tim. I 222.3-6. 
278 Cf. Beierwaltes (1969: 131): the Demiurge “wird (...) Vermittler zum Denken des höchsten 
Bereiches.”  
279 To (the universe created in) the text, he is the demiurge, to his audience, the mediator. Cf. In 
Parm. 838.34-839.6, where Parmenides, educating Socrates, is compared to the “paternal cause”. 
280 See the hierarchy of λόγοι, V.4.2(i) and n. 78.  
281 In Tim. I 222.17-223.2. 
CHAPTER V 
- 264 - 
actual production of λόγοι, which starts at Tim. 27d5. The commencement of 
Timaeus’ account with the words “in my opinion” (κατά γε ἐμὴν δόξαν)282 
indicates the activation of the opinative part (τὸ δοξαστικόν) of the soul of the 
speaker, after awakening his intuitive part by the prayer and the dianoetic part of 
the souls of all those present by the exhortation of the audience.283 The term 
δοξαστικόν here, as has been pointed out by Festugière, has an uncommon 
meaning: it is explicitly distinguished from δόξα as connected to sense perception 
and uncertainty,284 and is instead conceived as that part of the soul which channels 
the scientific knowledge it receives from διάνοια to others.285 That Timaeus can 
use this Pythagorean mode of teaching which consists in the dogmatic expression 
of discursive thinking, rather than the Socratic dialogue, is due to the fact that his 
interlocutors are intelligent men (ἄνδρες ἔμφρονες).286  
The production of λόγοι is yet another aspect of the parallel between demiurge 
and Timaeus. Creating discourse, like creating the cosmos, is a matter of λόγους 
ποιεῖν, in the sense of the unfolding and exteriorization of internal λόγοι.287 The 
demiurge brings forth creative principles288 and Timaeus expresses (ἐν προφορᾷ) 
his own scientific knowledge, in a didactic manner (διδασκαλικῶς), for the sake of 
education and communication. 289 In fact, the result of Timaeus informing his 
audience is analogous to that of the Demiurge informing the disorderly moving 
substrate, namely a κοσμοποιία, the creation of a cosmos:290  
T V.30 
                                               
282 Tim. 27d5, γε not in Burnet. 
283 In Tim. I 223.24-30. 
284 On δόξα cf. above V.5.2(i) and III.4.1(iii). 
285 Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 47 n. 2) (ad κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν): “Pas n’est besoin de signaler que δόξα 
et τὸ δοξαστικόν (223.24) sont pris ici dans un sense particulier, “l’expression au dehors de ἂ 
δοκεῖ”, cf. ἐκδίδωσιν εἰς ἂλλους 223.18s., ἐπ’ ἄλλους μετοχετεύει 223.26, ce sense se rapprochant 
de celui qui est usuel pour δόγμα. De là vient la précision indiquée plus loin (223.26ss.): ce 
δοξαστικόν-ci n’est pas comme la δόξα ordinaire qui est ἀμφίβολος, περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ μεριζομὲνη, ἐν 
ὑπολήψεσι μόναις τὴν εἴδεσιν ἀφωρισμένην ἔχουσα, mais il contemple (θεωροῦν! 223.30) le plan 
(λόγος) du Démiurge et porte sur la nature un jugement sûr (διακρῖνον).” Cf. Lernould (2005: 
145). 
286 In Tim. I 223.5, 11-12. Cf. O'Meara (1989: 152-5) on the theory of learning in the In Alc.  
287 Cf. Theol.Plat. I 29 (on divine names), 124.7ff, esp. 12-20, where discourse is called the 
presenting of a moving image of interior vision, comparable to the activities of the demiurge.  
288 See above, V.4.2(i). 
289 In Tim. I 217.28ff, esp. 218.13-28. On the Stoic distinction between the uttered word (λόγος 
προφορικός) and the inner thought (λόγος ἐνδιαθετός), see SVF (Sext.Emp. Adv.Math. VIII 275); 
cf. Galen Protr. 1.1ff. Cf. Festugière (1966-8: vol. V, 56 n. 4). On the Pythagorean side of 
Timaeus’ discourse, monologic as opposed to dialectic, see below.  
290 Cf. Struck (2002). 
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“… the father of the text (ὁ πατήρ τῶν λόγων) should stand in proportion 
(ἀνάλογον) to the father of things (ἔργα). For the creation of the cosmos 
according to λόγος is an image (εἰκών) of the creation of the cosmos 
according to mind.”291  
 
The demiurge has a preconception of the ‘definition’ of the cosmos before 
creation, and in imitation thereof Timaeus has a preconception of the account he 
will give, and defines its character, i.e. in Tim. 29b3-d3, before setting out on his 
own δημιουργία τοῦ παντός.292 That demiurgy starts immediately after the 
prooemium, with the question after the final cause of the universe.293 
The parallel between Timaeus’ exposition and the details of creation runs 
throughout Proclus’ commentary. Its most extensive feature is the structure of all 
of philosophy of nature as imaging the structure of the cosmos by an internal 
division into subdisciplines. This feature was the subject of the two previous 
chapters. We also find the assimilation of text to subject on a far smaller, semantic 
and lexical level, of individual words imitating certain aspects of the universe and 
creation, and on a formal level (morphological, syntactic and discourse).294 It 
would be neither feasible nor fruitful to treat all the details of Proclus’ rich and at 
                                               
291 In Tim. I 9.15-17. Cf. In Tim. I 29.7-9, 222.17-20, 334.18-27, 338.5-7, 339.21ff. The theme of 
the author as the father of his text can be found at Tht. 164e2 (μύθου), Symp. 177d5, Phdr. 257b2 
(both λόγου). On the topic of lexical correspondence between demiurge and author in Plato see 
Brisson (1987). In Proclus, the expression ‘ὁ πατήρ τῶν λόγων’ is not uncommon for ‘author’, ὀ 
πατήρ τοῦ λόγου and ὁ πατήρ τοῦ μύθου are more rare. 
292 In Tim. I 339.18-29 (quoted as T V.3) and 355.28. 
293 In Tim. 355.28-356.1. 
294 This presence of assimilation on the level of the λέξις of Plato’s text at times brings the theme 
of the εἰκὼς λόγος very close to that of the generation or construction of the universe 
διδασκαλίας ἕνεκα. The main difference between these two issues could be summarized as 
positive vs. negative: whereas the εἰκὼς λόγος concerns the manner in which the account is a 
faithful image of reality, the issue of the generation of the universe instead centers around the 
fact that in some respects it is not. The unlikeness of the likely account is primarily and inevitably 
caused by the nature of the world of Becoming, of human cognition, and of language, while the 
choices made by the author increase its likeness. In the case of the cosmogony, however, the choices 
made by the author for the sake of clarity result in decrease of likeness. The two issues come closest, 
of course, when the principle of assimilation is summoned to explain passages that seem 
indicative of unlikeness, as in fact being instances of the imaging of the structure of reality. A 
clear example is In Tim. I 334.18-27, where Proclus explains that the statement that the world 
“comes into being and perishes” (Tim. 22c), later followed by more noble designations like “most 
beautiful of things become” and the like, are given in imitation of the order of generation, from 
disorderly motion to cosmos. Cf. II 102.27-104.16, where Proclus explains the fact that Soul is 
discussed after Body (at Tim. 34b3ff.), despite the ontological priority of the former, as a 
temporary switch to exposition in the order of reversion rather than emanation.  
CHAPTER V 
- 266 - 
times overly zealous identification of instances of assimilation, so we will limit the 
remainder of our treatment thereof to some of the more interesting features, 
related to the structure of reasoning and the anagogic function of the dialogue. 
 
 
V.7.2 Reversion and emanation 
 
The last aspect of Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 20b3-d3 to be treated in this 
chapter is assimilation in the sense of the imitation of the subject matter in 
exteriorized λόγοι, with semantic and formal means, in order to increase the 
anagogic effect of the account. The procedure in question is one of a restructuring 
of reasoning into a phase of reversion and subsequent emanation, similar to the 
prayer and exhortation discussed above. The main purpose of this procedure is to 
imitate the metaphysical reversion and emanation and thereby stimulate the 
anagogy of the audience. We will see that it is in the context of this procedure that 
we can finally fathom the rationale behind the earlier introduction of the trio 
things thoughts and words, and the subsequent reduction of the εἰκὼς λόγος to its 
epistemological side. We will return to this later. Before looking at the passages in 
which Proclus uncovers this procedure, let us review Proclus’ description of the 
procedure and its connection to the εἰκὼς λόγος. 
 
We now return at long last to Proclus’ explanation of the apparent contradiction 
at Tim. 30b6-c1, where Plato combines truth and likely account in one sentence. 
After explaining this combination on the level of their respective metaphysical 
referents,295 Proclus continues to add a distinction internal to the account, related 
to what I called the human factor, the structure of reasoning:  
T V.31 
“...you may observe the likely as well as truth in the account itself (κατ’ 
αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον), not just dividing them on the basis of the nature of the 
things [treated]. For since in many places he attacked the demiurgy in a 
divided manner (μεριστῶς), employing calculations and divisions and 
compositions, even though in the divine creation all things are 
simultaneous,296 but in many other places ascended to the universal 
intellection of the father, as in the axioms “he was good” (Tim. 29e1) and 
“it neither was nor will be right for the best to do anything other than the 
most beautiful” (30a7), he called the one ‘likely account’ (εἰκοτολογία), and 
                                               
295 See above V.6.1(ii). 
296 Cf. In Tim. I 348.27-349.5 and above V.5.2(ii). 
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the other ‘truth’. He called simple apprehension (ἡ ἁπλῆ ἐπιβολή) truth, 
and divided apprehension (τὴν διῃρημένην) ‘likely account’, for it is from 
our manyformed (πολυειδής297) cognitions that he instructed us about the 
divine and demiurgic intellection.”298 
 
Proclus refines the division of likely and true by showing how the expression of 
the structure of reasoning contributes to the nature of Timaeus’ discourse. On the 
basis of the earlier metaphysical division one might feel justified to assert that 
everything in the Timaeus that concerns the intelligible, the transcendent, the 
eternal, etc., is taken by Proclus to be exempt from the qualification of ‘likely 
story’, and is instead read as truth. Here, however, Proclus states that, because of 
the many forms of cognition we have, also when it comes to descriptions of the 
activities of the Demiurge, that were in the previous part grouped with truth, both 
predicates, ‘truth’ as well as ‘likely’, are applicable.  
Our “multiform” cognitions and divided grasp (διῃρημένη ἐπιβολή)299 of reality 
force us to use “calculations, divisions and compositions,” i.e. not just in our own 
reasoning, but ascribing them to the Demiurge, whose activities are unitary and 
eternal.300 The result is a likely account. Timaeus can also, however, represent the 
highest form of cognition he possesses of the Demiurge, intuitive and unitary 
understanding (ἁπλῆ ἐπιβολή), in an account, by formulating certain axioms.301 
Such a representation of the divine, as well as the unitary understanding of which 
it is an expression, deserve to be called ‘truth’.302  
Moreover, Timaeus imitates the process of emanation by the representation of his 
unitary understanding in the form of an anticipated conclusion, followed by its 
discursive unfolding that consists in the elaboration of the premises leading to the 
                                               
297 In the context, πολυειδής could be the opposite of both μονοειδής and ἁπλῶς, since Proclus is 
talking about our different forms of cognitions as well as the multiplicity of divided 
apprehension. 
298 In Tim. I 410.20-411.2. 
299 A διῃρημένη ἐπιβολή seems to be a contradiction in terms, as ἐπιβολή is associated with 
immediate, intuitive grasping. The combination διῃρημένη ἐπιβολή occurs, as far as I have been 
able to ascertain, only in Proclus. Cf. Theol.Plat. I 111.9. Two options: either we should not supply 
ἐπιβολή, but assume that something like γνώσις is implicit, or we should understand διῃρημένη 
ἐπιβολή as a plural, cf. Porph. In Cat. 4,1.101.4 κατὰ ἄλλην γὰρ καὶ ἄλλην ἐπιβολὴν. 
300 Calculations/reasonings (λογισμοί): e.g. Tim 30b4, 33a6, 34a8; divisions (διαιρέσεις): e.g. Tim. 
35b4; compositions (συνθέσεις): e.g. Tim. 35a1ff. 
301 Their being axioms probably lies in the fact that they are not argued for. In the terminology of 
chapter III they are common notions rather than axioms. 
302 For truth as γνώσις see V.5.2(i). 
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conclusion.303 Using this procedure allows Timaeus to instruct his audience about 
“divine and demiurgic intellection” (see above).  
We have to maintain a certain caution when using the above passage as a source 
for general Proclus’ views on the status of Timaeus’ account, since its content is 
clearly determined by the need to explain the current and preceding lemmas.304 
Nonetheless, the explanation given for the procedure applied at Tim. 29e1 will 
help understand passages which according to Proclus contain the same procedure.  
Proclus explicitly identifies five instances of application of the procedure 
described above, and which on one occasion he calls ἀναφωνήσις:305 (a) 
‘γέγονεν’,306 the ‘axiom’ that the world “has become”, followed by the demiurgy; 
(b) παντὶ δὴ σαφές, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον, Plato’s statement that “it is clear to everyone 
that [he used] an eternal paradigm”, followed by the demonstration of the 
paradigmatic cause;307 (c) ἀγαθὸς ἦν, the assertion, immediately after the 
proœmium, concerning the goodness of the demiurge as the final cause of the 
universe;308 (d) ἕνα, the statement that the world is unique;309 and finally (e) εἰσὶ δὲ 
δὴ τέτταρες, the claim that “there are four” kinds of living being.310 
As becomes clear from the explanation Proclus gives of these instances, the 
progression of the text imitates the ontological structure of creation, but moreover 
mirrors the structure of cognition and reasoning.311 Timaeus’ questions whether 
the world has become, what its paradigmatic cause is, what its final cause, and 
                                               
303 Of course according to Proclus, as well as Plotinus the conclusion is prior to the 
argumentation, cf. for Plotinus Enn. V 8 [31] 7.36-47. 
304 The two axioms mentioned, “he was good” and “it neither was nor will be right for the best to 
do anything other than the most beautiful” are important arguments in favour of the conclusion 
that the world has been created as an animated intelligent living being. Despite the fact that in the 
other descriptions of the procedure (see below) Proclus often gives a list of its occurrences, the 
second axiom is never included. E.g. In Tim. I 360.5-14. 
305 In Tim. I 360.13, cf. the expression τὸ συμπέρασμα προαναφονεῖν, Hermias In Phaedr. 118.9-10 
and Simpl. In Cael 61.6, In Phys. 278.20. Cf. In Tim. I 438.20 ἀνεφθέγξατο. 
306 Tim. 28b, In Tim. I 282.27-283.12. Cf. II 7.18-21, where Proclus seems to have forgotten which 
part of the argumentation was the axiom and has it refer to the universal premise involved. 
307 Tim. 29a4-5, In Tim. I 330.12-19. 
308 Tim. 29e1, In Tim. I 360.5-14, cf. 370.13ff..  
309 Tim. 31a3, In Tim. I 438.20-439.1. 
310 Tim. 39e, In Tim. III 104.27-105. 
311 Cf. Theol.Plat. I 10 46.2ff. where the principle that accounts are interpreters of reality, and 
“carry an image” (εἰκόνα φέρουσι) thereof is put side by side with the principle that the unfolding 
(ἀνέλιξις) of demonstrations necessarily parallels the structure of the reality they concern, and is 
used to argue for the statement that a simple syllogistic reasoning purveys a truth closer to the 
One than a complex syllogism. Cf. I 11 53.9-10. See also Charles-Saget (1982: 310). For an early 
occurence of the expression εἰκόνα φέρειν, which suggest a Pythagorean origin, see Alex. in Met. 
771.24, 772.8. 
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whether it is unique, with their subsequent replies, are each mapped onto the 
circular motion of Timaeus’ soul, as well as the creative activities of the demiurge. 
The triadic structure of Neoplatonic metaphysics, in the order reversion, 
remaining, and emanation is clearly distinguished in its epistemological context, as 
a movement εἰς νοῦν, κατὰ νοῦν, and ἀπὸ νοῦν.312 Timaeus first turns from 
discursive reason to his own intellect, and subsequently proceeds from intellect to 
reasoning.  
More in detail, the three stages are the following: (1) Εἰς νοῦν. The first, 
preparatory stage is the formulation of an aporia, by posing a question, for 
example whether the world is generated or not.313 This stage is an awakening and 
reversion (ἐστραμμένος, ἀνατρέχων) of Timaeus upon his own mind, reflecting the 
self-motion of soul.  
(2) Κατὰ νοῦν: the second stage is the reply to the aporia in a single phrase or even 
word (μιᾷ φωνῇ), e.g. γέγονεν, which images the cast of intellect (μιμεῖται τὴν τοῦ 
νοῦ βολήν), and is comparable to the unitary and permanent act of creation of the 
demiurge.314 This phase expresses the intuitive, unitary (ἀθρόως) view of truth,315 
in the manner of the divinely inspired, who see everything all at once. Note that 
the expression of an intuitive view of reality is itself not that intuition, but an image 
and imitation thereof, because we cannot speak intellectively (νοερῶς).316 
And finally, (3) ἀπὸ νοῦ: the proceeding (ἀπὸ νοῦ προϊών, ἀπὸ νοῦ κάτεισιν εἰς λογικὰς 
διεξόδους) from intellect to rational exposition with the use of demonstration.317  
The last phase, the discursive unfolding of what is present in a concentrated form 
in the anticipated conclusion, and the division of what is unitarily present in 
                                               
312 In Tim. I 438.24-28: ἐπιστρέφων εἰς νοῦν...κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν...εἰς διάνοιαν ἀπὸ νοῦ κατιών. The 
fifth example of anticipating the conclusion, and the only one that does not occur in the second 
book of the commentary, consists only in the last two stages, as it is not preceded by a question.  
313 Proclus explains the three stages as the reflection of an internal dialogue: “For he himself is 
the one who raises the question, he is the one who solves it, and he is the one who presents the 
demonstration” (In Tim. I 438.23-24). Cf. Plato on thought as internal dialogue, Soph. 263e3-8, 
Tht. 189e6-109a2 and above n. 123. 
314 Cf. I 370.17 ἀποφθεγματικῶς. Note that there is a quantitative parallel between text and reality: 
the fewer the words, the more unitary the thing expressed. As Lernould (2005: 154 n. 145) points 
out, the axiom is as it were a concentrated form of the whole argument.  
315 Cf. In Tim. I 360.14 τὴν ἀθρόαν τοῦ παντὸς περίληψιν. 
316 In Tim. I 283.4 μιμεῖται, 360.14 μιμούμενος, 438.27 εἰκών; cf. I 303.19-20, also quoted above. 
On this issue cf. Kuisma (1996).  
317 In Tim. I 282.27-283.11, cf. 438.20-439.1, In Tim. III 104.27-105.14. Proclus argues for the 
necessity of the second phase for the third by referring to Arist. APo II 19: all demonstration 
takes its starting points from intellect (In Tim. I 438.28-439.1). Note that Proclus splits the third 
phase of example (c) ἀγαθὸς ἦν in two at I 370.18ff., namely an elaboration (a) διεξοδικῶς (at 
least, this is Taylors proposal for a lacuna in the text) and (b) ἀνειλιγμενῶς.  
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reality,318 is needed because it is impossible to express both the unity and the 
fullness of distinction at the same time.319 Both need to be expressed, however, 
for the sake of anagogy. That Timaeus has an intuitive grasp of the entire cosmos 
and its causes is not enough: he has to express it and unfold it for the benefit of 
his interlocutors who are epistemically less advanced, and need guidance in their 
ascent to knowledge.320  
The choice of the five examples of this procedure is not arbitrary. Assuming that 
Timaeus’ procedure is successful, his audience will afterwards be in the position to 
acquire insight into (a) the nature of the universe, (b) the paradigmatic cause, (c) 
the demiurgic and the final cause,321 (d) the unicity of the universe, and (e) the 
number of kinds of living beings.  
At this point we can return to the question why Proclus has chosen to expand 
Plato’s discussion of things and words at Tim. 29b3-d3 into one about ‘things, 
thoughts and words’: for Proclus the likeness that is most relevant in this section 
of the Timaeus is the psychological/epistemological one, through which our 
reversion is established, but this likeness is observable in and more importantly 
transferable through the likeness of discourse. Therefore, it is crucial for the 
didactic reading of the Timaeus that all three, things, thoughts and words, be 
introduced at the outset of the interpretation of the εἰκὼς λόγος. 
 
The procedure of anticipating the conclusion in imitation of reversion to νοῦς and 
emanation into discursive reasoning is one which we encounter throughout 
Proclus’ work. He finds it in the second half of the Parmenides, where it is part of a 
larger structure in which the audience is first stimulated to ascend to the One, and 
subsequently to follow the unfolding of all of reality from the One.322 Likewise, in 
                                               
318 In Tim. III 105.2-4 ἀναπτύσσει τὸ συνεσπειραμένον καὶ ἀνελίσσει τὴν μίαν νόησιν διὰ τῶν λόγων 
καὶ τὸ ἡνωμένον διαιρεῖ κατ΄ αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν.  
319 In Tim. III 105.4-6: ποτὲ μὲν τὴν ἕνωσιν αὐτῶν, ποτὲ δὲ τὴν διάκρισιν ἑρμηνεύων, ἐπειδήπερ 
ἑκάτερον ἅμα περιλαμβάνειν οὐ πέφυκεν οὐδὲ οἷός τέ ἐστι. 
320 Cf. Isaac (1976: 470). At In Tim. I 433.11-22 Proclus suggests that for didactic reasons Plato 
(sic) speaks in a certain manner in imitation of the emanation and reversion of the cosmos from 
and to the Living Being itself, in order to bring out clearly (ἡμῖν γνωρίμως) the ἀναλογία existing 
between them. Cf. Opsomer (2000: 358 and n. 30). 
321 Example (c) was ἀγαθος ἦν, which expresses the final cause as it is present in the Demiurge. 
322 On the procedure in the In Parm. and Proclus’ own practice in the El.Th. see O'Meara (2000). 
Cf. In Parm. VI 1125.13-22, 1132.26ff, 1152.12ff, 1167.1ff. Gritti (2003: 297f.) states in the 
context of the In Parm. passages that the development of the demonstration that leads to the 
conclusion is a representation of the transition from discursive reason to intellect. Proclus, 
however, like Plotinus, maintains rather that the conclusion has priority over the demonstration, 
and that there is a transition from intellect to discursive reason, in turn followed by a reversion to 
intellect by the second statement of the conclusion.  
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the Elements of Theology, Proclus commences with a short ascent (prop. 1-4), 
followed by a representation of the emanation of reality from the One/Good.323  
It need not surprise us, then, that in Proclus’ reading of the Timaeus the procedure 
of anticipating the conclusion is also part of a larger structure. In the previous 
chapter we have seen that Proclus explains the starting points presented in the 
prooemium as an ascent to the causes of the universe, and especially as they are 
present in the Demiurge. In this chapter, it has been shown in what sense 
Timaeus’ exposition is an imitation of the activities of the Demiurge. I propose 
therefore that Proclus’ reading of the Timaeus, inspired by the metaphysical reading 
of the hypotheses of the Parmenides, follows the same pattern as that of the 
Parmenides, but on a lower metaphysical level. It is a reversion to the Demiurge, 
followed by an emanation of the universe from divine providence. As such, the 
text is also a reversion for the writer/speaker and for the audience. The reversion 
takes place within the first half of the prooemium, and the emanation starts 
directly after the prooemium.  
 
The Timaeus is not a poem. If we momentarily disregard genre boundaries, 
however, we can see the dialogue as a hymn to the Demiurge, and as akin to 
scientific poetry, the second kind of poetry described by Proclus in the Commentary 
on the Republic.324  
We have seen in chapter I that the Timaeus for Proclus is a kind of hymn to the 
demiurge.325 In the foregoing, it has moreover become clear what that means, 
namely that the dialogue is an invocation of and reversion to the demiurge who 
mediates between us humans and the transcendent.326 That does not mean, by the 
way, that it is not also an argumentative and informative text. In fact, the 
argumentative and informative qualities of the text allow it to function as a 
hymn.327 
As scientific ‘poetry’, the Timaeus would be a form of teaching that is associated 
with both νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη, and teaches without the use of representation, by 
simply telling the reader or audience of its subject-matter within lower 
                                               
323 O'Meara (2000: 287-8). It is also well known that the ‘second part’ of the Platonic Theology 
(books II ff.) follows the order of emanation. Saffrey and Westerink (1968: vol I, lx ff.). 
324 For reff. see below. Cf. the suggestion of Coulter (1976: 108-9). As Sheppard (1980: 185) 
points out, in his discussion of scientific poetry Proclus is more interested in the properties of 
didactic than in delimiting a genre. 
325 See I.5. 
326 Beierwaltes (1969: 131). 
327 To go a step further, I see no reason to discard an argumentative and informative function of 
a text that is an invocation of the divine, as Rappe (2000: 170) does in the context of her reading 
of the Platonic Theology as an invocation of the divine.  
CHAPTER V 
- 272 - 
metaphysics, natural science, or ethics.328 Taking the Timaeus as an example of this 
kind of poetry may allow us to solve two small issues.  
(1) First of all, the contradiction Sheppard signals with regard to scientific poetry 
and ἀναλογία, namely that from Proclus’ 6th essay follows both that scientific 
poetry does not use any representation, and that it uses ἀναλογία,329 can easily be 
solved. Ἀναλογία is indeed “a matter of representing something on a higher level 
of reality by something on a lower level which is like it,” as she concludes on the 
basis of Gersh’s discussion of the notion, but using εἰκόνες in the sense of 
ontological images, rather than literary ones.330 That is, the representation is to be 
found on the level of the reality described in the text, not on that of the text 
itself.331  
(2) Coulter, who associates Platonic dialogues in general with scientific poetry,332 
signals the “curious conflation of two faculties”, νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη in the context 
of Proclus’ description of scientific poetry, and explains it as an attempt to fit four 
cognitive faculties into three kinds of poetry.333 As we have seen in the foregoing, 
however, the combination of just these faculties can be explained from the 
didactic nature of this particular kind of discourse, as leading the audience to a 
higher cognitive state.   
 
 
V.8 In conclusion: φυσιολογία as scientific mimesis 
 
In this conclusion we will review the different aspects of Proclus’ reading of the 
‘fourth demonstration’, Tim. 29b3-d3, and in the process address one final 
question, regarding Proclus’ take on the relation between the starting points, 
which formed the subject of chapter III, and the εἰκὼς λόγος discussed in this 
chapter.  
                                               
328 In Remp 177.23-178.2, 186.22ff, note especially 25-26: πολλὰ...εἰκότα...δόγματα, 198.21-24. On 
Proclus’ notion of scientific poetry see Coulter (1976: 107-9), Sheppard (1980: 95-103, 182-7) 
(who calls this kind of poetry ‘didactic’, but see Beierwaltes (1985: 304)) and van den Berg (2001: 
119ff.) 
329 Sheppard (1980: 198-9).  
330 I think this is the point Gersh (1973: 83-90, esp. 84), to whom she refers, is making.  
331 See on this issue also Martijn (2006b) and cf. Opsomer (2000). In a recent discussion of 
scientific poetry, van den Berg (2001: 135) has another solution, which I take to be incorrect 
because it ignores the fact that the εἰκόνες are ontological images: van den Berg denies that 
scientific poetry works without representation. 
332 See above n. 324. 
333 Coulter (1976: 108, n. 19) 
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We have seen that Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3 knows many layers. 
Assuming the widest scope of the principle of discourse, any discourse is a likely 
story, imprecise and refutable, and not truth, due to the nature of language, which 
is inherently discursive. This holds for any account, be it about the perceptible or 
about the intelligible.  
More importantly, the imprecision and refutability of, again, any account are due 
to the embodiment of human souls. Our cognition is the inferior of divine 
cognition. Accounts as expressions of our knowledge of the perceptible are 
refutable due to their dependence on the acquisition of knowledge with the use of 
faulty sense perception and external instruments, but even our knowledge of the 
intelligible is subject to discursivity and fallibility. Scientific knowledge of any 
subject is necessarily inferior to intuitive, unitary vision. 
All this does not imply, however, that Proclus reduces the whole issue of the 
status of discourse described at Tim. 29b3-d3 to a trivial statement regarding the 
necessarily discursive nature of discourse and thought: Proclus’ focus lies 
elsewhere. Proclus’ explanation of Tim. 29b3-d3 has as its main focal point the 
relation between discourse, knowledge, and reality, and assumes a basic continuity 
between higher and lower levels, both within these three domains, and among them.  
Due to that continuity, which is the result of the triadic nature of causation, every 
lower level of reality has an inherent and positive similarity to higher levels. The 
value of Platonic philosophy of nature lies in revealing that continuity and 
similarity between the sensible world and its transcendent causes, and thus 
connecting the perceptible with the intelligible.334 Thus despite the fact that the 
subject matter of philosophy of nature is the in many respects indefinite and 
changing universe, that our tools in studying it lack precision, and that our means 
for expressing it lack unity, Plato’s philosophy of nature is capable of conveying a 
certain kind of truth.  
The similarity of discourse to reality falls into two parts: an emanation and a 
reversion, or what I called resemblance and assimilation. Due to the resemblance 
of discourse, it has a natural and ontological relation of similarity to its causes, 
reality and our thoughts. And due to the increased assimilation of a text to its 
subject matter by the writer or speaker a text can function as a means of reversion 
for both author and audience to higher plains of reality. 
This brings us to a question that as yet remains to be answered, namely how 
Proclus’ reading of the two parts of the prooemium can be reconciled. In chapter 
III we have seen that from the interpretation of the prooemium minus Tim. 29b3-
                                               
334 In Tim. I 10.21; cf. 3.14, 7.5. Cf. Cleary (2006: 136). 
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d3 philosophy of nature emerges as a science.335 The description of accounts of 
Becoming in the second part of the prooemium, Tim. 29b3-d3, at first sight seems 
to be at odds with this claim. It has been argued that the sense in which 
φυσιολογία is a likely account in Proclus’ reading is irreconcilable with its scientific 
status and in general with Proclus’ interpretation of the entire rest of the 
dialogue.336 This claim, however, has been shown to rest on a faulty assumption, 
namely that in Proclus’ view science and likely account are diametrically opposed. 
The assumption that science and likely account are opposed can be refuted on the 
basis of our analysis of Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3. In the foregoing it 
has been shown that Proclus takes the account of philosophy of nature as 
presented in the Timaeus to be a combination of (relative) truth and belief, i.e. of 
scientific knowledge and likely story, in the sense that, where it presents the 
intelligible in a unitary manner, as well as certain conclusions concerning the 
universe, it expresses the truth which is attainable for us humans. This truth is 
equated with scientific knowledge. When treating the intelligible discursively, and 
even more when treating the heavenly bodies and the sublunary realm, Timaeus’ 
exposition expresses the likely story, or belief. This belief is not, however, the 
opposite of truth in any way, but something related to and positively resembling 
truth, namely a lower, but still rational form of cognition (πίστις). We can 
conclude, then, that the facts of φυσιολογία at times are, and at times are like, 
scientific knowledge. 
What does that tell us about the status of the starting points introduced in the first 
part of the prooemium? As said above (V.2), the location of the principle of the 
εἰκώς λόγος at the end of the prooemium has been used to argue for the limitation 
of its application to what comes after the prooemium, and thus safeguarding the 
starting points themselves. Proclus, however, has a different view. He does feel 
that he has to explain why the principle of discourse and its application, which 
inform us on the status of Timaeus’ account, had not been introduced at the 
beginning of that account. His answer, though, is that the question what kind of 
λόγοι fit perceptible things is necessarily brought up after the demonstration that 
the universe is generated, but not before, when we did not know the nature of the 
universe yet.337 In other words, there was no point in presenting it earlier, as the 
application of the general principle that texts are related to their subject matter to 
the particular case of the natural world could not have been given before, 
                                               
335 The status of the starting points within the likely story is one of the issues in the modern 
debate on the Timaeus. See above V.2.  
336 Lernould (2005: 160). In his earlier work Lernould argues that the starting points are not 
subject to the principle of the likely story. Lernould (2001: 293-4, 296-7). 
337 In Tim. I 339.29-340.1  
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although the general principle itself could have been introduced at the beginning of 
the exposition.338 The location of the principle of discourse at the end of the 
prooemium, then, for Proclus need not have implications regarding its application 
thereof – or not – to the starting points.  
Of course we can decide in this matter by assessing the content of the principle. 
Since Proclus identifies the introduction of axioms concerning the intelligible as 
scientific knowledge, and explicitly includes the conclusion of the first 
demonstration, ‘γέγονεν’, among Timaeus’ reversions to the truth of intellect, I 
propose that Proclus considers the axioms presented in the prooemium, as well as 
the conclusions of the demonstrations, to be elements of truth, whereas the 
elaborations of the demonstrations, e.g. into their premises, are elements of the 
‘likely story’.  
Apart from the relation between philosophy of nature as a science and as a likely 
story,  another relation needs to be clarified: that between philosophy of nature as 
a hypothetical science starting from sensory data (as argued in chapter III) and as 
the presentation of intuitive knowledge. The question can be answered simply by 
pointing to the difference between order of discovery and order of presentation. 
The intuitive knowledge Timaeus presents is the final stage, the ἀκρότατον θεωρίας 
τέλος (In Tim. 221.1), of his own epistemological journey, that originally started 
from sensory data. When teaching his interlocutors, Timaeus shows them the path 
he himself followed, in order that they discover their own innate knowledge.339 
Thus the account starts from intuitive knowledge in the sense that that is what 
comes first ‘by nature’ (τῇ φύσει), as well as in the order of presentation. The 
process of acquiring knowledge of the natural world and its transcendent causes, 
however, has its primary source in the senses, which is first ‘to us’ (πρὸς ἡμᾶς).340 
 
 
                                               
338 Proclus is right that the addition of the general principle of Tim. 29b4-5 would have seemed 
out of place at, say, Tim. 28b2 (after the introduction of the paradigmatic cause). 
339 Cf. O'Meara (1989: 152-5 and n. 34), referring to In Alc.  225.4-226.7, 277.10-278.13, 280.2-
281.14. 
340 On the distinction beteen what is better known to us and what is better known by nature see 
Arist. APo I 71b33 ff. 
  
V DISCOURSE AND REALITY: THE ΕΙΚΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ 
 
 
V.1 Introduction1 
 
In chapter III, we have seen how Proclus uses the prooemium of the Timaeus to 
demonstrate that φυσιολογία is a hypothetical science which provides knowledge 
of the causes of the universe, primarily the demiurgic cause, that starts from the 
information of sense perception. In that chapter we disregarded the last lines of 
the prooemium, concerning what Proclus tentatively considers ‘the fourth 
demonstration’ (Tim. 29b3-d3, In Tim. I 339.3-353.29).2 The present chapter offers 
an analysis of Proclus’ understanding of that passage, in which Timaeus famously 
refers to his exposition on the universe as no more than a ‘likely account’ (εἰκὼς 
λόγος),3 and warns his audience not to expect an exposition about the universe to 
be entirely consistent and accurate, due to the nature of its subject, the universe, 
which is an εἰκών of Being, due to the nature of discourse, which may not be 
incontrovertible and irrefutable, and finally due to human nature:  
T V.1 
(T V.44) “Concerning an image and its paradigm, a distinction should be 
made in the following manner:” (T V.7) “accounts are related to that very 
thing of which they are the interpreters” – (T V.10) “for a text concerning 
the permanent, and stable, and what is evident to the mind is itself 
permanent and irrefutable – insofar as it is possible and appropriate for 
words to be irrefutable and invincible, it should not fall short of that;” (T 
V.14) “but a text which concerns that which is copied from it and is an 
image, is likely,” (T V.17) “and standing in proportion to them: as Being is 
to Becoming, so truth is to belief.” (T V.19) “If then, Socrates, in many 
respects concerning many things – the gods and the generation of the 
universe – we prove unable to render an account at all points entirely 
consistent with itself and exact, you must not be surprised.” (T V.25) “If 
we can furnish accounts no less likely than any other, we must be content, 
                                               
1 Parts of this chapter appeared as Martijn (2006a). 
2 Proclus sees the determination of the εἶδος of the text (i.e. a likely story) as a demonstration 
from the nature of the universe, In Tim. I 355.25-28. 
3 Plato uses the expressions εἰκὼς λόγος and εἰκὼς μῦθος, see below. Occurrences of εἰκὼς 
λόγος: Tim. 29c2, 8; 30b7; 48d2 (bis); 53d5; 55d5; 56a1; 56b4, cf. d1; 57d6; 59d1, cf. d3; 68b7; 
90e8; cf. 40e1. εἰκὼς μῦθος: Tim. 29d2, 59c6, 68d2. 
4 These numbers are crossreferences to the places elsewhere in this chapter where the phrases in 
question and Proclus’ analysis thereof are discussed in further detail. 
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remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human, and 
consequently it is fitting that we should, in these matters, accept the likely 
story and look for nothing further.” (Tim. 29b3-d3, translation based on 
Cornford.) 
 
Like the starting points given earlier in the prooemium,5 this statement can be 
divided into a general principle, concerning the relation between account and 
subject matter, and a ‘demonstration’, the application to the realm of Becoming as 
the subject matter of Timaeus’ exposition.  
Considering Proclus’ efforts to emphasize the scientific nature of φυσιολογία, 
Timaeus’ statement concerning the status of an account about Becoming as an 
εἰκὼς λόγος may pose a threat for his position. The main questions of this chapter, 
therefore, are in what sense, according to Proclus, Platonic φυσιολογία is a ‘likely 
story’, and how Tim. 29b3-d3 can be reconciled with the scientific status of 
φυσιολογία.  
Part of the answer lies in the fact that Proclus focuses far more on theorizing 
about the general principle of the relation between account and subject matter, and 
about human accounts and knowledge in general, than on what is today 
considered the core of the above passage, namely the specific status of an account 
about Becoming.  
In the following I will refer to the general principle that accounts are like their 
subject matter as the principle of discourse, and to the specific application thereof 
to accounts concerning Becoming as the εἰκὼς λόγος.6  
A further distinction to be made is that between two strands present in Proclus’ 
interpretation of the principle of discourse, and that I will call ‘resemblance’ and 
‘assimilation’. By ‘resemblance’ I refer to those aspects of discourse and reasoning 
and their relation to reality in Proclus’ interpretation of the ‘likely story’ that are 
due to natural and necessary properties of language, reality, and the human make-up. 
                                               
5 See chapter III. 
6 I will not present a general Proclean theory of discourse, as that would go far beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. I will, however, discuss some principles that can be distilled from Proclus’ 
interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3 and that might figure in such a general theory of discourse. - 
When translating εἰκώς I have chosen ‘likely’, as a fairly theory-neutral rendering (as opposed to 
‘verisimillitude’ or ‘probabiliy’) and to indicate its root in ἔοικα and its relation to εἰκών. - I will 
not use the expression εἰκὼς μῦθος as the word μῦθος hardly plays a part in Proclus’ 
interpretation. Its occurrence at 29d2 is considered a metaphor, and no serious alternative for 
λόγος. See below V.5.2(ii). - As to λόγος, we should at all times be aware of the fact that Proclus 
makes extensive use of the polysemy of this word, as referring (in the context of Tim. 29b3-d3) to 
metaphysical, epistemological, logical and verbal concepts. When it refers to verbal expressions, I 
usually translate ‘account’ (in the sense of a verbal description, rather than an explanation), 
‘discourse’, or (in plural) ‘words’. 
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‘Assimilation’ is the term I use for the remaining aspects of discourse and 
reasoning in Proclus’ interpretation, that are related to what we could call the 
practice of discourse, i.e. its use and manipulation, serving to increase the similarity both 
of discourse to its subject, and of the human soul to reality.  
After a summary of recent explanations of the εἰκὼς λόγος (V.2), and some 
introductory remarks on the ancient εἰκὼς λόγος (V.3), sections V.4, V.5, V.6 and 
V.7 discuss the details of Proclus’ exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3. Section V.4 and V.5 
are devoted to ‘resemblance’. Section V.6 shows to what extent and in which 
manner Proclus understands the principle of discourse to apply to the Timaeus, 
and section V.7 treats the second main aspect thereof: ‘assimilation’.  We will 
conclude the chapter by bringing together some of the results of this chapter with 
those of chapter III (V.8). 
The main argument of this chapter is that Proclus interprets Tim. 29b3-d3 in such 
a way that it reinforces his reading of the dialogue as a reversion to the demiurgic 
cause of the natural world. Λόγοι in the sense of verbal expressions are primarily 
natural emanations of higher levels of reality, like any other λόγοι, and therefore 
naturally similar to their source (which I called ‘resemblance’), and secondarily a 
didactic tool of man, with which he tries to imitate reality and establish a reversion 
of his own and other souls (which I called ‘assimilation’). Thus Tim. 29b3-d3 is no 
longer a statement of the inadequacy of discourse of philosophy of nature, but 
instead an addition lending support to Proclus’ overall interpretation of the 
Timaeus as a theological philosophy of nature. 
In the literature on Neoplatonic literary theory and theory of language, in which 
the relation between text and metaphysics takes a central place, the interpretation 
of Tim. 29b3-d3 has so far hardly been taken into account.7 In general, and 
especially in Proclus’ case, it is in the context of his reception of the Republic and 
the Cratylus, rather than the Timaeus, that that relation is extensively discussed. The 
issues involved in such discussions are generally the true meaning and value of 
myths and poetry in the former, the nature of words and symbols in the latter, and 
in addition the role of language in theurgy.8 These issues and their contexts are 
                                               
7 Esp. Coulter (1976), Sheppard (1980: 296-318), Beierwaltes (1985: 296-318, with review of 
Coulter and Sheppard), Kuisma (1996), Rappe (2000: esp. 170-80), van den Berg (2001), 
Sheppard (2002). The lacuna signalled by Beierwaltes (1985: 301, cf. 308-9), regarding the 
philosophical implications of Neoplatonic theories of literature and exegesis, has in part been 
filled by Kuisma, Rappe and van den Berg, but a lot of work is yet to be done.  
8 In Remp/poetry: Coulter (1976), Dillon (1976), Hirschle (1979), Sheppard (1980), Kuisma 
(1996), Halliwell (2002: 323-34), Sheppard (2002), Brisson (2004) In Crat./naming: Hirschle 
(1979), van den Berg (forthcoming). Theurgy: Struck (1998), van den Berg (2001: esp. 120ff.), 
Struck (2002). 
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treated in this chapter only insofar as they are subsidiary to our understanding of 
Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3.  
Of the In Tim., if anything, the two prooemia, i.e. the “summary” of the Republic 
and the Atlantis story have been the subject of further investigation concerning 
Proclus’ theory of discourse. Proclus introduces them as representations of the 
universe in images (εἰκόνες) and in symbols (σύμβολα) respectively, and they have 
therefore been studied for the sake of a comparison of his notions of image and 
symbol.9 The exception is a recent paper by Lernould (2005), which focuses 
entirely on the theme of the εἰκὼς λόγος, and the question how it is compatible 
with the claim for a scientific status of philosophy of nature. The paper contains 
valuable analyses and a wealth of material, but since the author emphasizes the 
opposition, rather than the continuity, inherent in Proclean metaphysics and 
epistemology, he has to conclude that Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3 is 
incompatible with the rest of his commentary. In this chapter it will become clear 
that such a conclusion can be avoided. 
 
 
V.2 The εἰκὼς λόγος today – a selection 
 
To allow an appreciation of how different Proclus’ interpretation of the εἰκὼς 
λόγος is from some of the modern readings, and how close to other, especially 
more recent ones, let us briefly walk through some of those modern readings. 
This section highlights different interpretations of the εἰκὼς λόγος, but should not 
be considered to be an exhaustive discussion.  
In the modern debate on Tim. 29b3-d3 three issues are raised. (1) Plato speaks 
both of an εἰκὼς λόγος and of an εἰκὼς μῦθος, and this may, or may not, refer to 
different aspects of his cosmology or different senses of being likely.10 (2) 
Considering the position of the εἰκὼς λόγος remark at the end of the prooemium, 
Plato may be taken to exclude the prooemium from that qualification.11 Moreover, 
certain other parts of Timaeus’ exposition may be excluded as well, most notably 
                                               
9 Esp. Dillon (1976), Sheppard (1980), Kuisma (1996: 54ff.), Sheppard (2002: 196-201). Cf. 
Beierwaltes (1979: 171, n. 23). 
10 See the discussions in Morgan (2000: 275-9), Johansen (2004: 62-68). According to Vlastos 
(1964: 382) εἰκώς is the important word. See also Brisson (1994: 104-5). Johansen (2004) (see 
below and n. 26) connects μῦθος to the context of human nature, and Brisson (1998: 129-30) 
comes up with very different descriptions: “falsifiable discourse describing the present state of 
sensible things” (εἰκώς λόγος) and “non-falsifiable discourse presenting, in an explanatory model, 
the state of sensible things before and during their constitution” (εἰκώς μῦθος). 
11 Berti (1997: 119-20 and n. 5, 127), Reale (1997: 152). Cf. Hackforth (1959: 18f.), Vlastos (1964: 
402-5), Runia (1997: 113). 
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the introduction of the third kind at Tim. 47eff.12 (3) The central issue, of course, 
has been the meaning of εἰκώς. 
 
Timaeus’ remarks on the status of an account about nature are the subject of 
extensive discussion in their own right, but above all they have figured in an 
ongoing debate among Plato’s modern-day audience, on the question whether we 
should read his cosmogony literally or as one great metaphor. In general, those 
who prefer the metaphorical reading of the Timaeus find one of their clues – or 
arguments – in the word εἰκώς, that tells them, among others, that Plato never 
meant the world to have a beginning in time.13 On the other hand, literalists – as 
we may call them – try to defend their interpretation against the threat of the εἰκὼς 
λόγος, and, rather than focus on the λόγος’ being εἰκώς, concentrate on its 
refutability.14 Between these two extremes a rainbow of interpretations has been 
                                               
12 Runia (1997: 111-2) sees the introduction of the third kind as an application of the method 
advocated in Socrates’ ‘second sailing’ (Phaedo 99d-102a). For the position that both the 
proœmium and the principles at 47eff are rationally established principles, and hence (or this is 
suggested) free from εἰκοτολογία, see Leinkauf (2005: xii, n. 4): “Die Unterscheidung zwischen 
eikôs mythos und logos ist schon im text des Platons selbst deutlich festzumachen: die 
fundierenden Passagen zur Unterscheidung von Sein und Werden (27Dff) oder zu den Prinzipien 
der Weltentstehung (47Eff: nus und anankê) gehören zur rational erfaß- und darstellbaren 
Ontologie und Prinzipienlehre, nicht, wie die Demiurgen-Schilderung, zum Mythos.“ Leinkauf 
has this distinction mirrored in the use of λόγος and μῦθος for the respective kinds of discourse. 
His reading is inspired by Gadamer (1974: 245). 
13 See Zeyl (2000: xx-xxv) for an extensive and insightful discussion of this debate. Zeyl’s own 
reading will be discussed below. Baltes (1996: 94-5), who opts for the metaphorical reading, does 
not explicitly play the εἰκώς μῦθος card, but the argument is present in his reasoning. He refers to 
Timaeus’ repeated stressing of the difficulties involved in understanding what he says, despite the 
fact that in the Timaeus, more than in any other dialogue, the interlocutors are more or less on an 
equal level. Moreover, it is worth noting here that Baltes mentions Timaeus’ statement that it is 
impossible for the description of the universe to be entirely free of contradiction. Baltes explains 
this as involving ‘dass Timaios sich gelegentlich unscharfer kolloquialer Ausdrucksweise bedient’. 
Cf. Tarán (1971: 391 and n. 165), who sees the metaphorical character as a choice masking the 
likeliness, and Finkelberg (1996). Dillon (1997), who emphatically sides with the non-literal camp, 
does not avail himself of the likely story, but of other indications, mainly inconsistencies, as ‘clues 
sown’ by Plato.  
14 This camp of the literalists, of which Aristotle is famously the first adherent, has few followers. 
Of course their forte – to try and explain a text from its very words – is also their disadvantage: 
discrepancies are hard to get rid of. Roughly speaking two versions of the literal view can be 
distinguished, on the one hand the view that only the account is cosmogonical (e.g. Vlastos 
(1964)), on the other hand the inference that Plato’s genuine position was cosmogonical (e.g. 
Hackforth (1959)). Robinson (1979) proposes a hybrid reading that is the inverse of and less 
successful than that of Dillon: he interprets the text literally, unless the text itself explicitly 
indicates otherwise. 
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offered, from a reading of Tim. 29b3-d3 as indicating poetic license,15 through the 
suggestion that Plato is not presenting us with his cosmological views, but instead 
challenges his readers to examine their own views,16 to the anachronistic reading 
of the Timaeus in probabilistic terms or as verisimilitude, “the nearest 
approximation which can ‘provisionally’ be made to exact truth,” and which is 
subject to perpetual revision.17 
In the recent surge of interest for the εἰκὼς λόγος question,18 apart from readings 
that fit in the dichotomy sketched above, a certain trend is detectable. In two 
respects a shift has occurred, that, as we will see, brings us closer to the Proclean 
interpretation.  
(a) First of all, the word εἰκώς is explained as expressing the likeliness not so much 
of the exposition, but of the content of physical theory.19 Still, the qualification 
εἰκώς is explicitly given to the text, not to its subject. Considering that this 
qualification is due to the subject matter, it has been pointed out that the 
distinction made is not one between literal and metaphorical, but between 
consistent and accurate vs. less consistent and less accurate, between apodeictic 
certainty and plausibility.20 This is an important modification, since, assuming that 
the likeness of the text is of the same sort as that of the subject matter, it 
invalidates the εἰκὼς λόγος remark as arguments for the ‘metaphoricalist’ position.  
(b) Secondly, more attention is given to the validity expressed in εἰκώς, i.e. the 
positive side of some kind of similarity, as opposed to the mere limitation of 
dissimilarity.21 The ontological structure sketched in the prooemium necessitates 
the like(li)ness of discourse about the universe, but also supports and justifies this 
                                               
15 Cornford (1937: 28-32), cf. Atzpodien (1986: 113, cf. 8-9), who thinks the Timaeus is one great 
metaphor that allows the readers to see the “gedanklich-logischen Vorstellungswelt” of the 
harmonic structure of the cosmos and of the soul. 
16 Gregory (2000: 241-2, 259). 
17 Taylor (1928: 59-61), pushed to extremes in Ashbaugh (1988), more moderate versions in  
Sorabji (1983: 272), Wright (2000: 14-19), Morgan (2000: 271-281), and Runia (1997: 111-2).  
18 For example, in ‘Interpreting the Timaeus/Critias’, the Proceedings of IV Symposium 
Platonicum, five out of 31 contributions are to a large extent devoted to the εἰκώς μῦθος: Berti, 
Reale, Runia, Santa Cruz, and Vallejo.   
19 To be fair, this was already pointed out by Tarán (1971: 400-1 n 104). Tarán does, however, 
belong to the team of those who read the Timaeus as a metaphor (‘creation myth’), triggered by 
the word μῦθος.  
20 Zeyl (2000: xxxii), Johansen (2004: 51). 
21 Cf. already Rivaud (1925: 11-12), who refers to Brochard (1902). 
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discourse.22 It is, in fact, what makes sensible discourse about Becoming possible 
in the first place.23 
Almost all of the readings discussed in the foregoing are rooted in the modern 
conception of cosmology or science of nature in general: science of nature is 
supposed to be a science par excellence that requires, if not certainty, at least 
exactitude. Therefore Plato’s qualification of his science of nature as a mere 
like(li)ness has been regarded as a serious issue, with far-reaching consequences 
for not only the dialogue, but Plato’s doctrine about the generation of the universe 
and physics in general – to the extreme of qualifying the entire cosmology as 
fiction.24  
The most recent interpretation, put forward by Johansen (2004), does not suffer 
from such modern presuppositions, but provides an interesting and rather 
Neoplatonic angle, namely that, as a source of knowledge of the transcendent Forms, 
the sensible world is only moderately useful, since it is an image thereof, but in a 
different ontological medium.25 This is an interesting interpretation because it 
considers the Timaeus as ultimately also aiming at knowledge of the Forms, and as 
valuing cosmology to the extent that it provides that knowledge, rather than 
knowledge of the sensible world as such. In this respect Johansen is quite close to 
Proclus. Moreover, also like Proclus, Johansen emphasizes the role of the 
limitations of human nature (as opposed to divine nature), which so far has not 
been very present in the debate.26  
                                               
22 Santa Cruz (1997: 133ff.), Van Ophuijsen (2000: 128), Zeyl (2000: xxxii-xxxiii), Burnyeat 
(2005), cf. Reale (1997: 152).  
23 Gadamer (1974: 10) 
24 A very different approach is the interpretation of the Timaeus as a (re)creation of the or a 
universe in words. This is a scintillating reading, and one that easily relates to the Neoplatonic 
exegesis of the Timaeus. See V.7.1. When applied rigorously to the Timaeus, however, it inevitably 
runs into problems due to lack of evidence and even evidence to the contrary. Osborne (1996) 
considers the ‘likeliness’ of Timaeus’ discourse to lie in the extent to which it succeeds in 
moulding a world (if I understand her correctly, one that is independent of the material world) to 
match its paradigm, the Forms. A similar approach is to be found in Brague (1985), who analyses 
Timaeus’ exposition in detail in order to map it on the male human body. Unfortunately, his 
apparent success is to a large extent due to his begging several questions. Most importantly, as 
Brisson (1987: 127) points out, there is no reason to assume that the animal in question should be 
a human. Nor, I would add, a male. In this respect the anonymous author of the prolegomena 
understood the principle formulated in the Phaedrus better when he concluded that a text should 
assimilate the universe as the perfect living being (see below V.7). More credible versions of this 
interpretation, that are not associated with the theme of the εἰκὼς λόγος, are to be found in 
Johansen (2004: 186ff.) and Hadot, P. (1983) (see below and n. 266). Cf Friedländer (1975: 355) 
“Schon in seinem Aufbau ist der Timaios ein Abbild der Kosmos, den er deutend nachdichtet.”  
25 Johansen (2004: chapter 3, esp. 56, 59-60). 
26 Johansen (2004: 55, 60, 62-63). 
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V.3 Proclus on the εἰκώς λόγος: preliminaries 
 
From the moment the Timaeus was written, the polemics about whether the 
generation of the cosmos should be taken literally or in some metaphorical sense 
thrived. However, the theme of the εἰκὼς λόγος does not figure in any way in the 
ancient debate on this question.27 For this reason Proclus’ views on the 
generatedness of the cosmos will not be treated in this chapter.28  
Moreover, the ancient scholars do not seem to have struggled all that much with 
the notion that the account is not ‘truth’, but an approximation or an image 
thereof.29 On the contrary, writers after Plato have borrowed several expressions 
(εἰκοτολογία,30 κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα, etc.) from the Timaeus, as implying the 
validity, if within certain limits, of what is said. For example, the expression ‘κατὰ 
λόγον τὸν εἰκότα’ implies that something is probable, that it agrees with the facts, 
however incomplete they may be.31 So being εἰκώς means being fitting, seeming, 
probable: it does not imply a negative judgement. Proclus’ optimistic reading of 
the ‘like(li)ness’ of an account of the physical world fits in this picture. The more 
interesting part of the theme of the εἰκὼς λόγος for its ancient readers, as we will 
see, is the general principle according to which accounts are related to and 
interpreters of their subject matter. 
 
Before we move on to Proclus’ reading of Tim. 29b3-d3, a cautionary remark is in 
order. In interpreting his views on this theme, more than anywhere else in Proclus’ 
                                               
27 As shows from the fact that in the testimonia of this debate discussed in Baltes (1976), (1978) 
the εἰκὼς λόγος has no role whatsoever. Cf. Dörrie and Baltes (1998: 122-9 (texts and translation) 
and 426-36 (comments)) and Sorabji’s lucid discussion of the ancients’ dispute (1983: 268-282). 
28 For a thorough treatment of the issue in Proclus see Baltes (1978) and Lernould (2001: 129ff.). 
See below, n. 294 on the sense in which Proclus’ interpretation of the εἰκὼς λόγος and his reading 
of the generation of the cosmos do at times almost intertwine.  
29 Sceptics did make use of the notion εἰκώς for their own purposes, as can be seen from Anon. 
Proleg. 10; it is significant here, however, that there is no hint that they had the Timaeus specially in 
mind, and no suggestion that the author is worried by the implications of their argument for this 
important Platonic text. For a discussion of the role of εἰκώς in the Fourth Academy see Tarrant 
(1985). 
30 This word is not used in the Timaeus, but is clearly derived from it. Cf. Theophrastus Frg. 
51.1.1-3, Philo Heres 224.3-7, Stob. Anth. 1.41.5.19-22 etc. Cf. also εἰκοτολογικῶς at In Tim. I 
340.26, where Gaius and Albinus are said to think that Plato can ‘express doctrine’ (δογματίζειν) 
in this fashion. 
31 It does so in Plato at Tim. 30b7, 53d5, 55d5, 56b4, 90e8. Cf. Philo, Plant. 75.1, Aet. 44.2; 
Plut.Rom. 28.10.8; Sext.Emp.Math. 9.107.4 etc. 
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work, we encounter a hermeneutic difficulty due to what one might call an 
extreme case of Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν: Proclus’ main argument in his 
interpretation of the Tim. 29b3-d3 is that very passage. That is, he keeps justifying 
Plato’s and his own position regarding the account of philosophy of nature on the 
basis of the Platonic axiom that “words are related to their subject matter” (Tim. 
29b4-5), even when this is the very statement that needs justifying. A clear 
example is his reading of Tim. 29b2-3:  
T V.2 
“Μέγιστον δὴ παντὸς ἄρξασθαι κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχήν.” 
 
This sentence, which forms the transition from what Proclus calls the ‘hypotheses’ 
or the ‘demonstrations’ to the ‘likely story’, is ambiguous enough to allow him to 
explain it as pertaining to each of the elements playing a role in his reading of Tim. 
29b3-d3: discourse, reasoning, and reality. The universe, he states, proceeds from 
a natural beginning, namely “the eternity of the gods and the source of beings” 
and the final cause.32 Likewise, knowledge starts by deriving suitable conclusions 
from suitable starting points, namely the hypotheses as the natural starting point 
of demonstration;33 and the didactic account (ὁ διδασκαλικὸς λόγος) starts from 
“the distinction concerning the nature of the teaching (διδασκαλία): whether it 
should be understood to be fixed and unalterable and precise or as a likely account 
(εἰκοτολογία), i.e. not as truth, but as persuasion (πίστις) and as made alike to truth 
(πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὡμοιωμένην).”34 Thus “knowledge follows the order of reality, 
and the didactic account follows the order of knowledge.”35 The principle behind 
this explanation is that a text is essentially related to its subject matter, i.e. Tim. 
29b4-5. Likewise, when discussing Plato’s motivation for bringing up the relation 
between text and subject matter in the prooemium in the first place, Proclus 
explains it as an application of that same principle:  
T V.3 
                                               
32 In Tim. I 337.29-31, 338.26-27. 
33 In Tim. I 338.2-4, 27-8. 
34 In Tim. I 338.27-339.2, which I take to be parallel to I 337.31-338.2, where Proclus speaks of ὁ 
ἐπιστήμων λόγος, picked up almost immediately by ὁ διδασκαλικὸς λόγος (338.5). What Proclus 
has to say about the scientific account in the earlier passage (“starting from the natural beginning 
as from a root, it makes the following reasonings about the cause consistent with that 
beginning”) can be explained as referring both to the εἰκὼς λόγος, so parallel with I 338.27-339.2, 
and as referring to any of the other ‘beginnings’ Proclus identifies: Timaeus’ reversion to νοῦς 
(see V.7.1), the hypotheses, and the question whether the universe is generated or not, cf. In Tim. 
I 219.23-31 and III.3. 
35 In Tim. I 338.4-5. 
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“Now some people say that it is a part of speech writing to distinguish 
beforehand of what kind the account is, and what kind of attitude the 
audience should have, and that Aristotle emulated this,36 as well as many 
other, more recent philosophers. I, however, would say that the account 
imitates (μιμεῖται) the demiurgy itself: just as the latter first brings forth the 
invisible lifes of the cosmos, and then establishes the visible, and contains 
its definition before the whole cosmos itself, so too Timaeus possesses the 
theory of things, and renders the kind of account appropriate to the things, 
and has assumed and distinguished the mode of speaking before the entire 
study, in order to adjust the entire teaching (διδασκαλία) to that definition.” 
(In Tim. I 339.18-29)  
 
This passage touches on a number of issues relevant in this chapter, and we will 
return to the details of the text later.37 What is important at this point is Proclus’ 
rejection of the option that the principle of discourse is a rhetorical topos, and his 
proposal to consider it instead as a practice that imitates the demiurge’s 
conception of the ‘definition’ of the universe prior to his creative activities. Thus 
in the interpretation of the Timaeus the principle introduced at Tim. 29b4-5 occurs 
both as an explanandum and, since it had become embedded in the very heart of 
Neoplatonism, as an explanans of the relation between discourse and subject 
matter, both in general and with respect to the passage containing that very 
principle at Tim. 29b3-d3.  
 
 
V.4 The nature of the εἰκώς λόγος: resemblance 
 
T V.4 
“… concerning an image and its paradigm, a distinction should be made in 
the following manner... (ὧδε...διοριστέον)” (Tim. 29b3-4) 
 
Contrary to his habit of ending a lemma at a punctuation, Proclus breaks off the 
sentence from the Timaeus at the word διοριστέον and turns the first half into a 
single lemma, thereby creating a neat parallel with the ‘division’ of Being and 
Becoming made at 27d5 (διαιρετέον), that is highlighted even more with the use of 
                                               
36 Probably a reference to Arist. Rhet. I 3 1358a36ff (as Diehl proposes), which is about speeches, 
and a speech is what Timaeus will offer us (cf. Tim. 19d-20a).  
37 See V.6. 
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verbal echoes in the following exegesis.38 Thus the reader is reminded of the 
correspondence between the couples image-paradigm and Being-Becoming.  
In his exegesis of this passage, however, which is Timaeus’ transition to the theme 
of the εἰκὼς λόγος, Proclus in first instance does not discuss the distinction 
between image and paradigm, but instead distinguishes three domains that are 
naturally ‘grown together’,39 and that are all involved in the principle of discourse: 
“things, thoughts, and words” (τὰ πράγματα, τὰ νοήματα καὶ οἱ λόγοι).40 By 
breaking off the sentence Proclus also creates room for an emphatic introduction 
of this Aristotelian trio “things, thoughts, and words”, which is central to his 
exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3.41 In addition, in a somewhat repetitive passage that gives 
the impression of a chant, the connection of the three domains “things, thoughts, 
words” is mapped onto the earlier division into two realms: since cognitions stem 
from the things cognized, and different accounts from different cognitions, and 
since there were two kinds of things, Being and Becoming, and therefore two 
kinds of cognitions, summarized as intellection (νόησις) and opinion (δόξα),42 
there are also two kinds of accounts, permanent and likely (λόγους διττούς, 
μονίμους καὶ εἰκότας).43  
That the trio requires such an extensive introduction is due to the fact that, as 
pointed out in chapter III,44 our epistemological access to Becoming does not 
figure as such in Timaeus’ remarks on the εἰκὼς λόγος. Instead, it is the ontological 
status of Becoming as an εἰκών that is brought forward as necessitating an account 
that is εἰκώς. For Proclus, however, it is crucial to underscore that the account 
does receive its status from reality, but mediated by our thoughts, because the 
addition of the cognitions will later allow him to emphasize the epistemological 
                                               
38 τὸν διορισμόν (339.8), διέκρινεν (ib.), ὅτε δὲ τὰς ἡμετέρας γνώσεις διώριζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι, νῦν 
δὲ τοὺς λόγους μερίζων κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους γνώσεις τῶν λόγων ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξει τὴν διωρισμένην φύσιν 
(10-13). Proclus extends the parallel and reads Tim. 29b4-c2 as an axiom followed by a division. 
See V.7.1.  
39 συμφυῶς ἐχόμενα, In Tim. I 339.5, cf. ὁμόλογα (339.14), and in the next lemma συγγενῆ 
(340.22), ὅμοιον (341.4), συγγενῶς (341.6), συμφυῆ (341.10), συγγενής...καὶ οἷον ἔγγονος (341.19-
20), cf. προσήκοντες (342.13, more specific context of λόγοι about intelligibles). On this natural 
relation see below, V.4.2. 
40 In Tim. I 339.5-6. This trio is inspired on Arist. Int. 1 16a3ff. (to which Proclus refers at In Crat. 
XLVII), but the Aristotelian φωναί have been replaced with the λόγοι that are relevant in the 
context of Tim. 29b. Cf. Alex. Quaest.. 59.12-13, who has the same trio in a discussion of 
definitions (σημεῖα γὰρ τὰ μὲν νοήματα τῶν πραγμάτων, οἱ δὲ λόγοι τῶν ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων νοημάτων).  
41 Note that the trio is already present implicitly at In Tim. I 337.8-339.2. 
42 The summary may be inspired by Rep. 534a3-5.  
43 In Tim. I 339.5-18. 
44 See III.5.1 (i).  
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side of the whole issue of the εἰκὼς λόγος, and change its focal point into the 
didactic value of Timaeus’ account.  
 
The following discussion of the natural relation between the three domains is 
roughly structured on the Timaeus text. In the discussion of Tim. 29bc, the first 
issue broached is, inspired by the text of the Timaeus itself, the sense in which the 
world of sense perception is an ontological image of the intelligible (V.4.1). 
Secondly, just as the world of sense perception is somehow a likeness of the 
Forms, so too discourse has a certain formal and semantic resemblance to its 
paradigm, i.e. the subject it deals with (V.4.2). This semantic/syntactic 
resemblance – syntactic insofar as it is detectable not in meaning but in form, e.g. 
length and order of sentences – is later subsumed by Proclus under the third 
logical aspect of the principle of discourse: the relation between cognizing subject 
and object of cognition. This third aspect, in which especially the downside of the 
principle of discourse comes to the fore, i.e. unlikeness, will be treated in section 
V.5, which deals with the question of unlikeness from different angles. 
 
 
V.4.1 The cosmos as image  
 
In order to understand the relation between the account about the universe and 
that universe properly, it is worthwhile first to have a closer look at how Proclus 
sees the ontological status of the sensible world as an image of the intelligible 
realm. We enter here into a vast territory at the very heart of Neoplatonic 
metaphysics, but will cover only a minute part thereof, which is especially relevant 
for the εἰκὼς λόγος.  
We will briefly look at three issues: 1) the positive side of being an image, 2) the 
activity of paradigm and image and 3) the ontological level of the images in the 
sensible world.  
1) When explaining in what sense “the world is necessarily an image of 
something” (Tim. 29b1-2), Proclus focuses primarily on the difference between 
having a paradigm and being an image.45 The difference, he states, lies in the 
success of the imitation. Something can be made after a paradigm without being a 
real image, but “that which is not dissimilar but similar and resembling is an 
image.” Saying that the universe is an image is saying that it is in fact similar to the 
intelligible, that it is “mastered in terms of form”, and really is an imitation (ὄντως 
                                               
45 In Tim. I 334.30-337.5 (ad Tim. 29b1-2). Proclus also uses this passage to elucidate the relation 
in this context between the intelligible paradigm and the demiurge (for the latter see esp. 
335.19ff.). 
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μεμίμηται) of the paradigm.46 Moreover, the similarity of the universe to its 
paradigm is “marvelous and ineffable and truly indissoluble”.47 As Opsomer 
points out, Proclus here emphasizes the resemblance rather than the differences 
between the levels of reality.48 
2) A second factor of the universe’s being an image, besides it being a successful 
imitation of the paradigm, is the fact that for it to be an image is no mere end 
result of a process of imitation, but a state of continuous activity both on the side 
of the causes, the paradigm and the demiurge, and on that of their effect, the 
universe as image. Proclus takes the world to be “the kind of image that we 
consider the image of souls to be,”49 in the sense that the paradigm is “neither 
barren nor weak”. He elaborates this in a truly Proclean triad: it is primarily the 
generative power of the paradigm that gives the cosmos its resemblance to the 
intelligible, which by its very being (αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι) brings forth the image;50 secondly, 
the activities (αἱ ἐνέργειαι) of the demiurge in making the universe as alike as 
possible to the intelligible;51 and thirdly,  
T V.5 
“...the reversion (ἡ ἐπιστροφή) of the cosmos itself to the production of 
forms and the participation of the intelligible. For it makes itself resemble 
them, by “hastening” (ἐπειγόμενος), as the Oracle says, to put on the 
“impression” (τὸν τύπον) of the images, the impression which the 
intelligible gods hold out to it.”52  
 
Of this triad of remaining, proceeding and reversion, especially the last is 
interesting for the principle of discourse. Reversion in the sense of establishing 
                                               
46 In Tim. I 335.8-12.  
47 In Tim. 337.3-7. Proclus takes this to be one of the meanings of  ἀνάγκη (Tim. 29b1), the other 
being logical necessity of the conclusion expressed in 29b1-2. The word ‘indissoluble’ (ἄλυτον) is 
a reference to Tim. 32c3, 41a8, b3.  
48 Opsomer (2000: 356). 
49 In Tim. I 340.1-4. Rather than “au sense où nous pensons que les âmes sont des copies” 
(Festugière’s translation of ὁποίαν τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν εἶναι νομίζομεν). The disadvantage of F.’s 
reading is that the illustration is hardly helpful. I take it that Proclus uses an example more 
familiar to us, namely images made by souls using their own ideas as paradigms, as opposed to 
those created by e.g. a mirror, to illustrate his point that the universe is not an image made after a 
lifeless paradigm. Cf. In Tim. III 335.26-27 ἡ πρώτη τῆς ψυχῆς εἰκὼν ἔμψυχός ἐστιν. Festugière’s 
reading probably refers to Soul’s being an image of Intellect, for which see e.g. In Parm. 745.2-3.   
50 In Tim. I 340.5-7, see also 335.26-8. Cf Plot. Enn. II 9 [33] 8.17-26. 
51 In Tim. I 340.7-9. Cf. In Remp. I 77.13-19, where Nature is compared to a mimetic artist.  
52 In Tim. I 340.9-13, with ref. to Or. Chald. fr. 37.7–9 Majercik. Cf. Plotinus, for whom the haste 
of universe towards Being is an image of its incomplete and partial participation, Enn. III 7 [45] 
4.28-33 and Wagner (2002: 301).  
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similarity with one’s source is the core of all non-selfsubstantiated existence, and 
therefore the world, as an image of the intelligible paradigm, actively assimilates 
itself to that paradigm.53   
Note that the expression “the world is an image of its intelligible paradigm” is in 
fact not entirely accurate. In a casual but important remark further on Proclus 
provides limits the extension of “image of the intelligible”:  
T V.6 
“…that which is copied with regard to the intelligible are the products of 
nature, but not also what is produced in accordance with art, and likewise 
not the particulars, separately (διωρισμένως), but the common properties in 
them (αἱ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς κοινότητες).”54  
 
Two lower limits to the images involved in the εἰκὼς λόγος are here set. (a) The 
first excludes what one might call “second-degree” images, namely the products of 
craft (τεχνή), and (b) the second excludes particulars.  
(a) The first limitation comes at the conclusion of a polemic against the famous 
Plotinian thesis that a good craftsman is capable of creating artefacts using the 
intelligible itself as his paradigm.55 This limitation, we will see, positively affects 
the status of the account of φυσιολογία (V.5.1(i)). (b) The second limitation 
imposed says that what is made alike to the intelligible paradigm is not the 
particulars taken severally, but αἱ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς κοινότητες. The term κοινότης is not a 
common one in Proclus. This passage aside, it occurs only in the In Parm., where it 
refers to a common quality between coordinate entities,56 the common quality 
itself being in the coordinate entities, but belonging to a higher ontological level 
than the particulars of which it is a common quality: a universal in re.57  
                                               
53 El.Th. prop. 32. It is the similarity to which the cosmos owes its preservation: In Tim. I 336.28-
29. On the mutual substantiation of image and paradigm through similarity see Theol.Plat. VI 4 
24.13-20, cf. In Parm. IV 848. The ‘paradigm’ here is a summary for both the intelligible paradigm 
itself, and the paradigm existing within the demiurgic mind, which he “looked at” (335.6) when 
shaping the universe. Cf. In Tim. I 335.19-28 and 322.18-323.22. 
54 In Tim. I 344.22-24. The context is the distinction between natural images and artefacts (on 
which see V.5.1(i)), so the second half of Proclus’ remark is a little out of place, and he adds “we 
have spoken about this elsewhere”. A candidate for this “elsewhere” could be the In Parm., but 
only because universals are there at the center of attention. For reff. see below, n. 57. 
55 In Tim. I 343.18-344.18.  
56 Cf. the use of κοινωνία in Proclus, which can be used to describe a relation both (a) between 
similar particulars and (b) between a particular and a Form, e.g. for (a) El.Th. prop. 21 (24.13), 
and for (b) prop. 28 (32.19),  prop. 32 (36.4ff), prop. 125 (112.6-7).  
57 In Parm. 880.14-16 ἡ γὰρ κοινότης ὁμοταγῶν μέν ἐστιν, οὐχ ὁμοταγὴς δὲ τοῖς ὧν ἐστι κοινότης. 
Cf. the exegesis of Prm. 132a1ff, against the “one over many” argument (esp. In Parm. 885.8ff), 
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The images of the intelligible which are the subject matter of Timaeus’ account, 
then, and which Proclus calls the κοινότητες in (ἐπί +dat.) the sensible particulars, 
are the immanent universals. As is well known, Proclus harmonizes Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s theories of universals by arguing for the existence of both transcendent 
universals and immanent universals. What is important in the context of the 
principle of discourse is the cognitive tool we have at our disposal with respect to 
these immanent universals. Proclus, like Syrianus, maintains that they are not 
accessible to scientific knowledge, but instead, just as Nature, to ‘cognition 
through the likely’ (γνώσις δι’ εἰκότων).58 We will return to this later, when, after 
the analysis of the relation between text, subject matter, and human cognition, the 
time comes to determine in what sense and to what degree φυσιολογία is a likely 
story (V.6).  
 
In summary, 1) the universe is an image of the intelligible, in the sense that it is 
really similar to it; 2) the relation between image and paradigm (both in itself and 
in the demiurge) consists in constant activity from both sides; 3) the ontological 
level on which we find the image that is the universe is that of the immanent 
universals. A lot more could be said about the relation between image and 
paradigm, but I will limit my treatment to these three topics, not only because they 
are brought up by Proclus within the confines of his exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3, but 
especially because all three are crucial for the pedagogic value of an account of 
philosophy of nature, and allow us to explain Proclus’ optimistic outlook 
concerning the status of philosophy of nature as science. 
 
V.4.2 The resemblance of discourse 
T V.7 
“...accounts are related (συγγενεῖς) to that very thing of which they are the 
interpreters (ἐξηγηταί).” (Tim. 29b4-5)59  
                                                                                                                                      
and In Parm. 714.23-28, where ἡ κοινότης is equated with τό καθόλου. Perhaps the term has its 
source in Tht. 208d5-9, where Socrates distinguishes between differentia and common property. Cf. 
Porph. In Cat. IV 1, 81, 14ff.  
58 In Tim. III 160.7-12 ἡ δὲ γνῶσις …ἐνθουσιαστική…πάσης ἄλλης ἐξῃρημένη γνώσεως τῆς τε δι΄ 
εἰκότων καὶ τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς· ἣ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὴν φύσιν διατρίβει καὶ τὰ καθ΄ ὅλου τὰ ἐν τοῖς καθ΄ 
ἕκαστα, ἣ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ ἐπιστητά· μόνη δὲ ἡ ἔνθεος γνῶσις αὐτοῖς συνάπτεται 
τοῖς θεοῖς. This passage is part of the exegesis of Tim. 40d-e, Plato’s ironic remark concerning the 
theologians who claim to know all about their divine ancestors without any evidence whatsoever 
(see IV.3.1). Cf. Syr. In Met. 5.2-7, also discussed below, at V.6. Note that in ch. III the cognitive 
faculty of which immanent universals were found to be the subject was δόξα. 
59 Proclus suggests that this passage is the source of the distinction employed by Platonists in the 
school of Albinus and Gaius between two kinds of “δογματίζειν” or presenting doctrine by Plato: 
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This phrase – rather than the actual reference to the likely story at Tim. 29c7-8 – in 
Proclus’ view constitutes the core of the last section of the prooemium. In this 
phrase a general principle is formulated according to which two properties are 
ascribed to discourse: it is an interpreter (ἐξηγηταί) of some thing, and it is related 
(συγγενεῖς) to that thing. These are two different, yet connected properties. For 
Proclus, the latter is a requirement for the former: discourse has to (δεῖ) be related 
to its subject matter in order for it to be its interpreter.60 The two properties are 
two aspects of the way in which discourse reveals reality: (1) first, it is inherent in 
discourse that it is an image of reality, and that it therefore displays a certain 
similarity to reality. This is what I called ‘resemblance’. (2) Second, the very 
function of discourse is to interpret reality, but a speaker or author can increase 
the extent to which it does that by manipulating his discourse and creating a 
greater similarity between it and its subject matter. This feature I called 
‘assimilation’. In the following, we will look at the metaphysical foundation of the 
resemblance of discourse to its subject matter. The second aspect, assimilation, 
will be discussed under V.6. 
 
(i) The hierarchy of λόγοι  
According to Proclus’ naturalistic view of language as described in the In Crat. 
words (ὀνόματα and ῥήματα) are naturally related to the reality they refer to.61 
Likewise, the λόγοι that are constituted of them are also naturally related (συμφυῶς 
ἐχόμενα, In Tim. I 339.5) to reality, in the sense that they have a natural similarity 
                                                                                                                                       
scientifically and “εἰκοτολογικῶς” (In Tim. I 340.23ff). See Dörrie and Baltes (1996: 357-9) and, 
for Albinus and Gaius’ understanding of (the Timaeus as) εἰκοτολογία see Lernould (2005: 119-
29). It is interesting that Albinus and Gaius see the εἰκὼς λόγος as a methodological principle the 
application of which is limited to Plato’s own work, rather than a general point regarding the 
nature of discourse, which is how Proclus reads it. As Dillon (1996: 270) points out Proclus 
seems to be quoting from Albinus. It is hard to see where the quote would end, but probably not 
before 341.4, since that is where we find out in what sense Tim. 29b4-5 is related to their 
distinction.  
60 In Tim. I 340.22-23. For more reff. see below, V.7.1.  
61 For the natural relation between ὄνομα en πρᾶγμα see In Crat., esp. XLVIII 16.17ff. For Proclus’ 
theory that names refer primarily to the Forms, and his criticism of Porphyry’s semantics see In 
Parm. IV 849.16-853.12 with van den Berg (2004). I will not give a detailed account of the 
relevance of the theory expounded in the In Crat. for Proclus’ interpretation of Tim.29b3-d3, but 
merely point out some parallels. I do assume that that theory about ὀνόματα does apply to λόγοι 
in the sense of a verbal account composed of ὀνόματα (and ῥήματα), cf. In Crat. XLVII 15.29-30. 
For λόγοι as composed of ὀνόματα and ῥήματα see Plato Crat. 425a2-4 (de Rijk (1986: 272 n. 34) 
suggests that ὁ λόγος here is a story and refers to Arist. Rhet. III 2 1404b26). 
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to it. That the relation between λόγοι and reality is indeed natural is not only 
emphasized repeatedly in our passage,62 it is moreover argued for on the 
assumption that discourse is capable of revealing the nature of things: an account 
would not be able to do that if it were not similar (ὅμοιον) to them.63 Now being 
similar to something in fact comes down to being the same thing, albeit in a different 
manner:  
T V.8 
“For it is necessary that what the thing is in a contracted manner 
(συνῃρημένως), the account be in a developed manner (ἀνειλιγμένως), so 
that it reveals (ἐκφαίνῃ) the thing, while it is inferior to it in nature. For in 
this manner also the divine causes of discourse both reveal (ἐκφαίνει) the 
essences of the things above them, and are related (συμφυῆ64) to them.”65 
 
Leaving the inferiority of discourse aside for the time being, let us see how 
Proclus explains the partial identity between discourse and reality by firmly 
assigning discourse its proper place in the metaphysical chain of λόγοι.66  
The “divine causes of discourse” (τὰ θεῖα αἴτια τοῦ λόγου)67 are the λόγοι that 
mediate, on higher levels of reality, between a primary and a secondary entity. This 
asymmetrical mediation, like the relation between an account and its subject, 
consists in revealing to the secondary entity the essence of the primary entity, 
through a (non-Wittgensteinian) family resemblance (συμφυῆ). Paraphrasing 
Proclus’ explanation (In Tim. I 341.11-21): Zeus’ messenger (ἄγγελος) Hermes is 
“the λόγος to the intellect of the father”, as that which proclaims (ἀπαγγέλλει) his 
will to the secondary gods;68 among the essences Soul is the λόγος of the 
                                               
62 συγγενη (340.22), συγγενῶς ἔχων (341.6), συμφυῆ (341.10), συγγενής...καὶ οἷον ἔγγονος (341.19-
20). 
63 In Tim. I 341.5-6. Cf. also In Remp. II 354.27 (interestingly identical to Scholia In Remp. 621b,bis), 
where Proclus posits that myths are true, because they are the interpreters of reality. See below n. 
222. Cf. however In Tim. I 343.1-2, discussed under V.5, where Proclus adds that words cannot 
actually comprehend the nature of their subject matter as it is.  
64 For συμφυῆς cf. Tim. 45d, on the connection of the visual ray with its object. 
65 In Tim. I 341.6-11 
66 In Tim. I 341.11-24, ad Tim. 29b4-5. 
67 Despite the practically endless semantic range of λόγος in Greek and Proclus’ play on its 
polysemy in this passage, I think translating it as ‘discourse’ here is justified, because ὁ λόγος, 
which is the subject of the immediately preceding sentence, clearly picks up Tim. 29b4-5. For the 
different meanings of λόγος in Plato, see de Rijk (1986: 225-231). 
68 On the demiurge’s speech to the lower gods, see below. On speech as messenger and the 
influence of the subject of the message on the medium, cf. Porph. In Cat. 58.23-24, Ὅτι αἱ φωναὶ 
ἀγγέλῳ ἐοικυῖαι τὰ πράγματα ἀγγέλλουσιν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων, ὧν ἀγγέλλουσι, τὰς διαφορὰς 
λαμβάνουσιν.  
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Intelligibles, and it reveals the unifying cause of the λόγοι that are in the 
Intelligibles, and from which Soul has its existence, to the essences;69 one level 
above us, the “angelic” or messengers’ order, which receives its existence from the 
gods, “immediately expresses and transmits70 the ineffable of the gods”. Likewise, 
“down here” the account of reality (ὅδε ὁ λόγος ὁ τῶν πραγμάτων) is related to 
(συγγενής) reality.71 At this point Proclus adds an important adjustment, namely 
that our accounts are not immediate descendants of things, but “their 
grandchildren, as it were” (οἷον ἔγγονος αὐτῶν), as they are produced from our 
cognitions, which in turn correspond with reality.72 According to Proclus verbal 
accounts are mediators in a series, caused by a higher ontological level. Naturally, 
such accounts can be “about” any level of reality: discourse can be an explicit and 
discursive expression of material reality, of divine beings, and even of the One – 
but always mediated through the immediate cause of the λόγοι: our thoughts. We 
will return to this issue later (V.5.2). 
The hierarchy of λόγοι is difficult to understand, as it plays on the polysemy of 
λόγος. Proclus’ discussion of the λόγοι of the Demiurge to the younger gods (Tim. 
41aff.) in the Platonic Theology, which also uses that polysemy, may help elucidate 
                                               
69 I agree with Festugière that there is no need to change λαβοῦσα (N) into λαχοῦσα (Diehl). On 
the other hand, I also see no reason to change τῶν λόγων into τῶν ὅλων, as he does.  
70 συνεχῶς ἑρμηνεύει καὶ διαπορθμεύει echoes Plato Symp. 202e3-4 where, however, the 
communication established by Eros is symmetrical: ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον θεοῖς τὰ παρ᾽ 
ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὰ παρὰ θεῶν.  
71 As Festugière points out, τὰ πράγματα here not in the narrow sense of the Intelligible, because 
in the sequel Proclus points forward to the division of λόγοι into two kinds, following τὰ 
πράγματα. ὅδε ὁ λόγος (341.18) can refer either to “logos in the sublunary realm” or more 
specifically to the account of Timaeus. Arguments for the latter are the circular construction of 
the discussion of this lemma (Tim. 29b4-5): at the outset of the discussion (340.18-19), we read 
that the λόγος of Timaeus, which is made similar to Beings, starts from one common and 
universal axiom concerning λόγοι; at 341.18ff, the end of the discussion, we read that “this 
λόγος” is related to τὰ πράγματα, followed by the conclusion that “this (i.e. that λόγοι are related 
to their subject) is the common axiom”. Arguments for reading ὅδε ὁ λόγος as referring to the 
logos in the sublunary realm are first of all the fact that the λόγος is said to issue from the 
knowledge “in us” (ἐν ἡμῖν), and secondly that at this point Proclus is still speaking in general 
terms: the direct context is the universal axiom concerning λόγοι, not yet the character of the 
particular λόγος about nature.  
72 In Tim. I 341.19-21. Cf. Arist. dI I 16a3-4. For νοήματα as paradigms of ὀνόματα, see In Crat. 
XLIX, esp. 17.21-23 καὶ γὰρ ὡς εἰκὼν ἀποτελεῖται τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ ἐξαγγέλλει αὐτὰ διὰ μέσων τῶν 
νοημάτων; LXXI, esp. 33.10-11 καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἡ νόησις, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὄνομα, καὶ τὸ μὲν εἰκόνος, τὸ δὲ 
παραδείγματος ἔχει τάξιν. 
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it.73 The aim of that discussion, determining what kind of λόγοι the Demiurge 
‘expresses’, since it cannot be human discourse, makes Proclus pay more attention 
to the general metaphysical nature of λόγοι. He concludes as follows:  
T V.9 
“It is these efficient powers and activities, that advance from the one 
universal demiurgy into the demiurgic multitude of the gods, which 
Timaeus represents (ἀποτυποῦται) through words (διὰ τῶν λόγων). Indeed, 
words are images of thoughts (οἱ λόγοι τῶν νοήσεών εἰσιν εἰκόνες), because 
they unfold the folded being of the intelligibles,74 bring the undivided into 
divided existence, and transfer what remains in itself into a relation with 
something else.”75 
 
Just as a speech is an image of our thoughts, so the demiurgic λόγοι, i.e. the 
powers and activities advancing from the demiurge, are images of the νοήσις that 
remains in him.76 Λόγοι in general are the emanating potencies (δυνάμεις) and 
activities (ἐνεργείαι) of their source (and as such images of the remaining 
ἐνεργείαι), that convey the main character of the source to the receiver and 
transform the receiver accordingly.77 This latter aspect is important for Proclus’ 
reading of the Timaeus, since transposed to the context of Timaeus’ discourse, it 
explains the possibility of teaching through discourse. Discourse, like any other 
λόγος, has the capacities of transforming its receiver.78   
Since the resemblance of discourse is ultimately caused by transcendent λόγοι (τὰ 
θεῖα αἴτια τοῦ λόγου), it is thus rooted in a necessary and metaphysical likeness. This 
likeness, which as we will see consists in an ἀναλογία, in the sense that the 
relations among the paradigms are the same as those among the images,79 explains 
the capacity of language to transfer information. We can also gather from the 
                                               
73 Theol. Plat. V 18, p. 65.23-66.2, on Tim. 41a-d (the speech of the demiurge), cf. In Tim III 
197.26-199.12 and 242.8-244.8, concerning the same Timaeus passage. See also below. Cf. In Parm. 
IV 853.1-12 on different degrees of names. 
74 Proclus uses the same terminology (ἀνελίσσει τὸ συνεσπειραμένον) of διάνοια, cf. In Eucl. 4.11-
14. 
75 Theol.Plat. V 18 65.23-66.2. On the relation between namegiving and creation by the demiurge 
see Beierwaltes (1975: 166), referring to In Crat. LI 19.25ff., LXXI 30.8ff, 31.29ff, 32.18ff. 
76 Theol.Plat. V 18 64.25-65.7, 65.23-66.2, and 66.12-16. Cf. In Tim. I 218.13-28.  
77 See also Theol.Plat. V 18 66.2-67.13 and In Tim. III 198.6-16. For an allegorical interpretation of 
the framing of the λόγοι in the Parmenides as representing the hierarchy of metaphysical λόγοι, or 
creative rational principles, see In Parm. I 625.36ff. 
78 Cf. Crat. 388b.13ff on names as instruments for teaching, διδασκαλικόν τι ὄργανον. On the 
place of the teacher as elevated above his audience see V.7.1. 
79 Cf. Opsomer (2000: 358). 
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above that for Proclus, just as for Plotinus, an uttered λόγος is an image (εἰκών) of a 
λόγος in our soul.80 Proclus’ choice of words is significant: as Sheppard observes, 
for Proclus εἰκόνες are generally speaking ‘good images’, i.e. not the kind of images 
one should reject because they somehow misrepresent their paradigms.81 This 
does not imply, of course, that images are identical to their paradigms. 
 
V.5 Unlikeness 
 
As Socrates says in the Cratylus, an image can only be an image if it is not only like, 
but also unlike its paradigm.82 Proclus is well aware of this and maintains that, as a 
result, any image is inferior to its paradigm.83 This has consequences for discourse 
in general, but far more for discourse about Becoming. The latter account is 
                                               
80 Cf. for a similar relation between ‘names’ (ὀνόματα) and their referents In Crat. IX (3.10-11), 
περὶ ὀνομάτων …καθ΄ ὃ εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῶν πραγμάτων; 48, esp. 16.15-17 (Pasquali), δεῖται … ὡς δὲ 
εἰκὼν τῆς πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἀναφορᾶς (of course already Plato Crat. 423b9-11 Ὄνομ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐστίν, 
ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμεῖται, καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ ἂν μιμῆται, cf. 
430a10ff., 439a1ff.) In Parm. 687.2-11, 851.8-9 Τὰ ἄρα ὀνόματα, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἀγάλματα τῶν 
πραγμάτων λογικὰ, 851.31-32. For Plotinus see Enn. V 1 [10] 3.8-9: “...just as λόγος in its 
utterance (ἐν προφορᾷ) is an image (εἰκών) of λόγος in the soul, so soul itself is the λόγος of 
Intellect.”; I 2 [19] 3.28-31: “As the spoken (ἐν φωνῇ) λόγος is an imitation (μίμημα) of that in the 
soul, so the λόγος in the soul is an imitation of that in something else. As the uttered (ἐν 
προφορᾷ) λόγος, then, is broken up into parts as compared with that in the soul, so is that in the 
soul as compared with that before it, which it interprets (ἑρμηνεὺς ὢν ἐκείνου).” Cf. I 2 [19] 3.27-
30, where Plotinus also speaks of language as μίμημα and ἑρμηνεύς of the λόγος in the soul. The 
best examples of semantic likeness according to Plotinus are the ideogrammatic symbols in 
Egyptian temples, Enn. V 8 [31] 6.1-9, with Armstrong’s note. On Plotinus’ theory of language 
see Heiser (1991), Schroeder (1996).  
81 Sheppard (1980: 196-201) discusses the distinction between good and bad images in the 
context of the 6th essay on the Republic, Proclus’ defence of poetry. See also Dillon (1976), who 
points out that there is no strict division between the different terms used for images (more 
specifically icon and symbol). The term εἴδωλα, which in that essay refers to bad images, does not 
have the same negative connotation in the In Tim., where we find it used mainly in non-literary, 
ontological context. E.g. I 285.17, 323.16. See also below, V.5.1(i). For a comparison of εἰκων and 
εἴδωλον regarding words, see In Parm. 852.7-11. 
82 Plato Crat. 432a8-d3. Cf. In Parm. II 743.11-21, II 746.6-9 πα̃σαι γὰρ εἰκόνες ἐξηλλαγμέναι κατ' 
οὐσίαν βούλονται ει̃̓ναι τω̃ν οἰκει ́ων παραδειγμάτων, και ̀ μηκέτι τὸν αὐτο ̀ν λόγον έ̓χειν, ἀλλα ̀ το ̀ν 
ο ̔́μοιον τοι̃ς ἀφ' ω̃̔ν προη̃λθον, cf. 816.26-8.  
83 That an image is necessarily inferior to its paradigm is the core of Platonic metaphysics, of 
course, and is comprehensible especially in the context of causation, and the principle that the 
cause is superior to the effect (El.Th. prop. 7). Cf. In Parm. 816.17-20. On dissimilarity in Proclus’ 
metaphysics see Gersh (1973: 85). In our context: In Tim. 336.26-29, where Proclus adds that 
“Becoming is still an image”, as opposed to the original, and that its existence depends on the 
paradigm. 
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inferior to an account about Being, due to the fact that Becoming is an image of 
Being. Moreover, since the account itself is an image of its subject, it is also 
inferior to its subject. These two elements are found by Proclus in the passage that 
nowadays is considered the heart of εἰκὼς λόγος:  
T V.10 
“(1) ...for a text concerning the permanent, and stable, and what is evident 
to the mind is itself permanent and irrefutable – insofar as it is possible and 
appropriate for words to be irrefutable and invincible, it should not fall 
short of that.84 (2) But a text which concerns that which is copied from it 
and is an image (εἰκόνος), is likely (εἰκοτάς).” (Tim. 29b5-c2) 85 
 
This passage brings up the general refutability of discourse in a parenthesis, but its 
main aim is to introduce the parallel between subject and discourse – the 
metaphysical source of the εἰκὼς λόγος. Proclus, however, explains this passage, 
which he cuts into two lemmas ((1) and (2) in T V.10), in such a way that it no 
longer evolves around the deficiencies of the metaphysical resemblance of 
Becoming to Being, or even of an account to its subject matter. Instead, by a 
double strategy, he turns our attention to the general limitations of discourse, and 
of human cognition.  
(1) The first half of this ‘division’, as Proclus calls it, which describes the status of 
a text dealing with the intelligible realm, elicits no comments on the metaphysical 
aspect of the principle of discourse, but is instead used to illustrate Proclus’ theory 
of discourse, especially concerning the ‘unlikeness’ inherent in λόγοι.  
(2) Subsequently, in his exegesis of the second part of the ‘division’ Proclus 
prepares a shift to an epistemological approach that will dominate the remainder 
of the exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3, by narrowing the gap that he himself created 
earlier between text and cognition, and setting Timaeus’ account apart from 
accounts about artefacts.  
                                               
84 The only reference we find to Tim. 29b3-d3 in Syrianus, on the truth of Pythagorean and 
Platonic doctrine of principles, picks up this passage and combines it with a quote from the 
Gorgias (473b10): In Met. 81.3-5 οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐλέγχεταί ποτε κατὰ τὸν θεῖον ἐκεῖνον (i.e. 
Plato) καὶ τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγους ἐξομοιοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν οἱ πατέρες (Pythagoreans and 
Platonists) αὐτῶν μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους καθ᾽ ὅσον προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι κατεστήσαντο.  
85 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μονίμου καὶ βεβαίου καὶ μετὰ νοῦ καταφανοῦς μονίμους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους - καθ΄ 
ὅσον οἷόν τε καὶ ἀνελέγκτοις προσήκει λόγοις εἶναι καὶ ἀνικήτοις, τούτου δεῖ μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν - τοὺς 
δὲ τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἀπεικασθέντος, ὄντος δὲ εἰκόνος εἰκότας... Note that Proclus has ἀκινητοις, 
a textual variant of Tim. mms. FY, in his paraphrase of this passage at In Parm V 994.26-30. As at 
Tim. 29b4 Proclus here again cuts a sentence in half, in order to be able to start the next lemma, 
on the proportion between truth and belief, with the word ἀναλόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας, which is in 
fact the end of the sentence here quoted.·  
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V.5.1 Metaphysical unlikeness and the unlikeness of λόγοι 
 
The core of T V.10 is that due to the relation between text and subject matter 
some properties of the subject are transferred to discourse, influencing its 
epistemic status: its degree of stability and fixity. Proclus is hardly interested in this 
metaphysical side of the principle of discourse. He does not treat it in his 
explanation of either part of T V.10, but instead summarizes it elsewhere in 
parentheses in passages that on the whole pertain to the role of the cognizing 
subject and its faculties in the Timaeus passage: 
T V.11 
“...<cognitive> processes involving sense-perception miss their mark and 
fail to attain precision because of sense-perception and the instability of the 
object of knowledge itself. How would one express in words the material 
realm which is always changing and in flux, and indeed by nature is unable 
to remain at rest even for a moment?”86 
 
Precise knowledge of the sublunary cannot be obtained because the sublunary is 
constantly changing. And the heavenly bodies, Proclus adds, which are not subject 
to that same flux, are “far away from us” (πόρρω ἡμῶν), so we have still to be 
satisfied with approximating and plausible ‘knowledge’ (τὸ ἐγγύς...τὸ πιθανόν).87 
For that which has a spatial existence to be fully known the presence of that 
which is acquiring knowledge of it is required. As a consequence, if certainty is 
attainable at all concerning the celestial, it is with regard to that aspect of it that 
does not have a spatial existence and therefore does not require our physical 
presence: we can know it insofar as it partakes in Being, and is therefore graspable 
through νόησις. “For wherever one places one’s thought, it grasps truth as if it 
were present everywhere”.88 Insofar as they are perceptible, however, the heavenly 
bodies are “hard to grasp and hard to observe”.89  
This very argument on the distance between us and the heavenly bodies recurs 
only a few pages later, in roughly the same terms,90 but with some modifications 
that only seem insignificant: the context has changed from ontological unlikeness to 
                                               
86 In Tim. I 346.18-21, referring to Phaedo 82e-83a and Heraclitean flux. Cf. I 353.1-3: due to the 
instability (ἀστάθμητον) of the sublunary world we have to make do with τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολῦ. Cf. 
Arist. Rhet. I 2 1357a22ff., where τὸ εἰκός is defined as “that which happens in most cases”. 
87 In Tim. I 346.21-31.  
88 In Tim. I 346.27-29. 
89 In Tim. I 347.1-2.  
90 Cf. the repetition of ἐγγύς and πόρρω close together at In Tim. I 353.6.  
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the limitations of human knowledge, and therefore the perspective is inverted: it is 
us who are far away from the heavenly bodies (πορρωτάτω ὄντες ἐκείνων), rather 
than the other way around.91   
Just before that passage, we find another, almost perfunctory summary of the 
metaphysical unlikeness of the images of Being:  
T V.12 
“Timaeus has mentioned that the account about nature is neither certain 
nor precise (μὴ ἀραρὸς μηδ᾽ ἀκριβές) for two reasons: from the essence of 
the things of which it treats – for since the immaterial became enmattered 
and the undivided divided and the separate “in an alien setting”92 and the 
universal atomic and particular, it is not suitable for a scientific and 
irrefutable account, as such an account fits the universal and immaterial 
and undivided Forms – and from the impotence of those who study it.”93 
 
It is the “impotence of the students” that is subsequently elaborated. As said 
before, these remarks regarding metaphysics are made in contexts other than the 
actual Timaeus lemma expressing the metaphysical aspect of the εἰκὼς λόγος (i.e. 
29b5-c2, quoted above). In his exegesis of that passage Proclus instead displays a 
far greater interest in showing how the text itself is an illustration of the general 
principle of discourse formulated in the prooemium. By spelling out the details of 
the manner in which Plato fits the passage under examination to its subject, i.e. 
how he applies the principle of assimilation, Proclus creates a neat transition to 
the unlikeness of discourse. The details of the principle of assimilation will be 
elaborated on in V.7, but here we will briefly walk through Proclus’ lexical analysis 
of the first part of T V.10, because it gives a clear indication of the direction 
Proclus wants what he calls the fourth demonstration to take.   
He starts off by showing how Plato replaced the ontological attributes given to 
Being in the definition (Tim. 28a) with the corresponding epistemological 
attributes: “always being” is substituted by “stable”, “always remaining the same” 
by “firm” and “understandable with intelligence” by “clear to the intellect”.94 In 
the corresponding adjectives predicated of accounts, the purpose of the repetition 
of “stable” is to indicate (ἵνα...ἐνδείξηται) the similarity (ὁμοιότης) between subject 
and discourse, “unchanging” is used because accounts about Being should image 
                                               
91 In Tim. I 352.1, cf. 353.6. More on the context below V.5.2(ii). 
92 Cf. Plato Rep. 516b5. 
93 In Tim. I 351.20-27. On the second source of imprecision, human cognition, see below. Note 
that discourse itself is not mentioned as a source of imprecision.  
94 In Tim. I 342.3-7.  
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(ἵνα ἀπεικονίζωνται95) the firmness of reality, and “irrefutable” because they should 
imitate (μιμῶνται) the accessibility to intellect and proceed scientifically 
(ἐπιστημονικῶς).96 Note that the scientific proceeding is added because what we 
grasp with intellect can as such not be expressed in an account.  
The exegesis of this passage is layered, and what we have here is in fact a triple 
likely story. First of all there is the semantic likeness of Plato’s words to their 
subject, accounts about Being; secondly, these words express the resemblance of 
any account about Being to Being; finally, and for Proclus most importantly, the 
properties in question, the being stable, unchanging and irrefutable of the 
accounts, show that underneath the resemblance lies an epistemological correspondence, 
because, Proclus continues:  
T V.13 
“...a λόγος is unfolded cognition.”97 
 
And since our knowledge of eternal reality is unchanging, so is our account of it.98 
This positive statement, however, brings Proclus to the downside of resemblance.  
Because a text is unfolded cognition, it has the same properties as that cognition. 
Because it is unfolded, it has these properties to a lower degree. This second aspect, 
the consequences of the unfolding of discourse, Proclus also finds illustrated in 
Tim. 29b5-c2 (quoted under T V.10). Note that in his explanation thereof Proclus 
immediately switches back to λόγοι as an unfolding, not of thoughts, but of reality. 
This switch is not due to mere carelessness. For an explanation of why Proclus 
might think it justified to make that switch, however, we have to wait until the 
next lemma (part (2) of T V.10, see below). First let us look at how Proclus takes 
the consequences of the unfolding itself to be imitated in Timaeus’ words, this 
time with the help of morphological and lexical quantity, at Tim. 29b5-8. 
In Proclus’ view the addition of multiplicity and of composition and the ensuing 
diminished unity and “partlessness” of discourse as compared to reality (τοῦ 
πράγματος) are represented by the juxtaposition of the singular (ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἑνικῶς 
μόνιμον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ νῷ καταφανὲς προσεῖπε) and the plural (τούτων δὲ 
                                               
95 The sentence is something of an anacolouth. The subject of the first clause, ἵνα...ἐνδείξηται, is 
Plato (or Timaeus), but the subject of this plural ἵνα ἀπεικονίζωνται, as well as the following 
ἵνα...μιμῶνται...καὶ...προέρχωνται, are λόγοι about Being (not the specific λόγοι of the lemma, 
since in that case the addition ἵνα...ἐπιστημονικῶς προέρχωνται does not make sense). Proclus 
starts out discussing the semantic likeness of Plato’s words (Tim. 29b) to their subject (λόγοι about 
Being) and switches to the resemblance between any account about Being and Being itself.  
96 In Tim. I 342.7-12.  
97 In Tim. I 342.16...ὁ λόγος· ἀνειλιγμένη γάρ ἐστι γνῶσις.  
98 In Tim. I 342.15-16. 
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πληθυντικῶς μονίμους λόγους καὶ ἀμεταπτώτους καὶ ἀνελέγκτους εἰπών).99 Note that 
the exegesis of the text again has several strata. In this case the morphological 
assimilation of different words to their different subjects (things and words 
respectively) aims at expressing the unlikeness of words in general to their subject 
matter. In order to illustrate the fact that the dissimilarity of λόγοι exceeds their 
similarity to the subject, Proclus explains, only one out of the three adjectives 
remains identical (τὸ μόνιμον).100 Especially this last addition to the interpretation 
of Tim. 29b5-8 seems a case of pointless exaggeration due to exegetic zeal. 
However, the whole exercise has two specific purposes. It is an illustration of the 
principle of assimilation and the different manners in which a text is an image of 
its subject matter on a microlevel, namely semantically, lexically and 
morphologically, and it allows a smooth introduction to the unlikeness of λόγοι.  
Since the relation between λόγοι and their subject matter is in principle a natural 
one, and one of resemblance, like any image discourse also necessarily suffers 
from dissimilarity to its paradigm. As we saw above, the dissimilarity of an image 
in discourse to its subject matter is caused primarily by what we could call a 
change of medium.101 Discourse is in an unfolded (discursive) manner what its 
subject is in a unitary manner, no matter what the subject matter: “For it is 
necessary that what the thing is in a contracted manner (συνῃρημένως), the 
account be in a unfolded manner (ἀνειλιγμένως), so that it reveals (ἐκφαίνῃ) the 
thing, while it is inferior (ὑφειμένος) to it in nature.”102 The particular medium of 
spoken and written language is too poor to incorporate all at once the simplicity 
and fullness that reality possesses.103 This weakness of language, which is famously 
criticized in the Seventh Letter, is most notable – and most discussed – with 
respect to the expression of the fullness and unity of the One,104 but holds for 
lower levels of reality as well. Whenever it is possible to approximate in language 
the unity of, for example, the final cause of the universe, it is nonetheless 
                                               
99 In Tim. I 342.19-21.  
100 In Tim. I 342.21-25. 
101 Cf. Johansen (2004: chapter 3, esp. 56, 59-60). Johansen speaks of the medium in relation to 
the difference between Being and Becoming, but it is just as applicable to the difference between 
text and subject matter.  
102 In Tim. I 341.6-9, quoted under T V.8.  
103 In Tim. III 244.12-22, 27 ἡ ἀσθένεια τοῦ λόγου. Cf. Plato Epist. VII 343a1 τὸ τῶν λόγων 
ἀσθενές. 
104 Plato Parm. 142a. On this topic see Heiser (1991: 59-72), Rappe (2000). On negative theology 
see Steel (1999) Martin (2001), (2002). On language and its incapacity of expressing the divine, cf. 
e.g. In Tim. III 243.5-13. Cf. Plot. Enn. V 5.6.15-16. 
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impossible to include in that unitary linguistic expression the wealth that is present 
in the ontological unity.105 In language, riches and unity are mutually exclusive. 
Thus there is a certain unlikeness in discourse regardless of its subject matter. That 
unlikeness is described in terms that are familiar from descriptions of the soul and 
its discursive thought. Proclus follows Plotinus in calling the soul ‘unfolded 
intellect’,106 and the terminology in which he frames the unlikeness of λόγοι is the 
same as that which he uses elsewhere to portray διάνοια.107 Moreover, in the 
exegesis of the rest of T V.10 it becomes more and more clear that, after first 
introducing it, Proclus makes an effort to eliminate the distinction between 
discourse and thought.108  
An analysis of Proclus’ explanation of the second half of what he calls the division 
(see below T V.14), will clarify why the casual switch from λόγοι as unfolding 
thoughts to λόγοι unfolding reality is deemed harmless. Afterwards, we will further 
scrutinize how Proclus deliberately highlights epistemology in a way that puts the 
εἰκὼς λόγος in perspective and brings the scientific and the likely account much 
closer together. 
 
(i) Images of images 
 
T V.14 
“(2) But a text which concerns that which is copied (ἀπεικασθέντος) from it 
[i.e. from the permanent, and stable, and what is evident to the mind] and 
is an image (εἰκόνος), is likely (εἰκοτάς).” (Tim. 29c1-2)109 
 
Despite the fact that Proclus is well aware of the consequences of the iconic status 
of discourse, he does not have a pessimistic outlook on the epistemic value of 
discourse – even if it discusses a subject matter as fleeting as the natural world. 
The main reason for Proclus’ optimism is his view of the nature of the images in 
question. As mentioned above, εἰκόνες are ‘good’ images, and they represent their 
paradigms faithfully. Moreover, when it comes to λόγοι as representations of our 
                                               
105 In Tim. III 105.4-6 ποτὲ μὲν τὴν ἕνωσιν αὐτῶν, ποτὲ δὲ τὴν διάκρισιν ἑρμηνεύων, ἐπειδήπερ 
ἑκάτερον ἅμα περιλαμβάνειν οὐ πέφυκεν οὐδὲ οἷός τέ ἐστι. See also below, V.7. 
106 Cf. Plot. Enn. I 1 [53] 8.7-8, cf. Proclus In Remp. I 111.22, In Tim. II 249.9. There is an 
interesting semantic circle here: the word ἀνελίσσω, which is central in this context, is originally 
associated with discourse, as it refers to the unfolding of a book scroll. 
107 Cf. In Eucl. 4.11-14, mentioned also above.  
108 We will return to his reasons for introducing it nonetheless at V.7.2. 
109 Quoted above as the second part of T V.10. 
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thoughts, Proclus is convinced that their being a representation does not put them 
at a further remove from Being.  
As opposed to the ‘summary’ of the Republic and the Atlantis story, which in 
accordance with Pythagorean tradition present the cosmos in images and symbols 
respectively,110  
T V.15 
“Timaeus was going to offer an account of the demiurgic chain in a more 
universal and sublime way, and not through images (οὐ δι΄ εἰκόνων)…”111  
 
Timaeus does not use images representing the cosmos and its causes, i.e. literary 
images, in his exposition on the universe. In other words, Timaeus’ account is not 
a metaphorical, allegorical, or otherwise indirect representation of reality.112 
“Timaeus is not composing myths.”113   
This outlook comes to the fore also in the interpretation of Tim. 29c1-2 (T V.14), 
and the distinction Proclus there introduces between accounts that are likely 
(εἰκώς) and accounts that are merely conjectural (εἰκαστικός). Moreover, in that 
interpretation Proclus takes another important step in ‘upgrading’ the account of 
philosophy of nature. Rather than explaining the like(li)ness itself, i.e. the sense in 
which accounts about images of Being are εἰκότες, which he takes to be crystal 
clear (καταφανές), Proclus distinguishes it from a kind of like-ness that is further 
removed from truth, namely that of images of images. In doing so, he emphasizes 
the proximity of likely accounts to truth.114  
One might wonder, Proclus says, what kind of accounts could be given of images 
of sensible paradigms, that is, the objects of conjecture (τὰ εἰκαστά) of the lower 
part of the Divided Line,115 and artefacts (τὰ τεχνητά).116 What follows is a short 
                                               
110 In Tim. I 4.7-25, 30.11-15. Dillon (1976: 255). 
111 In Tim. I 63.8-9 Τίμαιος γὰρ καθολικώτερον καὶ ὑψηλότερον καὶ οὐ δι΄ εἰκόνων ταῦτα 
παραδώσειν ἔμελλεν…Note the sequel, in which Proclus adduces as an argument for this thesis 
the direct analogy between Timaeus and the Demiurge, who “decorates (διαζωγραφοῦντα) the 
heavens with the dodecahedron, and creation with the appropriate figures” (cf. Tim. 53cff, esp. 
Tim. 55c4-6). This is a surprising choice, because it refers to a passage which could very well be 
taken as a description “in images”, in the sense of metaphors. I take it, then, that Proclus is here 
emphasizing that the description of the demiurge’s activities should instead be taken literally. For 
the analogy between Timaeus and the Demiurge, see V.7.1.  
112 As is argued extensively also by Lernould (2005: 122-128 et passim).  
113 Theol.Plat. V 36, 133.11 ὁ Τίμαιος, οὐ μύθους πλάττων. N.b. this does not prevent Timaeus 
from using signs or metaphors every now and then, e.g. at Tim. 36a, the passage referred to at 
Theol.Plat. V 36. Cf. In Tim. II 256.29ff. 
114 On truth see below V.5.2(i). 
115 Rep. 511e, 534a, the objects of εἰκασία. 
CHAPTER V 
- 232 - 
but dense discussion of objects at different ‘removes’ from the Forms, and the 
corresponding accounts.  
Proclus distinguishes between images of intelligibles, to which Plato just assigned 
likely accounts, and images that do not have intelligible paradigms (the εἰκαστά 
and τεχνητά). To the latter Proclus assigns λόγοι εἰκαστικοί, while stressing the 
difference between ἐοικέναι (“to be like”) and εἰκάζειν (“to portray”, or “make 
oneself like”), and the corresponding adjectives εἰκώς and εἰκαστικός.117 The 
Platonic passages that are in the background here are of course book X of the 
Republic (esp 596bff.), where Socrates distinguishes three metaphysical levels 
(Form, object resembling the Form, and imitation of that object), and the Sophist 
(esp. the adjective εἰκαστικός).118  
Note that for the verb ἐοικέναι in this context a translation such as ‘avoir 
probabilité’ (Festugière) is not correct. Proclus deliberately highlights the root of 
εἰκώς in ἐοικέναι and thereby its relation to εἰκών, and it is better to translate 
ἐοικέναι in the above distinctions as “to be like”. The difference Proclus is after is 
that between a natural and an artificial ontological likeness, or between resemblance 
and imitation. This difference may be illustrated by quoting the juxtaposition of 
the two verbs in Phaedo 99e6-100a1. Socrates there states “ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω 
τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν,” which is best translated as something like “perhaps that 
to which I liken it is in a way not really like it”. The accounts of the images of 
Being, which ‘ἐοικέναι’, are not somehow an educated guess, which therefore have 
probability, as opposed to random guessing (cf. ‘conjecturer’, Festugières 
translation for εἰκάζειν). Instead, they are the expressions of everything Becoming, 
which has a natural metaphysical resemblance to Being. The difference between 
the accounts lies in the nature of their content.  
Proclus subsequently adds a further distinction within the group of the τεχνητά, 
between primary ones and secondary ones. His description is somewhat 
confusing, but it comes down to the distinction between an artefact and a work of 
art, e.g. a bed and a painting of a bed. To Plotinus is traditionally ascribed the 
thesis that an artist can use intelligible paradigms, but Proclus here emphatically 
denies this possibility: when in the Republic Socrates speaks of an artisan using ideas 
(ἰδέαι), he is not referring to transcendent Forms.119 Nonetheless the products of 
                                                                                                                                       
116 In Tim. I 343.18-22. 
117 In Tim. I 343.21-27. At In Eucl 40.18 Proclus mentions an εἰκαστικὴ γνώσις, which is involved 
in the science called general catoptrics, i.e. the science of reflection of light. 
118 The word εἰκαστικός is not very common, and in classical Greek occurs only in Plato, in the 
context of technai: Soph. 235c8ff, esp. 235d6, 236b2, 264c5, 266d9; cf. Leg. 667c9, 668a6. 
119 In Tim. I 344.8-18, with ref. to Rep. X 596b and Prot. 312b-319c. Cf. Sheppard (1980: 196). For 
Plotinus’ famous thesis that an artist can use an intelligible paradigm, see Enn. V 8 [31] 1, esp. 32-
39, cf. Arist. Phys. II 8 199a15-17. As Sheppard points out, Plotinus does not apply his theory to 
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the artisan are on a higher ontological level than secondary artefacts, because the 
paradigms used by the artisan are the ideas existing in his own mind, not sensible 
objects. Thus accounts of these primary artefacts are likely (εἰκότες), just as 
accounts of the images of Being. The secondary τεχνητά, which do have sensible 
paradigms, are “at three removes from truth”, and accounts of them, as of the 
natural copies of the sensible, are conjectural (εἰκαστικοί).120  
Interestingly, both in In Parm. and in In Alc. we find paraphrases of the εἰκὼς 
λόγος in which Proclus uses the very word εἰκαστικός, in the In Tim. reserved for 
accounts at a third remove, to refer to the likeliness of accounts about the images 
of Being. This choice can be explained from the context: the occurrences of the 
εἰκὼς λόγος at In Parm. and In Alc. are contained in passages which emphasize the 
contrast between the intelligible and the sensible.121 In the In Tim., however, 
Proclus’ main interest is the continuity between metaphysical levels.122  
This striving for continuity shows also from the fact that in the entire discussion 
in In Tim. of different kinds of accounts and different degrees of removal from the 
truth, the fact that the accounts in question are themselves images is not brought 
up. Despite the fact that, as we have seen, accounts are ontological εἰκόνες of their 
subject matter, they are not at a further remove from the truth. The reason for this 
is probably that they are actually εἰκόνες of our knowledge. Considering the 
terminology used – εἰκόνες as good images – and the Platonic view of thinking as 
internal dialogue,123 it is not unreasonable to assume that for Proclus the gap 
between thoughts and uttered λόγοι is quite small. We may assume that according 
to Proclus the main difference between thoughts and uttered λόγοι is that the 
division which is unifiedly present in the former is given a temporal ordering in 
the latter, and that this difference is innocent enough to sometimes equate λόγοι 
as images of thoughts with λόγοι as images of reality.124 Somehow there is a point-
                                                                                                                                      
texts. For a balanced discussion of Plotinus’ aesthetic notion of mimesis see Halliwell (2002: 316-
323). On the Neoplatonic discussion and rejection of Forms of artefacts, see In Remp. II 86.4-
87.6 and In Parm. 827.27-829.21 and D'Hoine (2006a: 185-211), (2006b), on the In Tim. passage 
here discussed see D'Hoine (2006a: 209-210), (2006b: 300-301). 
120 In Tim. I 344.1-5, after Plato Rep. X 597e3-4. For ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας instead of ἀπὸ φύσεως cf. 
Rep. X 599d2, 602c2. Proclus cannot use φύσις in that sense here because he is also discussing the 
distinction between φύσις and τέχνη.  
121 In Parm. 994.26-30, In Alc. 22.3-11, echoing Tim. 28a1-4, 29b3-c2 and 34c3, ἡμεῖς πολὺ 
μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος.  
122 As well as between cognitive faculties, and between kinds of discourse. 
123 Plato on thought as internal dialogue: Soph. 263e3-8, Tht. 189e6-109a2. 
124 Cf. In Parm. 809.17-19: Ως γὰρ ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ λόγος τὸ ἓν καὶ ἁπλοῦν νόημα μερίζει, καὶ 
διεξοδεύει κατὰ χρόνον τὰς ἡνωμένας τοῦ νοῦ νοήσει. Cf. Heiser (1991: 45-6) on Plotinus.  
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to-point correspondence between the accounts and thoughts.125 As a consequence 
of his short discussion of different kinds of likeness, the proximity of accounts 
about images of Being to truth has been increased. The next question imposing 
itself is what is the relation between thoughts and reality?  
 
 
V.5.2 The unlikeness of thoughts 
 
Let us return to Timaeus’ remark that a text about Being is irrefutable, “insofar as 
it is possible and appropriate for words to be irrefutable and invincible” (Tim. 
29c7-8).126 Proclus uses this passage to quite conspicuously establish the definite 
shift from λόγοι as uttered accounts to λόγοι as the reasoning that forms the 
foundation thereof. He does so by moving in three steps from accounts about 
something (λόγοι περὶ...), which suggests a verbal account, through ‘the scientific 
account’ (ὁ ἐπιστημονικὸς λόγος), to knowledge itself (αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη).127  
A scientific account may be irrefutable (ἀνέλεγκτος), says Proclus, but is so merely 
in a relative sense, namely with respect to our cognition (ὡς πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν 
γνῶσιν).128 It cannot be refuted by us. It can, however, be refuted (ἐλέγχεται), which 
here means that it is incorrect, in two respects. (1) First of all, with respect to the 
very subject of our knowledge, and (2) secondly with respect to higher 
cognitions.129  
(1) As to the first, the account can “be refuted by the subject itself” (ἐλέγχεται δὲ 
ὑπ΄ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, 342.27-343.1), because accounts are incapable of 
comprehending the nature of their subject as it is (ὡς μὴ δυνάμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν 
ὡς ἔστι περιλαβεῖν, 343.1-2) due to the above mentioned discursivity which 
diminishes the similarity between subject and account (ὡς ἀπολειπόμενος αὐτοῦ τῆς 
ἀμερείας, 343.2).130 This argument is in turn argued for, not with reference to the 
nature of discourse, but of knowledge: the second kind of refutation is offered as 
argument for the first.131 
                                               
125 At In Tim. I 353.17-22 Proclus even seems to suggest that a point-to-point correspondence 
between account and reality is possible. 
126 Quoted above as part of T V.10. 
127 In Tim. I 342.7-8 (discussed above), 342.25 and 343.3 respectively. 
128 In Tim. I 342.25-26. 
129 In Tim. I 342.27-343.15. 
130 As a result of discursivity, the soul loses not only the unitary grasp of its object, but also the 
real nature (φύσιν) thereof, as its nature is in fact that which gives a thing unity. Not grasping a 
thing’s unity implies not grasping its nature. Cf. Siorvanes (1996: 172).  
131 As shows from καὶ γὰρ, In Tim. I 343.3. 
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(2) Our knowledge, and consequently the account we give thereof, are both 
correctable by νοῦς, as the highest form of cognition, but one that is exterior to 
our souls.132 Every lower level of cognition adds a modification to the mode of 
knowing of the previous level, resulting in a diminution of cognitive power.133 Or 
as Proclus put it: imagination corrects (ἐλέγχει)134 perception, because perception 
works with affections, aggregation and separation,135 whereas imagination does 
not; opinion corrects imagination, because the latter needs form and impression; 
science corrects opinion, because the latter does not know causes; and intellect 
corrects science (ἐπιστήμη), because the latter uses division and discursivity. Only 
intellect “will say what Being is in essence (ἐρεῖ τὸ ὂν ὅπερ ἐστί).”136 And only 
intellect is really invincible (ἀνίκητος, cf. n. 85). All this is well-known Neoplatonic 
epistemology, and the surprise is not so much in the content, as in the location. 
With this discussion, Proclus has completed the shift started earlier, from λόγοι to 
ἐπιστήμη: while the deficiency of the εἰκὼς λόγος initially concerned specifically 
discourse and images of Being, i.e. the objects of δόξα and αἴσθησις, Proclus has turned 
it around so that the deficiency concerns all of human knowledge, including and in 
fact especially ἐπιστήμη, and its inferiority to νοῦς. This shows from his concluding 
statement:  
T V.16 
“Scientific knowledge (...) and a scientific account, are always the lesser 
(κρατεῖται) of intellect.”137 
 
We will take a closer look at the different aspects of the refutability of our 
knowledge in the next sections, after first following the further development of 
the new epistemological angle in the exegesis of Tim. 29c2-3. 
 
(i) Truth and belief 
T V.17 
“And standing in proportion to them: as Being is to Becoming, so truth is 
to belief.” (Tim. 29c2-3)138 
                                               
132 In Tim I 343.3-4.  
133 Kuisma (1996: 47) calls what is here described “the principle of cognitive relativity”. 
134 On this meaning of ἐλέγχειν see LSJ sv.  
135 Ref. to Democritean theory, cf. A 120 DK, Plato Tim. 67e5-6, Arist. Met. X 7 1057b8-9, Top. 
VII 3 153a38-b1, Plot. Enn. VI 3 [44] 17.19-24. 
136 Cf. Plotinus: Intellect is identical to what it says: V 3 [49] 5 25-26, cf. V 5 [32] 2.18-21; Heiser 
(1991: 27-8).  
137 In Tim. I 343.3-15. 
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The motif of truth and falsity, which runs through both Timaeus and Critias, 
culminates in this famous ἀναλογία that “as Being is to Becoming, so truth is to 
belief” (Tim. 29c3).139 Proclus explains this ἀναλογία as a geometrical alternation 
(γεωμετρικῶς...τὸ ἐναλλὰξ προσέθηκεν) of terms that are related as ratios (what 
truth is to the intelligible, belief is to the generated).140 What the value is of such 
an alternation, Proclus does not reveal, but it will turn out to be instrumental to 
one of his aims in the exegesis of Tim. 29c2-3: bringing closer together the forms 
of cognition related to Becoming and Being, belief and truth.141 
Proclus’ reading of this ἀναλογία starts out with a surprising summary. He lists the 
division of two realms, the intelligible and the generated, and the coordinate 
division of their ontological relation, paradigm and image, followed by the 
corresponding epistemic predicates ἐπιστήμη and εἰκοτολογία, or ἀλήθεια and 
πίστις, which he later calls γνώσεις. Although this reminds us of the earlier systoichia 
of reality and knowledge, some adjustments have been made to facilitate a 
continued epistemological angle.142 At the beginning of his exegesis of Tim. 29b3-
d3 Proclus used the terms ‘truth’ and ‘belief’ as referring to two kinds of accounts, 
rather than forms of cognition.143 Moreover, he there identified the two forms of 
cognition (γνώσεις) corresponding to Being and Becoming as νόησις and δόξα, 
based on the ‘definitions’ of Tim. 28a1-4.144 Instead, he now leaves out the 
‘definitions’, but adds the relation paradigm–image and two new forms of 
cognition: ἀλήθεια and πίστις, equating them with ἐπιστήμη and εἰκοτολογία 
respectively. In support of his new coordinate series Proclus quotes from 
Parmenides’ poem, whose description of ἀλήθεια he adjusts to fit the picture.145  
                                                                                                                                      
138 ἀνάλόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας. ὅτιπερ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια. On the strange 
distribution of text over the lemmata, see above n. 85. For the ἀναλογία, cf. In Remp. I 284.5. 
139 Within Timaeus’ exposition: Tim. 37b9, 51d6, 53e3. On truth in Timaeus-Critias, see Runia 
(1997). 
140 In Tim. I 344.28-345.7. Cf. Arist. EN 1131b5-7. On alternation in Euclid see In Eucl. 357.9-13. 
The comparison with geometry, which was so present in the exegesis of the first part of the 
prooemium, has now receded entirely into the background. I think this reference to geometry is 
not part of it.  
141 On these two as a pair of cognitions see below.  
142 On systoichia see Steel (1984: 7).  
143 In Tim. I 338.82-339.2, τῶν λόγων ὁ διορισμός, in which the pairing off of both εἰκοτολογία 
and πίστις with αλήθεια suggests that εἰκοτολογία and πίστις are interchangeable.  
144 In Tim. I 339.15, discussed above, V.4. On the definitions see chapter III. 
145 The quotations from Parmenides’ poem are frg. 1, ll. 29f, and frg. 4 (In Tim. I 345.15ff). In the 
first, Proclus has the textual variant Ἀληθείης εὐφεγγέος (“shiny truth”) rather than εὐπειθέος 
(Sextus Emp. adv. Math. VII 111, Simpl In dC 557.26 has εὐκυκλέος). O’Brien (1987: 316-7 and n. 
10) argues convincingly that Proclus replaced εὐπειθέος in order to maintain the separation of 
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That the pair ἀλήθεια and πίστις, which to 21th century minds look like the 
combination of a propositional property and a mental or cognitive attitude,146 is 
by Proclus seen as a pair of γνώσεις, cognitive faculties or states,147 is surprising, 
considering his earlier use of the terms πίστις and ἀλήθεια as applying to 
accounts,148 but fits the overall development of his exegesis. In the earlier passage 
he was concerned with introducing the systoichia of “things, thoughts and words,” 
which he has dropped at this point in favour of a purely epistemological approach.  
In the following, we will determine how the two pairs ‘intellection and opinion’ 
from the definitions and ‘truth and belief’ from the ἀναλογία can be reconciled. 
First, however, I will discuss the two notions, (1) πίστις and (2) ἀλήθεια, 
themselves and show how Proclus brings them closer together by elevating belief, 
the lower cognition, and lowering truth, the higher one.  
(1) Since πίστις at Tim. 29c is coordinate with perceptible Becoming, the first 
notion of belief that comes to mind is the one we find in the Divided Line, where 
Plato ascribes πίστις to the second lowest segment of the divided line, as the 
cognition of the higher visible objects.149 Proclus, however, explicitly rejects that 
notion of irrational belief as irrelevant for the Timaeus passage and states that “it 
seems that” (ἔοικε) here Plato adopts a notion of rational belief (λογικὴ πίστις) 
instead.150 He does not tell us what indications he has for that suspicion, but I 
propose that there are two reasons. First, the presence of the original predication 
of ἀλήθεια and πίστις/εἰκοτολογία to accounts (λόγοι), which are by nature 
                                                                                                                                       
πίστις and ἀλήθεια. Moreover, εὐφεγγέος gives him a nice parallel with the light metaphor at 
347.20ff., as shows from 346.1-2. On Proclus’ use of Parmenides’ poem see also Guérard (1987). 
On parallels between Tim. and Parmenides’ poem see Gregory (2000: 252). The contribution of 
Parmenides’ poem to Proclus’ point is rhetorical, rather than systematic, as the quotation cannot 
be made to match the distinctions Proclus is introducing, and Proclus even seems to misread 
Parmenides by suggesting an identification of Becoming with non-being (346.1). We will 
therefore leave the details of Parmenides’ lines aside.  
146 E.g. Johansen (2004: 50f.). Van Ophuijsen (2000: 127-8) discusses the apparent discrepancy 
and convincingly argues for a reading of ἀλήθεια at Tim. 29c3 as well as elsewhere in Plato as a 
state of the knowing subject. 
147 Leaving the question whether he has in mind faculties or states for later we will translate 
γνώσις as ‘(form of) cognition’ for the time being. 
148 In Tim. I 338.27-339.2. See above V.3. 
149 Plato Rep. 511e1, 509d. At Theol.Plat. I 25, 109.4-113.10 Proclus distinguishes four kinds of 
πίστις: divine faith, which is part of the Chaldaean triad Love, Truth, and Faith (Or. Chald. 46 
Majercik (=26 Kr.), see Hoffmann (2000); the belief of the Divided Line; the conviction we have 
of (innate) common notions; and the ἐνέργεια of intellect. 
150 In Tim. I 346.3 ἔοικε δὲ ἡ πίστις ἑτέρα τις εἶναι παρὰ τὴν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ...ἐκείνη μὲν γὰρ ἄλογός ἐστι 
γνῶσις...αὕτη δὲ λογικὴ...and 348.4-5. That Proclus calls the πίστις from the Republic irrational 
(ἄλογος), although Plato does not, is due to the fact that it is “distinguished from conjecture, but 
(...) classified in terms of sense-perception” (346.6-8).  
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rational, is still felt in the background. We will return to this point below. And 
second, this is where the geometrical alternation of the ἀναλογία comes in. In 
explaining the geometrical alternation Proclus reconstructs the original ἀναλογία to 
which the alternation is applied from Tim. 27d5ff. as “as truth is to the intelligible 
paradigm, belief is to the generated image”, even though there is no mention of 
paradigm and image at Tim. 27d5ff yet.151 After the alternation, we get “as Being is 
to Becoming, truth is to belief”. The  ‘ratio’, so to speak, is the relation paradigm-
image which Proclus added to the original ἀναλογία.152 Due to the alternation we 
know this same relation of paradigm-image to hold between truth and belief. And 
since truth is rational, therefore belief, as an image thereof, is here also rational, 
albeit in a lower degree.153  
That lower degree, of course, is due to the connection πίστις has with the realm of 
Becoming, and consists in its commixture (συμμίγνυται) with irrational forms of 
cognition, namely perception (αἴσθησις) and conjecture (εἰκασία). The rationality 
of πίστις lies in the fact that it uses these two for obtaining the fact (τὸ ὅτι), and 
from there moves on to providing causes (τὰς αἰτίας ἀποδίδωσιν).154 This is a 
strange form of cognition: it is a ‘belief’ associated with perception and conjecture, 
which reminds of the earlier description of δόξα, but it cannot be synonymous 
with that δόξα, since it is also capable of providing causes, which δόξα is not.155 It 
therefore has to be more elevated than δόξα. At the same time, the use of 
perception and conjecture seems to exclude that πίστις is here a synonym for 
διάνοια. Nonetheless, I propose that this is the case, and that πίστις here is 
something like a lower activity of διάνοια. Proclus’ διάνοια is more varied than 
Plato’s, and consists of different layers.156 The πίστις we encounter in Proclus’ 
explanation of the ἀναλογία of Timaeus 29c3, fulfils part of the role Plato gives to 
διάνοια in the Republic: reasoning discursively, and finding causes, while using the 
visible as images of higher realities.157 An argument in favour of reading πίστις 
here as a lower kind or part of διάνοια is the earlier description of διάνοια as 
                                               
151 In Tim. I 345.2-3. Proclus construes the original ἀναλογία from the definitions by replacing the 
definition of Being with truth, and the definition of Becoming with belief: “That which is 
apprehensible by thought with a rational account is the thing that is always unchangeably real; 
whereas that which is the object of belief together with unreasoning sensation is the thing that 
becomes and passes away, but never has real being.” (Tim. 28a1-4, transl. Cornford) 
152 Cf. the alternation 2:4 :: 3:6 to 2:3 :: 4:6, where the ratio is 1:2 of the original pairs. 
153 Perhaps Tim. 37b8 is playing in the background. See In Tim. II 315.6-10 and II 310.10, where 
πίστις is the ‘permanent and unchanging judgement of opinion’ (ἡ δὲ πίστις ἡ μόνιμος καὶ 
ἀμετάπτωτος τῆς δόξης κρίσις). 
154 In Tim. I 346.8-12. For the link of giving causes and rationality cf. In Tim. II 120.23-28. 
155 E.g. In Tim. I 257.19-21. On δόξα see III.5.1. 
156 On a recent and detailed treatment of διάνοια in Proclus see MacIsaac (2001). 
157 Plato Rep. 510d5-511a1. 
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cognition of the intermediaries, both intelligible and opinable (δοξαστά).158 As a 
consequence of the adjustment of the form of cognition associated with 
Becoming, from δόξα which knows essences to πίστις which delivers causes (here 
taken as not including the essence), Proclus now comes very close to identifying 
Becoming, at least from an epistemological point of view, with the intermediate 
realm distinguished earlier, Becoming-and-Being.159 Perhaps this adjustment can 
be explained with regard to context. In the definitions the cognitions ascribed to 
the different realms were the ones with which we grasp those realms. When it 
comes to Becoming, however, its respective forms of cognition, δόξα and 
αἴσθησις, will not suffice to giving an explanation (λόγος) of that realm. That role of 
thinking about and giving an explanation of Becoming is here given to πίστις. 
Despite the shift to epistemology, then, the whole discussion still regards the 
epistemological background of the account given.  
 
(2) Truth is the cognition that in the ἀναλογία of Tim. 29c2-3 is coordinate with 
Being. As an adherent of the so-called ‘Identity theory of truth’, Proclus generally 
speaking sees truth primarily as an ontological and cognitive property, in the sense 
that absolute truth is where cognizing subject and reality as object of cognition 
coincide.160 This notion of truth, which has its roots in Alexander’s reading of 
Metaphysics XII and de Anima III,161 is also associated with the contemplation of 
Being as “the plain of truth” (τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας πεδίον).162 On every level other than 
that of Intellect, we find only what Siorvanes calls “compromised” or partial truth, 
and truth as a relational property, rather than identity.163 On lower levels the 
                                               
158 In Tim. I 247.1-2 διάνοιαν τὴν τῶν μέσων γνῶσιν νοητῶν καὶ δοξαστῶν, discussed in III.5.1 (iii). 
159 In Tim. I 257.14ff. On this intermediate realm see III.5.1. 
160 Proclus on truth: Theol.Plat. I 21, with Taormina (2000). Künne (2003: 102) calls Proclus’ the 
“least felicitous” of a number of ancient formulations of correspondence theories of truth, as “the 
knower cannot sensibly be called true” (with ref. to In Tim. II 287.3-5). This is unfair criticism, as 
Proclus’ is an identity theory of truth. For different kinds of truth in Proclus and Plotinus and the 
importance of identity see Blumenthal (1989). 
161 Cf. Emilsson (1996: 237-9), who calls it the ‘Internality Thesis’ in his discussion of Plotinus’ 
notion of truth. Cf. Plot. Enn. V 5 [32] 2.18-20.  
162 In Tim. I 347.27-28, quoting Phaedr. 248b6. Cf. Plato Phil. 65d, where νοῦς and ἀλήθεια are 
tentatively identified. Proclus is generally following Phaedrus 247c3ff., here and elsewhere, e.g. In 
Parm. 1015.35ff. Truth itself, i.e. in the intelligible hypostasis, is what makes all the Forms 
intelligible, In Parm. 944.27-9. Cf. Siorvanes (1996: 157, 194). 
163 Siorvanes (2000: 53). Siorvanes passes over this “compromised” or partial truth later on in his 
paper, when he objects that according to the requirement of isomorphism “the criterion for truth 
is a whole and complete correspondence”, in which case there should be a one-to-one relation 
between words and things (causing several problems, such as how to explain for different 
languages and synonymy). The solution is simple: there is no complete isomorphism between 
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relation consists in “the agreement (ἐφάρμοσις) of the knower with the known”, 
i.e. as in a coinciding of two geometrical figures, without complete identity,164 and 
some kind of contact with the object of knowledge.165  
In his exegesis of the ἀναλογία of Tim. 29c2-3, Proclus distills three kinds of truth 
of beings (ἀλήθεια τῶν ὄντων, 347.20166) from Plato’s works. Using well-known 
imagery of light, he presents an emanation of unitary truth, as a light proceeding 
from the good and providing the intelligibles with unity and purity, followed by 
truth proceeding from the intelligibles, shining on the intellectual orders, and 
finally the truth in souls.167 It is this last kind of truth which Proclus takes Plato to 
have had in mind in the ἀναλογία “what Being is to Becoming, truth is to belief”, 
as it is the highest one attainable by human beings:168 
T V.18 
“... the [truth] that is innate (συμφυής) in souls, which through intuitive 
thought (διὰ νοήσεως), fastens (ἐφαπτομένη) on being and by means of 
scientific knowledge (δι’ ἐπιστήμης) has intercourse (συνοῦσα) with the 
objects of knowledge. (...) ...it is this truth found in souls that we must 
assume in the present context too, since we assumed this kind of belief as 
well, not the kind that is irrational and is denied all rational observation.”169  
 
Note that of the forms of cognition here associated with truth intellection (νόησις) 
is known from the definition of Being, but knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is not.170 A 
number of Platonic passages where it does occur in the context of truth may be in 
the background, such as Plato’s description of “the plain of truth” in the Phaedrus 
and in the Timaeus the description of the circle of the Same.171  
                                                                                                                                      
language and subject matter; complete, and therefore metaphysical, truth exists only on the level 
of Intellect. Cf. Blumenthal (1989: 276).  
164 See e.g. In Tim. II 287.1-5; cf. In Tim. II.315.21ff (γνώσις instead of ἀληθεία). In Crat. XXXVI 
11.30-12.17 (ad Crat. 385b-c). In Perpatetic writings, ἐφαρμόζειν and relatives are commonly used 
of accounts and definitions, and often almost synonymous with ‘being true of’. E.g.Top. VI 10 
148a10ff.  
165 Cf. In Tim. II 287.9-10. Theol.Plat. I 21 100.8 and 25 109.20 (συναπτεῖν), cf. Siorvanes (2000: 
54).  
166 Cf. In Crat. LXIII 28.5, CX 60.19. 
167 In Tim. I 347.20-348.3 Plato’s Rep. VI (507bff); for truth as illumination cf. In Tim. III 114.19-
23. See Runia (forthcoming) ad loc. for more reff. For a division of four objects of the predicates 
‘true’ and ‘false’ see In Crat. XXXVI 11.30-12.17 (ad Crat. 385b-c). 
168 In Tim. I 343-4. Cf. In Parm. 946.26-30; Theol.Plat. I 21 97.17-21.  
169 In Tim. I 347.29-348.6, transl. Runia slightly modified. 
170 Note that in Theol.Plat. I 21 97.17-18 psychical truth is associated with opinions and sciences. 
171 Plato Phdr. 247d1f., Tim. 37c. Cf. also Rep. VII 533c7, another ἀναλογία, where ἐπιστήμη is the 
highest section of the line, and νοήσις the combined highest two, ἐπιστήμη and διάνοια.  
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At this point we can return to the question whether Proclus has in mind cognitive 
states or faculties when he calls the truth and belief of Tim. 29c2-3 γνώσεις. 
Proclus clearly describes πίστις as an agent (χρωμένη 346.9, λαμβάνουσα 10, 
ἀποδίδωσιν 11-12), which suggests that we should read γνώσις in this context as a 
cognitive faculty. The case of truth is less clear cut, as the verbs attached to it 
could express both activity and state (ἐφαπτομένη 347.29, συνοῦσα 30), but this fits 
the nature of higher cognitions in which ultimately thinking activity and state 
coincide. Therefore by ἀναλογία we can tentatively conclude that both γνώσεις are 
primarily to be taken as cognitive faculties. 
 
In sum, according to Proclus the ἀναλογία of Tim. 29c2-3 distributes two cognitive 
faculties, rather than kinds of discourse, over the two realms of reality. The one, 
πίστις, which is coordinate with Becoming, is the faculty which combines 
rationality with perception (αἴσθησις) and conjecture (εἰκασία), and is capable of 
providing causes, whereas the one coordinate with Being, ἀλήθεια, is the form of 
cognition in our souls that works through both intellective insight (νοήσις) and 
scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The main differences between the two, truth and 
belief, lie in the respective levels of precision of the resulting knowledge,172 due to 
the ‘instrumental’ cognitions associated with them.  
The upshot of Proclus’ interpretation is the following: he brings the notions of 
truth and belief closer together by elevating the lower cognition, πίστις, to a 
“rational belief” by distinguishing it from its traditional Platonic level of 
association with the illusions of sense perception. On the other hand, he locates 
the relevant notion of the higher cognition, ἀλήθεια, at the lower end of its 
semantic spectrum, taking it as a cognitive truth on the level of human souls, 
rather than the primary metaphysical truth of Being. Apart from the introduction 
of ἐπιστήμη as ‘instrument’ of truth, this explanation of the notion of truth is not 
surprising in itself, and the sketch of the apparently irrelevant higher forms of 
truth serves to emphasize the elevation of πίστις.173 The most important aspect of 
Proclus’ interpretation, and what differentiates it from Plato’s descriptions, is, of 
course, the addition of the delivery of causes by πίστις.  
 
(ii) La condition humaine and the εἰκὼς μῦθος  
 
                                               
172 In Tim. I 346.10 ἀστάτου; 12-13 τὸ συγκεχυμένον...καὶ τὸ ἄστατον; 14-15 οὔτε ἀκούομεν ἀκριβές 
οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; 15-20 σφἀλλεται καὶ διαπίπτει τ’ἀκριβοῦς. Cf. 346.3, on πίστις in Parmenides’ 
poem, frg. 1.29f and frg. 4. See above n. 145. 
173 Cf. In Tim. I 348.3-7. 
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After adjusting the focus of Tim. 29b3-d3 to its epistemological side, and elevating 
πίστις to the lower limits of διάνοια, Proclus has paved the way for a reading of the 
εἰκὼς λόγος which makes full use of Plato’s introduction of human weakness: 
T V.19 
“(1) If then, Socrates, in many respects concerning many things – the gods 
and the generation of the universe – we prove unable (μὴ δυνατοὶ 
γιγνώμεθα) to render an account at all points entirely consistent with itself 
and exact, you must not be surprised. (2) If we can furnish accounts no less 
likely than any other (μηδενὸς ἧττον...εἰκότας), we must be content, 
remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human (φύσιν 
ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν), and consequently it is fitting that we should, in these 
matters, accept the likely story (τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον) and look for nothing 
further.”174 
 
That accounts of the natural world, both sublunary and celestial, are unfixed and 
imprecise is due to the impotence (ἀδυναμία, picking up μὴ δυνατοί) of its 
students,175 and which is a consequence primarily of our enmattered state, forcing 
the use of particular tools upon us, as well as spatiotemporal limitations. Proclus 
twice presents a mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian passages to illustrate this, and 
in the process expands the imprecision of our accounts to those about the 
intelligible.  
In the cosmological and eschatological myth in the Phaedo, Plato has Socrates 
describe how we humans live at the bottom of valleys on the earth, filled with mist 
and water, and perceive the heavenly bodies through those substances, like 
someone who lives at the bottom of the ocean (ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους) 
and thinks that the sea is the sky. He perceives the heavenly bodies through water, 
thinking he has a clear view of them. Our own slowness and weakness, like that of 
our hypothetical ocean-dweller, prevents us from actually reaching the heavens 
above the sky and getting a direct view of the beauty and purity up there.176 The 
up there, in the case of us earth-dwellers, refers not to the heavenly bodies, of 
course, but to the transcendent realm of Forms. The issue at stake, as in the image 
of the cave of Rep. VII, is ontological rather than physical distance.177 
Aristotle also remarks upon the disadvantages of our particular location in the 
universe, from his own non-otherworldly, empiricist point of view. Our position 
                                               
174 The numbers indicate the separation into lemmas: (1) Tim. 29c4-7 and (2) 29c7-d3 transl. 
Cornford, discussed at In Tim. I 348.8-351.14 and 351.15-353.29 respectively. For (2) see T V.25. 
175 In Tim. I 351.20-27. 
176 Phaedo 108cff, esp. 109b4-110b2.  
177 Cf. Hackforth (1955: 174-5). 
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far away (πόρρω) from a different ‘up there’, namely the celestial bodies, or rather 
this position in combination with the weakness of our organs of perception, 
prevents us from having accurate empirical data and therefore accurate 
knowledge, of all the properties of those heavenly bodies.178 In Aristotle’s case, 
then, the issue is primarily relative physical distance, as opposed to the 
metaphysical distance in the Phaedo,179 although in both cases the larger issue is 
that of cognitive problems as resulting from ontological differences. 
In Proclus’ exegesis of the prooemium we find two references to our position in 
the universe and its effect on the reliability of our knowledge. On both occasions, 
however, Proclus combines the theme of the Phaedo-myth with Aristotelian 
material and brings up the issue in the context of the study, not of the Forms, but 
of “the images of Being” (ἡ θεωρία τῶν τοῦ ὄντος εἰκόνων), which he describes in 
terms of distance.180  
The first instance is an odd reversal of the Platonic original. It concerns 
‘knowledge’ of physical objects, which can be gathered only with the use of the 
corresponding form of cognition (σύστοιχος γνῶσις), perception.181 If we had not 
been “living down here at the end of the universe” (ἐν τῷ ἐσχάτῳ τοῦ παντὸς 
κατῳκισμένοι) and “very far away” (πορρωτάτω) from the Forms, Proclus states, 
we would not have made so many mistakes.182 Note that we also have a 
fascinating reversal of perspective here: Aristotle calls the outer limit of the 
universe the ἔσχατον τοῦ παντός.183 In Proclus, this anthropocentric perspective is 
replaced by the perspective of emanation: the ‘end of the universe’ is that which is 
the furthest removed from the One.184 Interestingly, Aristotle himself indicated 
that the common expression ἔσχατον τοῦ παντός as referring to the outer limit of 
the universe is in fact incorrectly used, since that which we call the end of the 
universe is in fact in nature primary.185 
The mistakes we make in studying the ‘images of Being’ are obviously not 
primarily caused by the distance between us and the objects of perception, since 
                                               
178 Distance from the celestial bodies: Arist. Cael. 286a4-7, ib. 292a16-17; PA I 5, 644.22ff. 
Unreliability of perception of things far away: dA 428b28-30. The distance to the object of 
perception is a topos throughout the history of epistemology. In Epicureanism it is related to 
clarity of perception ap. Sext.Emp. adv. Math. vii 208ff. (=Us. 247). 
179 Note, however, that Simpl. In Cael 396 explaining the Cael. passage turns it into an example of 
the likely story: the distance is cognitive rather than spatial, referring to Tim. 29c2. 
180 In Tim. I 352.29-30. 
181 That is, by us humans, and insofar as they are perceptible. On divine knowledge of the 
perceptible see below.  
182 In Tim. I 351.30-352.1.  
183 Cael. IV 1 308a21, cf. Plato Tim. 36e2. 
184 Cf. Theol.Plat. V 27 102.6.  
185 Cael. 308a21-2. 
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we live among them,186 but by the ontological distance between us and reality, due 
to our enmattered state: we have a ‘coarse and faulty’ (παχέως καὶ ἡμαρτημένως) 
use of perception, imposed on us by our human nature, which is ‘eclipsed by 
body, divided, and in need of irrational cognitions.’187 Had we been ‘up there’, we 
would not have been enmattered humans, but divine transcendent beings, who 
perceive everything, including Becoming, in a divine manner:  
T V.20 
“Let us not think that the knowledge they have is characterized by the 
natures of the objects of knowledge, nor that what has no reliability is not 
reliable in the case of the gods, as the philosopher Porphyry says (fr. 45). 
(...) Let us rather think that the manner of knowing differs according the 
diversity of the knowers. For the very same object is known by god 
unitarily, by intellect holistically, by reason universally, by imagination 
figuratively, by sense-perception passively. And it is not the case that 
because the object of knowledge is one, the knowledge is also one <and 
the same>.”188 
 
Proclus here follows Iamblichus’ principle that the nature of knowledge depends 
on the knower, not on the object known.189 Since divine intellection is not a 
‘surplus’, i.e. is not distinct from what they are, the gods know as they are, 
undivided, unenmattered and eternal.190 As opposed to us humans, they are 
capable of knowing everything, including the perceptible, the individual, future 
contingents, even matter, in a unitary, non extended, undivided, ungenerated, 
eternal and necessary manner.191 The distance from the Phaedo passage, then, is 
used by our commentator to express the essential deficiency of enmattered human 
souls regarding knowledge of any realm, including the realm of generation. 
                                               
186 For the ‘images of Being’ that are farther away, the heavenly bodies, see below. 
187 In Tim. I 352.1-5.  
188 In Tim. I 352.11-16.  
189 In Tim. I 352.3-353.11. Cf. El.Th. prop. 124, Theol.Plat. I 21 98.7-12, and reff. in Saffrey and 
Westerink (1968: 156, n. 1,2). De Prov. chapter 63, 64, 82 (Isaac), Decem Dub. q. 2, El.Th. 124. Cf. 
In Parm. 961.19ff ad Parm. 134cd. A weaker version of the principle, in which knowledge is given 
a relative property of being ‘higher, lower than or on the same level as the thing known’, is 
ascribed to Iamblichus by Ammonius (in Int., 135.14ff, on future contingents). Sorabji (2004: 72-
3) points out that it is a version of “all in all but appropriately to each”, which we do find in 
Porphyry. See Sorabji (2004: 72-6) for more reff. on divine knowledge in the commentators. 
190 In Tim. I 352.19-24. cf. 352.32-353.1. 
191 In Tim. I 352.5-8, cf. In Tim. I 351.29-30, 352.24-27, 353.22-3. In Amm. In Int. 136.15-17 we 
find a similar series. 
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A little further, we find the second reference to our position at the bottom of the 
universe, this time in the context of our knowledge of the heavenly bodies. Lack 
of precision in the study of those images of Being results, again, from our 
weakness (παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν), but in a different sense,192 which Proclus 
explains in an beautiful oxymoron: 
T V.21 
“…with respect to [the heavenly bodies], we have to be satisfied with the 
approximate (ἐγγύς), far away (πόρρω) settled as we are at the bottom, as 
they say, of the universe (ἐν τῷ πυθμένι, φασί, τοῦ παντός)” 193  
 
The disadvantage οf our – enmattered and distant – position is that we have to use 
perception and physical tools (ὄργανα), and fill ourselves with ‘likelihood’ (τοῦ 
εἰκότος) concerning the heavenly bodies.194 Although they are unchanging, and 
thus do not suffer from unknowability due to flux, they are still hard to know.195 
The cause of the problem, in this case, is physical distance combined with the 
weakness of perception, as in Aristotle. The solution, however, is Platonic. By way 
of illustration of the mistakes that are made as a consequence of our physical 
distance to the heavenly bodies combined with a research method using 
perception and astronomical instruments, Proclus refers to the astronomers he 
criticized also elsewhere: they formulate many different hypotheses, of epicycles, 
eccentrics, and contrary motions, but always as explanations ‘saving’ the same 
empirical data (τὰ φαινόμενα σῳζόντων).196 Proclus implies that, since only one 
explanation can be true, at least some of them (and in fact all) must be mistaken. 
The method described is of course in Proclus’ eyes not the best approach to the 
study of the heavenly bodies, nor is it Timaeus’ approach, but it is the only one 
available for their perceptible aspects. Even at what is often perceived as the height 
                                               
192 In Tim. I 352.29-30. 
193 In Tim. I 353.5-7 (πυθμήν from Phaedo 109c5). Cf. idib. 23-24 ἡμῖν δὲ ἀγαπητόν, εἰ καὶ ἐγγὺς 
αὐτῶν βάλλομεν. Cf. Philop. Opif. 206.3. For a similar claim, using similar expressions, cf. Philop. 
In APo. 300.25-30. 
194 In Tim. I 353.3-5. Cf. the earlier reference to the distance between us and the heavenly bodies, 
with inverse perspective, In Tim. I 346.21-31, see above V.5.1. 
195 Proclus does not say this in so many words, but this must be what he has in mind, considering 
that immediately preceding this argument he mentioned the ‘instability’ (ἀστάθμητον) of 
sublunary objects (353.1-3), despite the fact that considering the context (i.e. that the nature of 
knowledge is determined by knowing subject, not known object) that instability is in itself 
irrelevant.  
196 In Tim. I 353.7-11. On Proclus’ criticism of ‘low’ astronomy see Segonds (1987b), (1987a) and 
ch. IV, n. 38. On Timaeus’ ‘hyperastronomy’ (ὑπεραστρονομεῖν, inspired on Theaet. 173e6) see In 
Tim. I 202.15f., also III 277, In Parm. III 828.26-40, Hyp.Astr. I 1. Cf. Syr. In Met. 88.21f. 
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of precision, i.e. mathematical explanations, for example of the circles of the same 
and the different (Tim. 36c), our speaking of circles and points is imprecise. Since 
the passage in which Proclus explains this is rather complicated, but makes an 
important point, let me quote it entirely in the translation of Runia, who I think 
understood very well what Proclus has in mind: 
T V.22 
“But what is this?, someone might say. Do we not give precise accounts 
about the heaven, such as that the celestial circles bisect each other? And 
when we are content not to obtain precision but what is close to it, is it not 
through our own weakness and not through the nature of the object that 
we fail to reach precision? But the fact is that whenever we take our 
starting-points not from sense-perception but from universal propositions, 
in the context of sense-perceptible reality the accounts we give on the 
heaven do reveal precision and irrefutability, but in the context of the 
objects of science these too are refuted by means of the immaterial forms. 
Let us look at the very statement that has just been made. The largest 
[heavenly] circles, they say, bisect each other. The intersection, therefore, 
necessarily takes place at [two] points. But this point is indivisible. What, 
then, is such a thing doing in the realm of the divisible? What is a 
substance without extension doing in the realm of the extended? After all, 
everything that comes to be in the bodily realm is physically divided 
together with its substrate. [But the response might be again]: What have 
we here? Is there not such as thing as a physical point? But this departs 
from what is truly indivisible. A point does exist in the physical realm, but 
it is not a point in absolute terms, with the result that the account of the 
point does not harmonize precisely with such a thing (i.e. the physical 
point). In general terms, just as the accounts about the intelligibles do not 
harmonize with the objects of discursive thought, so the accounts of the 
objects of science do not harmonize with the objects of sense-perception, 
for the intelligibles are models for the objects of discursive thought, while 
the objects of discursive thought are models for the sense-perceptibles. 
After all, it is a soul which has ordered the mighty heaven and it continues 
to do together with the Father. As a result, whenever we speak about 
circles in heaven and contacts and bisections and equalities, from the 
viewpoint of speaking about sense-perceptibles we are speaking with 
precision (ἀκριβῶς). But in the perspective of the immaterial realities (τὰ 
ἄϋλα), all such expressions are idle chatter. 
But if someone were to ask us: What have we here? Is not that which is 
truly equal a λόγος, and is not the true circle non-extended? After all, each 
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of them is universal, and the universal is λόγος and indivisible form. But 
what is in the heaven is divisible and bisected and in a substrate, so again 
we say that here in the sense-perceptible realm there are no [true] circles or 
equalities or any other such thing, and it is in this way that we furnish our 
own accounts that are ‘not consistent with each other’” (cf. 29c6). 197 
  
The main point Proclus is here making, using among others “cutting circles” to 
illustrate it, is that our speaking of certain mathematical operations, such as 
“cutting”, which require a material substrate, are really part of physical or in this 
case astronomical explanations, and do not provide real knowledge. The subject of 
real knowledge is the intelligible, and explanations involving cutting and the like 
are nonsense (φλήναφος) when applied to the intelligible. On the other hand, the 
use of certain universals, such as “circle”, reasoning about which would lead to 
real knowledge, will never apply to the physical, because there are no real circles in 
heaven. Either way, in our astronomical account we combine expressions that 
apply to the intelligible (in the example “circle”) with those that apply only to the 
sensible (in the example “cutting”), and thus do not give consistent accounts. The 
passage is highly complex, as Proclus discusses several issues in one go. I agree 
with Runia, however, that Diehl’s reading allows us to make good sense of it.198 
Hence, I do not agree with the interpretation of the passage provided by Lernould 
(2005: 116-8), who follows Festugière. Festugière adopts textual variants (μὴ 
ἀκριβῶς in 349.30 where Diehl has ἀκριβῶς, and in ἐνύλων 350.1 instead of 
ἀύλων).199 As a result, the conclusion of the first half of the passage quoted above 
changes into one concerning the inappropriateness of expressions concerning 
intelligibles to perceptibles. This has two disadvantages: (1) it does not make sense of 
the beginning of the passage, which concerns the inappropriateness of 
terminology involving divisibility to the intelligible; (2) it does render Proclus’ 
argument more simple, but also repetitive, since the point made at 350.1-8 (“But if 
someone were to ask us, etc...”), which is in fact introduced as a further step, also 
concerns the inappropriateness of expressions concerning intelligibles to 
perceptibles. 
From the above we gather that the ultimate blame for the imprecision of any 
account, be it of the physical world or of the intelligible, lies with us, humans, not 
with reality, because in the end the nature of knowledge is not only determined by 
                                               
197 In Tim. I 349.6-350.8, ad Tim. 29c4-7, translation Runia, slightly modified.  
198 Runia (forthcoming)snote ad loc.  
199 Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 209 n. 3) 
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the object, but also by the knowing subject.200 As we saw above, Proclus follows 
Iamblichus in maintaining that the character of knowledge is determined by the 
essence of the knower. Emphasizing this once more, Proclus concludes his 
exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3 and the prooemium as follows, with an echo of 
Aristotelian and Platonic pleas for pardon of the weakness inherent in human 
nature:  
T V.23 
“The gods know reality in a superior manner, but we have to be satisfied if 
we come close to the mark. We are humans and we are inserted in a body 
and we have before ourselves a partial kind of life and are replete with a lot 
of likeliness (αὐτοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ εἰκότος ἀναπεπλήσμεθα), so that as is to be 
expected we will also give accounts that resemble myths (μῦθοις 
ἐοικότας...λόγους). For the human account is replete with a lot of thickness 
(παχύτης201) and confusion, which the word ‘μῦθος’ (i.e. in Tim. 29d2) 
indicates, and we should forgive human nature (δεῖ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει 
συγγινώσκειν).” 202  
 
Proclus here echoes Aristotle’s discussion of equity as making up for the 
shortcomings of written laws: equity is also to forgive human nature (καὶ τὸ τοῖς 
ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές).203 The legal context is quite appropriate for the 
exegesis of Tim. 29c7-d3, since Timaeus is referring to his audience as οἱ κριταί 
(d1).204  
In the above conclusion we find Proclus’ only remark on the εἰκὼς μῦθος. The 
ancient debate on the εἰκὼς λόγος did not include, so far as we know, the issue of 
the significance, if any, of Plato’s use of both λόγος and μῦθος when referring to 
                                               
200 I disagree with Lernould (2005: 115) on this point, who takes it that it is the imperfection of 
the object of knowledge that is emphasized most by Proclus. His reading of the passage that is the 
source of his statement (In Tim. I 346.21-29), is based on the textual variant adopted by 
Festugière, but which does not make better sense of the passage, see the foregoing. That 
accepting this variant is crucial for Lernould’s interpretation shows from the fact that he keeps 
using the expression ‘bavardage’ (φλήναφος) in the context of explanations of the sensible (117, 
118, 122, 151). For my thesis that Proclus readjusts the focus of the principle of discourse to 
epistemology, see above. 
201 Παχύτης as metaphorical thickness, as opposed to precision, and due to corporeality: In Remp. 
II 281.4, Syr. In Met. 25.34, Iambl. Protr. 124.18. Cf. In Tim. 352.1-2 παχέως καὶ ἡμαρτημένως τῇ 
αἰσθήσει χρώμεθα. Παχέως is a rare adverb that is semantically rather vague, but used as opposite 
of ἀκριβῶς, Galen Plac. 9.9.33.4. 
202 In Tim. I 353.22-29, ad Tim. 29c7-d3.  
203 Rhet. 1374b10-11. Cf. EN 1136a5ff: involuntary mistakes made from ignorance are forgivable. 
204 Cf. in Plato: Crit. 107d5-e3.  
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the εἰκὼς λόγος.205 This is not to say that the Ancients agreed with Vlastos that 
εἰκώς is the relevant word, rather than either λόγος or μῦθος.206 Instead, they 
consistently speak of an εἰκὼς λόγος, rather than a μῦθος, which seems to imply a 
choice, if perhaps not always a conscious one.207 In the case of our commentator, 
the all but complete ignoring of the role of μῦθος fits into the overall picture of a 
‘scientifization’ of the Timaeus: Timaeus “is not forging myths”,208 but presenting a 
certain type of scientific knowledge of the natural world.209 Here, in the only 
comment Proclus makes on the εἰκὼς μῦθος, he explains it as pertaining to a 
property of the human account (λόγος), and indicating (ἐνδείκνυται) the 
weaknesses inherent in human discourse.210 By using the word μῦθος, Proclus 
explains, Plato indicates that our accounts of reality resemble myths (μύθοις 
ἐοικότας...λόγους) – even, I take it we can supply, the ones that attempt at being 
‘unveiled’ and scientific.211 An example of such weakness of our accounts was 
given elsewhere, when Proclus emphasized that even when speaking of the 
intelligible we are forced to abandon truth and precision by dividing it and 
‘temporalizing’ it.212  
 
 
V.6 How likely is the story of physiologia? 
 
The upshot of Proclus’ explanation of Plato’s εἰκὼς λόγος is that there are two 
kinds of accounts or teachings, scientific and likely, with their respective 
cognitions: ἀλήθεια and πίστις, and epistemic properties: certain, irrefutable, exact, 
vs. uncertain, refutable, inexact.213 In his exegesis of Tim. 29b3-d3 Proclus 
                                               
205 See above, V.2. 
206 Vlastos (1964: 382). 
207 See the indices to Dörrie (1987), Dörrie and Baltes (1990), (1993), (1996). 
208 Theol.Plat. V 36 133.11, quoted above at n. 113. 
209 On Timaeus’ exposition as science see chapter III and V.8. 
210 In Tim. I 353.26-29, quoted above. For a μῦθος as an image of a λόγος see Plut. dGA 348B1, or 
of truth see Simpl. In Gorg. 237.14-23 Westerink).  
211 I think this makes more sense of the phrase ἣν ὁ μῦθος ἐνδείκνυται than having the μῦθος refer 
to any specific myth or account, or myth as a genre (as Festugière seems to do). On myths as 
presenting veiled truth, cf. e.g. Theol.Plat. V 36 131.24ff.  
212 In Tim. I 348.30-349.5. ‘To temporalize’ is here used in the sense of ‘to place or define in 
temporal relations’ and is a translation of ἔγχρονον ποιεῖν. 
213 In Tim. I 338.28-339.2 περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς διδασκαλίας, εἴτε ἀραρυῖαν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον 
καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένην ὑποληπτέον, εἴτε εἰκοτολογίαν, ἀλήθειαν μὲν οὐκ οὖσαν, πίστιν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν ὡμοιωμένην;  340.25ff (on Albinus and Gaius) ἢ ἐπιστημονικῶς ἢ εἰκοτολογικῶς, καὶ οὐ 
καθ᾽ ἕνα τρόπον οὐδ᾽ ὡς μίαν ἀκρίβειαν τῶν παντοίων ἐχόντων λόγων; 345.1 ἐπιστήμην καὶ 
εἰκοτολογίαν ἢ ἀλήθειαν καὶ πίστιν. Cf. also 355.25-28; cf. In Remp. I 284.4-7 λόγους μὲν τοὺς 
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gradually and deliberately shifts the scene of the εἰκὼς λόγος from an ontological 
to an epistemological viewpoint, to conclude that the main source of the 
incertainty, refutability and inexactness in accounts about Becoming – as, to some 
extent, in those about Being – is the embodiment of the human soul. At this 
point, however, it is not clear yet why the epistemological viewpoint is so 
important, and how this interpretation hooks up with Proclus’ view of the Timaeus 
and of philosophy of nature in general. We know the source of ‘like(li)ness’, but 
not yet how likely an account of philosophy of nature is, or what it means that such 
an account is likely.  
 
V.6.1 A true and likely story 
 
Part of the answer to these questions consists in an analysis of the Proclean use of 
the words εἰκώς and εἰκοτολογία, which we have so far not investigated, the 
contexts in which it occurs, and the adjectives with which it is primarily associated 
in the exegesis of the εἰκὼς λόγος.  
 
(i) Demonstration vs. likeliness 
Let us take a look at the latter first. Of the properties mentioned by Plato in the 
passage on the εἰκὼς λόγος: permanent, unchanging, irrefutable, invincible (29b), 
consistent, and exact (29c), and their opposites, the property which Proclus 
associates most with the likelihood of the account about the sensible is its lack of 
exactness,214 followed by its refutability.215 Interestingly, Proclus frequently adds a 
property that is not mentioned by Plato, namely fixity (ἀραρ-), a Homeric word 
that is not common philosophical vocabulary, but does occur in Iamblichus in 
connection with mathematical and demonstrative certainty.216 That consistency, an 
internal property, does not play a part in Proclus’ reading can be explained from 
his adherence to Iamblichus’ exegetical principle of εἷς σκόπος according to which 
by definition every text is internally consistent.  
                                                                                                                                      
ἀνελέγκτους τοῖς οὖσιν, λόγους δὲ εἰκοτολογικοὺς τοῖς γενητοῖς; Cf. In Tim. II 36.20-24 where 
physical vs. mathematical is equated with likely vs. scientific, and In Tim. III 160.7-12 on 
knowledge from inspiration, demonstration and ‘likely things’. 
214 ἀ-/ἀπηκριβ- within the exegesis of the likely story: In Tim. I 338.9-339.1; 340.27, 30; 342.13; 
346.14, 16, 17, 19; 348.18; 349.6, 7, 9, 11, 14, 24, 31; 350.30 (selective quote from lemma); 351.3, 
20; 352.30  Cf. for a beautiful illustration In Tim. II 51.5ff., where analogy, exactitude and truth 
come together in a passage that slides from the ontological into the propositional.   
215 Within the exegesis of the likely story: 342.25, 27; 343.4 (bis), 7; 347.6; 348.27; 349.14, 15; 
351.25.   
216 Within the exegesis of the likely story: 338.29; 342.14; 346.29; 351.20; 352.12. Cf. Iambl. 
Comm. Math. 5.18. Other terms occur no more than three times each.  
DISCOURSE AND REALITY 
- 251 - 
Turning now to the word εἰκώς, we see that in Proclus’ use of that word the lack 
of precision,217 irrefutability and demonstrative certainty are most present, but that 
he tends to contrast it especially with demonstrative certainty. As we have seen 
Proclus describes the epistemic status of the account of the images of Being, i.e. 
nature and immanent forms, as ‘cognition through likely things’, γνώσις δι’ 
εἰκότων, as opposed to demonstration, ἀπόδειξις.218 The source of this distinction 
can be found in two Platonic passages. First of all, Phaedo 92d1ff,219 where 
Simmias makes a distinction between a thesis that is based on demonstration 
(ἀπόδειξις) and one that is based on probability and likeliness. The latter, which is 
also called “an argument that demonstrates through likely things” (ὁ διὰ τῶν 
εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιουμένος λόγος, 92d2), is in first instance rejected by 
Simmias as pretentious (ἀλαζών), but subsequently accepted on the condition that 
it start from an acceptable hypothesis (δι᾽ ὑποθέσεως ἀξίας, d6). Note that Proclus 
modifies Plato’s remark on “demonstrations through likelihoods” and turns it into 
a distinction between knowledge through likely things vs. knowledge through 
demonstrations, perhaps influenced by Aristotle’s requirements for the starting 
points of demonstrations, and the Aristotelian notion of inference from signs.220 
This modification is visible also in Proclus’ phrase “without likelihoods and 
demonstrations”,221 as opposed to Plato’s “without likely and necessary 
demonstrations” (Tim. 40e1). The rephrasing suggests that, whereas 
demonstrations have necessary conclusions by definition, reasoning through 
likelihood may have conclusions that are not necessary in some sense. Moreover, 
Proclus explains this passage as concerning two different cognitions (γνώσεις), 
demonstrative (ἀποδεικτική) and ‘through likely things’ (δι’ εἰκότων).222 There are 
                                               
217 For the opposition of precision and the likely cf. Plato Crit. 107d6-8. 
218 In Tim. III 160.7-12, see above V.4.1. Cf. Syr. In Met. 5.2-7.  
219 Quoted in In Eucl. 192.12. 
220 APo 71b21-22 ἀληθῶν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ 
αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος. Plotinus, on the other hand, seems to maintain the opposition, 
although he speaks of syllogisms, not demonstrations: περὶ μὲν ἐκείνων (i.e. γένεσις) λέγων ἄν τις ἐξ 
ἐκείνης τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ἀξιουμένων συλλογίζοιτο ἂν εἰκότως δι᾽ εἰκότων εἰκότας καὶ 
τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς ποιούμενος, Enn. VI 5 [23] 2.16-19. On inference from signs see Morrison 
(1997) with De Haas (1999). 
221 ἄνευ τε εἰκότων (λόγων) καὶ ἀποδείξεων, In Remp. I 185.16, II 340.29, 355.5. 
222 In Tim. III 160.8-9, where they are compared to a third, ἡ ἐνθουσιαστική. This version is found 
already in Syrianus, In Met. 42.25, where Aristotle’s statement that myths need not be taken 
seriously (Met. III 4 1000a19) is criticized with reference to Tim. 40e1. The same discussion seems 
to be in the background at In Remp. II 354.27ff. (=Scholia in Remp. 621b,bis), mentioned also 
above, where the truth of myths, which speak without likelihoods or demonstrations (ἄνευ 
εἰκότων καὶ ἀποδείξεων διδάσκοντες), is defended by pointing out that they are useful because they 
are “interpreters of reality”, an interesting use of Tim. 29b4-5. Cf. above n. 63. 
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no indications that Proclus takes on board Aristotle’s notion of the ‘likely’ as 
related to τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, and the material of inferences from signs.223 
Nonetheless, considering Proclus’ view of particular demonstrations presented in 
the Timaeus as likely, rather than truth (see below V.7), I propose that we should 
not read “likelihoods and demonstrations” as diametrically opposed, and as 
expressing two different kinds of reasoning, but as two kinds of demonstration, 
say demonstration simpliciter and likely, using the same kind of reasoning but from 
different kinds of starting points. Demonstration simpliciter, starting from necessary 
starting points, in a formally necessary way leads to (materially) necessary 
conclusions, whereas demonstration from likelihoods renders, in a formally 
necessary way, possibly (materially) non-necessary, likely, conclusions. 
This interpretation finds support in the connection Proclus makes elsewhere 
between the pair εἰκοτολογία - ἐπιστήμη and Aristotle’s distinction between the 
different sciences on the basis of the level of precision of their subject matter, and 
the subsequent characterization of the reasoning appropriate to that subject 
matter. Aristotle mentions demonstration in geometry and πιθανολογία in 
rhetoric.224 Proclus adjusts that distinction to his own purposes and to 
Neoplatonic theory of science. Within mathematics – as, we will see, in 
philosophy of nature – different degrees of precision are to be found, depending 
on the subject matter at hand.225 Moreover, Proclus states that, in accordance with 
the principle that every scientist should choose the appropriate kind of account 
(λόγοι) Plato demands (ἀπαιτεῖ) a likely account of the good philosopher of nature, 
and an irrefutable account of he who teaches about the intelligible.226  
This brings us to an aspect of the εἰκὼς λόγος that is crucial for a proper 
understanding of Proclus’ reading of the Timaeus as a whole, namely the sense in 
which Platonic φυσιολογία is itself a likely story.  
 
                                               
223 At one point (In Tim. I 353.2) Proclus qualifies the sublunary as that with regard to which we 
have to be satisfied with τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, but his notion of τὸ εἰκός is more extensive, cf. 353.3-
5. For Aristotle’s definition of τὸ εἰκός as τό ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον see APr II 27 70a10ff, Rhet. 
I 2 1357a31ff. 
224 In Eucl. 33.21-34.15 (cf. 192.9-11), which is very close to Iambl. Comm.Math. 86.2-22 (Klein) 
and refers to Arist. EN I 3 1094b22-28, which in turn has its source in Theaet. 162e (which, 
ironically, is a reference to Protagoras’ statement of ignorance concerning the gods). Another 
passage that is present in the background is Arist. Met. II 3 995a14-19 (cf. APo 87a), on the fact 
that mathematics and philosophy of nature do not allow the same degree of precision. Cf. 
Alexander, who quotes the EN distinction between demonstration and πιθανολογία when 
explaining the Met. passage (In Met. 169.3ff.). 
225 In Eucl. 34.11ff. 
226 In Eucl. 34.1-7. 
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(ii) True and likely  
Entirely in line with his overall interpretation of the dialogue, Proclus does not 
simply earmark philosophy of nature as εἰκοτολογία, tied to πίστις, and inexact. 
According to our commentator, that Plato does in fact call Timaeus’ account 
εἰκοτολογία is of course related to the subject matter, the nature of words, and 
human nature, but it is also the result of a deliberate choice he made:   
T V.24 
“...Plato sometimes defines science (ἐπιστήμη) as ‘providing causes’, 
sometimes as ‘the subject matter also having an entirely permanent 
essence, on top of giving account of the causes’, sometimes as ‘the 
principles not being hypotheses’.”227  
 
By the first definition, and only by that one, would φυσιολογία be a science. It will 
never be an unhypothetical science, since this is a prerogative reserved for 
theological dialectic; it can also never be a purely dianoetic science (as are the 
mathematical sciences), since the subject matter of φυσιολογία does not have a 
permanent essence. The only sense in which philosophy of nature can be a science 
is by providing the causes of natural phenomena. Proclus supposes that, although 
in the Timaeus causes of natural phenomena are indeed provided,228 Plato 
nonetheless demands that we call it a likely account (ἀξιοῖ καλεῖν αὐτὴν 
εἰκοτολογίαν), because he here adopts the narrower second definition.229 In 
Proclus’ view, Plato uses the terms ‘science’ and ‘likely account’ as mutually 
exclusive, although something that is a likely account from one point of view is 
science from another. Proclus himself, however, has a more liberal use of the 
terms, and does not take them as mutually exclusive.  
This shows again clearly from the explanation given by Proclus of the conclusion 
of the εἰκὼς λόγος, some aspects of which we discussed also above:  
T V.25 
“If then, Socrates, in many respects concerning many things – the gods and 
the generation of the universe – we prove unable to render an account at 
all points entirely consistent with itself and exact (αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοῖς 
ὁμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ ἀπηκριβωμένους), you must not be surprised.” 
(Tim 29c4-7, quoted above as T V.19 (1)) 
 
                                               
227 In Tim. I 350.8-12. 
228 In Tim. I 2.1-4.5 etc. See chapter III.  
229 In Tim I 350.12-20. Plato may, of course, have used the third definition, but must at least have 
used the second. 
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According to Proclus with these words Timaeus prepares his audience for the 
coming speech on the natural world. He indicates how they should receive it, 
namely not as a perfectly finished (ἀπηκριβωμένοι) and really scientific (ὄντως 
ἐπιστημονικοί) account, but as similar (ἐοικότες) to it.230 Proclus adds, however, 
that Timaeus also wants the audience to know that the account will not be a 
purely likely story, but a mixture (σύμμιξιν) of πίστις and ἀλήθεια, just as the 
universe is blended (συγκέκραται) out of “physical powers and intellectual and 
divine essences”.231 The seemingly innocent adverb ὄντως turns out to be telling: 
the account may not be pure science, but it is science in some way. It is surprising 
that Proclus would claim that the announcement of a mixture is to be found in the 
above quotation, and it seems that his only argument for this would be the fact 
that Timaeus mentions both gods and the generation of the universe – and 
perhaps also the phrase ‘at all points entirely consistent’. What is not surprising, is 
that Proclus sees the cosmological account as a mixture of truth and likely story.  
As Proclus repeatedly emphasizes, the true causes of the natural world are 
transcendent, and hence true philosophy of nature as treated in the Timaeus does 
not study only Becoming, but Becoming insofar as it is caused by Being. As a 
consequence, if the division likely story-truth is parallel to and dependent on the 
division Being-Becoming, the dialogue cannot be a pure likely story.232 Thus 
Timaeus’ account produces a combination of truth and belief, and all aspects of it 
that are based in perception partake in a great deal of likelihood (πολλῆς μετέχει 
τῆς εἰκοτολογίας), whereas everything starting from the intelligible possesses some 
(ἔχει) irrefutability and infallibility.233  
Note that in these carefully phrased statements both truth and likelihood, as 
dependent on the respective objects of study, are a matter of degrees.234 The two 
properties are not absolute and mutually exclusive, and what is more, the mixture 
of truth and likelihood is not determined only by the subject matter, but also by 
what we may call the human factor: discursivity and the structure of reasoning. 
Thus Proclus immediately adds the modification that even our discourse about the 
demiurge is far removed from reality because we say “that he deliberates and 
                                               
230 In Tim. I 348.16-20. 
231 As was emphasized in the exegesis of the preceding lemma, at In Tim. I 410.3-7. Cf. I 348.20-
25.  
232 Assuming for the moment the narrow sense of the principle of discourse, since as we have 
seen in the end all human accounts are likely.  
233 In Tim. I 348.25-27; cf. In Tim. III 356.17-22. On the translation of ἔχει see note 235. 
234 It seems that in Proclus we find a forerunner of Donini’s suggestion that there are levels of 
εἰκὼς λόγος in the Timaeus. Donini (1988: 47) connects the degrees of ‘verisimiglianza’ primarily 
to the source of our knowledge (φρόνησις, mathematical reasoning, perception, 
hearsay/traditional mythology). Cf. Runia (1989: 437). 
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thinks and does this before that”.235 Even when it comes to the truth of the 
intelligible we are forced to “divide the undivided and temporalize the eternal.”236 
We will return to this human factor again at a later point.  
The best illustration of the fact that the mixture of truth plus likely story is 
determined on two levels, reality and discourse, is found after the prooemium, in 
the exegesis of Tim. 30b6-c1. For now, we will concentrate on the level of reality 
and see how there truth and likelihood come together. The passage in question is 
Timaeus’ conclusion that the universe is an animated intelligent living being:  
T V.26 
“So we should say in accordance with the likely account (κατὰ λόγον τὸν 
εἰκότα) that this cosmos truly (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ) came to be an animated 
intelligent living being (ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν) due to the providence of the 
god.”237  
 
This conclusion seems to be qualified contradictorily as both adhering to the likely 
story, and offering the truth. Contemporary readers tend to pass over this 
apparent contradiction,238 or, following Proclus, take the likeliness and the truth 
each to pertain to different parts of the sentence, namely the cosmos and divine 
providence respectively.239  
T V.27 
“Just as the cosmos itself is a compound (σύμμικτος) consisting of both 
images and divine essences, and of both natural and supranatural things, so 
too did Plato call the account about it ‘likely’ and again dubbed it ‘truth’. 
For insofar as it is moved in a discordant and disordered manner the 
account requires an εἰκοτολογία, but with respect to the noeric essence in 
it, and the divine cause from which it proceeds, it requires ‘truth’, and for 
this reason when he intended to speak about the cosmos he added the 
adjective ‘likely’, but when about divine providence ‘truth’.”240  
                                               
235 The modificatory sentence starts with a γὰρ, which is out of place, unless we translate ἔχει in 
the previous sentence as “contains (some)”, as this way the modification is already announced 
and picked up by the γὰρ.  
236 In Tim. I 348.27-349.5 
237 Tim. 30b6-c1. 
238 Taylor and Johansen, e.g. lets it pass in silence. So does Gregory (2000: 250-1), who does 
point to other apparent contradictions (Tim. 37b, 47c, 56b). Cornford (1937: 34), adds a note that 
does not really explain anything, “it is literally true (not merely ‘probable’) that the world is an 
intelligent living creature.”  
239 Thus Runia (1989: 441-3). 
240 In Tim. I 410.11-19. 
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Not surprisingly, considering the careful phrases we have seen before (“a great 
deal of likelihood” and “some irrefutability”), for Proclus this combination of 
truth and account on metaphysical grounds is merely a first step, summoned to 
dispel the apparent contradiction in the lemma. As above, he immediately widens 
the scope after this first step, by pointing out that “moreover, you may observe 
them in the account itself, the likely as well as truth, not just dividing them on the 
basis of the nature of the things [treated].”241 We will here discuss the first step, 
and again leave the addition concerning likeliness and truth of the account itself 
for later.  
In the elaboration of the combination truth-plus-likely account on metaphysical 
grounds Proclus distributes the two predicates on the basis of the different aspects 
of reality. He divides the different aspects of the universe into two sets of things: 
on the one hand images, physical things and the discordantly and disorderly 
moving substrate, which correspond with the account that is “likely”, and on the 
other hand divine essences, supranatural things (ὑπερφυῆ πράγματα242), the 
intellectual essence and the divine cause of the cosmos, which correspond with 
“truth”. Although this list is presented as a neat dichotomy, it is more of a 
spectrum which ranges over all aspects of Timaeus’ exposition of the cosmos, 
from the ontologically most base to the most elevated. At the high end of the 
scale, we find the demiurge as the divine cause of the universe, and at the low end 
the disorderly moving substrate, on which the demiurge imposes order.243 In 
between, in descending order, we meet the intellect of the world, the immanent 
forms (i.e. which Proclus identified as the images of Being),244 and the objects 
informed by nature.  
Thus the explanation for Timaeus’ speaking the truth as well as the likely account 
in one and the same sentence is that that sentence contains information both 
about divine providence and about the kosmos, in the sense of the order of what is 
in essence unordered. Since the universe is a composite, consisting of both Being 
                                               
241 In Tim. I 410.20ff. The whole passage, I 410.11-411.2, can be divided into three parts, picking 
up the earlier division of reality, thoughts and words, although the latter two are almost merged 
into one. See below. 
242 This literal use of ὑπερφυής, which is originally used as meaning “growing aboveground”, but 
occurs mainly metaphorically in Classical Greek to indicate excellence, is found also in 
Iamblichus, e.g. Myst. 5.8.13. 
243 Tim. 30a3-6. 
244 See above V.4.1. 
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and Becoming, consequently the text about the cosmos is a composite of the likely 
and the true.245  
As said before, Proclus’ assumption of a mixture of the likely and the true in 
philosophy of nature is intimately connected with his characterization of the 
dialogue, introduced in the very first pages of the commentary, as being both a 
physical and a theological study of the natural world. Interestingly, the arguments 
adduced in favour of this characterization are derived directly from Tim. 29b3-d3, 
and more specifically from the principle of assimilation: the dialogue combines 
philosophy of nature and theology, in imitation (μιμούμενον) of nature itself, 
because the account should make itself alike (δεῖ ὁμοιοῦσθαι) to reality, of which it is 
the interpreter (ἐξηγηταί);246 and again, at the end of the first book of the 
commentary: real φυσιολογία should depend on theology, like nature on the gods, 
“in order that the account (οἱ λόγοι) be an imitation (μιμηταί) of the things which 
it signifies (σημαντικοί)”.247 
These are crucial passages, for two reasons. First of all, we here find the very 
principle that Plato uses to draw our attention to the limitations of the account of 
philosophy of nature, namely that an account is an exegete of reality, reused by 
Proclus to explain why, in some sense, and to some extent it surpasses such 
limitations and is related to theology. And secondly, Proclus here introduces the 
‘assimilation’ aspect of the εἰκὼς λόγος. Apart from being naturally related to its 
subject matter, a text should make itself alike to it, it should be a mimesis of reality. 
This brings us to assimilation and the practice of the εἰκὼς λόγος, and to the sense 
in which philosophy of nature is a mixture of likely story and truth with respect to 
what I called the human factor: the level of reasoning.  
 
 
V.7 The practice of discourse: assimilation 
 
The natural relation between discourse and reality discussed earlier (V.4) makes 
possible the second property of discourse ascribed to it in Tim. 29b4-5 (quoted as 
text T V.7): its functioning as an interpreter (ἐξηγήτης) of reality. 248 The principle 
                                               
245 Note that the truth and likeliness relevant here are not the cognitions of the ἀναλογία (see 
V.5.2(i)), but instead properties of the account (λόγος, I 410.13). 
246 In Tim. I 8.4-5, 9-13. The infinitive ὁμοιοῦσθαι is here and in the following taken as a middle 
form, but as we will see for Proclus it is not so much the text itself that ‘does’ the assimilating as 
its speaker or author. 
247 In Tim. I 204.8-12. I take the plural οἱ λόγοι here to refer to Timaeus’ account as a whole.  
248 Apart from the passages mentioned in V.6: In Tim. I 343.25 (λόγοις...ἐξηγηταῖς), 27 
(ἑρμηνεύεται); cf. Theol.Plat I 10 46.2-9, VI 1 5.18-19; In Alc. 22.10-11, ib. 119.25-27, where 
Proclus likens the progression of the text to the circular processes in reality, quoting Timaeus’ 
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that an account is an interpreter of things is understood by Proclus to mean, not 
only that there is a natural resemblance between a text and reality which allows a 
transfer of information regarding reality, but also that the user of discourse can 
and should actively try to increase the resemblance between discourse and reality. 
Thus the relation between discourse and its subject consists in opposite 
movements mirroring the metaphysical movement of emanation and reversion: 
just as the world is an image of the intelligible, coming forth from it and actively 
striving to return to it,249 the text is both a natural image of a higher reality and an 
active reversion to it.  
Before looking at the details of the application of the principle of assimilation in 
Proclus’ exegesis, let us subject the principle itself to a closer inspection.  
The principle is related, but certainly not identical, to what Coulter calls ‘literary 
organicism’, the influential literary theory according to which a text is a 
microcosmos.250 In the Phaedrus we find the famous demand that a good text 
resemble a living being, with the proper body, a head and feet.251 In Neoplatonic 
literary theory this requirement was merged with Timaeus 92c (quoted below as T 
V.29), and the animal of choice became the cosmos, as the most beautiful Living 
Being.252 Consequently identifying the constituent elements of the cosmos within 
the dialogue: the Good, the Intellect, the Soul, the form, and the matter of the 
dialogue, became part of the Neoplatonic schema isagogicum.253  
                                                                                                                                      
phrase of words as ἐξηγηταί of reality. Cf. Ammonius, who has the inverse relation because he is 
explaining the necessary truth of propositions expressing necessities: In Int. 154.18-20 εἰσὶν 
ἐξηγηταὶ τῶν πραγμάτων οἱ λόγοι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μιμοῦνται αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ 
Ἀριστοτέλους ὁ Πλάτων ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξεν (cf. 152.9-11, 153.12-13). Cf. Porphyry on definition as 
explanatory (ἐξηγητικός) of things, In Cat. 63.7-8 (Busse), cf. 73.19-20 and 31-35. 
249 See above V.4.1. 
250 Coulter (1976: 95ff.) 
251 Plato’s Phaedrus 264c. 
252 In Tim. I 29.11-13, In Remp. I 11.9-10, In Parm. 659.12-19. On this topic see Gersh (1973: 87-
8), Coulter (1976: 95-103, 120-11), Brisson (1987: 122), Mansfeld (1994: 28-9), Kuisma (1996: 66-
68), Sheppard (2002: 641-44). Cf. Anon. Prol. 4, 15.1-16, where it is not any text, but the Platonic 
dialogue that is compared to the perfect living being. Olymp. In Alc. 56.14-22.   
253 In Alc. 10.4-19, cf. Hadot (1987: 107). In the Anon. Prol. (an introduction to Platonic 
philosophy, dated by Westerink in the 2nd half of the 6th century AD), more details are provided 
on the analogy. Interestingly, Proclus does not name Nature as one of the constituents, whereas 
the anonymous author of the Prolegomena does. The latter distinguishes the Good (i.e. the end or 
purpose), an Intellect (the problem under discussion), a Soul (the demonstrations), a Nature (the 
manner or form of discussion), a form (the style) and a matter (characters and setting). Anon.Prol. 
16-17, cf. Westerink (1962: xxxii and xxxv-vi). The same method was applied to the ‘frames’ of 
Plato’s dialogues: every speaker and every embedding level was identified as an aspect of reality. 
In Parm. I 625.37-627.39, 644.1-645.8, In Tim. 8.30-9.24 and 14.5ff., Anon. Prol. 8 20.2-18. Cf. 
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As Gersh describes the role of this principle in Proclus’ work:  
 
“...a work of Proclus (for example, a commentary on a dialogue of Plato or 
a treatise in a freer form) functions as a map of the real world with a point 
by point correspondence between its own constituent elements and those 
of its counterpart. This usage is obviously related to that in which one 
order within the spiritual world is said to mirror that of its prior, the only 
difference being that the context of discourse itself is viewed as taking the 
place of the lower order.”254  
 
Although Gersh illustrates the practice matching the principle with the 
‘organicism’ of the In Alc. (10.3-14), in Proclus’ work the ramifications of the 
principle extend far beyond its formal application in the introductions to his 
commentaries, among others because, as Sheppard points out, the parallel is “no 
mere device of literary criticism,” but has a metaphysical foundation.255  
We encounter the principle that a text is an ἐξηγήτης of reality throughout Proclus’ 
writings, providing an argument for many instances of a speaker’s increasing the 
similarity of parts of a text, and even a dialogue or treatise in its entirety, to reality. 
It knows two versions. 
T V.28 
“δεῖ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὧν εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί.”256 
 
This sentence, in which the principle of assimilation is expressed, can be read in 
two ways, corresponding to two versions of the principle found in Proclus. The 
relative subclause can be either (1) explanatory or (2) limitative.  
(1) In the former reading, “accounts should make themselves similar to things, as 
they are their interpreters”, the principle has a general application according to 
which the structure of proper accounts mirrors the structure of reality as a whole.257 
This reading fits the above sketched practice of identifying parts of the cosmos in 
any text, but also other parallels. For example, according to Proclus the very 
                                                                                                                                       
Dillon (1976: 254) on Proclus’ interpretation of the characters of the Timaeus and Parmenides as 
images or symbols of reality. See also chapter I and V.7.1. 
254 Gersh (1973: 87-8).  
255 Cf. Sheppard (2002: 642). The fact that Gersh just before the quoted passage (87 and n. 2) 
states that “the structure of discourse mirrors that of reality itself” (my italics), and refers to the 
analysis of the structure of Proclus’ arguments in Festugière (1963), which is not limited to the 
schema isagogicum, suggests that Gersh is aware of this wider application.  
256 In Tim. I 8.9-10.  
257 On the relation between Proclus’ concept of image and parallelism of structure see Gersh 
(1973: 85-6) 
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introduction at Tim. 29b4-5 of the principle of discourse, or the “common axiom” 
(κοινὸν ἀξίωμα) as Proclus calls it, is similar to (ὁμοιούμενος) the emanation of 
everything from the One, or the development of (physical) number from the 
monad. Timaeus first posits one general axiom regarding λόγοι, and subsequently 
introduces a division (διαίρεσις) of two different kinds of λόγοι, on the basis of “the 
quality (ποιότης) of things”.258 The parallel here is merely that of numerical 
progression from any monad to any dyad, but as we will see Proclus considers 
such logical relations within the Timaeus to be crucial for its anagogic function.  
(2) In the latter, limitative reading of the sentence, “accounts should make 
themselves similar to those things of which they are the interpreters”, the principle 
of assimilation has a more narrow sense, to the extent that a text should be similar 
to exactly that part of reality of which it treats. Accordingly, as we saw, it explains why 
Plato’s cosmological dialogue is a mixture of philosophy of nature and theology: 
this is because the discourse makes itself alike (ὁμοιοῦσθαι) to Nature, of which it 
is the interpreter and contemplator (θεατής),259 in order to become an imitator 
(μιμηταί) of things which it signifies (ὧν εἰσι σημαντικοί).260 Likewise, this narrow 
sense of the principle dictates that a text about the universe is itself an image of that 
universe in more than a formal sense.  
As a consequence of this second version of the principle of assimilation, in the In 
Tim. we find one of its most extensive applications. Every Platonic dialogue is a 
microcosmos that imitates its subject with semantic and syntactic tools,261 but 
since the Timaeus has the cosmos as its subject matter, it is a microcosmos in two 
different ways: (1) the dialogue as a whole has the same constituents as reality (it is 
a cosmos), in the more common and superficial vein of the schema isagogicum. (2) 
More importantly, Timaeus’ exposition is also a microcosmos, because it imitates 
                                               
258 In Tim. I 340.16-23 and 341.22-24. Note that, despite the presence of an ἀξίωμα and a 
διαίρεσις, which remind of the comparison with geometry in Proclus’ exegesis of the first half of 
the prooemium, the geometrical method is not explicitly involved at this point. The reason for 
this is that, as indicated in chapter III, in the course of discussing the prooemium Proclus 
gradually shifts from a comparison with the geometrical method to a comparison between the 
structure of a text and the structure of the universe. See also below, V.7. 
259 In Tim. I 8.9-13. Cf. III 104.30-31 ὁ λόγος ὁ τῶν θείων ἐξηγητὴς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων 
ἀπεικονιζόμενος φύσιν, ὧν ἐστιν ἄγγελος. On discourse as ἄγγελος cf. above V.4.2(i). Theol.Plat. VI 
1 5.14-18: the treatment of the gods should be imaged after reality (ἀναγκαῖον...τοῖς πράγμασιν 
ἀπεικάζειν τοὺς λόγους, ὧν εἰσιν ἐξηγηταί), In Remp. I 86.5 (of μῦθοι). 
260 In Tim. I 204.8-12. Λόγοι as μιμηταὶ also at In Alc. 22.10-11. On the range of μίμησις in 
Proclus’ interpretation of Plato see Halliwell (2002: 332).  
261 See Festugière (1963).  
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its subject matter (it is the cosmos).262 Proclus sees a deep structural similarity 
between the syntactic/logical structure of the text and its subject matter, the 
universe as the specific analogue of this dialogue, as well as numerous smaller 
semantic and morphological parallels.263  
In the following Proclus’ elaboration of the second version of the principle of 
assimilation in the In Tim. will be discussed, taking two central issues as our 
starting points: the ἀναλογία between Timaeus and the Demiurge (V.7.1); the 
structural parallels between reality and the text of Timaeus’ account (V.7.2). These 
two issues will be shown to be intimately connected with a third issue, the didactic 
and anagogic nature of the dialogue (V.7.2). Plato’s cosmology is for Proclus 
primarily a didactic text, a λόγος διδασκαλικός,264 in the sense that, like the second 
half of the Parmenides, it trains the soul for the vision of a higher reality – the One 
in the case of the Parmenides, and the causes of the natural world, but the 
Demiurge in particular, in the case of the Timaeus. The role of the principle of 
assimilation in this anagogy cannot be overestimated, as the speaker employs it to 
facilitate the reversion mentioned at the beginning of this section by establishing 
the likeness of a text to its subject matter through his knowledge thereof. This  in 
turn paves the way for a reversion of the soul of the audience.  
 
 
V.7.1 Timaeus as demiurge, the Timaeus as cosmos 
 
In ancient literary theory the demiurge, the divine creator of the cosmos, whose 
activities were described as those of an artisan, himself in turn became the 
paradigm for the inspired literary creator.265 Already in the Timaeus, however, there 
seems to be a deeper parallel between the demiurge as the creator of the cosmos 
and Timaeus, not only as the creator of his text, but as the recreator in words of 
the demiurge’s creation:266  
                                               
262 As such, it is a successor of Homer and Hesiod’s poems, which according to Proclus imitate 
Nature’s mimesis of the Intelligible, see In Remp. I 77.13-28. Note that the Timaeus as a whole, so 
not just Timaeus’ speech, is also considered the analogue of the κοσμοποιία, In Tim. I 73.16-21. 
263 Another example of a dialogue in which Proclus sees this structure is of course the Parmenides, 
from the first hypothesis ‘if the One is’ at 137c onwards, see below V.7.2. Note that the principle 
is even used to explain the relation between Plato’s dialogues as mirroring reality, with the 
Parmenides at the top (Theol.Plat. I 7 32.6-12). As is well known, Proclus structured his own 
systematic works, most notably El.Th. and Theol.Plat., in accordance with the structure of 
emanation. Cf. O'Meara (2000).  
264 In Tim. I 338.5. See also below. 
265 Cf. Coulter (1976: 96). On the demiurge as artisan see Brisson (1994: 30ff.). 
266 Johansen (2004: 186ff.) shows that there is a structural parallel between Timaeus’ account and 
the world, as well as verbal correspondences between the tasks of Timaeus and the demiurge. Cf. 
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T V.29 
“And so now we may say that our account of the universe has reached its 
conclusion (τέλος). This world of ours has received and teems with living 
beings, mortal and immortal. A visible living being containing visible living 
beings, a perceptible god, image of the intelligible Living Being, its 
grandness, goodness, beauty, and perfection are unexcelled. Our one 
heaven, indeed the only one of its kind, has come to be.”267 
 
The parallel between the work of the demiurge and Timaeus’ exposition is of 
paramount importance to Proclus, which shows from the fact that it is brought up 
extensively in the introduction of the commentary. In what we could call the 
metaphysical prosopography, i.e. the description of the metaphysical stratum each 
persona represents in the microcosmos of the dialogue, Timaeus is made the 
analogue of the Demiurge, while the three members of the audience are analogous 
to the demiurgic triad consisting of Demiurgic Intellect, Soul, and universal 
Nature,268 with Socrates as the summit of the triad and the other two ordered 
below him, according to their verbal contribution: first Critias, who ‘does say 
something’, then the taciturn Hermocrates.269 Socrates, Critias and Hermocrates 
receive the words of Timaeus as the demiurgic triad receives the λόγοι of the 
Demiurge.270 
Of course, the parallel between Timaeus and the demiurge goes deeper than this 
mere symbolic hierarchy suggested by the quantitative differences between the 
contributions of the four men.271 It is in fact of great importance for the didactic 
nature of the text, as may be shown on the basis of Proclus’ second elaboration of 
the parallel, at the beginning of the second book of the commentary: the prayer, 
the exhortation of the audience, and the commencement of Timaeus’ exposition 
proper.272  
                                                                                                                                      
Hadot, P. (1983), who proposes that due to the imperfection of human nature the nearest 
approximation of creation obtained in an account is an imprecise imitation thereof, cf. above n. 
24. On the literary artisan as analogous to the Demiurge see Coulter (1976: 105). 
267 Tim. 92c4-9, transl. Zeyl, slightly modified. Cf. Crit. 106a4. 
268 In Tim. I 12.1-5. 
269 In Tim. I 23.11-16. 
270 In Tim. I 9.15-22. Cf. I 55.5ff, 57.31-59.6, 62.5-63.12, 199.31-200.3 and after the prooemia: I 
354.19-20. Note that both Plato himself and the dialogue itself are also compared to the 
demiurge, e.g. In Tim. I 423.24-29, and In Tim. II 98.18ff. On the λόγοι of the Demiurge see 
V.4.2(i). 
271 Although it is also a symbolic reading: In Tim. I 200.2-3.  
272 Tim. 27c1-d1, d2-4 and d5 respectively.  
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The invocation of the gods at the beginning of Timaeus’ account (Tim. 27c6-d1) is 
an imitation of the demiurge’s “entering the oracular shrine of night” before 
creation, as well as of the remaining of all beings with the gods before 
emanation.273 Its function is to establish in Timaeus a unitary view of reality, the 
“supreme end of philosophical speculation” (τὸ ἀκρότατον θεωρίας τέλος) in order 
for him to be able to arrange the coming account, primarily according to Intellect, 
and secondarily, where that is not possible, according to human intellect and 
science.274 Proclus is referring to the fact that Timaeus’ exposition combines 
expressions of intuitive knowledge with discursive argument, more on which 
below. 
On a textual level, the prayer, representing the reversion to Intellect, provides the 
exposition of Timaeus with an ἀρχή that imitates (μιμεῖται) the ἀρχή of the 
universe.275 It is followed by the exhortation of the audience (Tim. 27d1-4), 
explained by Proclus as the preparation of “that which will be filled”, in order to 
facilitate both the contribution of Timaeus and the reception by his audience.276 
This preparation is comparable to a first phase of emanation. Together, the prayer 
and the exhortation which constitute a combination of an upward and a 
downward motion starting from Timaeus, constitute a chain that reflects the 
demiurgic chain and ensures that Timaeus’ account is connected with its divine 
source and will be received as such.277 Thus by taking the place analogous to that 
of the demiurge, who is the highest mediator between the intelligible and the 
sensible,278 Timaeus, becomes a mediator for his audience through his λόγος, and 
opens up an ally to knowledge.279 In this sense of being the teacher and the 
mediator between a higher level and those whom he informs, Timaeus is slightly 
elevated above the level of his audience.280 
Once the chain to the divine source is established, Timaeus’ self-moving soul can 
take over and express its scientific knowledge (further emanation).281 This is the 
                                               
273 In Tim. I 206.26-207.2 (with reference to Orph. frg. 164-5 Kern), 214.23-26. On the prayer and 
the invocation see also Lernould (2005: 142-4) and the summary in Cleary (2006: 141). 
274 In Tim. I 221.1-8. On prayer as an essential condition for the transition from the study of the 
cosmos to theologia see Beierwaltes (1979: 10, 329). 
275 In Tim. I 214.23-26. 
276 In Tim. I 222.11-15, esp. δεῖ γὰρ τὸ πληροῦν ἐξηρτημένον τῶν οἰκείων αἰτίων προανεγείρειν τὰ 
δεξόμενα καὶ ἐπιστρέφειν εἰς ἑαυτὸ πρὸ τῆς πληρώσεως. Cf. El.Th. prop. 134. 
277 Cf. In Tim. I 222.3-6. 
278 Cf. Beierwaltes (1969: 131): the Demiurge “wird (...) Vermittler zum Denken des höchsten 
Bereiches.”  
279 To (the universe created in) the text, he is the demiurge, to his audience, the mediator. Cf. In 
Parm. 838.34-839.6, where Parmenides, educating Socrates, is compared to the “paternal cause”. 
280 See the hierarchy of λόγοι, V.4.2(i) and n. 78.  
281 In Tim. I 222.17-223.2. 
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actual production of λόγοι, which starts at Tim. 27d5. The commencement of 
Timaeus’ account with the words “in my opinion” (κατά γε ἐμὴν δόξαν)282 
indicates the activation of the opinative part (τὸ δοξαστικόν) of the soul of the 
speaker, after awakening his intuitive part by the prayer and the dianoetic part of 
the souls of all those present by the exhortation of the audience.283 The term 
δοξαστικόν here, as has been pointed out by Festugière, has an uncommon 
meaning: it is explicitly distinguished from δόξα as connected to sense perception 
and uncertainty,284 and is instead conceived as that part of the soul which channels 
the scientific knowledge it receives from διάνοια to others.285 That Timaeus can 
use this Pythagorean mode of teaching which consists in the dogmatic expression 
of discursive thinking, rather than the Socratic dialogue, is due to the fact that his 
interlocutors are intelligent men (ἄνδρες ἔμφρονες).286  
The production of λόγοι is yet another aspect of the parallel between demiurge 
and Timaeus. Creating discourse, like creating the cosmos, is a matter of λόγους 
ποιεῖν, in the sense of the unfolding and exteriorization of internal λόγοι.287 The 
demiurge brings forth creative principles288 and Timaeus expresses (ἐν προφορᾷ) 
his own scientific knowledge, in a didactic manner (διδασκαλικῶς), for the sake of 
education and communication. 289 In fact, the result of Timaeus informing his 
audience is analogous to that of the Demiurge informing the disorderly moving 
substrate, namely a κοσμοποιία, the creation of a cosmos:290  
T V.30 
                                               
282 Tim. 27d5, γε not in Burnet. 
283 In Tim. I 223.24-30. 
284 On δόξα cf. above V.5.2(i) and III.4.1(iii). 
285 Festugière (1966-8: vol. II, 47 n. 2) (ad κατ’ ἐμὴν δόξαν): “Pas n’est besoin de signaler que δόξα 
et τὸ δοξαστικόν (223.24) sont pris ici dans un sense particulier, “l’expression au dehors de ἂ 
δοκεῖ”, cf. ἐκδίδωσιν εἰς ἂλλους 223.18s., ἐπ’ ἄλλους μετοχετεύει 223.26, ce sense se rapprochant 
de celui qui est usuel pour δόγμα. De là vient la précision indiquée plus loin (223.26ss.): ce 
δοξαστικόν-ci n’est pas comme la δόξα ordinaire qui est ἀμφίβολος, περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ μεριζομὲνη, ἐν 
ὑπολήψεσι μόναις τὴν εἴδεσιν ἀφωρισμένην ἔχουσα, mais il contemple (θεωροῦν! 223.30) le plan 
(λόγος) du Démiurge et porte sur la nature un jugement sûr (διακρῖνον).” Cf. Lernould (2005: 
145). 
286 In Tim. I 223.5, 11-12. Cf. O'Meara (1989: 152-5) on the theory of learning in the In Alc.  
287 Cf. Theol.Plat. I 29 (on divine names), 124.7ff, esp. 12-20, where discourse is called the 
presenting of a moving image of interior vision, comparable to the activities of the demiurge.  
288 See above, V.4.2(i). 
289 In Tim. I 217.28ff, esp. 218.13-28. On the Stoic distinction between the uttered word (λόγος 
προφορικός) and the inner thought (λόγος ἐνδιαθετός), see SVF (Sext.Emp. Adv.Math. VIII 275); 
cf. Galen Protr. 1.1ff. Cf. Festugière (1966-8: vol. V, 56 n. 4). On the Pythagorean side of 
Timaeus’ discourse, monologic as opposed to dialectic, see below.  
290 Cf. Struck (2002). 
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“… the father of the text (ὁ πατήρ τῶν λόγων) should stand in proportion 
(ἀνάλογον) to the father of things (ἔργα). For the creation of the cosmos 
according to λόγος is an image (εἰκών) of the creation of the cosmos 
according to mind.”291  
 
The demiurge has a preconception of the ‘definition’ of the cosmos before 
creation, and in imitation thereof Timaeus has a preconception of the account he 
will give, and defines its character, i.e. in Tim. 29b3-d3, before setting out on his 
own δημιουργία τοῦ παντός.292 That demiurgy starts immediately after the 
prooemium, with the question after the final cause of the universe.293 
The parallel between Timaeus’ exposition and the details of creation runs 
throughout Proclus’ commentary. Its most extensive feature is the structure of all 
of philosophy of nature as imaging the structure of the cosmos by an internal 
division into subdisciplines. This feature was the subject of the two previous 
chapters. We also find the assimilation of text to subject on a far smaller, semantic 
and lexical level, of individual words imitating certain aspects of the universe and 
creation, and on a formal level (morphological, syntactic and discourse).294 It 
would be neither feasible nor fruitful to treat all the details of Proclus’ rich and at 
                                               
291 In Tim. I 9.15-17. Cf. In Tim. I 29.7-9, 222.17-20, 334.18-27, 338.5-7, 339.21ff. The theme of 
the author as the father of his text can be found at Tht. 164e2 (μύθου), Symp. 177d5, Phdr. 257b2 
(both λόγου). On the topic of lexical correspondence between demiurge and author in Plato see 
Brisson (1987). In Proclus, the expression ‘ὁ πατήρ τῶν λόγων’ is not uncommon for ‘author’, ὀ 
πατήρ τοῦ λόγου and ὁ πατήρ τοῦ μύθου are more rare. 
292 In Tim. I 339.18-29 (quoted as T V.3) and 355.28. 
293 In Tim. 355.28-356.1. 
294 This presence of assimilation on the level of the λέξις of Plato’s text at times brings the theme 
of the εἰκὼς λόγος very close to that of the generation or construction of the universe 
διδασκαλίας ἕνεκα. The main difference between these two issues could be summarized as 
positive vs. negative: whereas the εἰκὼς λόγος concerns the manner in which the account is a 
faithful image of reality, the issue of the generation of the universe instead centers around the 
fact that in some respects it is not. The unlikeness of the likely account is primarily and inevitably 
caused by the nature of the world of Becoming, of human cognition, and of language, while the 
choices made by the author increase its likeness. In the case of the cosmogony, however, the choices 
made by the author for the sake of clarity result in decrease of likeness. The two issues come closest, 
of course, when the principle of assimilation is summoned to explain passages that seem 
indicative of unlikeness, as in fact being instances of the imaging of the structure of reality. A 
clear example is In Tim. I 334.18-27, where Proclus explains that the statement that the world 
“comes into being and perishes” (Tim. 22c), later followed by more noble designations like “most 
beautiful of things become” and the like, are given in imitation of the order of generation, from 
disorderly motion to cosmos. Cf. II 102.27-104.16, where Proclus explains the fact that Soul is 
discussed after Body (at Tim. 34b3ff.), despite the ontological priority of the former, as a 
temporary switch to exposition in the order of reversion rather than emanation.  
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times overly zealous identification of instances of assimilation, so we will limit the 
remainder of our treatment thereof to some of the more interesting features, 
related to the structure of reasoning and the anagogic function of the dialogue. 
 
 
V.7.2 Reversion and emanation 
 
The last aspect of Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 20b3-d3 to be treated in this 
chapter is assimilation in the sense of the imitation of the subject matter in 
exteriorized λόγοι, with semantic and formal means, in order to increase the 
anagogic effect of the account. The procedure in question is one of a restructuring 
of reasoning into a phase of reversion and subsequent emanation, similar to the 
prayer and exhortation discussed above. The main purpose of this procedure is to 
imitate the metaphysical reversion and emanation and thereby stimulate the 
anagogy of the audience. We will see that it is in the context of this procedure that 
we can finally fathom the rationale behind the earlier introduction of the trio 
things thoughts and words, and the subsequent reduction of the εἰκὼς λόγος to its 
epistemological side. We will return to this later. Before looking at the passages in 
which Proclus uncovers this procedure, let us review Proclus’ description of the 
procedure and its connection to the εἰκὼς λόγος. 
 
We now return at long last to Proclus’ explanation of the apparent contradiction 
at Tim. 30b6-c1, where Plato combines truth and likely account in one sentence. 
After explaining this combination on the level of their respective metaphysical 
referents,295 Proclus continues to add a distinction internal to the account, related 
to what I called the human factor, the structure of reasoning:  
T V.31 
“...you may observe the likely as well as truth in the account itself (κατ’ 
αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον), not just dividing them on the basis of the nature of the 
things [treated]. For since in many places he attacked the demiurgy in a 
divided manner (μεριστῶς), employing calculations and divisions and 
compositions, even though in the divine creation all things are 
simultaneous,296 but in many other places ascended to the universal 
intellection of the father, as in the axioms “he was good” (Tim. 29e1) and 
“it neither was nor will be right for the best to do anything other than the 
most beautiful” (30a7), he called the one ‘likely account’ (εἰκοτολογία), and 
                                               
295 See above V.6.1(ii). 
296 Cf. In Tim. I 348.27-349.5 and above V.5.2(ii). 
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the other ‘truth’. He called simple apprehension (ἡ ἁπλῆ ἐπιβολή) truth, 
and divided apprehension (τὴν διῃρημένην) ‘likely account’, for it is from 
our manyformed (πολυειδής297) cognitions that he instructed us about the 
divine and demiurgic intellection.”298 
 
Proclus refines the division of likely and true by showing how the expression of 
the structure of reasoning contributes to the nature of Timaeus’ discourse. On the 
basis of the earlier metaphysical division one might feel justified to assert that 
everything in the Timaeus that concerns the intelligible, the transcendent, the 
eternal, etc., is taken by Proclus to be exempt from the qualification of ‘likely 
story’, and is instead read as truth. Here, however, Proclus states that, because of 
the many forms of cognition we have, also when it comes to descriptions of the 
activities of the Demiurge, that were in the previous part grouped with truth, both 
predicates, ‘truth’ as well as ‘likely’, are applicable.  
Our “multiform” cognitions and divided grasp (διῃρημένη ἐπιβολή)299 of reality 
force us to use “calculations, divisions and compositions,” i.e. not just in our own 
reasoning, but ascribing them to the Demiurge, whose activities are unitary and 
eternal.300 The result is a likely account. Timaeus can also, however, represent the 
highest form of cognition he possesses of the Demiurge, intuitive and unitary 
understanding (ἁπλῆ ἐπιβολή), in an account, by formulating certain axioms.301 
Such a representation of the divine, as well as the unitary understanding of which 
it is an expression, deserve to be called ‘truth’.302  
Moreover, Timaeus imitates the process of emanation by the representation of his 
unitary understanding in the form of an anticipated conclusion, followed by its 
discursive unfolding that consists in the elaboration of the premises leading to the 
                                               
297 In the context, πολυειδής could be the opposite of both μονοειδής and ἁπλῶς, since Proclus is 
talking about our different forms of cognitions as well as the multiplicity of divided 
apprehension. 
298 In Tim. I 410.20-411.2. 
299 A διῃρημένη ἐπιβολή seems to be a contradiction in terms, as ἐπιβολή is associated with 
immediate, intuitive grasping. The combination διῃρημένη ἐπιβολή occurs, as far as I have been 
able to ascertain, only in Proclus. Cf. Theol.Plat. I 111.9. Two options: either we should not supply 
ἐπιβολή, but assume that something like γνώσις is implicit, or we should understand διῃρημένη 
ἐπιβολή as a plural, cf. Porph. In Cat. 4,1.101.4 κατὰ ἄλλην γὰρ καὶ ἄλλην ἐπιβολὴν. 
300 Calculations/reasonings (λογισμοί): e.g. Tim 30b4, 33a6, 34a8; divisions (διαιρέσεις): e.g. Tim. 
35b4; compositions (συνθέσεις): e.g. Tim. 35a1ff. 
301 Their being axioms probably lies in the fact that they are not argued for. In the terminology of 
chapter III they are common notions rather than axioms. 
302 For truth as γνώσις see V.5.2(i). 
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conclusion.303 Using this procedure allows Timaeus to instruct his audience about 
“divine and demiurgic intellection” (see above).  
We have to maintain a certain caution when using the above passage as a source 
for general Proclus’ views on the status of Timaeus’ account, since its content is 
clearly determined by the need to explain the current and preceding lemmas.304 
Nonetheless, the explanation given for the procedure applied at Tim. 29e1 will 
help understand passages which according to Proclus contain the same procedure.  
Proclus explicitly identifies five instances of application of the procedure 
described above, and which on one occasion he calls ἀναφωνήσις:305 (a) 
‘γέγονεν’,306 the ‘axiom’ that the world “has become”, followed by the demiurgy; 
(b) παντὶ δὴ σαφές, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀίδιον, Plato’s statement that “it is clear to everyone 
that [he used] an eternal paradigm”, followed by the demonstration of the 
paradigmatic cause;307 (c) ἀγαθὸς ἦν, the assertion, immediately after the 
proœmium, concerning the goodness of the demiurge as the final cause of the 
universe;308 (d) ἕνα, the statement that the world is unique;309 and finally (e) εἰσὶ δὲ 
δὴ τέτταρες, the claim that “there are four” kinds of living being.310 
As becomes clear from the explanation Proclus gives of these instances, the 
progression of the text imitates the ontological structure of creation, but moreover 
mirrors the structure of cognition and reasoning.311 Timaeus’ questions whether 
the world has become, what its paradigmatic cause is, what its final cause, and 
                                               
303 Of course according to Proclus, as well as Plotinus the conclusion is prior to the 
argumentation, cf. for Plotinus Enn. V 8 [31] 7.36-47. 
304 The two axioms mentioned, “he was good” and “it neither was nor will be right for the best to 
do anything other than the most beautiful” are important arguments in favour of the conclusion 
that the world has been created as an animated intelligent living being. Despite the fact that in the 
other descriptions of the procedure (see below) Proclus often gives a list of its occurrences, the 
second axiom is never included. E.g. In Tim. I 360.5-14. 
305 In Tim. I 360.13, cf. the expression τὸ συμπέρασμα προαναφονεῖν, Hermias In Phaedr. 118.9-10 
and Simpl. In Cael 61.6, In Phys. 278.20. Cf. In Tim. I 438.20 ἀνεφθέγξατο. 
306 Tim. 28b, In Tim. I 282.27-283.12. Cf. II 7.18-21, where Proclus seems to have forgotten which 
part of the argumentation was the axiom and has it refer to the universal premise involved. 
307 Tim. 29a4-5, In Tim. I 330.12-19. 
308 Tim. 29e1, In Tim. I 360.5-14, cf. 370.13ff..  
309 Tim. 31a3, In Tim. I 438.20-439.1. 
310 Tim. 39e, In Tim. III 104.27-105. 
311 Cf. Theol.Plat. I 10 46.2ff. where the principle that accounts are interpreters of reality, and 
“carry an image” (εἰκόνα φέρουσι) thereof is put side by side with the principle that the unfolding 
(ἀνέλιξις) of demonstrations necessarily parallels the structure of the reality they concern, and is 
used to argue for the statement that a simple syllogistic reasoning purveys a truth closer to the 
One than a complex syllogism. Cf. I 11 53.9-10. See also Charles-Saget (1982: 310). For an early 
occurence of the expression εἰκόνα φέρειν, which suggest a Pythagorean origin, see Alex. in Met. 
771.24, 772.8. 
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whether it is unique, with their subsequent replies, are each mapped onto the 
circular motion of Timaeus’ soul, as well as the creative activities of the demiurge. 
The triadic structure of Neoplatonic metaphysics, in the order reversion, 
remaining, and emanation is clearly distinguished in its epistemological context, as 
a movement εἰς νοῦν, κατὰ νοῦν, and ἀπὸ νοῦν.312 Timaeus first turns from 
discursive reason to his own intellect, and subsequently proceeds from intellect to 
reasoning.  
More in detail, the three stages are the following: (1) Εἰς νοῦν. The first, 
preparatory stage is the formulation of an aporia, by posing a question, for 
example whether the world is generated or not.313 This stage is an awakening and 
reversion (ἐστραμμένος, ἀνατρέχων) of Timaeus upon his own mind, reflecting the 
self-motion of soul.  
(2) Κατὰ νοῦν: the second stage is the reply to the aporia in a single phrase or even 
word (μιᾷ φωνῇ), e.g. γέγονεν, which images the cast of intellect (μιμεῖται τὴν τοῦ 
νοῦ βολήν), and is comparable to the unitary and permanent act of creation of the 
demiurge.314 This phase expresses the intuitive, unitary (ἀθρόως) view of truth,315 
in the manner of the divinely inspired, who see everything all at once. Note that 
the expression of an intuitive view of reality is itself not that intuition, but an image 
and imitation thereof, because we cannot speak intellectively (νοερῶς).316 
And finally, (3) ἀπὸ νοῦ: the proceeding (ἀπὸ νοῦ προϊών, ἀπὸ νοῦ κάτεισιν εἰς λογικὰς 
διεξόδους) from intellect to rational exposition with the use of demonstration.317  
The last phase, the discursive unfolding of what is present in a concentrated form 
in the anticipated conclusion, and the division of what is unitarily present in 
                                               
312 In Tim. I 438.24-28: ἐπιστρέφων εἰς νοῦν...κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν...εἰς διάνοιαν ἀπὸ νοῦ κατιών. The 
fifth example of anticipating the conclusion, and the only one that does not occur in the second 
book of the commentary, consists only in the last two stages, as it is not preceded by a question.  
313 Proclus explains the three stages as the reflection of an internal dialogue: “For he himself is 
the one who raises the question, he is the one who solves it, and he is the one who presents the 
demonstration” (In Tim. I 438.23-24). Cf. Plato on thought as internal dialogue, Soph. 263e3-8, 
Tht. 189e6-109a2 and above n. 123. 
314 Cf. I 370.17 ἀποφθεγματικῶς. Note that there is a quantitative parallel between text and reality: 
the fewer the words, the more unitary the thing expressed. As Lernould (2005: 154 n. 145) points 
out, the axiom is as it were a concentrated form of the whole argument.  
315 Cf. In Tim. I 360.14 τὴν ἀθρόαν τοῦ παντὸς περίληψιν. 
316 In Tim. I 283.4 μιμεῖται, 360.14 μιμούμενος, 438.27 εἰκών; cf. I 303.19-20, also quoted above. 
On this issue cf. Kuisma (1996).  
317 In Tim. I 282.27-283.11, cf. 438.20-439.1, In Tim. III 104.27-105.14. Proclus argues for the 
necessity of the second phase for the third by referring to Arist. APo II 19: all demonstration 
takes its starting points from intellect (In Tim. I 438.28-439.1). Note that Proclus splits the third 
phase of example (c) ἀγαθὸς ἦν in two at I 370.18ff., namely an elaboration (a) διεξοδικῶς (at 
least, this is Taylors proposal for a lacuna in the text) and (b) ἀνειλιγμενῶς.  
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reality,318 is needed because it is impossible to express both the unity and the 
fullness of distinction at the same time.319 Both need to be expressed, however, 
for the sake of anagogy. That Timaeus has an intuitive grasp of the entire cosmos 
and its causes is not enough: he has to express it and unfold it for the benefit of 
his interlocutors who are epistemically less advanced, and need guidance in their 
ascent to knowledge.320  
The choice of the five examples of this procedure is not arbitrary. Assuming that 
Timaeus’ procedure is successful, his audience will afterwards be in the position to 
acquire insight into (a) the nature of the universe, (b) the paradigmatic cause, (c) 
the demiurgic and the final cause,321 (d) the unicity of the universe, and (e) the 
number of kinds of living beings.  
At this point we can return to the question why Proclus has chosen to expand 
Plato’s discussion of things and words at Tim. 29b3-d3 into one about ‘things, 
thoughts and words’: for Proclus the likeness that is most relevant in this section 
of the Timaeus is the psychological/epistemological one, through which our 
reversion is established, but this likeness is observable in and more importantly 
transferable through the likeness of discourse. Therefore, it is crucial for the 
didactic reading of the Timaeus that all three, things, thoughts and words, be 
introduced at the outset of the interpretation of the εἰκὼς λόγος. 
 
The procedure of anticipating the conclusion in imitation of reversion to νοῦς and 
emanation into discursive reasoning is one which we encounter throughout 
Proclus’ work. He finds it in the second half of the Parmenides, where it is part of a 
larger structure in which the audience is first stimulated to ascend to the One, and 
subsequently to follow the unfolding of all of reality from the One.322 Likewise, in 
                                               
318 In Tim. III 105.2-4 ἀναπτύσσει τὸ συνεσπειραμένον καὶ ἀνελίσσει τὴν μίαν νόησιν διὰ τῶν λόγων 
καὶ τὸ ἡνωμένον διαιρεῖ κατ΄ αὐτὴν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν.  
319 In Tim. III 105.4-6: ποτὲ μὲν τὴν ἕνωσιν αὐτῶν, ποτὲ δὲ τὴν διάκρισιν ἑρμηνεύων, ἐπειδήπερ 
ἑκάτερον ἅμα περιλαμβάνειν οὐ πέφυκεν οὐδὲ οἷός τέ ἐστι. 
320 Cf. Isaac (1976: 470). At In Tim. I 433.11-22 Proclus suggests that for didactic reasons Plato 
(sic) speaks in a certain manner in imitation of the emanation and reversion of the cosmos from 
and to the Living Being itself, in order to bring out clearly (ἡμῖν γνωρίμως) the ἀναλογία existing 
between them. Cf. Opsomer (2000: 358 and n. 30). 
321 Example (c) was ἀγαθος ἦν, which expresses the final cause as it is present in the Demiurge. 
322 On the procedure in the In Parm. and Proclus’ own practice in the El.Th. see O'Meara (2000). 
Cf. In Parm. VI 1125.13-22, 1132.26ff, 1152.12ff, 1167.1ff. Gritti (2003: 297f.) states in the 
context of the In Parm. passages that the development of the demonstration that leads to the 
conclusion is a representation of the transition from discursive reason to intellect. Proclus, 
however, like Plotinus, maintains rather that the conclusion has priority over the demonstration, 
and that there is a transition from intellect to discursive reason, in turn followed by a reversion to 
intellect by the second statement of the conclusion.  
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the Elements of Theology, Proclus commences with a short ascent (prop. 1-4), 
followed by a representation of the emanation of reality from the One/Good.323  
It need not surprise us, then, that in Proclus’ reading of the Timaeus the procedure 
of anticipating the conclusion is also part of a larger structure. In the previous 
chapter we have seen that Proclus explains the starting points presented in the 
prooemium as an ascent to the causes of the universe, and especially as they are 
present in the Demiurge. In this chapter, it has been shown in what sense 
Timaeus’ exposition is an imitation of the activities of the Demiurge. I propose 
therefore that Proclus’ reading of the Timaeus, inspired by the metaphysical reading 
of the hypotheses of the Parmenides, follows the same pattern as that of the 
Parmenides, but on a lower metaphysical level. It is a reversion to the Demiurge, 
followed by an emanation of the universe from divine providence. As such, the 
text is also a reversion for the writer/speaker and for the audience. The reversion 
takes place within the first half of the prooemium, and the emanation starts 
directly after the prooemium.  
 
The Timaeus is not a poem. If we momentarily disregard genre boundaries, 
however, we can see the dialogue as a hymn to the Demiurge, and as akin to 
scientific poetry, the second kind of poetry described by Proclus in the Commentary 
on the Republic.324  
We have seen in chapter I that the Timaeus for Proclus is a kind of hymn to the 
demiurge.325 In the foregoing, it has moreover become clear what that means, 
namely that the dialogue is an invocation of and reversion to the demiurge who 
mediates between us humans and the transcendent.326 That does not mean, by the 
way, that it is not also an argumentative and informative text. In fact, the 
argumentative and informative qualities of the text allow it to function as a 
hymn.327 
As scientific ‘poetry’, the Timaeus would be a form of teaching that is associated 
with both νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη, and teaches without the use of representation, by 
simply telling the reader or audience of its subject-matter within lower 
                                               
323 O'Meara (2000: 287-8). It is also well known that the ‘second part’ of the Platonic Theology 
(books II ff.) follows the order of emanation. Saffrey and Westerink (1968: vol I, lx ff.). 
324 For reff. see below. Cf. the suggestion of Coulter (1976: 108-9). As Sheppard (1980: 185) 
points out, in his discussion of scientific poetry Proclus is more interested in the properties of 
didactic than in delimiting a genre. 
325 See I.5. 
326 Beierwaltes (1969: 131). 
327 To go a step further, I see no reason to discard an argumentative and informative function of 
a text that is an invocation of the divine, as Rappe (2000: 170) does in the context of her reading 
of the Platonic Theology as an invocation of the divine.  
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metaphysics, natural science, or ethics.328 Taking the Timaeus as an example of this 
kind of poetry may allow us to solve two small issues.  
(1) First of all, the contradiction Sheppard signals with regard to scientific poetry 
and ἀναλογία, namely that from Proclus’ 6th essay follows both that scientific 
poetry does not use any representation, and that it uses ἀναλογία,329 can easily be 
solved. Ἀναλογία is indeed “a matter of representing something on a higher level 
of reality by something on a lower level which is like it,” as she concludes on the 
basis of Gersh’s discussion of the notion, but using εἰκόνες in the sense of 
ontological images, rather than literary ones.330 That is, the representation is to be 
found on the level of the reality described in the text, not on that of the text 
itself.331  
(2) Coulter, who associates Platonic dialogues in general with scientific poetry,332 
signals the “curious conflation of two faculties”, νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη in the context 
of Proclus’ description of scientific poetry, and explains it as an attempt to fit four 
cognitive faculties into three kinds of poetry.333 As we have seen in the foregoing, 
however, the combination of just these faculties can be explained from the 
didactic nature of this particular kind of discourse, as leading the audience to a 
higher cognitive state.   
 
 
V.8 In conclusion: φυσιολογία as scientific mimesis 
 
In this conclusion we will review the different aspects of Proclus’ reading of the 
‘fourth demonstration’, Tim. 29b3-d3, and in the process address one final 
question, regarding Proclus’ take on the relation between the starting points, 
which formed the subject of chapter III, and the εἰκὼς λόγος discussed in this 
chapter.  
                                               
328 In Remp 177.23-178.2, 186.22ff, note especially 25-26: πολλὰ...εἰκότα...δόγματα, 198.21-24. On 
Proclus’ notion of scientific poetry see Coulter (1976: 107-9), Sheppard (1980: 95-103, 182-7) 
(who calls this kind of poetry ‘didactic’, but see Beierwaltes (1985: 304)) and van den Berg (2001: 
119ff.) 
329 Sheppard (1980: 198-9).  
330 I think this is the point Gersh (1973: 83-90, esp. 84), to whom she refers, is making.  
331 See on this issue also Martijn (2006b) and cf. Opsomer (2000). In a recent discussion of 
scientific poetry, van den Berg (2001: 135) has another solution, which I take to be incorrect 
because it ignores the fact that the εἰκόνες are ontological images: van den Berg denies that 
scientific poetry works without representation. 
332 See above n. 324. 
333 Coulter (1976: 108, n. 19) 
DISCOURSE AND REALITY 
- 273 - 
We have seen that Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3 knows many layers. 
Assuming the widest scope of the principle of discourse, any discourse is a likely 
story, imprecise and refutable, and not truth, due to the nature of language, which 
is inherently discursive. This holds for any account, be it about the perceptible or 
about the intelligible.  
More importantly, the imprecision and refutability of, again, any account are due 
to the embodiment of human souls. Our cognition is the inferior of divine 
cognition. Accounts as expressions of our knowledge of the perceptible are 
refutable due to their dependence on the acquisition of knowledge with the use of 
faulty sense perception and external instruments, but even our knowledge of the 
intelligible is subject to discursivity and fallibility. Scientific knowledge of any 
subject is necessarily inferior to intuitive, unitary vision. 
All this does not imply, however, that Proclus reduces the whole issue of the 
status of discourse described at Tim. 29b3-d3 to a trivial statement regarding the 
necessarily discursive nature of discourse and thought: Proclus’ focus lies 
elsewhere. Proclus’ explanation of Tim. 29b3-d3 has as its main focal point the 
relation between discourse, knowledge, and reality, and assumes a basic continuity 
between higher and lower levels, both within these three domains, and among them.  
Due to that continuity, which is the result of the triadic nature of causation, every 
lower level of reality has an inherent and positive similarity to higher levels. The 
value of Platonic philosophy of nature lies in revealing that continuity and 
similarity between the sensible world and its transcendent causes, and thus 
connecting the perceptible with the intelligible.334 Thus despite the fact that the 
subject matter of philosophy of nature is the in many respects indefinite and 
changing universe, that our tools in studying it lack precision, and that our means 
for expressing it lack unity, Plato’s philosophy of nature is capable of conveying a 
certain kind of truth.  
The similarity of discourse to reality falls into two parts: an emanation and a 
reversion, or what I called resemblance and assimilation. Due to the resemblance 
of discourse, it has a natural and ontological relation of similarity to its causes, 
reality and our thoughts. And due to the increased assimilation of a text to its 
subject matter by the writer or speaker a text can function as a means of reversion 
for both author and audience to higher plains of reality. 
This brings us to a question that as yet remains to be answered, namely how 
Proclus’ reading of the two parts of the prooemium can be reconciled. In chapter 
III we have seen that from the interpretation of the prooemium minus Tim. 29b3-
                                               
334 In Tim. I 10.21; cf. 3.14, 7.5. Cf. Cleary (2006: 136). 
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d3 philosophy of nature emerges as a science.335 The description of accounts of 
Becoming in the second part of the prooemium, Tim. 29b3-d3, at first sight seems 
to be at odds with this claim. It has been argued that the sense in which 
φυσιολογία is a likely account in Proclus’ reading is irreconcilable with its scientific 
status and in general with Proclus’ interpretation of the entire rest of the 
dialogue.336 This claim, however, has been shown to rest on a faulty assumption, 
namely that in Proclus’ view science and likely account are diametrically opposed. 
The assumption that science and likely account are opposed can be refuted on the 
basis of our analysis of Proclus’ interpretation of Tim. 29b3-d3. In the foregoing it 
has been shown that Proclus takes the account of philosophy of nature as 
presented in the Timaeus to be a combination of (relative) truth and belief, i.e. of 
scientific knowledge and likely story, in the sense that, where it presents the 
intelligible in a unitary manner, as well as certain conclusions concerning the 
universe, it expresses the truth which is attainable for us humans. This truth is 
equated with scientific knowledge. When treating the intelligible discursively, and 
even more when treating the heavenly bodies and the sublunary realm, Timaeus’ 
exposition expresses the likely story, or belief. This belief is not, however, the 
opposite of truth in any way, but something related to and positively resembling 
truth, namely a lower, but still rational form of cognition (πίστις). We can 
conclude, then, that the facts of φυσιολογία at times are, and at times are like, 
scientific knowledge. 
What does that tell us about the status of the starting points introduced in the first 
part of the prooemium? As said above (V.2), the location of the principle of the 
εἰκώς λόγος at the end of the prooemium has been used to argue for the limitation 
of its application to what comes after the prooemium, and thus safeguarding the 
starting points themselves. Proclus, however, has a different view. He does feel 
that he has to explain why the principle of discourse and its application, which 
inform us on the status of Timaeus’ account, had not been introduced at the 
beginning of that account. His answer, though, is that the question what kind of 
λόγοι fit perceptible things is necessarily brought up after the demonstration that 
the universe is generated, but not before, when we did not know the nature of the 
universe yet.337 In other words, there was no point in presenting it earlier, as the 
application of the general principle that texts are related to their subject matter to 
the particular case of the natural world could not have been given before, 
                                               
335 The status of the starting points within the likely story is one of the issues in the modern 
debate on the Timaeus. See above V.2.  
336 Lernould (2005: 160). In his earlier work Lernould argues that the starting points are not 
subject to the principle of the likely story. Lernould (2001: 293-4, 296-7). 
337 In Tim. I 339.29-340.1  
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although the general principle itself could have been introduced at the beginning of 
the exposition.338 The location of the principle of discourse at the end of the 
prooemium, then, for Proclus need not have implications regarding its application 
thereof – or not – to the starting points.  
Of course we can decide in this matter by assessing the content of the principle. 
Since Proclus identifies the introduction of axioms concerning the intelligible as 
scientific knowledge, and explicitly includes the conclusion of the first 
demonstration, ‘γέγονεν’, among Timaeus’ reversions to the truth of intellect, I 
propose that Proclus considers the axioms presented in the prooemium, as well as 
the conclusions of the demonstrations, to be elements of truth, whereas the 
elaborations of the demonstrations, e.g. into their premises, are elements of the 
‘likely story’.  
Apart from the relation between philosophy of nature as a science and as a likely 
story,  another relation needs to be clarified: that between philosophy of nature as 
a hypothetical science starting from sensory data (as argued in chapter III) and as 
the presentation of intuitive knowledge. The question can be answered simply by 
pointing to the difference between order of discovery and order of presentation. 
The intuitive knowledge Timaeus presents is the final stage, the ἀκρότατον θεωρίας 
τέλος (In Tim. 221.1), of his own epistemological journey, that originally started 
from sensory data. When teaching his interlocutors, Timaeus shows them the path 
he himself followed, in order that they discover their own innate knowledge.339 
Thus the account starts from intuitive knowledge in the sense that that is what 
comes first ‘by nature’ (τῇ φύσει), as well as in the order of presentation. The 
process of acquiring knowledge of the natural world and its transcendent causes, 
however, has its primary source in the senses, which is first ‘to us’ (πρὸς ἡμᾶς).340 
 
 
                                               
338 Proclus is right that the addition of the general principle of Tim. 29b4-5 would have seemed 
out of place at, say, Tim. 28b2 (after the introduction of the paradigmatic cause). 
339 Cf. O'Meara (1989: 152-5 and n. 34), referring to In Alc.  225.4-226.7, 277.10-278.13, 280.2-
281.14. 
340 On the distinction beteen what is better known to us and what is better known by nature see 
Arist. APo I 71b33 ff. 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
VI.1 Introduction 
 
In Proclus’ interpretation, the Timaeus is both a hymn to the Demiurge and a scientific 
work of philosophy of nature. In this dissertation we set out to analyze Proclus’ 
philosophy of nature and its methods as described and applied in the Commentary on the 
Timaeus, and to show how hymn and science come together. We have seen that 
Proclus’ notion of φύσις is primarily that of a transitional hypostasis connecting the 
intelligible with the sensible, and from a broader perspective that of a chain of natures, 
from its transcendent cause to individual natures. Mirroring nature itself, philosophy of 
nature consists in a number of hierarchically and serially ordered kinds of φυσιολογία, 
namely theological φυσιολογία, which analyzes the universe into its transcendent 
causes, mathematical φυσιολογία, which through reasoning by ἀναλογία, using 
ontological images, leads to insight in body and soul of the universe, empirical 
φυσιολογία, which concerns the phenomena in the sky, and biological φυσιολογία, 
treating of the informed living body. Each of these subdisciplines has its proper 
methods and/or limitations. Finally, we have seen that the didactic account given of 
philosophy of nature uses a combination of resemblance and assimilation, or the 
natural similarity between discourse and subject matter, and the additional similarity 
established by the speaker. As a consequence of resemblance and assimilation, the 
account of the Timaeus can initiate an ascent to its subject matter, and especially to the 
demiurge as efficient cause of the natural world.  
Let us review the main findings of the preceding chapters.  
 
VI.2 Chapter II: Nature 
 
Proclus’ φύσις is a complex stratum of reality, in which the necessary connection with 
material bodies seems to conflict with the transcendence of real causes. This conflict 
has been shown to be apparent: Nature is immanent in the sense that it is inextricably 
connected with bodies, yet it has an ontological transcendence in the sense that it is 
causally prior to that in which it inheres. Primary Nature is universal insofar as it is the 
nature of ‘the all’, of all things that have a nature taken together, without thereby being 
separated from those things. This universal nature has thus been shown to fulfil a 
crucial metaphysical function, next to soul, as a transitional quasi-hypostasis, and the 
lowest link between the transcendent and the immanent. 
Combining Platonic, Aristotelian and Plotinian material, Proclus sketches a nature that 
is very similar to soul, yet distinct from it, in order to explain the presence of unity and 
motion in bodies that are not animated by soul.  
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Moreover, by regarding nature as a tool of the transcendent efficient cause, the 
Demiurge, Proclus solves two problems: first of all, the problem of the immanent 
efficiency of a transcendent cause is solved by giving the transcendent cause an 
immanent tool which informs the sensible world. Secondly, the problem of the 
rationality of nature is solved by demonstrating that nature is dependent on and 
connected with its demiurgic origin.   
In order to obtain this original and sophisticated notion of nature, Proclus has to 
adjust his metaphysics and to allow for a hypostasis that does not have an 
imparticipable monad, but instead has a participated monad, universal nature, or the 
nature of the universe, and an imparticipable origin, the Demiurge and before him 
Rhea/Hecate, the primordial source of nature. Thus we obtain a chain of natures, from 
its transcendent source – which is not itself nature – in Rhea/Hecate, through the 
paradigmatic nature in the Demiurge, primary nature which is the nature of the 
universe, the natures of different heavenly spheres, to the lowest, individual natures.   
This vertically ordered ontological structure of natures has far-reaching consequences 
for philosophy of nature as studying the chain as a whole. Rather than being limited to 
one stratum of reality, or one scientific genus in the Aristotelian sense, Proclean 
philosophy of nature studies the chain of nature at all its levels, starting from its 
summit in the Demiurge, and reaching down all the way to the individual natures. The 
different ontological levels require different approaches and have different limitations. 
 
 
VI.3 Chapter III: Theological philosophy of nature 
 
At its summit, philosophy of nature studies the natural world in order to obtain 
knowledge of its transcendent causes. At this level, it can be called theological or 
dialectical philosophy of nature. That does not imply, however, that philosophy of 
nature at this levels turns into theology pure and simple. The proper subject matter of 
the discipline is and remains the natural world, which imposes certain limitations on it, 
e.g. that it will never be a study of the transcendent per se, but always insofar as it is the 
cause of the natural world.  
An important characteristic of this theological philosophy of nature in Proclus’ 
Commentary on the Timaeus is the repeated comparison of Plato’s method with the 
method of a geometer. One of the main functions of that comparison is to provide 
philosophy of nature with a scientific status, by showing how philosophy of nature 
deals with starting points (definitions, axioms, hypotheses, and demonstrations) and 
applies all the dialectical methods, division, definition, demonstration and analysis, as 
well as some geometrical practices, namely the assumption of hypotheses and 
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conversion. These terms are often used in a sense that is not strictly technical, but 
adapted to the context.  
The starting points of philosophy of nature are in part a priori and in part a posteriori. 
The metaphysical principles used in the demonstrations of philosophy of nature are so-
called common notions, which are taken to be self-evident and serve as premises in the 
demonstrations. On the other hand, the ultimate foundation of philosophy of nature, 
like that of geometry, remains hypothetical due to the assumption of the genus of 
Being. Moreover, the nature of the universe as belonging to the realm of Becoming is 
determined – and can only be determined – on the basis of empirical evidence. The 
combination of these two forms of knowledge, science and perception, is possible due 
to Proclus’ ingenious adaptation of the notion of δόξα as mediating between 
perception and thought. Thereby, the scientific status of philosophy of nature – albeit 
one appropriate to the natural world – is guaranteed.  
A second aim of the comparison of Plato’s method with that of geometry is to enable 
through the starting points a conceptual analysis of the world of sense perception, 
revealing its transcendent efficient cause, the Demiurge, as well as the paradigmatic 
cause and the final cause, but the latter two especially insofar as they are present in the 
Demiurgic mind, as the model he uses and his aim respectively. This delivery of causes 
is taken to be the distinguishing characteristic of Platonic philosophy of nature.  
Finally, we have seen that in the prooemium the order of exposition knows two 
phases, namely a didactic/anagogic one, leading the audience to knowledge of the causes, 
and a subsequent natural order of exposition, i.e. following the ontological structure of 
the subject matter.  
 
 
VI.4 Chapter IV: Mathematical, empirical, biological philosophy of nature 
 
After the second book of the commentary, the notion of philosophy of nature changes 
in each following book, following the change of subject matter.  
When the body and soul of the universe are discussed in book III, Proclus assumes a 
notion of intermediate, mathematical φυσιολογία according to which mathematical 
explanations are instrumental to philosophy of nature, but need at all times be 
supplemented with a truly physical explanation. That is, we do not find 
mathematization in Proclus in the modern sense of the reduction of physical 
phenomena to quantitative relations. As in the case of theological philosophy of 
nature, Proclus combines the continuity of reality and the consequent treatment of 
different strata of reality within one science, by a strict safeguarding of the particular 
mode of explanation suitable to the part of reality that is the actual focus of the 
discipline in question.  
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Mathematical φυσιολογία is intermediate in the sense that it is ranked between 
theological and lower philosophy of nature, but also insofar as it takes an intermediate 
position on the methodological role of mathematics for the study of the natural world. 
Mathematical φυσιολογία neither ignores it by focusing only on the objects of sense 
perception nor does it take the mathematics in question as an object of study in its own 
right.  
The role of mathematics in philosophy of nature is that of allowing reasoning by 
ἀναλογία, more specifically by ontological ἀναλογία. Ontological ἀναλογία is a strong 
version of ἀναλογία which consists in similarities among realms of reality that are due 
not to chance, but to a necessary ontological relation between cause and effect.  
The way in which mathematics is involved in the reasoning using this ontological 
relation depends on the level of reality to which it pertains. In the case of the body of 
the world, mathematics has the position of cause, and the body of the world that of 
effect. The mathematical λόγοι of Soul cause certain structural aspects of the world 
body, namely unity or cohesion, its order, and regularity. When studying those aspects 
of the physical world, starting from mathematics provides the student with a more 
accessible ‘image’ of the structures of reality, or rather the paradigm: the mathematical 
causes that lies at its source, but also at the source of the structure of the human mind, 
thereby functioning as a didactic tool.  
When it comes to the world soul, we find the inverse relation, since Soul is itself the 
cause of mathematics. Thus mathematics as such, in the shape of its projections in the 
material world that are in a sense abstracted from it by us, serves as an anagogic tool, 
providing an ascent to and insight in its cause, the world soul.  
Both these versions of ‘mathematization’ ultimately serve the same purpose, namely 
that of acquiring knowledge of the transcendent causes of certain structural properties 
of the universe.  
 
In books IV and V, which treat of the heavenly bodies and the lower gods, and human 
body and soul respectively, we find lower philosophy of nature, which at first sight 
seems to fulfil only the function of justifying certain omissions on Plato’s part. Their 
correspondence to aspects of Proclean φύσις, however, tells us that they should be 
taken as distinct aspects of Proclus’ notion of philosophy of nature. In book IV, 
philosophy of nature is treated as an empirical discipline, which should not treat that 
for which it has no sensory evidence. And in book V philosophy of nature is biology, a 
discipline which treats of the soul not from an ethical point of view, or with respect to 
its afterlife, but only insofar as it is embodied.  
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VI.5 Chapter V: The likely story  
 
All human discourse is an imitation of its subject. That is the main message Proclus’ 
highlights in his commentary on the last section of the prooemium, Timaeus’ 
formulation of the so-called εἰκὼς λόγος. I have argued that, rather than emphasize the 
relative unreliability of an account about the physical world, Proclus focuses on the 
mimetic qualities of discourse and its function in our epistemological development.  
Important notions in my reading of his treatment of the εἰκὼς λόγος are ontological 
continuity, resemblance, and assimilation.  
I also argued that for Proclus also in the context of the account of φυσιολογία 
ontological continuity is a crucial feature of reality, which explains why the study of the 
natural world is in a sense theology and why the account of philosophy of nature is a 
combination of truth and belief (where the latter is a lower kind of truth), or of science 
and something closely resembling science.   
The ontological continuity lies at the source of the two aspects of all accounts, and also 
the account of philosophy of nature, resemblance and assimilation. Just as the cosmos 
is a natural image of, in the sense of an emanation from the intelligible, accounts are 
ontological images of their subject matter. Every account has a natural resemblance to 
its subject that is due to the emanation of accounts (λόγοι) from transcendent λόγοι. As 
such, it is capable of conveying truth.  
Moreover, in the practice of discourse the author or speaker adds an element of 
assimilation, by increasing the similarity between discourse and subject matter with the 
use of certain formal and semantic tools. As a result, discourse itself becomes a 
reversion to its subject matter and a means of reversion to the intelligible for both 
reader and audience.   
In the case of the Timaeus, the speaker’s construal of his exposition as starting from 
principles setting out the divine causes of the universe, and subsequently unfolding the 
universe as it emanates from those divine causes, provides an ascent to the Demiurge 
as the primary intelligible cause of the universe.  
Of course, when the soul is united with the intelligible once she “gets beyond the 
threshold of the demiurge,” and “is dining with him on the truth of being,” she realizes 
that “scientific discussions (ἐπιστημονικοὶ λόγοι) are mere words (μῦθοι).”1 
 
Leiden, October 2007  
Marije Martijn 
 
                                               
1 In Tim. I 302.5-6 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
PROCLUS OVER DE NATUUR 
NATUURFILOSOFIE EN HAAR METHODEN IN PROCLUS’ COMMENTAAR OP 
PLATO’S TIMAEUS 
 
“Werkelijke natuurfilosofie moet afhankelijk zijn van theologie, net als de natuur 
afhangt van de goden en onderverdeeld is volgens al hun klassen, opdat ook de 
verklaringen nabootsers zijn van de dingen die ze betekenen...”1 
 
Dit is de kortst mogelijke samenvatting van de voorliggende dissertatie, gevat in de 
woorden van de 5e eeuws diadochus Proclus: mijn dissertatie is een bespreking van 
Proclus’ natuurfilosofie, de verschillende soorten natuur en hun goddelijke oorzaken, 
de verschillende soorten natuurfilosofie en de verhouding van de natuurfilosofie tot de 
theologie, en tenslotte de schriftelijke weerslag van de bevindingen en verklaringen van 
de natuurfilosofie. 
Proclus’ natuurfilosofie is voornamelijk te vinden in zijn Commentaar op de Timaeus, en 
voor zijn beschouwingen over aard en methode van de natuurfilosofie moeten we in 
het bijzonder te rade bij zijn interpretatie van het zogenaamde prooemium, Plato’s 
uiteenzetting van de beginselen van de natuurfilosofie. In Proclus’ interpretatie is de 
Timaeus zowel een hymne aan de Demiurg als een wetenschappelijk werk in de 
natuurfilosofie. Het doel van mijn dissertatie is middels een analyse van Proclus’ 
natuurfilosofie en haar methoden, zoals beschreven en toegepast in het Commentaar op 
de Timaeus, te tonen hoe hymne en wetenschap bijeenkomen.  
 
Dit zijn de resultaten van de analyse in een notedop: 
Ik laat zien dat Proclus’ notie van natuur (φύσις) primair die van een 
overgangshypostase is die het intelligibile met het waarneembare verbindt, en in een 
breder perspectief één van een keten van ‘naturen’, van de transcendente oorzaak van 
de natuur tot individuele naturen.  
Net als φύσις bestaat ook de natuurfilosofie uit een aantal hiërarchisch en serieel 
geordende soorten φυσιολογία, namelijk theologische natuurfilosofie, die het universum 
herleidt tot zijn transcendente oorzaken, mathematische natuurfilosofie, die door 
analogisch redeneren en met gebruik van ontologische beelden leidt tot inzicht in het 
lichaam en de ziel van het universum, empirische natuurfilosofie, die zich bezighoudt 
met de hemelfenomenen, en biologische natuurfilosofie, die het gevormde en bezielde 
                                               
1 In Tim. I 204.8-12.  
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lichaam behandelt. Elk van deze subdisciplines heeft haar eigen methodes en/of 
beperkingen.  
Tenslotte laat ik zien dat volgens Proclus het relaas waarvan de natuurfilosofie gebruik 
maakt een didactische en anagogische functie kan hebben dankzij een combinatie van 
gelijkenis en assimilatie, oftewel van de natuurlijk overeenkomst tussen discours en 
subject enerzijds, en de toegevoegde overeenkomst die door de spreker bewerkstelligd 
wordt anderzijds. Als gevolg van die gelijkenis en assimilatie kan het relaas van de 
Timaeus een aanzet geven tot een opklimmen naar het eigenlijke subject van de 
natuurfilosofie, en vooral naar de Demiurg als efficiënte oorzaak van de natuurlijk 
wereld. 
 
Hieronder zal ik de voornaamste vindingen van de afzonderlijke hoofdstukken van het 
proefschrift in meer detail uiteenzetten.  
 
Hoofdstuk I 
In het inleidende hoofdstuk wordt duidelijk dat voor Proclus de Timaeus van Plato een 
hymne aan de Demiurg is in de zin van een lofrede op de voornaamste oorzaak van de 
natuurlijke wereld, de Demiurg. Die lofrede heeft de vorm van een presentatie van 
wetenschappelijke kennis van de natuurlijke wereld voor zover verklaard vanuit die 
oorzaak. Natuurfilosofie is dus voor Proclus een soort metafysica oftewel theologie, 
maar zeker geen metafysica ἁπλῶς. Ik ga met deze stelling in tegen het werk van 
Lernould, dat een waardevolle bijdrage levert aan de nog zeer lacuneuze discussie over 
Proclus’ natuurfilosofie, maar voorbijgaat aan een cruciaal aspect van Proclus’ denken: 
continuïteit. De notie van continuïteit ligt aan de basis van de metafysica en 
epistemologie van onze filosoof, en zijn opvatting van natuurfilosofie als wetenschap 
kan niet begrepen worden dan aan de hand van die notie van continuïteit. 
 
Hoofdstuk II 
Proclus’ φύσις is een complexe laag van de werkelijkheid, waarin de noodzakelijke 
verbinding met het materiële lichaam lijkt te conflicteren met de transcendentie van 
echte oorzaken. Dit conflict blijkt echter slechts schijn te zijn. Natuur is immanent in 
de zin dat het onlosmakelijk verbonden is met lichamen, maar het heeft een 
ontologische transcendentie in de zin dat het causaal voorafgaat aan dat waarin het 
werkzaam is. Natuur in primaire zin is universeel inzoverre het de natuur van ‘het al’ is, 
i.e. van alle dingen die een natuur hebben bijeengenomen, maar niet gescheiden van die 
dingen. Deze universele natuur vervult een cruciale metafysische functie, naast ziel, als 
een overgangs-‘hypostase’ en de laatste schakel tussen het transcendente en het 
immanente.  
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Door Platoons, Aristotelisch en Plotiniaans materiaal te combineren schetst Proclus 
een natuur die in grote mate lijkt op de hypostase Ziel, maar daarvan onderscheiden is 
om de aanwezigheid te verklaren van eenheid en beweging in lichamen die niet door 
ziel geanimeerd zijn.  
Door bovendien natuur als een instrument van de transcendente efficiënte oorzaak, de 
Demiurg, te beschouwen, lost Proclus twee problemen op. Ten eerste wordt het 
probleem van de immanente werking van een transcendente oorzaak opgelost door die 
transcendente oorzaak een immanent gereedschap te geven dat de waarneembare 
wereld vormt. Ten tweede wordt het probleem van de rationaliteit van de natuur 
opgelost door aan te tonen dat die natuur afhangt van en verbonden is met haar 
demiurgische oorsprong.  
Om deze originele, complexe en subtiele notie van natuur te verkrijgen moet Proclus 
zijn metafysica aanpassen en een hypostase toelaten die geen on-participeerbare 
monade kent, maar een geparticipeerde monade, namelijk universele natuur, of de 
natuur van het universum, en een on-participeerbare origine, namelijk de Demiurg en 
nog daarvoor Rhea/Hecate, de uiteindelijke bron van de natuur. Dit resulteert in een 
keten van naturen, van de transcendente oorzaak – die zelf geen natuur is – in 
Rhea/Hecate, via de paradigmatische natuur in de Demiurg, natuur in primaire zin die 
de natuur van het universum is en de naturen van de verschillende hemelse sferen, tot 
de laagste individuele naturen. 
Deze verticaal geordende ontologische structuur van naturen heeft verreikende 
consequenties voor de natuurfilosofie als de studie van die keten in zijn geheel. 
Proclus’ natuurfilosofie is niet zozeer beperkt tot één laag van de werkelijkheid, of tot 
één wetenschappelijk genus in Aristotelische zin, maar bestudeert alle niveaus van de 
keten van naturen, van de top in de Demiurg tot aan de individuele naturen. Die 
verschillende ontologische niveaus vereisen verschillende benaderingswijzen en kennen 
verschillende beperkingen.   
 
Hoofdstuk III 
In hoofdstuk III wordt de hoogste vorm van natuurfilosofie besproken: natuurfilosofie 
die de natuurlijke wereld bestudeert om kennis te verkrijgen van haar transcendente 
oorzaken. Deze vorm kan theologische of dialectische natuurfilosofie genoemd 
worden. Dat wil echter niet zeggen dat natuurfilosofie op dit niveau theologie ἁπλῶς 
wordt. De eigen materie van de discipline is en blijft de natuurlijke wereld en dat alleen 
al leidt tot zekere beperkingen, met name dat ze nooit een studie van het transcendente 
per se zal zijn, maar altijd van het transcendente qua oorzaak van de natuurlijke wereld. 
Een belangrijk kenmerk van deze theologische natuurfilosofie in Proclus’ Commentaar 
op de Timaeus is de herhaaldelijk terugkerende vergelijking van Plato’s werkwijze met die 
van een meetkundige. Eén van de voornaamste functies van die vergelijking is de 
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natuurfilosofie te verzekeren van een wetenschappelijke status, door te tonen dat 
natuurfilosofie gebruik maakt van principes (definities, axioma’s, hypotheses en 
bewijsvoeringen) en meetkundige procedures, namelijk definiëren met existentie-claim 
en converteren van theoremata. Overigens worden de technische termen vaak gebruikt 
in een niet strict technische zin, maar aangepast aan de context.  
In dit hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat de natuurfilosofie principes heeft die deels a priori zijn 
en deels a posteriori. De metafysische principes die gebruikt worden in de 
bewijsvoeringen van de natuurfilosofie zijn de zogenaamde κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι (iets als 
‘gedeelde noties’), die zelf-evident zijn en dienen als premissen voor de 
bewijsvoeringen. Aan de andere kant blijft de uiteindelijke fundering van de 
natuurfilosofie, net als die van de meetkunde, hypothetisch omdat het bestaan van het 
genus van het Zijn aangenomen wordt. Bovendien wordt de essentie van het 
universum als behorende tot het domein van het Worden bepaald – en kan zij ook 
alleen bepaald worden – op basis van empirisch bewijs. De combinatie van deze twee 
soorten kennis, wetenschap en perceptie, is mogelijk dankzij Proclus’ ingenieuze 
aanpassing van de notie van δόξα tot een bemiddelaar tussen perceptie en denken. 
Daarmee is de wetenschappelijke status van de natuurfilosofie verzekerd, en bovendien 
op een wijze die toepasselijk is voor de natuurlijke wereld.  
Een tweede doel van de vergelijking van Plato’s werkwijze met die van een 
meetkundige is om door middel van de principes een conceptuele analyse van de 
waarneembare wereld te bewerkstelligen, die haar transcendente oorzaken onthult: de 
Demiurg, maar ook de paradigmatische en de doeloorzaak, tenminste voor zover zij 
aanwezig zijn in de demiurgische geest, als respectievelijk het model dat hij gebruikt en 
het doel van zijn streven. Dit onthullen van de werkelijke oorzaken van de natuurlijke 
wereld is voor Proclus het onderscheidende kenmerk van de Platoonse natuurfilosofie.  
Tenslotte laat ik zien dat Proclus in het prooemium, de kerntekst voor dit deel van het 
proefschrift, twee fasen van uiteenzetting onderscheidt, namelijk de hierboven 
beschreven didactisch/anagogische analyse, die het publiek meevoert naar kennis van 
de oorzaken, en vervolgens een uiteenzetting in natuurlijke volgorde, dat wil zeggen die 
de ontologische structuur van het onderwerp weerspiegelt. 
 
Hoofdstuk IV 
Na het tweede boek van het commentaar, waarin het prooemium besproken wordt, 
verandert de notie van natuurfilosofie met elk volgend boek, in overeenstemming met 
een verandering van onderwerp. In het vierde hoofdstuk bespreek ik die andere noties 
– dat wil zeggen anders dan de theologisch/dialectische – van Proclus’ natuurfilosofie.  
Als Proclus in boek III van zijn commentaar het lichaam en de ziel van het universum 
bespreekt, hanteert hij een notie van een intermediaire, wiskundige natuurfilosofie 
volgens dewelke wiskundige verklaringen instrumenteel zijn in de natuurfilosofie, maar 
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te allen tijde voorzien moeten worden van een werkelijk fysische verklaring. Dat wil 
zeggen, in Proclus vinden we geen mathematisering in de moderne zin van een reductie 
van natuurlijke verschijnselen tot kwantitatieve relaties. Zoals in het geval van de 
theologische natuurfilosofie combineert Proclus de continuïteit van de werkelijkheid en 
de daaruit volgende behandeling van verschillende strata van de werkelijkheid binnen 
één wetenschap, door uitsluitend die wijze van verklaren te hanteren die van toepassing 
is op het deel van de werkelijkheid dat daadwerkelijk op een bepaald moment centraal 
staat in de betreffende discipline.  
Wiskundige φυσιολογία is intermediair in de zin dat het in de rangorde tussen 
theologische en lagere natuurfilosofie staat, maar ook voor zover het uitgaat van een 
tussenpositie ten aanzien van de methodologische rol van de wiskunde in de studie van 
de natuurlijke wereld. Wiskundige φυσιολογία moet de wiskunde noch negeren door 
zich alleen op de voorwerpen van de waarneming te richten, noch de betreffende 
wiskunde als studie-object per se beschouwen.  
De rol van de wiskunde in de natuurfilosofie is die van de analogie-redenering, en meer 
specifiek door middel van ontologische analogie. Ontologische analogie is de term die 
ik gebruik om een sterke versie van analogie aan te duiden die bestaat in 
overeenkomsten tussen domeinen van de werkelijkheid, die niet slechts door toeval 
bestaan, of in onze ogen, maar dankzij een noodzakelijke ontologische relatie tussen 
oorzaak en gevolg.  
De wijze waarop de wiskunde functioneel is in het redeneren dat gebruik maakt van 
deze ontologische relatie hangt af van het niveau van de werkelijkheid waarop het 
betrekking heeft. In het geval van het lichaam van de wereld heeft de wiskunde de 
plaats van de oorzaak en het lichaam dat van effect. Met betrekking tot de wereldziel, 
aan de andere kant, is er sprake van een inverse relatie, aangezien Ziel zelf de oorzaak 
van de wiskunde is. Beide versies van ‘mathematiseren’ hebben uiteindelijk hetzelfde 
doel, namelijk kennis te verwerven van de transcendente oorzaken van bepaalde 
structurele eigenschappen van het universum.  
 
In de boeken IV en V, die respectievelijk de hemellichamen en lagere goden en het 
menselijke lichaam en de menselijke ziel behandelen, vinden we lagere soorten 
natuurfilosofie. Deze lagere soorten natuurfilosofie lijken in eerste instantie niet meer 
te zijn dan een lapmiddel om veronderstelde omissies van Plato weg te verklaren, maar 
omdat er sprake is van een correspondentie tussen deze soorten natuurfilosofie en 
aspecten van φύσις die in het tweede hoofdstuk besproken zijn, kunnen ze beschouwd 
worden als werkelijk onderscheiden niveaus. 
In boek IV wordt de natuurfilosofie behandeld als een empirische discipline die zich 
alleen bezig zou moeten houden met dat waarvoor zintuiglijk bewijs is. En in boek V, 
tenslotte, wordt de natuurfilosofie biologie, een discipline die de ziel behandelt, niet 
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vanuit een ethisch perspectief, of met aandacht voor het hiernamaals, maar alleen voor 
zover de ziel belichaamd is.  
 
Hoofdstuk V 
In hoofstuk V tenslotte laat ik zien hoe het voorgaande een reflectie vindt in het 
verslag van de natuurfilosofie.  
Elk menselijk discours is een imitatie van haar onderwerp. Dat is de voornaamste 
boodschap die Proclus wil overbrengen in zijn commentaar op het laatste deel van het 
prooemium, Timaeus’ formulering van de zogenaamde εἰκὼς λόγος. Ik verdedig de 
stelling dat Proclus hiermee niet zozeer de relatieve onbetrouwbaarheid van een 
uiteenzetting over de natuurlijke wereld benadrukt, maar zich veeleer concentreert op 
de mimetische kwaliteiten van discours en de functie ervan in onze epistemologische 
ontwikkeling. Belangrijke noties in mijn lezing van zijn behandeling van de εἰκὼς λόγος 
zijn die van ontologische continuïteit, gelijkenis en assimilatie.  
Ik stel dat voor Proclus ook in de context van het verslag van de natuurfilosofie 
ontologische continuïteit een cruciaal kenmerk van de werkelijkheid is, dat verklaart 
waarom het verslag van de natuurfilosofie een combinatie is van waarheid en geloof (in 
de zin van een lager soort waarheid), of van wetenschap en iets dat daarop lijkt.  
De ontologische continuïteit ligt aan de bron van twee aspecten van alle discours, 
namelijk gelijkenis en assimilatie. Net zoals de kosmos een natuurlijke afbeelding is van 
het intelligibile, in de zin van een emanatie daaruit, zo is discours een ontologische 
afbeelding van het onderwerp. Elk verslag gelijkt van nature op zijn onderwerp dankzij 
de emanatie van discours (λόγοι) uit transcendente principes (ook λόγοι). Dit is 
waarom discours de waarheid kan overbrengen.  
Daarnaast voegt de auteur of spreker in de praktijk van het discours een element van 
assimilatie toe, door de gelijkheid tussen discours en onderwerp te vergroten middels 
bepaalde formele en semantische instrumenten. Als gevolg hiervan wordt het discours 
zelf een reversie naar het onderwerp en een middel tot reversie naar het intelligibile 
voor lezer en publiek.  
In het geval van de Timaeus hebben we te maken met de constructie van het verslag van 
de natuurfilosofie als een uiteenzetting van transcendente oorzaken vanuit principes, en 
het daaropvolgende ontvouwen van het universum zoals het emaneert uit die 
transcendente oorzaken, die tezamen een opklimmen bemogelijken tot aan de Demiurg 
als de eerste intelligibile oorzaak van het universum. 
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